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ABSTRACT 
An Analysis of Bahrain's Reform Process, 1999-2005: Elite Driven Reform, 
Developmental Challenges, and Strategic Opportunities 
Waheed AI Qassim 
This study offers the first detailed analysis on the social, economic, and political elite 
driven reforms undertaken in the Kingdom of Bahrain by King Hamad Bin Isa AI 
Khalifa in the significant timeframe of 1999-2005. This era has witnessed the most 
fundamental changes in the country since the historic situation of 1973-75. Therefore, 
in accordance with the thesis ' objectives, an original contribution is offered firstly 
through the detailed and micro level examination and analysis of the character of the 
reforms. Such analysis is largely absent from any scholarship on this topic. Secondly, it 
provides a comprehensive identification of the obstacles and challenges facing the 
implementation of future reforms and changes. The thesis focuses on a variety of 
differential factors within broad social , economic, political , and human rights spectrums. 
It provides an identification of policy relevant initiatives which would likely counter the 
obstacles to future reform. Here it is suffice to say that current policy relevant 
scholarship and indeed government practice may indicate that strategic vision exists but 
fails to appreciate that on a broad level there is an acute lack of detailed policy planning. 
This study shows how the lack of bureaucratic project management and analysis, at a 
bureaucratic agency level, on new initiatives is the overarching factor, which inhibits the 
successful advancement of reform for the future. Furthermore, attention is given to 
particular localised initiatives that also need to be undertaken. 
Finally, and most importantly, this thesis offers a new interpretation through a pragmatic 
analysis of this era of reform. Indeed, it offers a comprehensive understanding and 
meaning to the reforms and changes in Bahrain for scholarship in this field. Moreover, 
it builds on the existing body of scholarship on GCC states politics in particular and the 
Arab region in general , by showing the uniqueness of Bahrain and ultimately the need 
for a country specific solution to its existing barriers to future success. 
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1.0 PREAMBLE 
Bahrain has existed for over two hundred years in a state ruled by hereditary 
monarchy base. Bahrain's history shows that the last period in which political 
reform took place was from 1973-75. In 1999, Bahrain has entered into a new era 
following the onset of King Hamad bin Isa AI Khalifa's reign. The changes that 
have been undertaken underline that a marked departure from the social and political 
order of the past has taken place. It is necessary to end this abnormal situation by 
bringing the country back to normalcy. While these reforms activities have helped 
restore political calm, more needs to be done to fully achieve King Hamad's 
liberalisation programme. 
Despite its small size, the structure of Bahraini society is clearly very complex, 
particularly with regard to the Shia and Sunni split. It is clear that an integration of 
interests must now lead the establishment of a pluralistic political system; a new 
long-required sense of social agreement. 
Some observers have regarded Bahrain as the democratic hope of the Arab World 
after King Hamad succession of the throne in March I999. Its progress toward 
liberalisation is being driven by economic stagnation, societal fragmentation and a 
history of political unrest. Therefore, its experiment with liberalisation will not be 
easily replicated by other Arab countries and especially the other Gulf States' 
reforms. 
Bahrain's liberalisation programme might be different than other Arab countries 
because the reform submitted some constitutional restrictions on the ruler's power, 
to the will of the people in free, fair, and regular elections, and to term limits. 
Although these restrictions of power are limited but it is enough as a first step. King 
Hamad started his programme by assigning himself as head of state of a 
constitutional hereditary monarchy and new bicameral parliament where most 
strategic decisions are taken and approved by them. He established the foundation 
of the liberalisation programme to enhance the Kingdom to advance ahead. 
II 
Essential steps such as parliamentary elections, municipal elections, women having 
the right to vote and stand for election, constitutional court, political societies, 
allowing peaceful demonstrations, transparencies, champion Human Rights issues, 
free media, free speech, citizenship for many non national residents, and many other 
that encourage people to contribute in the reform process. A Bahrain political 
opening after years of autocracy is different than the limited political opening of 
Qatar on replacing its 35-member Consultative Council in 2003. Other monarchies 
like Saudi Arabia and Morocco also having very limited liberalisation agenda. 
Moreover, several Arab countries started with limited power to legislations. Most of 
Arab parliaments do not rule where the most logical way to begin liberalising this 
system would be to lower the stakes of the transition by increasing the 
competitiveness of the parliament while initially maintaining executive dominance. 1 
In the Middle East many internal factors are holding the advancement of their 
reforms. Bahrain reform is challenge mainly by the sectarian and poverty dilemmas 
that can be manage with more freedom and equal opportunities for citizens and 
raising the income of the poor where King Hamad is very well aware of in his 
reform process. Some Middle Eastern countries are experiencing political pressures 
unrelated to the threat of terrorism that forced them to face the necessity of change. 
Egypt was moving towards a succession crisis because of President Mubarak's 
advancing age and failure to appoint a vice president. Jordan with more than half of 
its population of Palestinian origin was confronted by widespread anger among its 
citizens because the government was maintaining its peace treaty with Israel while 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were under siege. Algeria is trying to 
reconstruct a political system that could maintain a fragile peace after a civil war 
between government forces and radical Islamist groups.2 
1 Vickie Langohr, "An Exit from Arab Autocracy," Middle East Studies after 9/11, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No.3, July 2002. 
2 Amy Hawthorne, "Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?," Middle East series, 
Carnegie. Endowment for International Peace, No.52, October 2004, p. 8. 
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Bahrain started its reforms with the coming of the younger leader. Bahrain shares 
this factor with other younger leaders that succeeded power almost at the same 
period of time: King Abdulla II in Jordan, King Mohammed VI in Morocco, and 
Bashar AI Assad in Syria. In 1995, a younger leader Amir Hamad AI Thani came to 
power after a palace coup overthrowing his father. A mixture of personal inclination 
to consolidate power and an unwillingness or inability to take on the old guard in 
their respective governments hindered the reform process in Syria and greatly 
constrained it in Jordan. 3 Qatar has sealed its reform to limited changes because of 
the booming wealth. Where, a reformist trend is still alive in Bahrain. 
Most of the political reforms allowed in many Arab countries are piecemeal 
measures that fall into the "modernisation" category. Some government such as in 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia for example have organised national dialogues on reform, 
but participants and topics discussed at such gatherings are tightly controlled. 
Attempts by citizens to ask their governments for change usually met with arrests. 
Notably, the rulers of Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen have made 
general statements in support of reform but have not yet implemented any significant 
measures.4 Bahrain, on the other hand, implemented reform that seeks to change the 
overall structure of the political system that has been frozen since the mid-1970s and 
greatly reduced strife. 
Bahrain's experience is in part an attempt to resolve economic problems and social 
unrest through increased political participation. However, for Saudi Arabia, another 
Gulf state facing demographic and economic challenges, a move toward greater 
openness is unlikely.5 Rulers of Saudi Arabia rest on religious grounds. Their 
interpretation of the Koran rejects the notion of man-made law, and the only 
provision for popular participation in governance is through Shura, a consultative 
mechanism whereby wise and well-informed men are meant to advise the King and 
3 Ibid, p. 10. 
4 Ibid, p.ll. 
5 Middle East Policy Council, "U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf Political liberalization," 
Forums, Policy Brief No. 8, 22 November 2002. 
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transmit to him the views of the populace. Saudi Arabia has a Consultative Council 
that includes a diverse group of elites and often innovative, but does not have much 
direct responsibility for governance. Kuwait, on the other hand, has had its own 
struggles since the establishment of its parliament in 1992. The Kuwaiti parliament 
is active, vocal, and significantly more conservative than the royal family. Oman's 
slow liberalisation process has been tightly controlled by the Sultan. It has a 
bicameral parliament with an elected lower house, but suffrage is limited, political 
parties are outlawed, and the Sultan can invalidate election results. Qatar and UAE 
with their tiny populations and booming wealth made the need for reforms less 
needed than the other GulfStates.6 
The study attempts to show how Bahrainis could deal with the new reform in a 
professional and civilised way. King Hamad's intention is to make the kingdom a 
constitutional hereditary monarchy. The King famously pledged to transform 
Bahrain into a "people's Kingdom" and said Bahrainis "deserve dignified free life 
and the advanced democratic constitutional practice." This is a new challenge for 
all Bahrainis citizens whether they are male or female, old or young, Shia, Sunnis or 
other, they well all be tested in the new arena. The King appears to have succeeded 
in quelling all kind of oppositions- at least for the time being. 
As a consequence of this unexpected reform, several basic questions present 
themselves. Were these reforms by the young King a product of internal forces or 
were they the fruit of Western pressure? Can Bahrain prove wrong and overcome all 
6 See Olivier Da Lage, "The Gulf Monarchies in Transition: Saudi Arabia and the Smaller Gulf 
States: The Vassals Take their Revenge," lO-ll January 2005, at www.ceri-sciences-po-org; Michael 
Herb, "Emirs and Parliaments in the Gulf," Democratisation in the Arab world, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol.l3, No.4, October 2002; James A. Russell, "Political and Economic Transition on 
the Arabian Peninsula: Perils and Prospects," Gultwire Perspectives, 15 May 2003; Middle East and 
Africa, "Bahrain: An Arab Exception," The Economist, 31 July 2004; Adam Garfinkle, "Democracy 
in the Middle East: Is it Possible? Can it be Imposed?," Prospect, April 2003; Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami, "Is the Middle East Democratizing," JSTOR, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 26, No.2, November 1999.Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Reform from Above: the Politics of 
Participation in the Oil Monarchies," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 79, No.I, 
January 2003; Richard N.Haass, "Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World," The 
Washington Quarterly, summer 2003; Daniel Neep, "Dilemmas of Democratization in the Middle 
East: TheForward Strategy of Freedom," RUSI newsbrief, Vol.23, No.l2, December 2003. 
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pessimistic strategists and observers m the world who believe that Islam and 
democracy maybe incompatible, and oil and democracy are certainly unable to 
coexist? Can we presume that Bahrain transition is no different than those of many 
Arab countries that tried reforming democracy and held back? 
Understanding the origins and nature of these new reforms is not on ly important for 
academic scholarship given the lack of in-depth studies undertaken on this important 
topic, but also for policymakers and the decision-making elite. Only through a 
detailed critical analysis of these initiatives can an identification of challenges and 
policy opportunities be identified. 
When examining the nature of the reforms undertaken in Bahrain from 1999-2005, it 
becomes clear that they have been limited to five broad areas. Figure 1.0 illustrates 
their character. 
Figure 1.0: The Location of Bahrain's Reforms 1999-2005 
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1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The overarching objective of this research is not only to offer an analysis of the 
reforms but also to form a set of recommendations to make the new political reform 
in Bahrain more constructive. Therefore, the research will fulfil the following 
essential objectives: 
• Develop the findings into policy relevant recommendations on key areas that 
could further reform in accordance with the strategic outline unveiled by 
King Hamad. 
• To provide a detailed empirical examination of the character of the reforms 
post-1999 until 2005. 
• Provide an identification of the challenges future reform may encounter. 
• Given what is achieved through the first three objectives, the final purpose 
will be to fulfil a pragmatic interpretivist objective of ascribing new meaning 
and understanding of the reforms undertaken specifically in the socio-
political sphere in Bahrain during the time period 1999-2005. 
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis being to analyse the reforms in Bahrain 1999-2005, the 
following research questions can be identified: 
• What is the nature of the reform process in Bahrain 1999-2005? 
• What factors exist which could conceivably hinder the realisation of King 
Hamad's liberalisation programme? 
• How can these challenges be overcome by the government of Bahrain? 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
Given the objectives and the purpose of this thesis, the key issue here is to identify 
the most suitable methodological approach. A clear issue is that this thesis seeks to 
analyse the reforms conducted in several divergent fields in order to fulfil its' 
objective of analysing the reforms to ascribe meaning, identifying challenges and 
developing recommendations for the way forward. 
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Several methodology theories came in mind but after analysing them there were 
limitations made the author from using them. For example, the modernisation 
theory was one of the theories that could be used here as it is a socio-economic that 
highlights the positive role played by the developed world in modernising and 
facilitating sustainable development in underdeveloped nations.7 Theory of 
modernisation has been subject to some criticism especially for being too 
ethnocentric, one-sided and focused on the Western world and culture. The thesis 
on the other hand, recommends strongly Bahrain to develop their own liberalisation 
programme that coop with their culture and tradition. A key methodological issue 
that should be recognised from the offset is that the analysis has been conducted 
within a short period of time after the reforms were conceived and implemented: this 
places clear restrictions on the suitability of more economic based methodological 
frameworks due to the limited viability of a long term retrospective study. As such, 
it would not be appropriate or feasible to examine the reforms under a singular 
methodological framework as the subject matter is simply too expansive and would 
not necessarily fulfil the qualitative and interpretivist premise of the thesis. 
Therefore the most suitable methodology for this thesis would be for a pragmatic 
approach which seeks to give a new interpretation ofthe reforms in Bahrain through 
a comprehensive deconstruction of the available data. 
As the focus of the thesis is to analyse the nature of the reforms in order to give them 
meaning, the most appropriate methodological approach for achieving this objective 
will be shown to be Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This will form the essence 
of the methodology and will be reinforced with observation, semi-interviews, and 
dialogue with key decision making elites. Therefore, the thesis will firmly adopt a 
qualitative methodology in order to fulfil its objectives. 
7 For better understanding of the theory see Nils Gilman, "Mandarins of the Future: Modernisation 
Theory in Cold War America," Johns Hopkins University Press, ISBN 0-8018-7399-1, Baltimore 
2003; Colin Leys, "The Rise & Fall of Development Theory," Indiana University Press, 1996; 
Catherine Scott, "Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernisation and Dependency Theory," 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1995; Naeem Inayatullah & David Blaney, "International Relations and 
the Problem of Difference," Routledge, London, 2004; Martina Schuster, "Modernisation Theory and 
Dependencia: Why did they Fail?," http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de. 
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As a theory, CDA does not seek to provide scientific or positivist answers on a 
particular situation, but rather offers the potential for a more detailed understanding 
of the motivations and conditions behind a given issue. In essence CDA falls within 
a Foucaultian post-modern conception as it is based on the premise that there is no 
scientific meaning to social and political systems, and thus meaning is only obtained 
through a subjective interpretation. The aim is thus not to provide definite answers 
but rather to give new or deeper meaning to the issue, which could then be the 
subject to debate and amendment towards yet an even more informative and useful 
prescription. This approach shows an implicit recognition of what Thomas Kuhn 
highlighted was the tendency for paradigm shifts in the theory of epistemology. 8 
In terms of the specifics of the methodology, this thesis will utilise a CDA approach 
as developed by Norman Fairclough through his seminal study on this 
methodology. 9 CDA is a qualitative interdisciplinary methodology which has three 
constituent dimensions. Fairclough writes: 
Where the aim is to map three separate forms of analysis onto one 
another: analysis of (spoken or written) language texts, analysis of 
discourse practice (processes of text production, distribution and 
consumption) and analysis of discursive events as instances of socia-
l l . 10 cu tura practrce. 
CDA differs from other forms of discourse analysis in so much as it is 'critical'. 
"Critical" implies showing connections and causes which are hidden; it also implies 
intervention, for example providing resources for those who may be disadvantaged 
through change. Fairclough indicated that the exposure of things hidden is 
8 Thomas S. Kuhn, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," 3rd ed. ed. Chicago; London, University 
of Chicago Press, 1996. 
9 Norman Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language," Language in 
Social Life Series, London, Longman, 1995. See also: Lilie Chouliaraki & Norman Fairclough, 
"Discourse in Late Modernity : Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis," Critical Discourse Analysis, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, Norman Fairclough, "Language and Power," 
Language in Social Life Series, 2nd ed. ed., Harlow, Longman, 200 I, Norman Fairclough, "Analyzing 
Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research," London: Routledge, 2003. 
10 Norman Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language," 2. 
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important, as they are not obvious for the people involved and therefore cannot be 
fought against. In short, CDA reveals what is going on behind our backs and those 
of others and which determines our actions. 
Another methodology the thesis will develop is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. 
Maslow, an American psychologist, wrote that a better method to understand the 
behaviour and motivations of individuals was through the concept of the hierarchy 
of needs. The research will adopt this concept to the situation of socio-cultural and 
socio-economical needs of citizens in Bahrain and show how these can be 
considered as a key challenge to the liberalisation programme. 
Maslow's work developed a grand theory of motivation, a theory that would put all 
of the factors influencing motivation into one model. 11 He examined the finest 
specimens of the species. So in order to discover exemplary qualities in the human 
race, he studied the lives of Abraham Lincoln, Albert Einstein, Jane Addams, 
Eleanor Roosevelt, Frederick Douglass, Martin Buber, Albert Schweitzer, and a few 
dozen others representing his definition of the brightest and the best rather than 
mentally ill or neurotic people. 12 
Prior to Maslow, researchers generally focused separately on such factors as 
biology, achievement, or power to explain what energises, directs, and sustains 
human behaviour. Maslow put forward a hierarchy of human needs based on two 
groupings: deficiency needs and growth needs. Within the deficiency needs, each 
lower need must be met before moving to the next higher level. Once each of these 
needs has been satisfied, if at some future time a deficiency is discovered, the 
individual will act to remove the deficiency. 
11 Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2d ed., Harper & Row, New York, 1970 p. 38. 
12 Huitt, W. (2001). Motivation to learn: An overview. Educational Psychology Interactive. Valdosta, 
GA: Valdosta State University. Retrieved [date], from: 
http://chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/motiv·ation. 
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Maslow felt that people are basically trustworthy, self-protecting, and self-
governing. Humans tend toward growth and love. Although there is a continuous 
cycle of human wars, murder, deceit, etc., he believed that violence is not what 
human nature is meant to be like. Violence and other evils occur when human needs 
are dissatisfied. In other words, people who are deprived of lower needs such as 
safety may defend themselves by violent means. He did not believe that humans are 
violent because they enjoy violence, or that they lie, cheat, and steal because they 
enjoy doing it. 
In to Maslow' s theory, there are four types of needs that must be satisfied before a 
person can act unselfishly. Maslow drew his famous Hierarchy ofNeeds Pyramid in 
the late 1 960s. This pyramid is shown in Figure.5 .1 below. As illustrated, the needs 
are arranged in a hierarchical order. The upward climb is made by satisfying one set 
of needs at a time. The most basic drives are physiological. After that come the 
need for safety, then the desire for love, and then the quest for esteem and lastly the 
needs for self-actualisation. We are driven to satisfy the lower needs, but we are 
drawn to meet the higher ones. 13 
Figure-5.1: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 
Being Needs 
Belonging Needs 
SafewNeeds 
Phy:sluluglL:al N tltnl:s 
Deficit Needs 
13 Abraham H. Maslow, "A Themy of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, Vol. 50, 1943, pp. 
370-396 . 
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14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
Physiological (Body) Needs 
Physiological needs are the very basic needs such as air, water, food, sleep, 
sex, treedom of movement, etc. When these are not satisfied we may feel 
sickness, irritation, pain, discomfort, etc. These needs can be very strong 
because if deprived over time, the person will die. These feelings motivate 
us to alleviate them as soon as possible to establish homeostasis. Once they 
are fulfilled, we may think about other things. 14 
Safety (Security) Needs 
When the physiological needs are largely taken care of, this second layer of 
needs comes into play. Safety needs have to do with establishing stability 
and consistency in a chaotic world. These needs are mostly psychological in 
nature. Here people need the security of a home and family and living in a 
safe area away from threats. However, if a family is dysfunctional, i.e., an 
abusive husband, the wife cannot move to the next level because she is 
constantly concerned for her safety. Love and belongingness have to wait 
until she is no longer cringing in fear. Many people in different society cry 
out for law and order because they do not feel safe enough to go for a walk in 
their neighbourhood. 15 Many people, particularly those in the inner cities, 
unfortunately, are stuck at this level. In addition, safety needs sometimes 
motivate people to be religious. Religions comfort us with the promise of a 
safe secure place after we die and leave the insecurity of this world. 16 
Maslow also placed religious inclination on the safety layer because he saw 
that tendency as an attempt to bring about an ordered universe with no nasty 
shocks. 17 
16 Keith Miller, "Religious application: The Becomers," Word, Waco, Tex., 1973, p. 89-109. 
17 Maslow, 1943, pp. 370-396. 
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18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ib-id. 
Social (Love and Belongingness) Needs 
When physiological needs and safety needs are, by and large, taken care of, a 
third layer starts to show up. Love and belongingness become necessity. 
You begin to feel the need for friends, a sweetheart, children; affectionate 
relationships in general, even a sense of community. Humans have a desire 
to belong to groups: clubs, work groups, religious groups, family, gangs, etc. 
We need to feel loved and appreciated and to be accepted by others. 
Performers appreciate applause. We need to be needed. 18 
Esteem (Ego) Needs 
The Ego needs focus on our need for self-respect, and respect from others. 
Maslow noted two versions of esteem needs, a lower one, and a higher 
one. 19 The lower one is the need for the respect of others, the need for status, 
fame, glory, recognition, attention, reputation, appreciation, dignity, even 
dominance. The higher form involves the need for self-respect, including 
such feelings as confidence, competence, achievement, mastery, 
independence, and freedom. 20 Note that this is the "higher" form because, 
unlike the respect of others, once you have self-respect, it is a lot harder to 
lose. However, wanting admiration has to do with the need for power. 
People, who have all of their lower needs satisfied, often drive very 
expensive cars because doing so raises their level of esteem.21 
Self-Actualisation (Fulfilment) Needs 
The last level is a bit different. Maslow has used a variety of terms to refer 
to this level: He has called it growth motivation (in contrast to deficit 
motivation), being needs, and self-actualisation.22 Self-Actualisation Needs 
such as purpose, personal growth and realisation of potentials, the point 
where people become fully functional, acting purely on their own volition 
22 
and having a healthy personality. These are needs that do not involve 
balance or homeostasis. Once engaged, they continue to be folt. In fact, they 
are likely to become stronger as we "feed" them. They involve the 
continuous desire to fulfil potentials, to "be all that you can be. " They are a 
matter of becoming the most complete, the fullest, "you" - hence the term, 
self-actualisation. 23 
People on this level work at something very precious, call it a vocation or 
calling in the old priestly sense. These people are very fine, healthy, strong, 
wise, and creative. Maslow described the need for self-actualisation as "the 
desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that 
one is capable of hecoming"24 People who have everything can maximise 
their potential. They can seek knowledge, peace, experiences, self-
fulfilment, and oneness with God, etc.25 
1.4 THE PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY 
This study seeks to offer analytical, descriptive, and prescriptive methodologies to 
the subject matter. These will be applied accordingly to Bahrain's reform process, 
in selected areas, within the time frame from March 1999 to the end of 2005. This 
period is commensurate with the onset of King Hamad's succession to the throne 
and the bulk of his liberalisation reforms actually being unveiled. 
In terms of the specifics of what this study will examine, the following broad themes 
will be included: 
II Political and legislative: This includes parliamentary and municipal 
restructuring; constitutional reform; changes to ministerial structure; the 
executive structure, and the activities ofNGOs. 
23 Critique: Daniel Yankelovich, "Stepping off Maslow's Escalator," in New Rules: Searching for 
Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down, Random House, New York, 1981, pp. 234-243. 
24 Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, Vol. 50, 1943, p. 382. 
25 Frank: Goble, "The Third Force," Grossman, New York, 1970, p. 14. 
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• Legal reform: Changes to the judiciary; independence; the courts system; and 
the laws governing state and society. 
• Social sphere: The role and rights of women; land reform, unemployment, 
education and training; social welfare programmes; initiatives and royal 
gesturers; labour market reforms; national identity and citizenship, and the 
establishment of a Grievance Court. 
• Human rights initiatives: Protection of rights; freedom of speech; press and 
the right to protest; the State Security Laws, citizenship and extension of 
legal rights towards international human rights conventions. 
• Economic development: Financial and administrative oversights bodies; and 
the Economic Development Board. 
1.5 THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
The thesis is arranged in seven chapters. In accordance with the methodological 
framework and objectives of the thesis, there will be four substantive chapters and 
one contextual chapter. The substantive element of the thesis will aim to analyse the 
reform through adopting the interpretative textual and discourse analysis. This will 
allow for a clear identification of the fundamental departure from the past that has 
occurred in this unique period in Bahrain's history. This will then be followed by a 
critical analysis section which will seek to evaluate the reforms by indentifying the 
challenges inherent in the programme. This will then be supported by a subsequent 
chapter which will seek to offer some policy orientated recommendations. Finally, 
the thesis will offer a concluding chapter which will seek to revisit the thesis. For a 
clear depiction of the structure ofthe thesis, see Figure 1.1. 
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1.6 THE SOURCES OF DATA 
As this study utilises a critical discourse analysis, the sources that it will draw from 
are wide ranging. The focus will be on drawing from primary data and the sources 
will include: speeches, discussions in the Majlis , governmental and non-
governmental reports, press briefings, semi-interviews, election data, and official 
statistics. Secondary data such as journal and newspaper articles will also be 
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employed where relevant. In addition to these sources, the author was able to draw 
from a number of conferences and seminars where the issues pertaining to the thesis 
came under the spotlight. Nevertheless, a key limitation is that this thesis was not 
able to draw from classified governmental material which could provide for a more 
valid interpretation ofthe King's reforms. This was compounded by a general lack 
of journal articles or books on the topic thus necessitating a reliance on primary 
material. Whilst this leaves scope for future research on this area, the following 
section will outline the contribution this study makes to the existing scholarship and 
the limitations of research. 
1. 7 LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
In the first instance, the subject of the thesis IS a recent occurrence which has 
unfolded during the writing of this study. In fact, the reforms and their impact is a 
long-term process which at the time of writing continues to take place. Therefore, it 
is recognised that this study is unable to offer the degree of validity that a more long-
term retrospective study can claim. However, this does not detract from the 
originality of the thesis as it is the first major investigation into this new era for 
Bahrain. 
A second epistemological limitation concerns the ontology of the author of this 
thesis. As the author is a senior Bahraini government official, certain 
methodological issues arise from this. On the one hand, the author was under clear 
legal constraints for this thesis as classified information known to the author could 
not be incorporated into the analysis in order to support the argument and 
conclusions drawn. 
On the other hand, the findings from semi-interviews suffered from a poor response 
rate given the unwillingness of key opposition figures and commentators to 
cooperate with the author knowing his background as a government official. Whilst 
this is a methodological limitation on the validity of the findings from the semi-
interviews, it should be recognised that this was only a small aspect of the data used 
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to evaluate the reforms and enrich the thesis. Indeed, this would therefore be an 
ideal area for future research in which scholars can undertake such detailed 
interviews to test the robustness of the findings made in this thesis. 
1.8 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study applies an interpretative textual and critical discourse analysis 
methodology towards the reform process in Bahrain during the time frame 1999-
2005. It is the first study to conduct this form of analysis on Bahrain within this key 
time frame of the initial period after the beginning of the reform programme by King 
Hamad. It is also original in that it offers policy relevant recommendations on what 
should be done in the future to make the realisation of the reformist vision actually 
being achieved. 
The overall significance of this study, however, is that it fills a unique void in the 
literature on Bahrain's 'second wave' of reforms post-1999. With the absence of 
detailed qualitative research on this important topic, the thesis ultimately seeks to 
serve as a stepping stone from which future scholarship and debate on Bahrain's 
political path can be based. This is compounded in that the author is an elite 
decision-maker who is participating and playing a role in implementing the reformist 
programme. Therefore, the thesis offers a unique perspective to academic 
scholarship on Bahrain by providing a perspective of actual policy formation and 
delivery. Moreover, a further contribution is that it will also serve to add to the 
existing literature on regional politics in the GCC and so has wider currency in 
academic scholarship than simply a country specific case study. Combined together, 
these factors allow the thesis to offer a genuine and rich contribution to knowledge 
and scholarship in the field of enquiry. 
1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The subject matter of the reforms in Bahrain from 1999-2005 has received scant 
debate within the academic context. Whilst coverage has mainly occurred through 
newspaper articles, it is noticeable that few books, journal articles, or even non-
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governmental reports have been published on the topic. This thesis seeks to bridge 
this wide gulf through its detailed qualitative approach. Therefore, it is appropriate 
here to provide a review of the limited texts within the academic setting on this topic 
so a proper understanding of where this thesis is located and its overall importance 
to scholarship in this fie ld can be made. 
When examining the texts on this subject, it is helpful that their arguments and 
findings fall within three broad categorisations. The first are those that offer an 
uncritical and optimistic assessment of the reforms thus far. The second can be 
understood as being pessimistic about the nature and future application of the 
reforms. Here it is noticeable that such authors commonly tout a sceptical opinion 
on the origins and substance of the King Hamad's liberalisation programme. 
Finally, there is a more balanced conception whereby the reforms are considered in a 
pos itive light and a constructively critical analysis is offered to ideally see reform 
progress yet further. Figures 1.2 below illustrate these categorisations. 
Figure 1.2: Categories of Literature on Bahrain's Reforms 1999-2005 
T he Pessimistic 
Perspectives 
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Location or 
this Thesis 
1.9.1 The Optimistic Perspective 
Naturally, King Hamad is the most optimistic figure towards his liberalisation 
programme. 
The fact is that I relied above all on Almighty God, and then on my 
confidence in the awareness, civilised attitude and political maturity 
of the people of Bahrain. I personally made a decision that entailed a 
historic responsibility by holding a free referendum in order to 
release the country from a bottleneck. It was an unprecedented 
referendum in our political history and the hesitation and 
apprehension towards it persisted until the last moments.26 
The King therefore shows a confidence that his people can fulfil the challenges 
brought by the new changes. Such reforms have been largely welcomed by the 
international community and President Bush and Prime Minister Blair in particular. 
Adding to this, leading human rights organisations and journalists have also given a 
positive assessment over Bahrain's transition and consider it to be a role model for 
developing countries.27 President Bush's invitation for the King to attend the Group 
of Eight (G8) summit of the world's major industrial nations, which was held on 8 
June 2004 in Georgia, USA, to highlight his reformist vision, was an excellent 
indication of how the international community perceives Bahrain's evolution into 
modernity. 
The Gulf Centre for Strategic Study (GCSS) is symbolic of those NGOs which hold 
an optimistic perception of the reforms in Bahrain. The Centre has published 
articles and books which underscore this interpretation of the new reforms?8 Glada 
Lahan offered a positive analysis about the reforms in her book "Democratic 
26 King Hamad AI Khalifa, "Talks on National Awareness: First Talk," All Bahrain's Official 
Newspapers, Wednesday 9 February 2005. 
27 President Bush in his speech at the 201h anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy in 6 
November 2003 addressed Bahrain reform as a positive step forward. 
28 See'the Gitlf Centre for StrategiC Stui:lies on http://www.gcss.org.bh/index_english.htm. 
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Transition in Bahrain: a Model for the Arab World."29 Here she says that the 
reforms were a genuine break from the past. Moreover, Orner AI Hassan, Head of 
the GCSS, has devoted the research efforts of the Centre to understanding and 
evaluating the reforms in Bahrain.30 The centre devoted itselfto monitor the process 
of the reform and provide several constructive critical reports to the Executive 
branch and the legislative one too. Here AI Hassan has been a leading commentator 
in offering detailed discussion on the character of the reforms, but has fallen short of 
offering any critical interpretation on what the new reforms should be understood. 
Therefore questions still exist as to how the reforms can be conceptualised in terms 
of their origins, nature, and future course. 
1.9.2 The Pessimistic Perspective 
Most of the opposition activists were very pessimistic about King Hamad's 
liberalisation initiative. Ebrahim Sharif Alsayed, Head of Bahrain's National 
Democratic Action Society, argues that the King's reforms are superficial as they 
fail to tackle the major problem of land misappropriation. He gave a presentation on 
this entitled "Bahrain: State-Sponsored Corruption" on 25 August 2005 in London 
and also on 7 September 2005 in Jameiat AI Amal AI Watani (National Democratic 
Action Society). He said; "Three decades of absolute rule resulted virtually all 
public lands misappropriated."31 In 1974, the parliament tried to pass legislation that 
regulates the distribution of state land, but the government objected and defeated it. 
A further driver of pessimistic assessments on the new reforms in Bahrain centred 
on their perceived ineffectiveness against poverty. Here the United Nations 
Development Report of 2003 prompted political controversy by finding that the 
steps and initiatives taken by the government to alleviate poverty were largely 
29 Glada Lahan, "Democratic Transition in Bahrain: A Model for the Arab World," Gulf Centre for 
Strategic Studies, London, 2004. 
30 Omar AI Hassan, "The Kingdom of Bahrain in 2002," Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London, 
2003. 
31 Ebrahim Sharif Alsayed, "Bahrain: State-Sponsored Corruption," Jameiat AI Amal AI Watani, 
Seminar 'Handout, Bahrain, 7 September 2005. 
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ineffective.32 Poverty was described as a vital issue which was increasing. The 
measurers undertaken were thus largely piecemeal. Scott Waalkes picked up on this 
by writing that the real test of any policy change is whether it can provide more jobs, 
give families a livelihood, and allow them to live in peace whilst seeing the true 
fruits oftheir labour.33 
A key report, authored by McKinsey, related to such social benchmarks of the new 
reforms concerns employment. Some 100,000 Bahrainis will enter the job market 
over a decade as compared to 2002 statistics. 34 This is a virtual doubling of the 
labour market pool. The McKinsey report, sponsored by Bahrain's Economic 
Development Board, concluded that the demographic factors coupled with even the 
most optimistic economic development projections, highlighted that the 
unemployment rate would rise to upwards of 30% by 2012.35 This underscores that 
even within the Bahraini government there is a degree of pessimism as to whether 
Bahrain's economy can fulfil the objective of the reforms without experiencing the 
grave social cost brought through high unemployment. Of course such a situation 
would potentially pose national security issues. 
There is a wonderful passage which captures the spirit ofthese problems in Bahrain, 
quoted by Noble Prize novelist Naguib Mahfouz. He talks about a typical Muslim 
struggling with the paradoxes, generated daily by a long-term historical 
secularisation process, glimpsed only intermittently:36 
He leads a contemporary (i.e., "modern") lifo. He obeys civil and 
penal laws of Western origin, is involved in complex tangle of social 
and economic transactions, and is never certain to what extent these 
agree with or contradict his Islamic creed. Life carries him along in its 
32 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "The Arab Human Development Report 2003," 
National Press, Amman, Jordan, 2004. 
33 Scott Waalkes, "Reflections on Bahrain," Malone College, 16 January 2005, www.malone.edu. 
34 William Wallis, "Jobless Corner of Bahrain a Far Cry from Glossy Malls," The Financial Time, 25 
November 2004. 
35 Bahrain Economic Development Board, "Reforming Bahrain's Labour Market," BEDB, 2004, 
Bahrain. 
36 Scott Waalkes, "Reflections on Bahrain." 
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current and forgets his misgivings for a time until one Friday he hears 
the Imam or reads the religious page in one of the papers, and the old 
misgivings come back with a certain fear. He realises that in this new 
society he has been afflicted with a split personality: half of him 
believes, prays, fasts, and makes the pilgrimage. The other half 
renders his values void in banks and courts and in the streets, even in 
the cinemas and theatres, perhaps even at home among his family 
before the television set. 37 
The regimes' problem is that whatever they are willing to concede (or can afford to 
concede) is almost bound to be too little and too late?8 Both Abbas Murtada and 
Abdulrahman AI Noami argue that the structure of the reforms is directed towards 
benefiting the ruling tribe rather than the people of Bahrain.39 They go onto 
interpret the character of the reforms as misleading given their view on the King's 
motives. Here they specifically cite the failure of the amended Constitution of 2002 
to reflect the undertakings given by the King in the National Action Charter. They 
see the reforms as not having gone far enough in that they fail to address the issue of 
both chambers of the Majlis al Watani (National Assembly) being fully elected. 
Indeed the Constitution stipulated that the Majlis al Shura (Consultative Council) 
was to be appointed rather than elected. Given this, such members of the opposition 
argued that the powers of the King were unchecked and thus there was little 
substance to the reforms. Such views have currency as the majority of the 
opposition boycotted the historic elections in October 2002. 
A further key interpretation has been offered by Gerd Nonneman. He argues 
persuasively that the actual character of the reforms within the GCC should be 
37 Ibid. 
38 Abbas Murtada, "Cosmetic Reforms Unlikely to Change Realities of Despotic Rule in Bahrain," 
Muslim Media, Bahrain, 16-31 January 2001. 
39 Abdulrahman M. AI Noami, "AI Bahrain: AI Azma AI Distoria," Dar AI Konooz AI Adbia, Beirut, 
Lebanon,2004. 
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viewed as a form of controlled liberalisation rather than actual democratisation.40 
The importance of his argument should not be underestimated as it implies that the 
real reasons as to why Bahrain is changing under King Hamad are not based on 
achieving a democratic polity. However, a weakness in Nonneman's conjecture is 
that it infers that democracy is not the actual goal but in fact it is national stability 
and regime survival. This is an important point but, Steven Wright offers a 
contrasting view in that he argues one cannot discount the view that actual 
liberalisation maybe, and indeed is likely to be, a prior stage in actual 
democratisation.41 Therefore, it would not be valid to discount statements made by 
the King of Bahrain that his desire is for a democratic Bahrain under the auspices of 
a constitutional monarchical system. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
liberalisation and democratisation are key terms which will be applied to this thesis. 
1.9.3 Constructively Critical Approach 
Whilst both of the other broad perspectives represented the views of certain cohorts, 
the majority of interpretations centred on what can be described as a constructively 
critical approach. In this regard, Anoush Ehteshami argues that in the case of 
Bahrain the reform should, in the first instance, be understood as elite driven. He 
writes: 
In this case, the leader is himself the revolutionary agent, rather than 
the protector of the status quo and of the so-called 'conservative 
values'. In this regard at least, the Bahraini experience defies the 
conventional wisdom about the role of Gulf leaders in their national 
1. . 42 po lflCS. 
40 Gerd Nonneman, "Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies: From Liberalisation to 
Democratisation? A comparative Perspective," Sir William Luce Fellowship Paper No. 6, Durham 
Middle East Paper No. 80, Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham, UK, June 2006. 
41 Steven Wright, "Generational Change and Elite-Driven Reforms in the Kingdom of Bahrain," Sir 
William Luce Fellowship Paper No. 7, Durham Middle East Paper No. 81, Institute for Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham, UK, June 2006. 
42 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Reform from above: the politics of participation in the oil monarchies," 
International Affairs Volume 79, Number I, January 2003. 
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Ehteshami moves onto recognising that whilst the new reform is progressive in 
substance and an example for the other GCC countries, he argues that the motives 
behind the reforms are pragmatic in that it seeks to counter the causes of instability 
in the 1990s.43 Therefore, he implicitly recognises that the reforms face a tension 
between countering the roots of instability against challenging the traditional 
position of the ruling tribe. 
One of the main opposition figures, the President of Bahrain's Islamic National 
Accord Association (al Wafaq), Sheikh Ali Salman, has underlined that although the 
government has implemented substantial reforms in correcting what he views as 
injustices of the past, further reform is still needed. He argues that in order for a true 
break from the past to occur and for the reforms to fulfil the pledges made by the 
King, further legislative and parliamentary reform will be needed. Ali Salman 
stresses two key factors: Firstly, that both chambers of parliament need to be elected 
in order for sovereignty to lie with the people. Secondly, he argues that the 
government is inherently corrupt and that this needs to be countered in tandem with 
the reforms unveiled by the King. Without such measurers being undertaken, Ali 
Salman argues that the reforms will not be meaningful and overcome sectarian 
rivalry. He comments that "we are proposing gradual change, which we hope will 
eventually lead to the development of the political system ... I am not calling for a 
Shia state in Bahrain. I am calling for an Arab Islamic state." 44 
A similar perspective is echoed by Toby Jones, formerly of the International Crisis 
Group, who argues that whilst progress has been achieved through the reforms of 
King Hamad, they ultimately fail to fulfil the need to develop a fully constitutional 
monarchy. He offers a series of suggestions but most importantly says that the 
government should move towards reforming the Consultative Council in line with 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ali Salman, Interview in AI-Mushahid AI-Siyasi, London, reprinted in Middle East Mirror, London, 
14 October 1997. 
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the demands articulated by Ali Salman.45 Moreover he goes onto argues that such 
reform is pressing: 
Ultimately, for the Bahraini government to do nothing or, worse, 
return to older modes of authoritarian and police action, would likely 
lead to further escalation. The current situation is inherently 
unstable, and recent events suggest change is on its way: if not 
through accelerated reform then, unhappily, by a return to violence.46 
The manner in which Jones suggests these underlying sectarian challenges should be 
countered is through granting more rights and equality to the Shia community. In 
contrast, Steven Wright highlights that such a position would not actually aid the 
prospects for future reform unless the opposition understand the character of the 
reforms and change tactics accordingly.47 He argues that Bahrain is experiencing a 
new era of reform which is positive and is elite driven and a product of generational 
change. The opposition therefore is charged with having failed to understand that 
they are not driving the reforms and their increasingly vocal demands is actually 
stagnating the reform process through undermining the position of reformers such as 
the King. He concludes that the opposition need to act in a mature fashion whereby 
they support the King rather than challenge him as without doing so he will be 
unable to overcome the more conservative factions within the government and 
reform is thus likely to be stagnant. 
Others look at the more social aspects by highlighting the government has been 
unable to address the needs of the lower and middle classes. Here reducing 
unemployment, transparency, and human rights whilst also improving the provision 
of social services is seen to be the key issues which the reforms are seen to be 
wanting in this regard. Such issues are notably highlighted by Nadeya Sayed Ali 
Mohammed as she sees such issues as key to providing for stability within the 
45 International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," Middle East Report No. 40, 6 May 
2005. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Steven Wright, "Generational Change and Elite-Driven Reforms in the Kingdom of Bahrain," June 
2006. 
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country. Indeed, such factors were behind the Shia discontent which manifested 
itself in the form of prominent riots in 1994-98.48 
1.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined a series of objectives, research questions, the methodology, 
and structure of this study. The methodological approach is an interpretative 
discourse and textual analysis which seeks to ascribe new meaning to the reforms 
that have taken place in Bahrain. This chapter has also shown the location of this 
research in the wider body of scholarship and in accordance with this has set out its 
contribution to the field. 
The following chapter will provide a historical narrative on the socio-political and 
economic context of Bahrain. The purpose and relevance to the study is that it will 
allow the context in which the reforms have taken place to be established. Indeed, 
only through recognising this context can we appreciate the significance, extent, and 
direction the reforms have taken. 
48 Nadeya Sayed Ali Mohammed, "Political Reform in Bahrain: The Price of Stability," Middle East 
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 4 No.9 September 2002. 
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Chapter II 
The Socio-Political and Economic 
Context of Bahrain: An Empirical Narrative 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Although the Kingdom of Bahrain occupies a small territorial area, it has a rich 
history. Historically, the name 'Bahrain' identified two separate entities. On one 
hand, it described the region that covered the whole of Eastern Arabia (from 
south AI Basra in Iraq to the edge of the coast of Oman in the south). On the 
other hand, it describes the modern Kingdom of Bahrain. Since 1783, the AI 
Khalifa Dynasty, a Sunni sect, on a hereditary Arab monarchical basis, has ruled 
Bahrain. It declared itself fully independent from the British on 15 August 1971 
with the main sects of the population being Sunni and Shia Muslim. 1 Bahrain is, 
however, been religiously diverse where alongside Sunni mosques and Shia 
rna 'tarns one can find Christian Churches, a Jewish Synagogue, Sikh Gurdwaras, 
and Buddhist and Hindu temples? 
Bahrain's small size and central location among the Arabian Gulf countries entail 
it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger and richer 
neighbours. It has always acted as a bridge between East and West in trade and 
commerce. Bahrain's oil resources are poor in comparison with the other Gulf 
States. 3 It has diversified its economy to other fields such as petroleum 
processing and refining, and has transformed itself into an international banking 
centre. 4 This diversification strategy has encouraged a more mixed and open 
society. Bahrain is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
Arab League, the United Nations (UN), and many other organisations.5 
1 Most writers indicate that the Shia comprise about 70% of the population in Bahrain; although 
some writers put the figure as high as 80%. In fact, there are no official published statistics that 
support these estimated percentages, except the census of January 1941, which showed there 
were 41,944 Sunni and 46,354 Shia, giving a difference of only 4410. Writers refer the present 
Shia majority to several factors: One is the continuation among Shia of traditional practices such 
as early marriage and multiple wives. Another is the importance of a large, extended family for 
economic and social survival. Finally, Shia are more often rural, with lower levels of education 
and skills. Sunnis tend to be urban and have more modem ideas about the nuclear family and 
birth control. 
2 Glada Laban, "Democratic Transition in Bahrain: A Model for the Arab World," Gulf Centre 
for Strategic Studies, London, 2004, p. 3. 
3 See www. infoplease.com/ipa/ AO I 07313 .html 
4 Ibid. 
5 Bahrain is also a member of the following: UN Commission on Trade and Development, UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, UN Industrial Development Organisation, 
Universal Postal Union, International Chamber of Commerce, World Federation of Trade 
Unions, International Finance Corporation, World Health Organisation, Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference, Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia, Food and Agriculture 
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Constitutional changes introduced by the fourteenth ruler, King Hamad bin Isa 
Al Khalifa; in February 2002 assign himself as head of state of a constitutional 
hereditary monarchy. The King governs with the support of an appointed cabinet 
of ministers. Most strategic decisions are taken and, approved by the new 
bicameral parliament, which was established in October 2002. The parliament 
has an elected chamber of 40 members, and an appointed chamber (Majlis al 
Shura,)6 of 40 members. King Hamad's liberalisation programme is trying to 
enhance economic, social, and political reforms. The reform has to some extent 
improved relations mainly with the Shia community and other sects. The King is 
sending the critical message that the people's voices have been heard by 
declaring his intention "to engage in serious and fruitful work to revive Bahrain 
so that it can once again catch up with the fast developments taking place in our 
contemporary world."7 
A comprehensive appreciation of Bahrain's diversity is a necessity before 
Bahrain's reform process is examined in detail. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter will be to provide a detailed exposition of the unique socio-political and 
economic character of Bahrain from 1783. 8 Specifically, it will serve the 
objective of establishing the context in which the subject matter and focus of this 
thesis is located. 
The following analysis will provide an examination of the historical background 
of Bahrain in terms of its socio-political and economic system. In this regard, 
several themes of relevance are to be addressed. Firstly, an overview of 
Bahrain's historical makeup will be provided in order to set the context for this 
Organisation, Arab Monetary Fund, International Labour Organisation, International Monetary 
Fund, Interpol, International Standardisation Organisation, International Telecommunications 
Union, Organisation for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, World Meteorological 
Organisation, International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, International Civil 
Aviation Organisation, Group of 77, Arab Bank for Economic Development of Africa, World 
Intellectual Property Organisation, International Hydrographical Organisation, International 
Maritime Organisation, Indian Ocean Commission, Inter-American Development Bank, Non-
Aligned Movement, World Tourism Organisation, and the Organisation for Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons 
6 Majlis a/ Shura is an Arabic term, which means Consultative Council. 
7 The Gulf Daily News, Bahrain, Dec. 16, 1999. 
8 The AI Khalifa Dynasty came to power in Bahrain in 1783. This is an appropriate date for 
setting the parameters of this chapter. 
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chapter. This will involve an account of Bahrain's demographics and will be 
followed by a history of the ruling Al Khalifa dynasty. Secondly, the history of 
Bahrain's social affairs will be discussed. This will encompass the interrelated 
themes of education provision and the sectarian character of civil society. 
Thirdly, the question of Bahrain's political evolution will receive attention 
through an examination of the issues of political participation, the legal system, 
and the foreign relations of Bahrain. Finally, an empirical account of the key 
economic aspects of Bahrain's development will be provided. Attention here 
will be geared towards the role of Bahrain's hydrocarbon resources, its foreign 
economic initiatives, and an overview of key public and private sector projects. 
2.1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BAHRAIN 
Bahrain's history goes back to the roots of human civilisation as the main island 
is thought to have broken away from the Arabian mainland around 6000 BC and 
has almost certainly been inhabited since prehistoric times. 9 Bahrain first 
emerged into world history in the third millennium BC as Dilmun. Assyrian 
Kings repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the islands. Shortly after 600 BC, 
Dilmun was formally incorporated into the new Babylonian empire. There are 
no further historical references to Bahrain until Alexander the Great appeared in 
the Gulf in the fourth century BC. Although the Arab tribes of Bani Wa 'eland 
Persian governors ruled Bahrain interchangeably, Bahrain continued to be known 
by its Greek name Tylos until the seventh century, when many of its inhabitants 
converted to Islam. For more than 100 years, various tribes and national groups 
attacked Bahrain until the Al Khalifa clan took control of the islands in 1783.10 
The Al Khalifa is the only ruling family in the Gulf to have achieved their 
position by conquest. As a result of its strategic location, Sumerians, Greeks, 
Umayyad Caliphs of Syria, the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad, Persians, 
9 Sheikh Abdulla Bin Khalid AI Khalifa & Abdul Almalk Y. AI Hamar, "Bahrain through the 
History," Volume I, Bahrain, 1972, p. 16. 
10 Some historians indicated that moving from the west coast of Qatar (AI Zubara) to Bahrain was 
the first strategic error that AI Khalifa tribe made. The wealth between Qatar and Bahrain is now 
incomparable. The second error was in 1971 when Bahrain did not join the other eight states (the 
seven (UAE) and Qatar) to form a union of Arab Emirates. However, it should be known that at 
the time when AI Khalifa invaded Bahrain, water and plants were considered a greater necessity 
for humankind than anything else was, and enjoying their own sovereignty is worth more than 
any wealth. 
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Portuguese, Turks, Wahhabis, Omanis, British, Arab tribes and, of course, AI 
Khalifa all claimed control at various points during the history of Dilmun, Tylos, 
Awal, Bahrain and then the Kingdom of Bahrain. Bahrain has historically been a 
trading centre, a pearling port, and, on some occasions, a military garrison. 
2.1.1 Demographic Overview 
Bahrain is an archipelago of 33 islands with the total area being about 707 square 
kilometres. In 200 1, it had a population of 650,604. This consisted of 405,667 
native Bahrainis (62.4%) and 244,937 were non-Bahrainis (37.6%) 11 • See Chart 
2.0 below. In July 2005, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
estimated the population to be 688,345 (including 235,108 non-citizens). 12 
Ethnic composition, according to 2004 World Fact book by the CIA, showed: 
63% Bahraini Arab, 19% Asian, 10% other Arab, 2.5% European, and 8% 
Iranian. 13 
Chart 2.0: Bahrain Population (2001) 
Bahraini 
Citizenship; 
405,667; 62% 
Bahrain Population 
Non-Bahraini 
Expatriates; 
244,937; 38% 
11 The 200 I census of population by the Bahrain Government, Bahrain. 
12 Arab Political Systems: Baseline information and Reforms - Bahrain, 
www .carnegieendowment.org 
13 Word Fact Book, CIA, 2004, www.cia.gov, wifak.uni-wuerzburg.de/factOO 
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2.1.2 The History of the Ruling AI Khalifa Dynasty 
Most of the islands' inhabitants, in the seventh century, accepted the personal 
invitation of the Prophet Mohammed to convert peacefully to Islam. Bahrain 
flourished with the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. His teachings of Islam 
through the holy Quran became the origin of Muslim religion and culture. 
Bahrain came under the rule of the Al Khalifa (who belong to the Utub tribe), 14 
on 28 July 1783 after 180 years oflranian control. With the assistance of the AI 
Sabah of Kuwait and the help of other tribes, Amir Ahmed Al-Fateh 'The 
Conqueror' sailed from the west coast of Qatar (AI Zubara) and drove the 
Persian garrison from Bahrain and reclaimed the AI Khalifa family's title to the 
islands. The availability of fresh water and vegetation, plus a significant 
population base, made the islands much more attractive than the Qatari 
peninsula. 15 The Al Khalifa has continued to rule Bahrain to this day, see Figure 
2.0. 
Through history, resources, trade, and its strategic location have made Bahrain an 
attractive target. The Al Khalifa has effectively and wisely dealt with external 
and internal threats to ensure the survival of their sovereignty over the islands. 
In so doing, the Al Khalifa maintained close contact with all their tribal 
neighbours and when threatened, they sought to manipulate the process of 
migration and regrouping. They even sought protection from the Shah of Persia 
in order to survive the Portuguese occupation during the 17th century. On other 
occasions, Bahrain's rulers invited the Wahhabis for protection from Omanis and 
later the Omanis from the Wahhabis and so on. In the 1830s, Bahrain signed the 
first of many treaties with Britain, which offered Bahrain naval protection from 
the Ottoman Empire in exchange for free access to the Gulf. This arrangement 
kept the British out of Bahrain's internal affairs until a series of battles within the 
ruling families prompted the British to install their own choice of Amir in 1869. 
Treaties with Britain secured Bahrain against external threats, and the subsequent 
accession of Amir Isa Bin Ali AI Khalifa, the tenth ruler, in 1869 marked the 
14 The Utub represent an alliance into which several Arab tribes from the plains of Nejd merged 
subsequent to their migration. They settled down on the Arab coastlines ofthe Arabian Gulf. 
15 Jawad S. AI-Arayed, "A Line in the Sea: The Qatar v. Bahrain Border Dispute in the World 
Court," North Atlantic Books, Berkeley, CA, 2003, p. 20. 
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beginning of a period of stability and prosperity which was to last over half a 
century, see Table 2.0. 
Bahrain is not an OPEC member. Although oil was discovered in the area in 
1902, large-scale drilling and processing did not happen until the 1930s, which 
was about the time the world pearl market was collapsing. Bahrain became the 
first country in the Arabian Peninsula to discover oil in 1932. Oil money 
improved the economy and social aspects of Bahrain. It also brought the British 
closer: the main British naval base in the region was moved to Bahrain in 1935, 
and the senior British official in the Middle East followed suit in 1946. In 1971, 
when the British Government announced its decision to end treaty relationships 
with the Gulf area, Bahrain initially joined the other eight states (the seven 
Sheikhdoms now forming the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar) under 
British protection in an effort to form a union of Arab Emirates. The nine 
countries did not come to an agreement on the terms of the union, and when 
Bahrain foresaw that independence from the British was inevitable, it withdrew 
from the grouping and became independent under the rule of Amir Isa Bin 
Salman AI Khalifa, the thirteenth ruler. Bahrain proclaimed its independence on 
15 August 1971. The National Day (16 December 1971) is the date of 
independence from British Protection. Within a month the new state was 
recognised by Arab and other nations and diplomatic relations were established 
with other countries. Bahrain joined the League of Arab States, which was 
founded in March 1945 with the aim of protecting the independence and integrity 
of member states and encouraging economic, legal, and cultural cooperation, on 
11 September 1971. Just ten days later, 500 guests attended a reception held in 
New York to celebrate its admission as the 128th member of the United Nations 
(UN).I6 
In 1972, Amir Isa Bin Salman announced that the country would have a 
constitutional form of government. He issued a decree providing for an elected 
national assembly of 30 members charged with drafting and ratifying a 
16 Angela Clarke, "Bahrain Oil and Development: 1929- 1989," International Research Centre 
for Energy and Economic Development (IRCEED), IMMEL Publishing, London, 1990, p. 229. 
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constitution. The relatively free elections produced a markedly independent 
membership, which alarmed many in the ruling Al Khalifa family. This election 
was the first in Bahrain's history. Given the climate of mutual suspicion between 
the government and opposition activists, the government introduced legislation 
through the assembly that would permit the government to arrest and detain 
political opponents for indefinite periods without trial. 17 When the assembly 
refused to approve this draft law, Amir Isa suspended the assembly in 1975 after 
the Prime Minister refused to work with it. Some of those subsequently arrested 
were ex-members ofthe assembly. 18 The Amir then governed Bahrain by decree, 
and through a cabinet chosen by him. This situation remained for quarter of a 
century. Discussions and public debate in 1979-1980 for restoration of the 
assembly came to naught. 
The 1979 revolution in Iran raised expectations and tensions among all the Arab 
states and several arrests were made in Bahrain of Iranian-backed Shia whom the 
government accused of planning a coup d'etat. The Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) 
drove a wedge through Sunni-Shia solidarity and created Sunni suspicions of 
Shia throughout the Gulf. 
In the 1990s, Bahrain suffered from repeated incidents of political violence, 
which arose from the disillusioned Shia. In response, Amir Isa instituted the first 
17 The State Security Law was approved by the ruler on October 1974. It states that the Minister 
of Interior could order the arrest, imprisonment and searching of homes and workplaces of any 
person suspected of having committed acts, made statements, or engaged in activities considered 
to be against the internal security of the State or its religious, social and economic foundations 
(Article 1 ). It also states that any acts or statements that might cause the deterioration of relations 
between the people and the government, and the dissemination of "harmful" propaganda and 
"heretical" principles, are considered seditious. The same article gives the Interior Minister the 
power to take the "necessary measures to collect evidence and to conclude investigations". 
Suspects can be detained for up to three years without charge or trial. The period of detention can 
be extended at the discretion of the Minister of Interior despite the fact that Article 5 of the law 
states that in all cases those held must be released at the end of three years. 
18 Background to these events is given in Abdulrahman M. AI Noami, "AI Bahrain: AI Azma AI 
Distoria," Dar AI Konooz AI Adbia, Beirut, Lebanon, 2004; Raya Yousuf Hamza, "AI Tajroba AI 
Barlamanya AI Awla Fe AI Bahrain: 1972- 1975," 1st ed., Kingdom of Bahrain; AI Moassa AI 
Arabia Lltba wa AI Nashor; J. E. Peterson, "The Arab Gulf States: Steps Towards Political 
Participation," New York, Praeger, I 988, pub I. with the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington Papers, No. 131; Fuad I. Khuri, "Tribe and State in Bahrain: The 
Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State," University of Chicago, IL 
publisher, 1980; Emile A. Nakhleh, "Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society," 
Toronto, Lexington Books, 1983. 
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Bahraini cabinet change in 20 years in 1995, and increased the size of the 
Consultative Council, which he created in 1993, from 30 appointed members to 
40. The Consultative Council was established to provide advice and opinion on 
legislation proposed by the cabinet and, in certain cases, to propose new laws. 19 
These steps led to an initial decline in violent incidents, but in early 1996 Shia 
factions again demonstrated, and called for more political participation and 
measures to address the unemployment problem. Street clashes periodically 
paralysed the country, and a number of five-star hotels, banks, international 
offices and restaurants were firebombed, resulting in several fatalities. Many 
Western firms relocated their Gulf headquarters to the more peaceful setting of 
Dubai. Under the government's Security Law, which had been rejected by the 
1973 National Assembly and enacted via Amiri decree, over 1000 people were 
arrested and held in detention without trial in connection with these political 
disturbances. 
There was a great deal of public sympathy, which crosscut sectarian lines, for 
those individuals arrested. All sections of Bahrain's society shared the goals of 
an expansion of employment opportunities, the call for serious reform by the 
government, and a restoration of the elected National Assembly. The 
government, on the other hand, tackled the outbreaks of violence in the 1990s 
through a reliance on intimidation, power, and repression by the armed forces to 
keep full control of the situation while waiting for the opposition to run out of 
steam. 20 It was therefore a clear case of repressing the problem rather than 
countering its actual causes. 
The situation changed after King Hamad bin Isa AI Khalifa succeeded to the 
throne in March 1999 after the sudden death of his father. He championed a 
programme of political participation and liberalisation shortly after his 
successiOn. In November 2000, the new King established a committee to create 
19 Most Bahrainis viewed this step as inadequate and even insulting, given that Bahrain once had 
a totally elected, though short-lived, legislature. 
20 On the 1994-1999 unrest, see Munira Fakhro, "The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment," in 
Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter, eds., "The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in 
Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion," New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 167-188, and 
Joe Stork, "Bahrain's Crisis Worsens," Middle East Report, No. 204, 1997, p. 33-35. 
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blueprint transformations in Bahrain from that of a hereditary state to a 
constitutional monarchy. The resulting "National Action Charter" was presented 
to the Bahraini public in a referendum in February 2001. It was the first public 
vote in Bahrain since 1972 and, for the first time, women had the right to both 
vote and stand as candidates. At the same time, all political prisoners were freed; 
all exiles were officially allowed to return to the country; and the security laws 
and the Security Court that allowed police to hold prisoners without charge for 
up to three years were abolished. On 14 February 2002, King Hamad proclaimed 
Bahrain as a constitutional monarchy and changed his constitutional status from 
Amir to become the first King in the history of Bahrain. On 9 May 2002, the 
first municipal elections since 1957 took place, followed by the parliamentary 
elections on 24 October 2002. Further details on the new reforms will be 
elaborated in the following chapter. 
2.1.3 Profile of King Hamad 
Given the importance of the role of King Hamad as the architect of the radical 
new era of reform in Bahrain, it is only appropriate to provide some observations 
on the background of this key figure. The following will provide a biographical 
overview of his formative years, which will be drawn on in chapter three where 
his character will be identified and analysed within the context of his vision for a 
reformed and modernised Bahrain. 
King Hamad bin I sa Al Khalifa is the eldest son of the late Amir of Bahrain. The 
King was born in Riffa on 28 January 1950. At the age of six, he began his 
primary education in Bahrain in addition to reciting the Holy Quran and studying 
the principles of Islam and the Arabic language at the hands of professionals in 
the field of Islamic studies. This education had a positive impact on his 
mastering of Arabic and his appreciation of Arabic poetry. He was keen on 
attending the Majlis (open court sessions with the people) of his late father where 
he listened attentively to traditional stories and legends about heroes, nations, 
incidents and factors that contributed to victory or resulted in defeat. He also 
expressed keenness on learning swimming, horse riding, and target shooting 
from expert trainers, which had a major influence in planting the seeds of his 
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interest in sports and his patronage of sportsmen. Following the completion of 
his primary education, Hamad was proclaimed Crown Prince on 27 June 1964. 
He completed his secondary schooling at Leys Public School in Cambridge, 
England, before returning to Bahrain in the summer of 1967. He then joined the 
Mons Officer Cadet School at Aldershot, England, from which he graduated on 
14 September 1968. He also studied at Sandhurst Academy. On his return, 
Crown Prince Hamad played an active role in preparing the outline of the 
Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) that was created by an Amiri Charter issued in 
August 1968. He married his cousin Sheikha Sabeeka bint Ibrahim AI Khalifa 
on 9 October 1968, a union that bore: Sheikh Salman on 21 October 1969, 
Sheikh Abdullah on 30 June 1975, Sheikh Khalifa on 4 June 1977, and Sheikha 
Najla on 20 May 1981. 
Crown Prince Hamad was appointed Head of the Defence Directorate and 
became a member of the State Council, which was established on 19 January 
1970. He became Minister of Defence on 15 August 1971. On 21 June 1972, he 
joined the US Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
He was awarded the Freedom Medal of Kansas City. He attained a National 
Diploma in military administration on 31 May 1972, from the Industrial College 
for the Military Forces in Washington. On 9 June 1973, he graduated with 
honours from Fort Leavenworth with a degree in leadership. He was awarded 
the military honour certificate from USA for his achievements in military affairs 
since 1968 and his name was enlisted in the college's lieutenant honours list. On 
his return from the US, he took active part in Bahrain's development and 
expansion process in general and the BDF in particular. His efforts covered 
various fields including culture, sports, military, and technological and health 
sciences. On 26 June 1974, he was appointed deputy to the Head of the AI 
Khalifa Family Council following an Amiri decree issued in this context. In 
January 1978, he ordered the establishment of the Historical Documents Centre, 
which he housed in his Court. This had a great impact in the development of the 
Centre. His interest in sports and the youth was enhanced by his appointment as 
President ofthe Supreme Council of Youth and Sports in 1975. 
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Figure 2.0: The Ancestry of AI Khalifa 
I 
Muqrin 
6. Abdulla 
1821- 1842 
9. Mohammed 
1869 
few months only 
I 
I. Khalifa 
Died in Kuwait 1708 
2. Mohammed 
Kuwait- Zubara 
1762 - 1772 
I 
I 
4. Ahamed AI Fateh 
Zubara - Bahrain 
1783- 1795 
I 
8. Ali 
1868- 1869 
10. lsa 
1869- 1932 
13. lsa 
1961 - 1999 
14. Hamad 
1999 
I 
I 
3. Khalifa 
Zubara 
5. Salman 
1795- 1821 
I 
I I Eb rahim 
7. Mohammed 
1842- 1868 
Source: First Light: Modern Bahrain and its Heritage, Hamad Bin !sa AI Khalifa, 1994 
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Table 2.0: The History of the Kingdom 
I 3'a millennium BCE I Bahrain is known as the commercial town ofDilmun, which is part ofSumer. Ia 41h Century CE Occupied by the Persian Sassanid Empire. Bahrain is turned into a Christian 
Nestorian hold. 
I ~ 8th Century Conquered by the Abbasids, and becomes from this time as part of th,e 
"',.; Caliphate. A process of conversion to Islam starts in the population. 
I ~ 1521 "lib I Portuguese rule. At this time Bahrain is a centre of trading. ,_,,;.<·:>:~ 
I ~~ 1602 t%\ I Persians drives the Portuguese away. '''" 'I" •• 
I~ 1783 )1 AI Khalifa family takes control and drives the Persians out. For a period, Bahrain is an independent Emirate. 
1 ~··-c;~"<'f'• 1820 ... I Treaty between Britain and Bahrain is signed after British pressure . '~.- ~ h .'·:U 
I~ 1861 ;jl Second treaty is signed, and Bahrain becomes a British protectorate. British "1.1 Jf -.. ~~-~~ ~· 
·•··· takes control over the external affairs, and gets exclusive rights on trade. 
,~; 1932 Oil is discovered, and national assertion becomes stronger. 
;,< 1934 British naval base established. 
'· 
1968 British forces withdraw from the Gulf region. 
1970 Council of state established. 
15 August 1971 Bahrain gained independence from the UK. 
16 December 1971 Bahrain National Day (the date of independence from British Protection). 
1971 Bahrain becomes a member of the United Nations. 
December 1973 Elections are held for a National Assembly, an advisory legislative body, with 
44 members (14 cabinet members and 30 elected by male voters). 
August 1975 I The National Assembly is dissolved. ' ,. '.'h' ' ·i· • i i 
1978 I Oil industry partly nationalised. .. I.·:·-· 1979 -:~q. 1 rl With the Iranian revolution, pro-Iranian groups begin to protest against the ·-t,w ·.-, • l· -<!U• ~ ,1.;. 
government, and Iran expresses its claim on Bahrain. 
March 1981 
, I Bahrain joined the GCC. 
April1986 Qatari troops occupy Fasht al-Dibal Island and try to do the same in Hawar 
Islands but withdraw in June after mediation by Saudi Arabia. 
December 1986 I A causeway between Bahrain and SaudLArabia opens. 
1991 The International Court of Justice began in 1991 looking over the Qatar & 
' Bahrain's border dispute and ended with the fmal decision on 16 March 200 I. 
December 1992 The government appointed a 30 member Consultative Council and increased to 
40 by September 1996. 
1993- 1998 I Shia protests against the government. 
6 March 1999 Amir lsa Bin Salman AI Khalifa died at the age of 65 and King Hamad Bin lsa 
AI Khalifa ascended to the throne in a smooth transition. On March 9, King 
Hamad's son, Sheikh Salman, becomes Crown Prince. 
1999 I The new reform by King Hamad Bin Isa AI ~ali fa. 
September 2000 The King appoints non-Muslirns to the Con~ultative Council, including 4 
women- one of whom is a Christian- and a Jewish businessman. 
Feb 2001 I The National Action Charter approved and voted overwhelmingly (98.4%). 
Feb 2002 I The amended Constitution of the Kingdom. 
May2002 Municipal elections took place, the frrst since 1957. The turn out was 51%. For 
the frrst time women vote and stand as candidates but fail to win a seat. 
I·· October 2002 Parliamentary elections took place. The turn out was 53.4% despite calls by some parties for a boycott. 
* The information are derived from di fferent sources; Encyclopaedia of the orient, the world fact book, BBC News (country 
profiles), The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Bahrain Government, and Gulf Centre for Strategic Stud ies. 
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2.2 STRUCTURE OF BAHRAIN'S SOCIETY 
Many observers are misled by the idea that most GCC countries are the same in 
relation to their traditions in which social relations are determined by tribal or 
religious factors. Richard Lawless indicated that Gulf Arab societies may appear 
similar, but they should not be treated as though they were a homogeneous entity. 
On closer examination, as he describes, one is struck by their diversity.21 Although 
there are some similarities, Bahrain's society is distinguished by the way in which 
cleavages based on ethnicity, class position, and national origin overlap to produce a 
matrix of social relations unique to the islands in particular and to the region in 
general. The Kingdom has already gone through many of the stages, from nomadic 
to village to city life, necessary for a transition to modernity. Bahrain society is 
small but sophisticated to the extent that it is difficult to exemplify. 
There is no doubt that throughout the history of Bahrain, all empires that inhabited 
the islands have transferred their culture, sciences, crafts, and skills to its indigenous 
people. Most of these empires were highly developed and advanced in many fields. 
For example, the Sumerians were the first to start using the alloy bronze, which 
allowed them to develop better instruments. The discovery of how to mould bronze 
soon spread all over the rest of Middle East. Among the earliest cultural artefacts in 
Sumer was pottery. Around 3000 BCE the Sumerians started carving in stones and 
shells, and creating statues. Jewellery was also created from gold and silver. Such 
skills are still used by Bahrainis and many other skills has been gained from 
Sassanids, Abbasids, Portuguese, Persian, British, and Arab tribes which at various 
times had been on the islands. Another example is that the current parliament is 
modelled on the British political system. 
Accordingly, trade, fresh water, pearls, Islam, and colonisation all made Bahrain 
more advanced than its neighbours did. Bahrain was the first Gulf state to discover 
oil; it was also the first to enjoy the benefits that came with the revenues. Although 
21 Richard I. Lawless, ed., "The Gulf in the early 201h century: Foreign Institutions and Local 
Responses," Durham: Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1986, p. 1. 
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oil has played a vital role in improving the quality of education, health care and the 
development of the country, it has also affected the natural development of the 
maturity of the population, which will be elaborated in depth in a later chapter. In 
contrast, the small oil reserves of Bahrain have proved to be an advantage. Without 
the resources for a boom, Bahrain has moved more slowly and thoughtfully into the 
technological age. The necessity to diversify their economy as well as their long 
history as a trading country has proved to be a fortuitous set of circumstances. It has 
produced new professions for the citizens to grab and advance. All these benefits 
have attracted different people to come and settle in Bahrain. 
2.2.1 Sectarian Character ofBahrain's Society 
Bahraini society, which did not change even after the transformation to civil society, 
is principally divided into the following groups or sects:22 
I) The Arabs; which are locally called (Qaba el) or what is known in the 
English language as tribes, e.g. AI Utub.23 They are Sunnis. 
2) AI Baharna; they are regarded as the original inhabitants of the islands. 
They are Arab Shia. 
3) AI Hawala; they are of Arab origin and emigrated from the Arab mainland 
to Persia and later returned to the mainland. The Hawala are Sunnis, divided 
into Hawala Arab and Hawala al Mostarebeen whom seem similar to 
mainstream Arabs. 
22 A detailed and interesting analysis of Bahrain society and politics is presented in M. G. Rumaihi, 
"Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War," Bowker Publishing Co., London, 
1976; Another detailed analysis of the same topic is presented in Fuad I. Khuri, "Tribe and State in 
Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State," The University of 
Chicago, U.S.A., 1980; Sir Charles Belgrave, "Personal Column: A History of Bahrain 1926 -1957," 
Librairie Du Liban, Beirut, 1960; Emile A. Nakhleh, "Bahrain: Political Development in a 
Modernizing Society," Lexington Books, Toronto and London, 1938; Sheikh Abdulla Bin Khalid AI 
Khalifa & Abdul Almalk Y. AI Hamar, "Bahrain through the History," Volume I, Bahrain, 1972; 
Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima, "History of Eastern Arabia 1750- 1800," Beirut, 1965; May Seikaly, 
"Women and Social Change in Bahrain," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 26, No. 
3, August 1994, pp. 415-426; Rosemarie Said Zahlan, "The Making of the Modern Gulf States," 
London, Unwin Hyman, 1989, rev. ed., Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998, and The Bahrain Government 
Annual Reports 1924-1956, Archive Editions, Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire, England, 1987. 
23 The most popular Arab tribes in Bahrain are AI Khalifa, AI Jalahma, AI-Ghatum, AI Fadel, AI 
Mosalam, AI Bin Ali, AI Sadah, AI Rumaihi, AI Manai, AI Dowsari, AI Noaimi, etc. 
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4) AI Ajam or Iranian; Shia who speak Persian and are unrelated to the Shia 
Bahama. 
The Utub tribes and their allies are one of many tribes that were attracted by the 
wealth of Bahrain and have occupied it since 1783. The Muslims are divided 
religiously between the two sects of Islam: Sunnis and Shia. The Arab tribes, who 
came to Bahrain with AI Khalifa as conquerors and allies, were and continue to be 
considered as the upper class. These Arab tribes have a close relationship with the 
AI Khalifa and always get support in the form of money or lands from the rulers in 
return for their loyalty and protection. Some of these tribes still isolate themselves 
in their villages and do not mix or intermarry with the middle class.24 For a long 
period, since their settlement in Bahrain, this group did not feel that education and 
work was essential (except in the military and pearl fishing) because of the support 
of AI Khalifa. They considered working on the land or in commerce as beneath their 
dignity. Approximately a decade ago, they started to educate themselves and their 
children, mostly the males, when the country and the region was challenged by 
recession and scarce natural resources that affected the allowances given by the 
rulers to them. Moreover, they were confronted by the increasing numbers of 
educated people from the Hawala, Bahama, and the Ajam and found themselves way 
behind in terms of development, political consciousness, and new challenges. 
AI Baharna are the original inhabitants of the Islands. They are Shia Arab and are 
considered in Bahrain as second-class citizens. Their ethnic origin is still unknown. 
Charles Belgrave refers to them as originally Jewish who settled in the Arabian Gulf 
before the days of Islam?5 P. W. Harrison, who wrote about the Islands in 1924, 
recognised them as semi-Persians.26 Others indicated that they are the descendants 
24 Most writers and analysts criticise AI Bahama's isolation as a threat and as a stance against 
urbanisation, whereas the isolation of other Arab tribes is not considered as threat to the citizenship 
and loyalty of Bahrain. The AI Bahama's isolation means they have failed to contribute to economic 
development such as the oil industries and commerce, which creates a gap in their self-development 
and gaining the necessary skills for future challenges. 
25 Sir Charles Belgrave, "Personal Column: A History of Bahrain 1926- 1957," Librairie Du Liban, 
Beirut, 1960, p. 148. 
26 P. W. Harrison, "The Arab at Home," New York, 1924, p. 29. 
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of Arabs taken as prisoners by Nebuchadnezzar into Iraq who later escaped and 
settled in Bahrain.27 The fact that they do not speak the Persian language and there 
are no form of Persian words in their form of Arabic, seems to rule out the 
possibility of them being semi-Persians. 28 The Baharna Arabic dialect is very 
similar to that spoke by the Arabs of Iraq. The Shia of Bahrain are practitioners of 
the "Twelver Shia," because they believe in the succession of twelve Imams who are 
called Mohamed AI Mehdi. Differences between Shia and Sunni in Bahrain in 
matters such as ones that touch on the interpretation of Islamic teaching, being the 
original inhabitants of the Islands, way of living, job opportunities, and many others 
historical beliefs, have created social and political conflicts between these two sects 
of Islam. 
The Hawala were the rulers of Bahrain before the AI Khalifa appeared on the 
Islands under their leader Jabbara of Tahiri.29 The Hawala, who are considered as 
middle class citizens, came from the western coast of Fars (Iran) but they are Arab 
and Sunni. They are well integrated with the people of the Islands and are well 
adapted to the development of the Kingdom. They still dominate commerce and 
maritime trading, and play a key role in the economy. They were amongst the first 
people to take advantage of modern education, and most of them at present have 
leading positions in the public and private sectors. As a group, they have no 
solidarity such as that which exists amongst the Shia and to a lesser degree the Arab 
tribes. Thanks to their better education, they are the most politically conscious 
group in the Islands, but their political feelings are expressed on an individual rather 
than on a group basis. Their aspirations range from Arab nationalism, Islamic unity, 
and Western-style democracy, to simple patriotism. The Hawala were the prime 
movers in the political confrontations of the 1950s. 30 
27 James H. Belgrave, Welcome to Bahrain, Bahrain, 1970, p. I 0. 
28 M. G. Rumaihi, "Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War," Bowker 
Publishing Co., London 1976, P. 26. 
29 Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima, "History of Eastern Arabia 17 50- 1800," Beirut, 1965, p. 34. 
30 M. G. Rumaihi, p. 28. 
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In the seventh century, with the rise of Islam in the region and especially in Persia, 
many Persians migrated to Bahrain and settled there. A much larger number of 
Persians settled permanently on the Islands after the occupation of Bahrain by the 
Persians at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Arab population in 
Bahrain has always considered the Ajam, who came from Iranian mainland and 
speak the Iranian language, at the bottom of the social and economic ladder. Most 
of them came to work in Bahrain's promising oil industry in the 1930s and 1940s. 
They work mainly in trade, finance, and private business. Most of them were not 
granted Bahraini citizenship until King Hamad's reign; this was due to their high 
rate of illegal immigration and the fact that they were perceived as being linked to 
Iran. As Iran has historically claimed the sovereignty of Bahrain, other groups of 
Bahrain society have not welcomed the Ajam. The Iranian Shia do not associate 
themselves with the Bahama Shia. They speak a different language (Farsi) from 
Arabic. As relations between Bahrain and Iran improved in 1970 when Iran 
recognised Bahrain as an independent state, more individuals have been granted the 
citizenship of Bahrain as a reward for their loyalty to the Islands. This loyalty was 
expressed in the United Nation questionnaire on whether Bahrain should become 
part of Iran or obtain sovereignty. Moreover, the relationship with other groups has 
also improved. In contrast, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and its aftermath had a 
negative effect on the population: the government believed that a number of Shia 
plots during the 1980s received clandestine support from Iran. 
Generally speaking, the structure of Shiaism and its holiest shrine are located in 
southern Iraq, and its most influential ulamas are found in the cities Najaf and 
Karbala of Iraq, Qom, and Mashhad of Iran. Since the creation of the Safavid 
Empire in the sixteenth century, Iran was the defender of Shiaism, which, until then, 
had been a more or less persecuted minority sect throughout the Islamic world. 
Since Khomeini's revolution, Iran has sometimes been described as "the Vatican of 
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the Shia."31 Although many Shia are ethnic Arabs, there is in Bahrain and in the 
Gulf in general a persistent and widespread stereotype according to which Shia is 
equivalent of Persian (Ajam), and Sunnis is the equivalent of Arab. As ethnic 
Persians, the Shia are seen as outsiders by Bahrainis Arab Sunnis.32 
Those mentioned above are the main groups of Bahrain society. However, it does 
not mean that there are no other groups. Many other nationalities were attracted by 
the wealth of Bahrain and chose to settle there. Indian merchants and workers are 
one of these groups. Their numbers have rapidly increased over Bahrain's history 
and became the largest group of foreigners on the Islands. Before the discovery of 
oil, Bahraini people dealt with Indian merchants during the pearl diving era, which 
made many of these Indian merchants stay in Bahrain. The number has increased 
with the discovery of oil in the Islands. Many Indian and Pakistani people were also 
brought to Bahrain to work in the police force. 33 Moreover, due to a shortage of 
public health labour it was necessary to recruit from Pakistan and India. 34 A 
remarkable number of Far East nationalities have also become a very high 
percentage of the Islands' population. The majority of them work as housemaids. 
At present, Asians are considered to be the largest foreign community in Bahrain, 
see Table 2.1. 
Because of its uniqueness, Bahrain has accepted many ethnicities. A small number 
of Jewish immigrants who fled from Iraq, Iran, and India have lived in the Islands 
since the 1920s. 35 There has been minimal friction between them and the Muslims; 
an indication of this was the fact that for many years there was a Jewish member on 
31 Anh Nga Longva, "Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualisation and Practice," in the book 
edited by Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian, "Citizenship and the State in the 
Middle East: Approaches and Applications," Syracuse University Press, New York, 2000, p. 189. 
32 Ibid. 
33 The Bahrain Government Annual Reports 1924-1956, Archive Editions, Gerrards Cross, 
Buckinghamshire, England, 1987, Volume I, p. 77. 
34 The Bahrain Government Annual Reports 1924-1956, Archive Editions, Gerrards Cross, 
Buckinghamshire, England, 1987, Volume v, p. 20. 
35 The 1950 census of population by the Bahrain Government indicated that there were 293 Jewish in 
Bahrain. 
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the Manama Municipal Council. 36 One exception to this friendly relationship 
occurred when the United Nations decided on 2 December 1942 to divide Palestine. 
There was a demonstration in part of Bahrain against America and Jewish groups, 
during which some houses occupied by Jews were ransacked or burned. Although 
some of the Jewish families fled the region, others continued to live in Bahrain. 
Jewish citizens continue to be allocated a seat in the Consultative Council. 
There are also Arabs from other Middle East countries living in Bahrain. Some of 
them have lived there for a while, and have mainly worked in the field of education 
and business. In the recent history of the Island, many Jordanians and Syrians have 
increasingly worked in the military forces to protect Bahrain from external and 
internal threats, and to boost the economy of these countries. This political and 
protection policy of citizenship, was shown to be ineffective during the 1986 Qatar-
Bahrain border dispute over the Hawar Islands. In May 1986, the two countries 
almost clashed when Qatar tried to take the Hawar Islands by force. The majority of 
Jordanians and Syrians refused to go to war against their fellow countrymen or 
relatives who worked in Qatar's military, and decided to return their Bahraini 
passports before fleeing back to their countries. Bahrain continues bringing these 
nationalities! 
There are also a considerable number of Westerners such as British and Americans, 
who came to the Islands after the discovery of oil to contribute to economic 
development. They were considered experts as Bahrainis at that time lacked the 
experience for such a market. Their numbers are decreasing as Bahraini citizens 
become highly educated and skilful. Taking over the Westerners' positions is not an 
easy task, as these W estemers resisted training Bahrainis to maintain their own 
position and large incomes. In general, foreign workers such as the Indians and 
Westerners have reduced opportunities for the advancement of the indigenous 
population, especially in the field of oil and banking. Table 2.1 illustrates the 
36 Sir Charles Belgrave, "Personal Column: A History of Bahrain /926 -1957," Librairie Du Liban, 
Beirut, 1960, p. 148. 
56 
Bahrain population by nationality groups based on the Bahrain Government 2001 
census. 
The differences between these classifications in the Bahrain society creates on one 
hand enormous economic benefits, and on the other hand, it brings tensions that lead 
to social and political conflicts. There is unrest between the Shia and Sunnis in 
Bahrain. As the AI Kha1ifa family belongs to the Sunnis, Shia Muslims have 
continued to agitate for more representation in government, and minor violent 
clashes have historically occurred. 
Bahrain's society developed early; it was the first country from the GCC to hold a 
population census in 1941 and to continue to do so see Table 2.2. The first census 
was held primarily to determine the total population of the country for the purposes 
of food rationing. The most recent Bahrain census' objectives are to determine the 
major demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population, providing 
necessary data for assessing the changes that have occurred in the kingdom, 
furnishing data on labour forces structures, providing necessary information for 
planning health, education, housing, etc. 
In fact, Bahrain's census has served many developmental aspects, but this massive 
database has hardly ever been used to bring about solidarity in Bahraini society or to 
diminish the underlying tension between the different groups. On the other hand, it 
does not, for example serve on the selection of MPs (Consultative Council), 
Ministers, or/and high-level appointed posts to ensure the right person for the right 
position. 
The numbers in tables 2.1 and 2.2 indicate how the kingdom's population is rapidly 
increasing in a limited geographical area, which indicates that planners should look 
at the ways of developing the economy of the country and closely study social rather 
than political aspects. These criticisms will be elaborated on in detail in the coming 
chapters. 
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Table 2.1: Population by Nationality Group- 2001 
Bahraini GCC Other Asian African European North South Oceanian Total Arabs American American 
405667 6823 20050 205626 2924 5788 3195 70 461 650604 
Chart 2.1: Population by Nationality Group- 2001 
Bahraini DOther Arab DAsian •African 0 European • North American 0 South American •oceanian 
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Table 2.2- Changes in Population Size and the Percentage Distribution of Bahrain 
Population by Nationality (1941- 2001 
Item 1941 1950 1959 1965 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Population 89970 109650 143135 182203 216078 350798 508037 650604 
Bahraini 74040 91!76 118734 143814 178193 238420 323305 405667 
Non-Bahraini 15930 18471 24401 38389 37885 112378 184732 244937 
Bahraini% 82.3 83.2 83.0 78.9 82.5 68.0 63.6 62.4 
Non-Bahraini 17.7 16.8 17.0 21.1 17.5 32.0 36.4 37.6 0/o 
Chart 2.2: Chanf{es in Population Size by Nationality (1941- 2001) 
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2.2.2 The Legitimacy ofthe AI Khalifa 
One of the key issues that should be examined from the outset is the question of the 
legitimacy underpinning the ruling AI Khalifa tribe. A common critique levelled 
about the political systems of the Gulf countries is that the ruling tribes do not enjoy 
legitimacy, as they are ultimately not elected through a popular mandate. With 
specific regard to Bahrain, John Peterson implies that the AI Khalifa tribe lacks 
legitimacy within the Shia segments of society. He writes, '[b]y 2003, the graffiti 
was back with its terse exhortations of "No National Charter" [and] "Death to 
Khalifa."37 It is, however, important for us to recognise the distinction between 
vocal unpopularity within certain quarters of society and legitimacy per se. Whilst 
such graffiti does indicate a degree of unpopular sentiment, it does not necessarily 
show a belief that holds widespread currency. Indeed, when we look back 
historically at Bahrain it is possible to identify three separate occasions where 
Bahrain's society has been able to offer freely pledges of allegiance to the AI 
Khalifa. This demonstrates that a distinction needs to be made between 
unpopularity and legitimacy. 
• The first occasion was in 1843, when a series of battles within the ruling 
families took place and threatened the rule of AI Khalifa over the Islands. 
These incidents prompted the British to install their own choice for Amir in 
1869. After surveying the society of Bahrain, they selected Amir Isa Bin Ali 
AI Khalifa, who was only 21 years old and living in Qatar, to become the tenth 
ruler. That period marked the creation of modern Bahrain and the beginning 
of stability and prosperity which was to last for over half a century. 
• The second occasion was in 1970 when the people of Bahrain were asked to 
give their opinion on the sovereignty of Bahrain in the United Nation's 
questionnaire as to whether Bahrain should become part of Iran, or gain 
37 J. E. Peterson, "The Promise and Reality of Bahraini Reforms," Joshua Teitelbaum, ed., 2002, p. 
34. 
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sovereignty. Again, Bahrain citizens, Sunni and Shia, proved their loyalty and 
that they were responsible patriots who were highly committed to their country 
and gave the ruling family legitimacy over the Islands. 
• The third pledge of allegiance took place in 200 I when the people of Bahrain 
voted by 98.4% in favour of the vague National Action Charter, despite their 
political grievances and poor standards of living. 
The final analysis that can be made is that the majority of Bahrain's society has 
historically supported and provided legitimacy for the AI Khalifa in their capacity as 
the de jure rulers of Bahrain. Indications that certain vocal sectors of society do not 
accept this position are thus a reflection of unpopularity rather than the actual de jure 
legitimacy. 
2.3 THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
The education system is of key importance to appreciating several interlinked factors 
relating to Bahrain's historical social and economic development. With education 
forming the bedrock of society, it has implications on the structure of the labour 
market, the political outlook of the population and by extension to the very 
definition of citizenship in Bahrain. With King Hamad implementing reforms in this 
area, it is pertinent to provide a background to this sector at this stage. 
The education system in Bahrain is the longest established in the Arabian Gulf and is 
over 86 years old. At the beginning of the 201h century, Quranic Schools (Mutawwa) 
were the only form of education in the country. They are traditional schools aimed 
at teaching children and youth, both male and female, the reading ofthe Holy Quran 
by local Mullahs who were usually in charge of the local mosques. Such schools 
were the first sparks of enlightenment for Bahraini individuals. Meanwhile, the first 
Western style school in Bahrain was founded by the American Mission, an 
independent group who began their operations on the Islands in 1892 and were 
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adopted in 1894 by the Reformed Church in America. 38 Interestingly, the school 
was only for girls and the classes were very small, rarely exceeding one dozen 
during the early years, due partly to the local population's resentment of girls being 
educated, and partly to the fact that Christian religious instruction was given at the 
school. In 1905, the school expanded and a boys' school was opened in the Mission 
building. The school's attempt to attract and convert Bahrainis to Christianity did 
not work because Moslems are generally loyal to their religion. By 1934-35, the 
boys' school closed due to poor attendances and a lack of financial support. From 
1940 to the 1960s, a few small private schools were established in Bahrain and, 
during the early stages, targeted minorities such as Persians, Indians, Pakistanis and 
Westerns. Examples included the Sacred Heart School, run by the Roman Catholic 
Church, and the Indian School, run by the Indian community on the Islands. 
After the First World War, Bahrain became open to modern western influences. 
Political and social changes have occurred in the country, and helped create the rise 
of social and cultural awareness among the population, which found that Quranic 
schools did not fulfil their ambitions and did not cope with the challenges of the new 
era. 
Before 1919, a number of well-known citizens in Muharraq city joined by members 
of the Royal family, discussed, and agreed to establish a modern formal school. As 
a result, the first modern public school system started in Muharraq in 1919. The 
school was called AI Hidaya AI Khalifia and was mostly occupied by Sunnis boys. 
An Education Committee ran the school consisting of several leading merchants. In 
1926, the Education Committee opened a second public school for boys at Manama, 
the capital, and then in Hidd and Riffa, followed by the first public school for girls in 
1928. In the same year, the Sunni committee took one more advanced step by 
sending eight youths for their higher education at the American University of Beirut. 
In contrast, the growth of these schools, which were restricted to the sons of Sunni 
population, created anxious feelings amongst the Shia society, which resulted in 
38 R. B. Winder, "Education in At-Bahrain," World oflslam, London and New York, 1959, p. 283. 
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them establishing their own schools. The first Shia school, called the Ja.ffariya, was 
opened in Manama in 1927. A year later, another school was opened in the village 
of AI Kamis. Thus, the education system furthered the division of the two main 
sects in the country. 
Due to financial and administrative difficulties faced by the Education Committee, 
the schools came under the direct control of the government in 1930. The Gulf 
Polytechnic was the first institution of higher education in Bahrain and was 
established in 1968. 
From its early years of growth, Bahrain has invested its oil revenues in education 
system development, based on the principle of human development and preparing 
the individual to face intellectually the future needs of the country. Since the 1970s, 
education has been one of the largest current government expenditures. Although 
not compulsory, primary and secondary attendance rates are high and illiteracy rates 
are currently among the lowest in the Arab and Muslim countries. Illiteracy was 
only 2.7% in 2001.39 Higher education is available for secondary school graduates 
and can be obtained through Bahrain University, Arabian Gulf University, Private 
universities and Colleges, and Specialised Institutions including the College of 
Health Sciences, operating under the direction of the Ministry of Health, which 
trains physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and paramedics. The government has 
targeted the provision of education services to the wider Gulf region as a potential 
growth area, and is actively working to establish Bahrain as a regional centre for 
higher education and training. 
In the 2001-2002 academic year, 118,129 students of both genders attended 195 
public schools and 31,925 students attended 46 private schools. Education in public 
schools is free. Additionally, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence, and 
many other public and private organisations in the country give huge numbers of 
scholarships to students who gain a high secondary school score. The Crown Prince 
39 The 2001 census of population by the Bahrain Government. 
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established a fully sponsored scholarship programme targeting public and private 
high schools graduates with score higher than 95%, with equal opportunities given 
for both male and female students. The scholarship includes 10 seats at the most 
prestigious universities in UK and America such as Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, 
and Yale. 
Education is the leading factor for the development and the building of Bahrain's 
modem polity. It has acted as a catalyst for the Bahrainisation programme in the 
schools and all other fields; indeed the 86-year-old education system has made 
Bahrain's society more advance and open-minded. However, the challenge that 
Bahrain is facing now is to find jobs for all the graduate citizens from centres, 
institutes, colleges, and universities inside and outside the country. 
2.4 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Bahrain is one of the Gulf States that realised the importance of consultation and 
participation of its people in all general issues, and the interaction between the rulers 
and the ruled has occurred in several ways and techniques. The following analysis 
will divide the development of political participation into three stages: firstly 
covering the beginning of the 201h century to 1971; secondly dealing with the period 
from the independence to 1992; and finally the period from 1992 to the new reforms 
by King Hamad. 
2.4.1 Stage One: The period before Independence 
Political participation started with Amir Isa bin Ali AI Khalifa, the tenth ruler of 
Bahrain, when he gave an oath to rule using the principle of al Shura as counselled 
by Islamic Law. He kept his oath and discussed all issues of political, social, and 
economic with his people via the following: 
• AI Majlis: This tradition was and continues to be held. Rulers open their 
Majlis to the public to discuss matters of mutual interest and even the 
specifics of policies. The people of Bahrain meet on regular basis in their 
own Majlis for the same purposes. 
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• Al Moktar (Mayor): A tribal system where an elected person acts as the 
mediator between the tribe and the ruler. The Moktar collects all his 
people's requirements and suggestions and discusses them with the ruler. 
This system has been developed by Decree No. 16 of 1996 on establishing 
the Governorates' system that have the role of assisting ministries and other 
government institutions. 
As early as 1913 the people of Bahrain demanded to have state structures such as the 
municipality, department of finance, police department, judiciary system, education, 
and customs taxes system. The first Bahrain Municipality demanded was reviewed 
and enacted by Article 70 of the Bahrain Order in Council, 1913, No. 1 of 
1921/Municipal. 40 In 1938, the intellectual and nationalist people of Bahrain 
continued to put pressure on the government and Charles Belgrave, the British 
representative at that time, demanding the following: 
• The development of a Consultative Council (Shura Council) 
a Reform in the Police Department 
a Categorising and coordinating the Bahrain Law 
• Job priorities for Bahrainis in Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) 
In the absence of political parties, the clubs and societies, whose membership 
includes a majority of Bahrain's elite, have played the essential functions performed 
by political parties. Although none of the clubs and societies was established for 
political reasons or to perform explicit political functions, they have all provided the 
environment for the public to develop and articulate political opinions. Sir Charles 
Belgrave wrote that the increase in the number of clubs, and the intensification of 
their political role, was directly related to the emerging political consciousness 
following the end of World War II. As they were the places where the educated met, 
the clubs, though strictly non-political, became in reality, political centres.41 There 
were many types of clubs: literary and cultural, sports, women's welfare, and music 
40 
"Record of Bahrain: Primary Documents 1820- 1960," Volume 3 I 1892- 1923, Archive 
Editions, 1993, Antony Row Ltd., England, p. 447. 
41 Sir Charles Belgrave, "Personal Column," 2"d ed., Librairie Du Liban, Beirut, 1972, p. 144. 
65 
clubs. The press also played a vital political role in the early days of Bahrain. The 
press is considered as an agent of political socialisation in modernising societies. 
Historically, Bahrain has had a relatively strong tradition of journalism, especially in 
comparison to other Gulf States. However, this tradition was in fact intermittent due 
to the numerous interruptions to which newspapers were subjected as a result of 
governmental restrictions and orders, particularly during the mid 1950s. 
2.4.2 Stage Two: 1971 - 1992 
After independence from the British in 1971, the rulers of Bahrain continued 
meeting with people on a regular basis through the Majlis. The rapid growth of the 
population resulted in the call for a larger institution to represent its citizens. In his 
1971 National Day Speech, the first since independence, Amir Isa bin Salman 
announced that the country would have a constitutional form of government. Such a 
constitution would protect society's unity and cohesion, and guarantee citizens their 
basic individual freedoms of education, work, social welfare, health, and the free 
expression of opinions. It also provided the people with the right to participate in 
the management of their country's affairs in a context of legitimacy and 
constitutionalism.42 
Six month later, Amir Isa bin Salman issued a decree providing for the election of 
representatives to a Constituent Assembly, charged with drafting and ratifying a 
constitution. The assembly was to consist of twenty-two elected delegates plus 
twenty additional members, including eight delegates appointed by the Amir and the 
twelve members from the Council of Ministers. The election, which was held in 
December 1972, was the first national election in the history of Bahrain. The 
electorate was restricted, however, to native-born male citizens aged twenty years 
and older. This commitment signalled a move by the AI Khalifa family to urbanise 
42 State of Bahrain, Ministry oflnfonnation, Huna AI Bahrain, December 1971, p. 3. 
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and modernise its tribal rule, thereby attempting to establish a legitimate basis of 
government other than the traditional, autocratic tribal system.43 
The Constituent Assembly was m session during most of 1973. It approved a 
constitution of I 08 articles. The Constitution, enacted by decree in December 1973, 
provided for an advisory legislative body, the National Assembly, consisting of 
thirty members elected for a four-year term plus all the members of the Council of 
Ministers whose terms were not fixed. The Assembly was not empowered to initiate 
or enact legislation, but it was authorised to give advice and consent to laws 
proposed by the Council of Ministers. The Assembly had the right to question 
individual ministers about policies and to withdraw confidence from any minister 
except the Prime Minister. The Constitution allowed the Ruler to dissolve the 
Assembly, provided he made public the grounds for so doing. lfthe Assembly was 
dissolved by decree, new elections had to take place within two months or the 
dissolution would be invalidated and the dismissed members reinstated. 
There were several frictions between the National Assembly and the Government. 
On 26 August 1975, the Prime Minister resigned, complaining of the continual 
obstruction of his work by the Assembly. The ruler formed a new government and 
dissolved the National Assembly. Although the constitution stipulated that new 
elections had to take place within two months of dissolution, this did not happen. 
This remains a defining moment in the relations between the government and 
opposition: in the view of some people, the government has been operating illegally 
since October 1975.44 One year later, in August 1976, the ruler announced that the 
National Assembly would remain dissolved indefinitely. Some of the reasons of 
dissolving the Assembly were the demands to rescind the 1965 Law of Public 
Security, as political parties were not permitted. It was assumed that the members of 
the Assembly were acting on behalf of parties such as the National Front for the 
43 Nakhleh, Emile, "Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society," Lexington Books, 
Toronto and London, 1983, p. 117. 
44 International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's sectarian Challenge," Middle East Report No. 40, May 6, 
2005, p. 2. 
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Liberation of Bahrain, which espoused Marxist economic ideas; the People's Bloc 
that advocated the legislation of labour unions and the abolition of the Security Law; 
the Religious Bloc which supported labour reforms and various social restrictions, 
such as a ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages; and independents whose individual 
positions shifted according to the issues. 
Many internal and external factors postponed elections to the new Assembly until 
1992: 
• The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the disorder that came prior to it, in 
addition to the claim on Bahrain by Iran. 
• The Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) that threatened the security and stability of 
the whole Gulf. Additionally, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and 
the peace accord between Egypt and Israel that saw Egypt withdraw from the 
Arab League. 
• Qatar-Bahrain border dispute that pushed the country to military readiness. 
• The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, which changed all GCC States' 
aspects of security and policies towards their neighbour. 
2.4.3 Stage Three: 1992 to the present 
From 1975, the appointed government ruled with virtually absolute power. In 1992, 
Amir I sa bin Salman appointed a 30 member Shura Majlis for a term of four years. 
In 1994, there were public protests by Shia calling for the reinstatement of a national 
assembly. As a move towards a more political participation, the council was 
expanded to 40 members in May 1996. There were still no recognisable political 
parties. The new Consultative Council, which began debating labour matters in 
January 1993, is believed to have had an impact on the provisions of the new Labour 
Law enacted in September 1993. 
In March 1999, King Hamad succeeded as head of state following his father's death. 
His accession to power led to a significant acceleration of the political reform 
process. He adopted a comprehensive reform project taking a number of measures 
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to secure a climate of national unity and social consolidation. The King started his 
reform when he said on 13 March 1999: 
We are greatly confident that our Bahraini civilised society is blessed 
with much potential of real progress upon which we can build in the 
path of political, administrative, and economic development. Such path 
we highly believe in and consider it as a source of richness for our 
traditions of consultation, and as a pattern for governmental 
development and for accomplishing the comprehensive progress and 
diversifying of the national economy in the interest of the people of this 
nation and every piece of this soi/.45 
2.5 THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
In examining, the primary factors, which have contributed to the development of 
Bahrain's reformed system, it is essential to recognise the structure of the legal 
apparatus that underpins the distribution of political power in Bahrain. For a full 
appreciation of the manner in which King Hamad reformed the legal system in 
Bahrain, it is necessary for us to firstly examine its historical development. This will 
allow the reader to realise the significance of change and the obstacles Bahrain was 
facing prior to this new initiative. 
Bahrain has a complex system of courts, based on diverse legal sources, including 
customary tribal law (Uri), 46 Sunni and Shia Sharia law (Islamic law), British 
Common Law and other civil laws as embodied in codes, ordinances, traditions and 
45 Ministry of Information, "The Speeches of His Majesty King Hamad bin /sa AI Khalifa, King of 
Bahrain," Ministry of Information publication, Bahrain, 2002, p. 8. 
46 The Blake's Law Dictionary, 61h edition, West Publishing: USA, explain the word custom or Urfas 
follow: 
• 
• 
Custom: Term generally implies habitual practice or course of action that characteristically is 
repeated in like circumstances. 
Custom and usage: A usage or practice of the people, which, by common adoption and 
acquiescence, and by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, and has acquired the 
force of a law with respect to the place or subject-matter to which it relates. It results from a long 
series of action, constantly repeated, which have, by such repetition and by uninterrupted 
acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit and common consent. A habitual or customary 
practice, more or less widespread, which prevails within a geographical or sociological area; 
usage is a course of conduct based on a series of actual occurrences. 
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regulation created with the help of the British advisers in the 1920s and which 
continued up to independence in 1971. As there are several differences between 
Shia and Sunna Islamic law (Sharia) practice, the Bahraini government has 
permitted each sect to have its own Sharia courts. Sharia law includes the Maliki 
School of Islamic law (from Abd Allah Malik Ibn Anas, an eighth-century Muslim 
jurist from Medina) and the Shafai School of Islamic law (from Mohammed Ibn 
Idris AI Shafai, a late eighth-century Muslim jurist from Mecca). Sunni Muslims 
recognise both of these schools. The third school is the eighth-century Ja 'afari 
(from Jaafar Ibn Mohammed, the Sixth Imam) school of Twelver Islam, which is 
recognised by Shia. The subdivided Sharia courts have the power to arbitrate on 
personal status conflicts relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. 
The Sharia courts in this regard adjudicate disputes among Muslims, while those 
between members of other religions are judged under civil courts. Appeals beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal are taken to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, which is part of the civil system. 
Legislative Decree No. 13 of 1971, regarding the organisation of the judiciary, 
establishes courts of first instance (lower and higher courts) and courts of 
enforcement, Higher Civil Courts of Appeal and the Court of Cassation. There are 
two classes of courts: Civil courts, which have jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
cases, and the Sharia courts, which rule on issues of personal status. The Civil 
Court system consists of summary courts and a supreme court. Summary courts of 
first instance are located in all communities and include separate Urj, civil, and 
criminal sections. The Supreme courts hear appeals from the Summary courts. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest appellate court in the country. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal also decides on the constitutionality of laws and regulations. 
There is no administrative court system in Bahrain, and according to the Judiciary 
Act of 1971, courts are forbidden to review acts of State. However, the Court of 
Cassation has ruled that the civil courts are competent to hear petitions against 
administrative decisions. 
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The Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) and the National Guard (NG) maintain a separate 
court system for military personnel accused of offences under the Military Code of 
Justice. The Ministry of Interior has a similar system for trying police officials. The 
military courts do not review cases involving civilian, criminal, or security offences. 
However, Article 105 (b) of the Constitution provides for the possibility to extend 
such jurisdiction when Martial Law is declared and within the bounds prescribed by 
law.47 
The most encouraging recent development relating to the judiciary system is the 
abolition of both the Decree Law on State Security Measures and the State Security 
Court Measures. On 18 February 2001, King Hamad issued Decree No 11 of2001, 
abolishing the Decree Law on State Security Measures, in force since 1975, which 
empowered the Ministry of Interior to detain individuals without charge or trial for 
up to three years. In another decree, No. 4 of 2001, he removed the power of the 
High Civil Court of Appeal, in its capacity as a State Security Court, to consider 
offences relating to internal and external state security. 
In September 2000, the King created the Higher Judicial Council to regulate these 
courts and separate the administrative and judicial branches of government. The 
King chairs the Council and its members are appointed by him and include judges 
from the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Sharia Law Courts, and the Civil High 
Courts of Appeal. Moreover, in 2002, the King created a Constitutional Court that 
rules on the constitutionality of laws and constitutional conflicts. It consists of a 
president and six members who are all appointed by the Higher Judicial Council. 
These seven judges serve a term of nine years and cannot be removed before their 
terms expire. Any member of the government, including the King, can challenge the 
47 Article I 05 (b) of Bahrain Amended Constitution. "The jurisdiction of military courts shall be 
confined to military offences committed by members of the Defence Force, the National Guard, and 
the Security Forces. It does not extend to other persons except when martial law is declared and 
within the bounds prescribed by law." 
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constitutionality of laws in this court, where the decisions are final and "binding on 
all state authorities."48 
2.5.1 Sources of Bahraini Law 
Sources of law mean the origins of law or the means by which the provisions, rules, 
and principles of law are created. The majority of Bahraini law are influenced by 
moral values, which have been heavily shaped by Islamic religion and obligations. 
The rule of law has two aspects: The first aspect is that there should be no sanction 
without breach, i.e., nobody should be punished, unless he has broken the law. The 
other aspect is that one law should govern everyone, including both ordinary citizens 
and stated officials, i.e. supremacy of law. 
As the principle source of Bahraini law, legislation means the formation of rules of 
law by the making authority. Legislation embraces: (I) codified acts of parliament, 
that is statutes; and (2) legislation of necessity and delegated legislation, which is 
directives, regulations, and provisional law. The legislative authority issues the 
statutes, which constitute the main and the general part of the legislation in the state, 
whereas the executive authority issues regulations and provisional laws. 
It is assumed that every person of the state has knowledge of the laws. So, when a 
new law is issued, whether a statute or a regulation, the state takes certain steps in 
order to inform the public of the provisions of the new law. Thus, every new law 
undergoes the following steps:49 
• Promulgation: this is an act done by the head of the executive authority (the 
prime minister) and aims to the declaration of the existence of the legislation 
and to order the governmental institutions for executing it. 
• Publication: legislation in Bahrain becomes executable now it has been 
promulgated, but it is not applicable to individuals, unless there is some 
48 The Constitution ofthe Kingdom of Bahrain, 14 February 2002, section I, the King. 
49 Ibid, Arts. 122 and 124. 
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means by which they can know of it. Publication is made to enable 
individuals to know the law in order to comply with its rules. 
It is to be said the main sources of the Bahraini laws are custom, Islamic doctrine, 
the writing of law jurists and judicial decisions. 
• Custom: Custom prescribes behaviour that through continued observance 
has become customary, and announces sanctions for deviant behaviour. It is 
distinguished from mere habits by the coercive force that is gathered behind 
it. In order to be resorted to by the Bahraini court, custom must be ancient, 
stable, and not contradict the rules of law, public order, or morals. 
• Islamic Doctrine: Sharia is one of the maJor sources of Bahraini 
legislation. 50 Judges are required to consider the Sharia principles most 
suited to the terms of the civil code when they do not find solutions in the 
provisions of the law. Sharia principles are to be found in the texts of Quran 
and Sunna. 
• The writing of law jurists: The writing of national and foreign law jurists 
and academics are regarded as one of the important sources of Bahraini civil 
law, providing these writing do not contradict with the principles of Islamic 
Sharia. Jurists' materials may be restored to by the national court, for 
example, in the course of their interpretation of national law. 
• Judicial Decisions: The application and interpretation of legislation has 
given rise to a mass of case law Uudicial precedents). These precedents are 
regarded as a major part of Bahraini source of law. They do not have an 
independent authority of their own, but they are evidence of what the law 
is. The principle behind the doctrine of precedents is that in the absence of 
legal rule, judges are required to rule according to the other source of law 
50 Ibid, Art. 2. 
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and to take into consideration the existing examples, or precedents of earlier 
decisions. Where the case to be decided is one without precedent. That is, 
unlike previous cases, the judge must decide according to custom or general 
principles of justice. By doing so, he lays down an original example that 
later judges will respect and may take into account if they encounter a similar 
case. 
2.6 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
A further key area, which is directly relevant to contextualising Bahrain for the 
substantive element of the thesis, concerns its international relations. Historically 
speaking, external forces have heavily influenced Bahrain's internal politics and 
social character. Therefore, it is crucial that a discussion of these wider influences is 
taken into consideration prior to considering the contemporary nature of reform 
under King Hamad. 
Bahrain's historical concern over the threat from Iran, as well as its domestic unrest 
of the Shia in the country prompted it to join the GCC, which was formed in 1981, 
and includes UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. It is effectively a six-
nation body designed to enhance economic and security co-operation between the 
Gulf States. Even within the GCC, however, from time to time Bahrain has had 
tense relations with Qatar over their mutual claim to the Hawar Islands, and the 
adjacent islands located between the two countries. Fortunately, the International 
Court of Justice at The Hague solved this dispute on 16 March 2001, awarding 
sovereignty over Hawar Islands and Qit'at-Jaradah to Bahrain and sovereignty over 
Zubara, Janan Island and Fasht AI Dibal to Qatar.51 The peaceful settlement of this 
dispute has allowed for renewed cooperation on several fields. 
Additionally, Bahrain has begun taking steps to improve relations with Iran. King 
Hamad made a visit to Iran, followed by another visit by his wife Sheikha Sabeeka. 
51 A Rich and interesting book regarding Qatar & Bahrain dispute illustrated in Jawad S. Al-Arayed, 
"A Line in the Sea: The Qatar v. Bahrain Border Dispute in the World Court," North Atlantic Books, 
Berkeley, California, 2003. 
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These efforts have included encouraging bilateral trade and maritime security 
cooperation. 
Through the history of the Islands, Bahrain has been an important Western ally. 
Both British and US military forces have been allowed to use Bahraini ports and 
airfields, which were vital to the prosecution of the three Iraq wars and the 2002 
Afghan war. In the light of Bahrain's strategic importance and its historical 
commitment in supporting the defence, of not only its own values and interests in 
the region, but also those of its neighbours and the West, it is of no surprise to see 
the US Navy's regional operations based in Bahrain. Since the establishment of the 
Gulf Area Command in January 1949, the US-Bahrain security relationship has 
evolved and deepened, despite intense pressure from some quarters for Bahrain to 
sever these ties. 52 It has also been a defensive strategy protecting the Islands from 
invasion by surrounding countries, a strategy which took neighbouring countries 
longer time, and painful experience to understand (Kuwait comes first to mind). The 
designation of Bahrain as a US Major Non-NATO Ally 53 has not accidentally 
52 Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad AI Khalifa, "GCC Defence Cooperation with the West: A Bahraini 
Perspective," "The Gulf: Future Security and British Policy," the Emirates Centre for Strategic 
Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 2002, p. 39. 
53 Major Non-NATO Ally Status does not entail the same mutual defense and security guarantees 
afforded to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. However, designation of Bahrain 
as an MNNA represents an affirmation of the importance the US places on the US-Bahrain alliance 
relationship in the 21st century. Bahrain has been a treaty ally of the United States for nearly 57 
years, since the 1949. The alliance partnership has continued to expand over the years. 
(MNNA) Definitions: U.S. legislation creates two categories of MNNA status. The first category is 
under Title 10 U.S Code Section 2350a (Nunn Amendment of 1987). The Second is under Section 
517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA) (title 22, USC Section 2321 k). 
Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2350a authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, to designate MNNAs for purposes of participating with the Department of Defense 
(DOD) in cooperative research and development programs. Israel, Egypt, Japan, Australia, and the 
Republic of Korea were given MNNA designation under Title 10 in 1987, followed by Jordan (1996}, 
Argentina (1998}, New Zealand, and Bahrain (2002), and the Philippines and Thailand (2003). 
Designation under this provision: 
• Permits firms of the country to bid on certain USG contracts for maintenance, repair or overhaul 
of DOD equipment outside the Continental US. ( 10 USC 2349) 
• Makes a country eligible for certain joint counterterrorism research & development projects. (22 
USC 2349a-10(b); PL 104-132 sec. 328(b) 
• Allows DOD to enter into cooperative R&D projects with the country to improve conventional 
defense capabilities on an equitable cost-sharing basis. (10 USC sec 2350a) 
Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes the President to 
designate a country as a MNNA after 30-days notification to Congress, for purposes of the FAA and 
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The statute, enacted in 1996, initially designated Australia, 
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occurred due to a certain event or passing interest. It comes out of an objective 
expression of the historical links over more than a century, initially launched 
thorough humanitarian projects, notably the American Mission Hospital that remain 
and have for over a century, provided true services for Bahrain and its neighbours in 
the Gulf. In one of his speeches, the King said: 
Out of this Major-Ally status we shall mainly gain economic benefit for 
the prosperity of Bahrain people, since this strategic partnership gives 
Bahrain a seat in the forum of advanced countries in Asia and the 
Orient. 
The involvement of Bahrain in the US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) initiative has 
played a great role in reinforcing the commercial, economic and investment sectors 
in the country. Moreover, Congress and successive Administrations, citing 
Bahrain's limited oil income, have supported military assistance to Bahrain's small 
BDF. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for Bahrain in 1994, but, in 
appreciation of Bahrain's support in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, FMF has 
restarted. International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET) increased. 
See Table 2.3. 
Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand as MNNAs. Subsequently, Jordan 
(1996), Argentina (1998), Bahrain (2002), and the Philippines and Thailand (2003) have also been 
designated as MNNAs under this provision. 
Designation under this provision: 
• Makes a nation eligible, to the maximum extent feasible, for priority delivery of excess defence 
articles if it is on the South or South-eastern flank of NATO. 
• Makes a nation eligible to buy depleted uranium ammunition. 
• Makes the country eligible to have U.S.-owned War Reserve Stockpiles on its territory outside of 
U.S. military installations. 
• Allows the country to enter into agreements with the USG for the cooperative furnishing of 
training on a bilateral or multilateral basis under reciprocal financial arrangements that may 
exclude reimbursement for indirect costs and certain other charges. 
• Allows the country to use U.S. provided Foreign Military financing for commercial leasing of 
certain defence articles. 
• Makes a country eligible for loans of materials, supplies and equipment for cooperative R&D 
projects and testing and evaluation. 
• Makes a country eligible for expedited processing of export licenses of commercial satellites, their 
technologies, components, and systems. 
MNNA designation under section 517 of the FAA can be terminated at the discretion of the President 
with 30 days notice to the Congress, but no specific criteria or precedents exist regarding termination. 
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Table 2.3: United States Assistance to Bahrain 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (requested) 
FMF (in millions) $28.5 $90.0 $24.6 $18.85 $19.0 
IMET (in thousands) $395 $448 $600 $650 $650 
Source: CRS Report for Congress DATE? 
Likewise, the longstanding bilateral relationship with UK is in excellent health. The 
UK continues to support the King's reform agenda and develop cooperation in other 
key areas. 54 Education is one ofthe key areas of assistance besides trade. The field 
of Citizenship Education is at present of high teamwork between the two countries 
to improve the lives of nationals in Bahrain. The UK Home Office signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Interior on 20 October 2005 
aimed at promoting cooperation on a number of issues, including counter terrorism 
and civil policing.55 Alongside the excellent relationship with GCC countries and 
the Arab and Islamic countries, Bahrain, through history has kept strong relations 
with most of other countries, such as China, Japan, Russia, all Far East states, South 
America, and South Africa.56 
The Kingdom remains committed to the concerns and issues of the Arab and Islamic 
nations. Despite the aggression that came from Iraq and Iran regimes, Bahrain has 
remained able to differentiate between the regime and the people. Additionally, it 
has always adhered to a general Arab policy and in its basic precepts in its relations 
with Israel ; it has not rushed to take steps towards diplomatic links with Israel. In 
general, Bahrain 's foreign policy is based on mutual respect and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries. It is based also on good neighbourly relations, 
with the permanent conviction that every problem can be solved, no matter how 
complicated and entrenched it may seem. 
54 British Embassy, "Bahrain lnternational relation," www.britishembassy.gov.uk. 
55 Ibid. 
56 A rich report provided by Ministry of Jndustry and Commerce regarding Bahrain foreign relations, 
2004. 
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Its strategic location and wise foreign policy in the Arabian Gulf has made Bahrain a 
unique case. Most world specialists indicate that Bahrain's strategic location and 
wise foreign policy have made it the key for Arabian Gulf security and stability, and 
the first defensive line to any aggressions in the region. 
2.7 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
The economic structure of Bahrain is a tangible factor to understanding its modern 
polity and society. Indeed, Bahrain can be considered to have a unique political 
economy within the GCC. A key driver of the reform for King Hamad will be 
shown to be the social grievances of the population, which have been brought about 
by the poor economic development. The national disturbances and riots of the late 
1990s is a case in point. Here it is important to recognise from the offset that there 
is a direct relationship between Bahrain's social and political problems and its 
economic performance. Therefore, the following will provide a narrative of the 
historical and contemporary character of Bahrain's economy. 
The rulers of Bahrain have tried hard through the use of force or through 
political/social manoeuvring to maintain their independence and position since their 
rule began in 1783. On the other hand, each ruler, in one way or another, has tried to 
build up and develop what was so vital for his reign: to ensure the continuation of 
rule over the Islands. Some of the rulers prevailed in peace; others prevailed in 
power, trade and business, navigation, diving, construction of projects such as 
schools, buildings, electricity, and health facilities. Others made drastic political, 
economic, and social changes. Recognition should go to Amir Isa bin-Salman AI 
Khalifa, who became Amir in 1961, in order to diversify his country's economy, set 
about establishing Bahrain as a major financial centre. The Bahrain Oil Company 
refinery, which was built in 1935, was the first of its kind in the Gulf and has a 
capacity of about 250,000 barrels per day. Since 1980, 60% of the refinery has been 
owned by the Bahrain National Oil Company and 40% by the American company, 
Caltex. Saudi Arabia provides most of the crude oil for the refinery operation via 
pipelines. Today some 60% of the national income comes from oil and natural gas, 
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which is all processed locally. Bahrain has the lowest oil and gas reserves in the 
GCC, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet 
of gas, and the energy sector accounts for 16.5% of Bahrain's Gross Domestic 
Product (GOP). The Saudi government has given Bahrain all revenues from the 
150,000 barrels per day produced from Saudi Arabia's Abu Saafa offshore oilfield.57 
Accordingly, Bahrain has stabilised its oil production at about 50,000 barrels per day 
and Bahrain's onshore oil reserves are expected to last I 0-15 years. 58 Bahrain 
awarded exploration rights to Malaysia's Petronas and the American Chevron 
Texaco after the resolution of its long-standing territorial dispute with Qatar, but no 
meaningful finds have been announced to date. Industrial processing of aluminium, 
petrochemicals, iron, and steel are also established by Bahrain. The country's main 
shipbuilding and repair facility had a high trade in the late 1980s, patching up 
tankers that had been hit by one side or the other during the Iran-Iraq War. The 
opening of the King Fahd Causeway between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1986 
gave a crucial boost to business and tourism. Bahrain's development as a major 
financial centre has been the most productive aspect of its diversification effort. 
International financial institutions operate in Bahrain, both offshore and onshore, 
without impediments, and the financial sector is currently the second largest 
contributor to GOP. 
Since he took over the throne, King Hamad has pledged to bring in goodness for the 
people of this nation, giving priority to raise the living standard of the Bahraini 
citizen, notably those of limited income. He said: 
We believe in involving all categories of the society in the economic and 
social development process and the need that every group receives its 
fair share of the fruits of growth and of the wealth of the nation. In 
pursuance of this objective, we continue to cultivate and distribute the 
economic prosperity through further policies of free economy, the 
privatisation of projects, the drafting of laws and discipline that tackle 
57 Saudi Arabia started to retain their share of the refinery by mid 2004. 
58 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, November 2003. 
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recession and unemployment and also to open a wide scope for free 
trade competition that avert monopoly and avoid duality of interests.59 
At the present time, Bahrain is working to place itself as a safe international, 
financial and economic centre, governed by legislation and rules in this vital region 
of the world. The removal of barriers and restrictions in the economy and the 
opening of future investment opportunities, away from political and administrative 
procedures, are among the essential needs for the desired economic growth. 
King Hamad transformed the long historical border dispute with Qatar from tension 
to one of promise. He pointed out: 
In regard to relations with brothers in Qatar, the historical verdict of the 
international court of justice on affirming Bahrain's full sovereignty on 
Hawar islands has come as a joint victory for both brotherly countries, 
defining the regional and international entity of the islands and waters 
of Bahrain archipelago. This has also opened the doors for integration 
with Qatar under the leadership of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani 
who spares no effort to initiate joint ventures with Bahrain, notably the 
causeway project, supply of gas and the use of Bahraini skilled labour 
force. 60 
Furthermore, on September 14, 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA).61 Under the agreement, all bilateral trade in consumer and 
industrial goods will be duty free, and 98% of US agricultural exports will be duty 
free. The FT A is intended to signal US support for economic reform in Bahrain and 
59 Ministry of Information, "The Speeches of His Majesty King Hamad bin Jsa AI Khalifa, King of 
Bahrain," Ministry of Information publication, Bahrain, 2002, p. 76. 
60 Ibid, p. 77. 
61 For more details in the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement see the following sites: 
www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreement/Bilaterai/Bahrain-FTA, www.fta.gov.bh, www.bilaterals.org, and 
www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Bahrain. 
80 
throughout the Middle East, and it is viewed as support for Bahrain's longstanding 
alliance.62 The Prime Minister has confirmed this issue by indicating that: 
FTA will reinforce the commercial, economic and investment sectors in 
the country and attract more foreign investment by advertising and 
marketing the FTA accomplishment. 63 
Bahrain is working to develop other service industries such as information 
technology, healthcare, and education. The government has used its oil revenue to 
build an advanced infrastructure in transportation and telecommunications. Bahrain 
Telecommunications Company (Batelco), the Kingdom's monopoly that lasted for 
approximately 50 years, was broken in April 2003 with the liberalisation ofthis state 
sector. Liberalisation of the water and power industries was seen as part of the same 
initiative. Regional tourism is also a significant source of income. The government 
continues to favour large-scale tourism projects. Education is an area that Bahrain 
has been developing for some time, attempting to become the prime training centre 
in the region. In 2003, it awarded several contracts to develop a state-of-the art 
international horse racing track, and a Formula-1 circuit and tourist complex. The 
Bahrain Financial Harbour Project aims to attract more financial institutions when it 
opens in 2006. For more information regarding development projects in the public 
and private sectors in Bahrain see Table 2.4. 
Since 1999, Bahrain's defence spending has been steady. The government spends 
around $440 million annually on its armed forces, which equates to about 20% of 
the current national expenditures. The reconstituted parliamentary process has 
produced spirited debate over government spending - particularly defence 
spending but no actual reduction has been made yet. 
Obviously, there can be no development without security and stability, and Bahrain 
has to some extent granted security for its development but it was made by using 
62 Kenneth Katzman, "Bahrain: Key Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress, March 24, 
2005, p.5. 
63 
"PM ca/1 on private sector to benefit from FfA deal," Bahrain Tribune, June 2"d 2004. 
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force where opposition was kept muted through the security law. However, the new 
reforms have brought new schemes where all strategic decisions are shared between 
several bodies that make the decisions more so lid and productive. [t is not a one-
man show any more. This process also works to the advantage of the ruling family, 
as failure of any planned responsibilities will be shared. As Nonneman notes, 
"opening up the decision-making process for non-royal actors, and expanding 
aven ues for popular participation, can ... spread responsibility for difficult decisions 
or circumstances, or for government failures."64 
Table: 2.4 Major Projects in the Pipeline in Bahrain 
G overnment p . ro ects 
Project's Name Project's Value Status Description 
I. New Towns Four new towns are to be built in The project is in the 
in Manama Manama area. The project includes implementation stage. 
infrastructure, services, and houses. BD390MM The reclamation 
The owner is Ministry of Works & contract has been 
Housing. The government is expected awarded to Boskalis 
to move ahead with each town as funds Westminister for 
become available over 10 years period. BD66.4M. The work 
is expected to be 
completed by 
December 2007. 
2. AI Hidd New desalination plant with a capacity New Private Company 
Desalination to produce 60 million gallons per day. is being formed which 
plant The project will form the third phase of U.S.$400MM will handle the new 
AI Hidd Power & Water plant which project. 
has recently been privatised to a 
consortium led by international Power 
Company of U.K. for USD732MM. 
3. Airport Construction of a complex on a site The project is in the 
Commercial facing Bahrain International Airport. [t design stage. The 
Complex will incorporate 4000 unit multi-storey U.S.$115MM Ministry has signed 
car park and various leisure and MOU with Paris-based 
shopping developments. The client is Optimum Group. 
Ministry of Transportation. 
64 Gerd Nonneman, "Governance, human rights, and the case for political adaptation in the Gulf," 
issues in the EU-GCC political dialogue, policy paper 3, Badia Fiesolana: European University 
Institution, 2001, p.5. 
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4. Township Dredging, reclamation and installation The main contractor is 
Dredging at of shoreline protection at Busaiteen and AI Ghannah 
Busaiteen west Hidd. The project entails BD25MM Contracting in joint 
dredging and reclamation of 16MM venture with Wade 
cubic meters and 13MM cubic meters Adams. 
of sandfill. 
5. Development The project consists of two islands The project is in 
of Pearl where one has a tourist resort, play implementation stage. 
Island grounds, hotels and restaurants. The U.S.$60MM The promoters are 
Tourism other island consists of housing. The seeking bank finance 
Project project is owned by Ministry of to complete the project 
Finance & National Economy (50%) by Jime 2007. 
and Robert Muwad Group of Lebanon. 
The location is next to the new 
Financial Harbor project at Manama. 
6. Infrastructure The works comprise the earthworks, The project is being re-
works ofNew pavement construction, drainage, water designed and will be 
Port at Hidd supply, electrical and other services for N.A. re-tendered soon. 
the 100 hectare port. 
7. Sh. Khalifa This project at Isa Town stadium The contract has been 
Sports City include a new stadium with capacity of awarded to Moh'd 
at Isa Town 3600 spectators to replace the old BD10MM Jalal Contracting and 
stadium in addition to multi-purpose implementation will 
hall, tennis court, Olympic swimming start shortly. 
pool and other facilities. 
8. Municipality The project will cover an area of one The project will be 
Housing million sq.ft and will involve the executed in three 
project construction of 1500 apartments, and BD15MM phases. 
will include a park, mosque, shops and 
school. The project will be undertaken 
by the Municipality and Agriculture 
Ministry and Central Municipal 
Council on a beachfront near AIBandar 
Resort at Sitra. 
9. Muharraq Construction of a new medical complex The project is in the 
500 Bed at Muharraq by Ministry of Health BD49MM tendering stage, A.A. 
Hospital covering various specialties. Nass contracting is the 
lowest bidder. 
IO. Sh. Khalifa Extension of the existing Sh. Khalifa The project is under 
Highway Bin Salman highway beyond Hamad BDI3MM constructing. 
Town area. 
II. Bahrain Construction of a new terminal and The project is in the 
International other facilities. BD76MM tendering stage. 
Airport 
Expansion 
12. Privatisation The project entails leasing the The mandate has been 
of Bahrain's operation of Mina Salman and AI Hidd N.A. given to a joint venture 
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Ports new port to a private operator. between MAERSK 
and YBA Kanoo. 
Terms are not Known. 
13. Bahrain- Negotiations between Bahrain and The project is in the 
Qatar Qatar governments started in 200 I for initial stage. 
Causeway construction of the causeway between U.S.$Ibn 
and Gas the two countries which would include 
Pipeline a pipeline to supply Qatari gas to 
Bahrain. 
14. Bahraini To replace the existing old pipeline that According to Bapco 
Saudi Crude transmits crude oil from Saudi Arabia U.S.$IOOMM sources the project is 
Oil Pipeline to Sitra Refinery. presently put on hold 
(June 2004). 
15. Durrat AI Construction of 28 km highway that The project is in the 
Bahrain will link Durrat AI Bahrain Resort at BDI8MM design stage. 
Highway the south of Bahrain to Manama area. 
16. GCC The project is to link the power grids of Contracts for Phase I 
Electricity Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and of the projects has 
Grids Qatar in the initial stage. Oman and U.S.$ 1.25 bn been signed in Saudi 
U AE are expected to join at a later Arabia in early 
stage. The project involves awarding November 2005. All 
13 contracts in the four countries. Saudi contractors are 
Arabia will contribute 40% of the cost. international 
Completion is expected by 2008. companies. 
17. Bahrain The project targets to promote App. The project is 
International formation of new companies at the new BD600MM sponsored by Tameer. 
Investment industrial area at Hidd. Phase I consists Further information is 
Park at Hidd of development of240 hectare. being obtained. 
18. Expansion To expand Sitra bridge to cope with App. The project is in the 
ofSitra increasing traffic on the route. U.S.$150MM tendering stage. 
Causeway 
19. New Firms The government has approved a The incorporation of 
to hold proposal to establish a holding the two holding 
State's company to acquire government's BD250MM companies is in 
tourism stakes in tourism projects such as progress in 
assets. Durrat AI Bahrain, AI Areen Resort, consultation with 
Lulu Islands, Southern Area international advisers. 
Development Co., Bahrain Family The cabinet has 
Leisure Co. and SeefProperties Co. officially approved 
About BD I OOMM of capital will be formation of the 
accounted for by the state's tourism companies on 
assets and the reminder of BD l50MM 4/9/2005. The first 
will be sold to the public through an company will own 
initial public offering (IPO) by the end government's 
ofthe first halfof2005. corporate assets e.g. 
Alba, Batelco etc. and 
the second will own 
lands that belong to the 
government. 
84 
PRIVATE SECTOR PROJECTS 
Project's Name 
I. Bapco 
Expansion 
2. Civil works 
for Bapco 
Expansion 
3. 1000 MW 
Private 
Power 
Station 
4. Bahrain 
Financial 
Harbour 
5. New 
Petrochemic 
al Complex 
6. AL Futtaim 
Commercial 
Centre 
7. Touristic 
Village at 
Budayea 
Description 
Modernisation of existing plant and 
construction of new plant for low sulfur 
diesel production. 
As sub-contracts for the EPC contract 
of the expansion that is being 
implemented by JGC to cover 
construction and civil works. 
Construction and operation of a new 
I OOOMW power plant at AI Ezzel area 
in AI Hidd. The project is to be 
executed by the private sector through 
IPP arrangements . 
The project combines business, leisure 
and residential components and is 
being developed on the Manama 
seafront. Construction of Phase I 
which has already started in February 
2004 is expected to take 18 months. 
This phase comprises construction of 
an eight-storey financial mall, two 50-
storey towers for commercial and 
residential use, and an eight-storey 
harbor house. The cost of phase 1 is 
U.S.$250MM. Gulf Finance House is 
the placement agent and financial 
adviser of the project. 
Kuwait Finance House has announced 
its plan to construct a large plant for 
production of petrochemical products 
m addition to electricity and water. 
Financing will be arranged through 
participation of institutional and 
individual investors. 
The project will be similar to Deira 
City Centre in Dubai . It will include a 
5 star hotel and a commercial enter at 
A I Seef District. 
The project will be constructed on 
100,000 sq.m. at Budayea on a land 
that was purchased at a cost of 
U.S.$12MM. The promoters are Saudis 
(31 %) Bahrainis (20%) and Italians 
( 49%). The project will include an 
international hotel , villas, shops and 
other touristic attractions. 
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Project's Value 
U.S.$.650MM 
BD20MM 
U.S.$650MM 
U.S.$1.3bn 
U.S.$1 bn 
U.S.$400MM 
U.S.$.100MM 
Status 
JGC of Japan is the 
main contractor. The 
project is m the 
implementation stage. 
The project is in the 
implementation stage. 
The project 1s m the 
implementation stage. 
AI Hamad Contracting 
of UAE is the main 
contractor for phase I. 
Work is on process . 
The implementation is 
expected to start during 
the next 18 months . 
Feasibility study is 
presently in progress. 
The main contract has 
been awarded to 
Cybarco/WCT joint 
venture for BD 160MM. 
The project is still in 
the initial stages. The 
consu ltant is AI Waffa 
Int. Investment Co. 
8. The Diplomat 
Hotel 
Executive 
Apartments 
9. Expansion of 
SeefMall 
10. Arad Fort 
Touristic 
Project 
11. Zallaq 
Resort 
12. Commercial 
Complex at 
Sanabis 
13. Expansion 
of Sponge 
Iron project 
14. Bahrain 
Hotel's 
Apartments 
15. Banagas 
LPG Plant 
Expansion 
The project involves construction of 
15-storey extension featuring bedroom 
apartments and a limited number of 
VIP penthouse suites. 
The project involves expanding the 
mall's total area by one third of its 
current space. The project has been 
approved and expected to be completed 
in 24months. 
Arad Fort will be used as a background 
to construct a sound and light project 
which will also include a local market, 
restaurants, theatres and other touristic 
attractions. The promoter is Kamel 
Abu Ali who constructed similar 
projects in Egypt. 
Construction of 5 star hotels and 
challets on the site of Bapco beach at 
Zallaq. 
The project entails construction of three 
towers and a commercial complex at 
Sanabis near AI Dana Mall. The 
project will be established on 200,000 
sq.ft site. The first tower will be for 
offices, the second tower will be for 
residential apartments and the third 
tower will be a hotel. 
To increase the production capacity of 
the existing plant at AI Hidd that is 
owned by Gulf Industrial Investment 
Co. 
Construction of 15-storey building with 
100 fully furnished flats. Expected 
completion date is 2006. 
Banagas is planning to revamp its 
existing liquefied petroleum gas 
processing and storage facilities. The 
progress will depend on the result of 
negotiations with Qatar in respect of 
supply of natural gas. 
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BD7MM 
N.A. 
N.A. 
BD21MM 
U.S.$100MM 
U.S.$390MM 
BD3.5MM 
N.A. 
The implementation of 
the project started in 
2004, and expected to 
be completed in 2006. 
The project 
progress. 
IS in 
The project is still in 
the early stages. 
The operating Co. of 
the project has been 
formed. The company 
will seek bank finance 
shortly 
to start project's 
implementation. 
The project IS m the 
implementation stage. 
The project is in the 
tendering stage. 
The project is in the 
implementation stage. 
The project is still in 
the early stages. 
16. Privatisation 
of Horse-
Riding Club 
into a 
Tourism 
Town 
17. Executive 
Building at 
Diplomatic 
area. 
18. AI Deyar 
Real Estate 
Project 
19. Salam & 
Sabaa Resort 
Projects 
20. ARCAPIT A 
Bank Project 
21. Shuwaifat 
International 
School 
22. Palace Hotel 
23. Chamber of 
Commerce 
& Industry 
New 
Headquarter 
24. E.K. 
Kanoo's 
New 
Workshop_ at 
The Ministry of Finance & National 
Economy and Regens Group have 
signed a MOU in August 2003. The 
proposed tourism town is to contain 
1500 housing units, a hotel and Arabian 
horses museum. 
Construction of 25-storey building near 
Ministry of Justice. The owner is Sh. 
Salman Bin Ali AI Khalifa. 
AI Deyar is the investment arm of State 
of Qatar and it is presently considering 
a real estate project in Bahrain. The 
project's location and design has not 
been decided yet. 
The promoters are Dubai Holding 
company and group of investors. The 
project will be constructed on an area 
of 500M sq. m. near Formula One 
location. Target completion date is 
March 2007. 
Reclamation of 400,000 sq. mt. 
opposite the Diplomatic Area for 
construction of residential buildings 
and touristic attractions including the 
head office for the main promoter 
(Arcapita Bank). 
A branch for the Lebanese private 
school which will be constructed on an 
Island at Amwaj project. The school 
includes classes for KG's, Primary, 
Middle and Secondary stages. The 
project consists of classes building and 
residential buildings for the teachers 
and students and other facilities. 
Construction of a royal hotel at the sea 
coast near Formula One area, 
consisting of 300 rooms and other 
facilities. The investors are from UAE. 
20 storey building at new Sanabis of 
which 14 storeys will be rented and the 
rest to be used by the Chamber. The 
project is expected to be completed by 
end of2006. 
New Vehicle service workshop and 
associated facilities. The site will 
cover an area of 82M sq.m. Chapo is 
main contractor and completion is 
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U.S.$500MM 
BDIOMM 
U.S.$ 500M 
U.S.$2bn 
U.S.$ 1 bn 
BD9MM 
U.S.$ 600MM 
BD8.5MM 
BD5MM 
The project is in 
feasibility study stage. 
The project is in the 
tendering stage. 
The project is in the 
very early stages. 
The project is in the 
early stages. 
The project is in the 
initial stages. 
The construction works 
has already started as 
part of Amwaj project, 
and the school is 
scheduled to be opened 
in September 2006. 
The project IS in the 
initial stages. 
The main contract has 
been awarded to 
Cybarco. 
The project 
progress. 
is in 
Tubli scheduled for September 2006. 
25. Car Plant at 
AI Sakhir 
26. Star Cement 
Factory 
Expansion 
27. Royal 
University of 
Women 
28. United 
Stainless 
Steel Co. 
29. AI Areen 
Desert Spa 
& Resort 
30. Ain Adhari 
National 
Park 
31. Twin Tower 
Block at 
Amwaj 
Island Resort 
A joint venture is in the process of 
being formed by RUF - Automobile of 
Germany and the local Rashed Janahi 
to establish a high-end car 
manufacturing facility close to the 
Formula One racetrack at AI Sakhir. 
The plant will have a built up area of 
20M sq.m. 
A subsidiary of Star Cement - UAE is 
Planning for doubling the capacity at 
the existing plant at Hidd (ex Hyundai 
Plant) to reach 1.2MM tonnes a year. 
The promoters who are local and GCC 
businessmen and companies will be 
setting up a university for women only 
in Bahrain in affiliation with Me Gill 
University of Montreal, Canada and the 
Middlesex University of U.K. Target 
number of students is initially app. 500. 
A newly formed company owned by 
GIC of Kuwait (30%) and other local 
and regional investors for 
manufacturing of stainless steel plates. 
Capacity will be 950 tons. 
Construction of the plant will take 3 
years. A.A. Nass has been selected as 
the main contractor for civil works. 
A joint venture between Gulf Finance 
House and MOFNE. The project is 
close to the new International racetrack 
at Sakhir. The project will be 
completed in stages, beginning with the 
Oasis Spa Resort covering an area of 
appx. 300,000 square meters. 
The developer is a team including the 
local AI Khaleej Development Co. 
(Tameer) and Kuwait Commercial 
Complexes Co. 
Two 23-storey residential towers are 
being developed by the local AI Damur 
Real Estate Co. Each tower will house 
80 apartments along with leisure and 
parking facilities. The project will be 
located at the commercial district of 
88 
BDJ9MM 
BD7MM 
BOSOM 
U.S.$750 MM 
BD9.IMM 
BD19MM 
The project 1s m the 
very early stages. 
The project is in the 
design stage. 
The project is in the 
construction stage. 
The project 1s in 
progress. 
Egra Group of Lebanon 
has been appointed to 
carry out the master 
planning of the project. 
AI Hamad Contracting 
Co. of UAE is the main 
contractor. 
The local Gulf House 
Engineering has been 
awarded the design 
Consultancy contract on 
the project. 
Abu Dhabi - based 
Syrconsult has been 
appointed to prepare 
concept designs. 
Amwaj Resort, facing a lagoon. 
32. World Trade Two 50-storey towers under U.S.$150MM 
Centre construction on the seafront side of the 
Sheraton Hotel complex in Manama. 
The developer is a private company 
owned by members of the royal family. 
The project is due for completion in 
June 2006. 
33. AI Futtaim 
Cinema 
Complex 
34. Fanar Beach 
Development 
20 cinema theatres housing 3600 seats 
in the new Bahrain City Center being 
developed by Majid AI Futtaim 
Investments Co. A leasing agreement 
has been signed between Bahrain 
Cinema Co. and AI Futtaim to carry out 
the project. 
Five-star and four-star hotels along with 
marina and a shopping center at the 
Fanar Beach portion at Amwaj Islands. 
The developer is Ossis Property Co. 
BDSMM 
BD25MM 
35. Lube Base 60:40 joint venture between Bapco and U.S.$200M 
Oil Refinery Neste of Finland to process 12,000 
barrels I day of unconverted oil into 
lube base oil for export purposes. 
Target completion date is end of2008. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
A joint venture of the 
local A. A. Nass and 
Murray & Roberts of 
South Africa are 
presently carrying out 
the main construction 
contract. The UK-
based property 
consultant DTZ has 
been appointed as 
marketing and leasing 
agent for the project. 
The implementation is 
expected to start in the 
second half of 2006. 
The developer has 
signed a letter of intent 
with an international 
operator to manage one 
of the hotels and ts 
negotiating with 
another operator for the 
second hotel. 
Discussions are also 
under way with a 
contractor to build the 
two hotels. 
The project is in the 
design stage. 
From the preceding narrative, it has become clear that prior to the onset of King 
Hamad's reign, Bahrain has suffered from significant problems in several key areas. 
Although progress was achieved and Bahrain developed accordingly, many of the 
underlying problems were largely left untouched by the government. Under the rule 
of Amir lsa bin Salman, its policy can be generally characterised as desiring to 
89 
maintain and develop within the status quo -a policy typical of some of the other 
GCC states at that time. This chapter has sought to highlight Bahrain's social, 
economic, legal, and political character from a historical perspective. This is 
important given that subsequent chapters will focus on showing the fundamental 
shift King Hamad has introduced in these broad spheres. 
What can be concluded is that Bahrain is a small country with a relatively low GNP 
when compared with its neighbours; and that this all brings with it unique 
challenges. It has very few resources to its advantage other than its location. It has 
used up nearly all of its small oil reserves and it has a large population relative to its 
mcome. Therefore, Bahrain is a leading example of a former rentier economy 
adopting diversification. The secret of Bahrain's economic success in this regard is 
that it "stays ahead of the curve" in introducing new technology and new priorities 
for development. The King Fahd Causeway alone has opened Bahrain to a Middle 
East market of some I 00 million people. During the 1970s, Bahrain did well as a 
financial centre for the region and m 2003, the Heritage Foundation scored 
Bahrain's economic freedom as the 15th highest in the world. Economically, 
Bahrain is open to changes in technology and trade. Culturally, it is a traditional 
Arab Muslim society. Politically, there has been gradual change since Bahrain's 
independence in 1971. However, political instability and the rise of Dubai as a 
competing financial centre have hurt the Bahraini economy. The economy is also 
constrained by competition from other countries in the area, notably Oman, Qatar, 
and Saudi Arabia, which are looking for foreign investment and are welcoming 
foreign banks and financial institutions into their countries. In addition, of course, 
economic factors are most often at the root of political grievances. The country 
shows the greatest level of socio-political stratification in the GCC and there is a 
long history of dissidence and overt opposition precisely because of this factor. This 
was exhibited most recently in the 1994-1999 period but also occurred in 1921, 
1938, 1953-1956, 1965, and in a more limited situation, in the early 1970s and the 
early 1980s. 
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Its strategic position in the Gulf means that Bahrain has been subject to the religious 
and political tensions of a volatile area. The Shia revolution in Iran and the three 
Gulf wars have all required adaptation. Since its independence, Bahrain has tried 
hard to reform its political system and, by 1973, had its own constitution, 
guaranteeing legislative powers to the elected members of parliament. Although the 
government suspended the National Assembly in 1975, it marked a period in which 
economic growth continued but in this part of the world, it was not at the same level 
as the political development. Certainly, the Bahrain of today is very different from 
that of most of the 1980s and 1990s when security laws abused the freedoms of 
citizens and many of the opposition went into exile. 
Both the promise and uncertainty created by the prospect of a generational change in 
leadership, in the Arab world in general and in the Gulf in particular, could bring 
stability and solidarity to the region. Morocco, Jordan, and Syria have witnessed 
successful leadership transitions. Even the Gulf, where attention is more often 
focused on the aging rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has seen three new younger 
rulers come to power: Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa AI Thani in Qatar in 1995, King 
Hamad bin Isa AI Khalifa in Bahrain in 1999, and Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed in UAE 
in 2004. Both Hamads have taken bold steps that promise to transform the nature of 
politics in their small monarchies. But, so far, King Hamad who proclaimed himself 
King, rather than the traditional title of Amir in 2000, has gone the furthest and has 
promised the most. 
Given this, the subsequent chapter, which will form a substantive element of the 
thesis, will provide a detailed account of the new reforms under the fourteenth ruler 
of Bahrain, King Hamad bin Isa AI Khalifa. The chapter will provide a 
comprehensive exposition of this fundamentally new era of reform in Bahrain and 
will indicate that it was an elite driven reform, which can be understood primarily 
through the distinctive characteristics of King Hamad. But most importantly, it will 
also establish the nature of the new reforms in the social, economic and political 
spheres which will then be evaluated in later chapters. 
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Chapter III 
The New Era of Reform 
1999-2005: 
Legislative and Parliamentary Restructuring 
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3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Historically the government of Bahrain has sought to enhance the socio-political 
cohesion of this Singapore-sized island nation by carefully navigating its internal and 
international affairs. After the unexpected death of the thirteenth ruler Amir I sa Bin 
Salman, there was widespread uncertainty both within society and amongst many 
political elite as to what direction King Hamad would take the country. Given King 
Hamad's strong military background, the view that he would maintain the status quo 
had common currency. Indeed, as the Crown Prince and the General Commander of 
Bahrain Defence Force, it was widely reported that in 1986 he had insisted on going 
to war with Qatar without hesitation or compassion. Some considered King Hamad 
to be tribal orientated and thus believed he would rule accordingly. More seasoned 
observers of Bahraini politics expected little change from King Hamad because of 
both the dominant role of his uncle, Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa, who was the de 
facto ruler of the country, and perceptions that King Hamad was under Saudi 
influence. These expectations and rumours epitomised the context of the time until 
new reforms for Bahrain were implemented. This new era witnessed a 
comprehensive revolution in reform of society and the long-standing political order. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to provide a detailed exposition on the reforms 
undertaken since King Hamad's succession in 1999. This will demonstrate that the 
reforms implemented under King Hamad are not merely a return to the political 
climate prior to the suspension of the National Assembly in 1975, but actually 
constitute a more radical and far-reaching example of total change. In line with the 
central premise of this thesis, the issues raised here will be analysed and evaluated in 
subsequent chapters. 
The structure of this chapter will firstly see some observations on why the reforms 
were undertaken. Here attention will be given to the idiosyncrasies of King Hamad, 
the nature of his advisors and the socio-economic and political context which all 
worked together to deliver this new revolution in reforms. Although the underlying 
reasons are important, it should be recognised that this ultimately is an issue that falls 
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outside the core parameters ofthe thesis as outlined in chapter one. Following from 
this, the chapter will then provide a detailed account of the composition of the 
reforms from 1999-2005. The spheres that will be examined fall into broad 
categories of political and legal frameworks. Economic restructuring, social 
initiatives and human rights issues will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. 
3.1 OBSERVATIONS ON THE ORIGINS OF REFORM 
The reforms implemented since King Hamad's reign began have led to a near total 
revision of the political order. The King is steering Bahrain into a new and 
exceptional era in its history, but implementing the reforms is also proving to be the 
most challenging political agenda the country has faced. Rather than adopting the 
traditional role of a de facto guarantor of the status quo, the King has chosen a path 
that challenges this very doctrine at its most basic level. Indeed, the King is aiming 
to secure a climate of national unity and social consolidation in order for the people 
to work collectively towards achieving his ambitious and pragmatic vision. For 
many people in Bahrain, the unveiling of the strategy was a dream come true. 
However, the question raised here is whether the King's reforms were merely to calm 
the unrest and win over international support, or were they symptomatic of his own 
benevolent character? 
In order to fully appreciate the origins of the reforms, several factors must be taken 
into account. First, a discussion of the King's distinctive characteristics will be 
provided in order to show where his pragmatic vision stems from. Second, the input 
of the elite decision makers, who form the King's inner circle, will be highlighted. 
This will indicate that he has surrounded himself with experts and with those who 
share a broad outlook on the key issues that affect Bahrain. Finally, a discussion of 
the socio-economic and political contexts will be undertaken. Here the evidence 
supports the conjecture that the King can be described as a pragmatic leader who has 
undertaken reform in order to allow Bahrain to adeptly modernise and effectively 
tackle the underlying social and economic issues that it faces. Importantly, these 
reforms began in earnest prior to the 9/11 atrocities, which prompted a strategic 
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change for the promotion of reform in the international community and the United 
States in particular. This underscores that the reforms were domestically constituted 
and took on a character geared towards achieving the pragmatic vision of Bahrain's 
young King. 
3.1.1 King Hamad 
A key element in analysing policy formation is that of the individual level which 
lends itself to prescriptions that are more psychological. The manner in which 
political decision makers construct a view of the world is an essential component in 
understanding policy formation. 1 Indeed, this is especially true in the case of 
Bahrain as the reform is elite driven. These ontological factors are important in 
understating how policy issues, either domestic or foreign, are interpreted and acted 
upon.2 
As has already been highlighted in chapter two, the character of King Hamad is key 
to understanding the origins and direction the reforms in Bahrain have taken. Whilst 
the subject matter of this thesis is primarily concerned with an analysis on the 
limitations of the reforms that have been implemented, the reader should, 
nonetheless, have an appreciation of the origins of the new era of reform. 
One of the most central explanations of the origins of the reform process since 1999 
concerns King Hamad's personality. There is little doubt that King Hamad's reform 
initiatives stem from a need both to maintain the survival of AI Khalifa dynasty and 
to benefit Bahrain's society as a whole. After all, throughout Bahrain's history, the 
AI Khalifa has effectively and wisely dealt with external and internal threats to 
ensure the survival of their sovereignty over the Islands. However, the King's own 
background has also contributed to his strategic decision to reform Bahrain after his 
1 Yaacov Vertzberger, "The World in Their Minds: Information Processing," Cognition and 
Perception in Foreign Policy Decision-making, pp.lll-91. 
2 Robert Snyder, et a!., "Decision Making Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, New York, The Free Press, 1969, pp. 199-206; 
and Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. 
James N. Rosenau, New York, The Free Press, 1969, pp. 239-54. 
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succession in 1999 for better future. The King's early education in Bahrain, the 
learning of the Holy Quran, studying the principles of Islam, and the Arabic language 
at the hands of professionals in the field of Islamic studies gave him firm 
foundational knowledge on the need to foster solid social relationships and a clear 
sense of humanity and compassion. Moreover, his attendance at his father's Majlis 
where he listened to traditional stories and legends about heroes, nations, incidents 
and factors which contributed to victory or resulted in defeat, widened and enriched 
his awareness of the need for diligence in public affairs. 
When Hamad was appointed Crown Prince at the age of fourteen, he developed an 
excellent strategic understanding of Bahrain through exposure to social, political, 
legal, economic, and cultural state issues. Moreover, by being involved in the 
decision making process from such a young age, he has grasped the skills of 
leadership and diplomacy. 
The King studied abroad at Leys public school in Cambridge, England, and he was 
able to enjoy a degree of independence that was not open to him in Bahrain as Crown 
Prince. Not only was he able to become more adept at making decisions, but it also 
offered him a rich awareness of British social and political culture. He completed his 
secondary schooling in Britain in 1967 and thus was exposed to the radical political 
culture of the 1960s which may well have had a decisive impact on his character and 
provided the initial drive behind his vision for a reformed Bahrain. Indeed, as Henry 
Kissinger highlights, the question of generational outlook is one of the most 
important explanatory factors in a leaders' policy decision making.3 
As highlighted in chapter two, on his return to Bahrain, Hamad, as Crown Prince, 
began a military career, which culminated on him becoming Commander in Chief of 
the Bahrain Defence Force. The importance of this career should not be 
underestimated, as it would have imposed upon him logic of thinking which was 
3 Henry Kissinger, "Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st 
Century," Rev. ed. London, Free Press, 2002, p.28-31. 
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geared towards the avoidance of war and need for the maintenance of peace whilst 
also having discipline and professionalism in leadership. As professional military 
individuals work within a clear 'code' of conduct, which stresses the utilitarian view 
that the group comes before the individual, it is reasonable to conclude that this 
would have fostered an inclusive outlook. When we examine his vision in detail in 
subsequent sections of this thesis, it is clear that he is driven by the desire to achieve 
national unity behind the reforms. 
The further key factor that has had an impact of the formation and delivery of the 
reforms under King Hamad is the composition of his advisors. Since the early 1980s, 
as Crown Prince, Hamad surrounded himself with highly qualified local and foreign 
advisors who were specialists within political, economic, social, culture and 
religious spheres. The composition of his advisors is highly indicative: they are 
primarily comprised of distinguished experts in their own specific fields rather than 
being tribally orientated. Since the King met these advisors, who constitute his inner 
circle, on a near daily basis, they have played a critical role in the reform process 
that was characterised by a clear, forward thinking pragmatism.4 
On a wider level, King Hamad had a very close personal friendship with Sheikh 
Zayed of the United Arab Emirates. Sheikh Zayed was widely regarded as having 
been a wise leader who enjoyed the widespread adoration of his people through his 
humility and pragmatism that characterised his tenure as President of the UAE. 
Indeed, their close relationship is significant as Sheikh Zayed's style of leadership, 
which was very much respected by King Hamad, was likely to have inspired him to 
adopt a similar leadership style influenced by Islam towards his people. 
Other commentators have commonly observed that the historical competitiveness 
and tense relationship with Qatar has also been a driving force on King Hamad's 
outlook and vision. With this undeclared historical competition between the two 
countries, King Hamad may well have been further motivated to enact his reform 
4 Personal observation by author and discussions with key advisors. 
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agenda as municipal elections in Qatar were held for the first time in March 1999 by 
the new Amir of Qatar. 
3.1.2 Socio-Economic and Political Contexts 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Bahrain had pressing socio-economic 
difficulties that needed to be overcome in order for a substantive and stable 
modernisation to be achieved in the long term. Together with Bahrain's 
demographic structure, it is clear that a comprehensive economic reform was needed 
in order to address the potential security risk linked with high unemployment and 
poverty. Two interlinked reasons can be used to explain King Hamad's response 
towards these socio-political and economic challenges: one is to reform Bahrain for 
the benefit of all sections of society, and secondly, to reconstitute the social contract5 
between the AI Khalifa and the people. 
Under the leadership of Amir Isa bin Salman, there was a clear emphasis on the 
maintenance of security in order to uphold the political order and to ensure the 
loyalty of key tribes within Bahrain through granting them political and economic 
powers. Whilst this did achieve its objective, a negative consequence was that it 
fostered social, political, and economic alienation within both Sunni and Shia sects 
who were outside the wider circle of tribal elites who supported and benefited from 
maintaining the status quo. This political order directly fuelled unemployment, 
poverty, and resentment at the inequality within Bahrain: a clear example of this was 
the widespread violent riots in the 1990s. 
With the succession of King Hamad, the actual durability of the existing political 
order with the AI Khalifa retaining its historical position could not continue unless a 
revolutionary overhaul of Bahrain's system was undertaken. Compounding this 
understanding on the pressing need for reform, King Hamad's own background and 
the main factors that contributed in the formation of his character as a leader, as 
5 The social contract refers to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conception on how the 
legitimate basis of sovereignty comes from its relationship with civil society, and of the rights and 
duties constituting the role of a citizen within this mutual contract. 
98 
discussed above, were fully commensurate with the goal of reforming Bahrain to 
benefit society as a whole. Therefore, in light of these unique and complex 
challenges, it can be argued that the reform agenda of the King was geared towards 
both addressing the fundamental challenges of Bahrain and also reforming the social 
contract between the AI Khalifa and the people of Bahrain. Indeed, this redefinition 
by King Hamad was premised on a more egalitarian and inclusive basis, which will 
be shown in subsequent sections, and can be considered a complete departure from 
the past. 
3.2 A PERIOD OF CONSULTATION AND PREPARATION (1999-2000) 
Following the death of Amir Isa bin Salman, King Hamad quickly began to solicit 
the views of Bahrain's society in an unprecedented fashion. In an approach that 
distinguishes him from his father, the King showed a willingness to consult with 
Bahrain's wider society as he entered into a national dialogue with those who 
outside the narrow circle of decision makers and those who were beneficiaries of the 
old order. Indeed, consultations were conducted beyond the traditional tribal allies 
to include all disenfranchised sectarian groups within Bahrain's rich and diverse 
society. This was a clear break from the past. 
Whilst the substantive reforms only began in 200 l, it is important for us to recognise 
what character this unprecedented period of national dialogue actually took. The 
reason for this is that it underscores the means by which the King saw his vision 
ultimately being achieved: the establishment of a stakeholder society whereby all of 
its citizens had a role to play in achieving the modernisation and liberalisation of 
Bahrain. 
King Hamad instituted a number of reform measures that had an immediate and 
strong impact, but it is instructive that they originated from the unprecedented 
national dialogue he undertook. Stemming from his religious background his action 
was commensurate with what God has said in the Holy Quran about the consultation 
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with people "and consults them in affairs (of moment)."6 It also states that: Those 
who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs 
by mutual Consultation; who spend out of what we bestow on them for Sustenance.7 
King Hamad was keen to enrich the formula of consultation through the exchange of 
views with various national groups by a constant national dialogue. Accordingly, 
the King made a number of preliminary consultations towards the reform agenda in 
addition to royal gestures as an initial step in the reform process. These led towards 
the formulation of a general plan for the reform process as will be discussed below. 
3.2.1 Consultation 
The King opened a dialogue with all government institutions, governorates, and 
different sects of the population with the aim of soliciting their views and needs in a 
modernised Bahrain. Examples ofthe consultation process included: 
• The King visited leading Shia religious figures in their houses to discuses the 
referendum with them. 
• On an almost daily basis the King met with group of local and former exiles 
opposition figures, journalists, and representatives of civil societies at his 
palace. 
• The King visited on 20 March 1999 the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF); on 30 
March 1999 the National Guard; and on 3 April 1999 the Ministry of Interior. 
All three visits were to show appreciation for their effort to ensure the 
country's stability after the death of his father and to inform them about the 
reform plans. 
6 The Holy Quran, [159] (Al-i- 'lmran). 
7 Ibid, Emphasis added. [38] (Ash-Shura). 
100 
• On 10 May 1999, the King visited Saudi Arabia on the occasion of the GCC 
exceptional summit and enlightened members about the future changes he 
planned for his country. 
• On 31 July 1999, the King visited the BDF to communicate some of his 
initiatives for internal stability, including the National Pardon. 
• On 15 November 1999, the King met all the heads of churches in Bahrain to 
express the country's welcome of Christianity alongside Islam, and to inform 
them that he will be meeting the Pope. 
• On 16 December 1999, King Hamad delivered a speech in which he 
announced the future shape of the municipality councils, described the 
development of the Consultative Council, encouraged the press to practice 
more freedom in order to bring forward people's opinion and needs, and 
confirmed Bahrain's readiness to welcome all Bahrainis who wanted to return. 
Moreover, he announced that women would have the right to vote and to run as 
candidates. 
• On 17 July 2000, King Hamad visited the Municipality of Muharraq; on 28 
February 2001, he stopped over the Municipalities of Southern and Western 
provinces; on 2 October 2001, he visited the Northern Municipality; and on 27 
December 2001, he visited the Capital Municipality. Again, his aim was to 
break the ice between the ruler and his ruled. 
• On 8 September 2000, the King delivered a speech at the summit ofthe United 
Nations General Assembly in which he focused on peace and stability in the 
world, unofficially briefed the main international delegations about his drastic 
changes, and listened to their remarks accordingly. 
• On 25 September 2000, the King invited and received the Bishop of the 
Roman Orthodox Church. His agenda was an attempt to win the churches 
support along with that from other religious sects. 
• On 16 December 2000, the King made a speech in which he announced that 
the country would move into a new era following a well-studied plan that arose 
from the national dialogue with professionals. 
11 On I3 March 200I, King Hamad received a group ofbusinessmen. 
• On I December 2001, the King organised a special audience for religious 
clerics and leaders along with a number of senior ruling family members and 
state figures. 
111 On I6 December 200 I, the King delivered a speech, which focused on the 
importance of improving the economic conditions of citizens through working 
closer with the government increase the wealth of the country through 
economic development. 
3.2.2 Royal Gestures towards the Reform Initiative 
In line with the King's unprecedented consultation with Bahrain's society over what 
character the reforms should take, he undertook a series of gestures aimed at 
addressing the most commonly held concerns of those who felt disenfranchised 
within society. Moreover, it also served the purpose of garnering wider public 
support for himself: this allowed the King to show his seriousness in his reform 
agenda and also to garner support for the implementation of the revolutionary 
reforms. Some of the key initiatives were: 
• The release of all political prisoners. 
111 All exiles were officially allowed to return to the country. 
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• The Security Laws and the Security Court, that allowed police to hold 
prisoners without charge for up to three years, were abolished. This also 
included the removal of the Head of Internal Security, Ian Henderson, who was 
widely criticised for the tactics he employed in maintaining internal security. 
• The King granted a one-month basic salary to government employees, reduce 
the monthly instalments for all beneficiaries of housing services, reduce 
electricity fees for the benefit of limited income citizens, and reduce custom 
duties with the aim of reviving the country's economic drive. 
3.2.3 Objectives for the Reform Process 
A product of the national consultation process was a series of objectives formulated 
by the King. These encompassed strategic objectives in social, political, and 
economic spheres and were geared towards modernising Bahrain's state institutions 
in order to improve their quality in civil society for the new millennium. The 
restructuring plans can be summarised as follows: 
• Rebuild Bahrain's position in order to become the financial and economic 
centre in the region. 
• Develop the institutional bodies and system of the state and move from the 
formula of a progressing state established by his father, and to enter a new 
stage of modern state that mirrors people's ambitions and copes with various 
international changes. 
• The formation of the Supreme National Committee with the participation of 
individuals to represent all sectors of the state and community. The task of 
the committee is to draft the national action charter, a contract of pledge, and 
a firm formula for a new social covenant that would solidify and cohere 
Bahrain's nobility, distinctive and cultural heritage. 
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11 A comprehensive and balanced modernising of powers, including executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers. With regard to the legislative body, the 
King believed that the democratic and constitutional developments in the 
world meant adopting and introducing the bi-cameral system, whereby the 
members of the deputy chamber are freely and directly elected by the citizens 
and have legislation duties. In addition, there is a Shura (consultative) 
council, made up of clear-sighted professionals who are able to give proper 
advice and guidance. With regard to the judiciary power, the King sought to 
activate judicial bodies with the aim of speeding up the processing of legal 
cases while emphasising the independence of these bodies. 
• The King also announced that the committee assigned to draw a draft for 
municipalities' law had already accomplished this, and that the draft had 
been referred to the concerned body for further action. 
3.3 THE NATIONAL ACTION CHARTER 
After retaining ultimate control over the Bahraini political system, King Hamad 
made significant moves to open up the political system. On 23 November 2000, 
King Hamad established the Supreme National Committee in order to draft a new 
National Action Charter (NAC) for Bahrain. This charter would transform the 
country into a constitutional monarchy and reaffirm the constitutional premise of the 
government. The Committee was also set the remit of suggesting amendments to the 
original constitution of 1973. The Committee comprised forty-six leading Bahrainis, 
including six women and several leading governmental and private sectors 
individuals, and set out a plan of action to map the country's political and 
institutional development. The Committee examined the experiences of political 
institutions in other countries such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, Egypt, and 
Kuwait. 
It promised to create a bicameral system, similar to the UK, with a directly elected 
legislative house and a consultative appointed house. It also safeguarded individual 
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freedoms and equality, including the freedom of religious belief and expression, the 
establishment of a public accountability committee to ensure the state's financial and 
administrative transparency, and freedom for civil society to form Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and unions. The liberal-minded Crown Prince, 
Sheikh Salman bin Hamad, was in charge of the implementation ofthe NAC. 
The NAC was then redrafted, based on the recommendations and criticisms that 
followed, and then subsequently approved in February 200 1. On 14-15 February 
200 I, a referendum was held which had a 90% turnout of the electorate. Both men 
and women were able to vote on the new NAC. The government subsequently 
announced that 192,262 out of 217,000 eligible Bahrainis had voted, with 191,790 
(98.4%) in favour of the NAC, which backed the proposal for a constitutional 
monarchy and an elected legislature. What was most extraordinary was the support 
for the referendum from leading Shia clerics, which emphasised the significant 
reconciliation between the government and the Shia community. 8 In summary, the 
principal provisions of the NAC are as follows: 9 
3.3.1 Chapter 1: Basic Principles of the Society 
The first chapter considered the core values, principles, and responsibilities of the 
entire society including: 
• Goals and basis of the government. Justice is the basis of the government. 
Equality, rule of law, liberty, security, peace, education, social solidarity, and 
equal opportunity are all core principles of the society that are ensured by the 
state. 
• Protection of individual freedoms and equality. Stipulations are given on how 
personal freedom and equality were to be guaranteed. 
8 Opposition groups believed that people rushed to vote for the NAC for two reasons. First, most 
Bahrainis supported the prospect of change as an alternative to the status quo. Second, many feared 
that the referendum was a means for the security apparatus to identify discontented elements (this 
perception was reinforced when voters' passports were stamped, making boycotters readily 
identifiable in the future). 
9 The National Acting Charter for the State of Bahrain of23 December 2000. 
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• Freedom of belief. The state guarantees freedom to practice religious rites 
according to the considered custom of the land. 
• Freedom of expression and publishing. 
• Civil Society Activities. The state ensures the freedom to form non-
governmental, scientific, cultural and professional associations and unions. 
• Family as the basis of society. Protection for the family and the state's 
responsibility to care for those in need. 
• Employment as both a duty and a right. 
• Education, culture, and science. The right to education and to academic 
freedom. 
3.3.2 Chapter II: Government System 
This chapter defines the structure of the state. The government system of Bahrain is 
defined as a hereditary constitutional monarchy with the Amir as head of state and 
Supreme Commander of the armed forces. He appoints premiership and ministerial 
posts within his powers as prescribed by the constitution. Islam is the religion of the 
state and Islamic Sharia is the principle source of legislation. The people are the 
source of all powers and the government system is based on checks and balances and 
depends on the separation of power between the three branches (legislative, 
executive, and judiciary). The Amir is the head of the three powers. The sovereignty 
of the law is the basis of rule and therefore the independence and immunity of the 
judiciary are fundamental warranties to protect rights and liabilities. Citizens, men 
and women alike, have the right to participate in public affairs, including suffrage, 
and the right to contest according to the law. 
3.3.3 Chapter III: Economic Fundamentals of the Society 
The third chapter defines the economic foundations of Bahrain and includes: 
• The principle of free economy: the economy system is based on individual 
initiative, freedom of capital movement in terms of investment and transfer. 
An Auditor General and Administrative Supervisory Authority is to be 
instituted for bureaucracy to become more transparent. 
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• Private ownership: private property is guaranteed. 
• Economic justice and balanced contracts: economic justice is secured through 
legal adherence to contractual relations. 
• Diversification of economic activity and sources of national income: the 
diversification of economic activities has promoted economic development and 
offered employment opportunities. 
• Environment and wildlife: preventing and addressing major environmental 
problems. 
• Public property and natural resources: both citizens and the state should protect 
public property. All natural resources are property of the state and the best 
ways and means to utilise them must be put into place. 
• Labour and training: the state must ensure greater employment opportunities 
for citizens. 
3.3.4 Chapter IV: National Security 
The fulcrum of national security is to strengthen the armed forces (BDF and NG), 
and the Ministry of the Interior is to enable them to maintain security and public law. 
3.3.5 Chapter V: Democratic Life 
The government remains to be fully receptive to the feeling of the people and, hence, 
has worked for the sole purpose of saving public good. The fifth chapter also drafted 
the background to parliamentary activities, with an emphasis on the role of the Majlis 
al-Shura. It asserts that many deep-rooted democracies have adopted a bicameral 
legislative system, with one chamber to represent the trends and thoughts of the 
people on contemporary issues, and the other to operate as a chamber for competent 
and experienced members. 
3.3.6 Chapter VI: Gulf Relations 
Chapter six affirms Bahrain's commitment to the GCC and pledges to work for more 
coordination within the GCC in such areas as the economy, defence and information, 
as well as for furthering people's participation in the GCC. 
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3.3.7 Chapter VII: Foreign Relations 
This chapter highlights Bahrain's Arab identity, its membership in the Arab League, 
Organisation of Islamic Conferences, and the United Nations, and its belief in the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. The state stands for free international trade, 
movement of investment, capital, and labour while taking into account the national 
interests of individual countries. 
Despite the principal provisions of the NAC, areas ofthe NAC remained unclear. It 
neither specified the role of the elected assembly vis-a-vis the chamber dissolved in 
1975, nor the role and powers of the legislative branch as a whole in relation to the 
executive one. The size of the proposed chambers was not specified, nor was there 
any indication of how differences between them would be resolved. Furthermore, 
the charter specified that the King would have the authority to appoint and dismiss 
the prime minister and cabinet. 10 However, despite its limitations, many Bahrainis 
supported the prospect of change as an alternative to the status quo. 
3.4 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973 
On 14 February 2002, one year after the referendum that endorsed the changes 
outlined in the NAC, King Hamad presented Bahrain's amended Constitution which 
provided for a bicameral legislature (the National Assembly), and transformed 
Bahrain into constitutional hereditary monarchy. The official title of the country 
changed to the Kingdom of Bahrain, and Hamad was declared King. 11 The 
differences between the 1973 constitution, which was modelled on Kuwaitis, and the 
amended constitution of February 2002 are crucial to understanding the true 
character of the reform. Only by analysing and appreciating the differences can we 
identify where change has taken place and from this draw conclusions of both 
differences and opportunities facing the reform project. In order to do this, what will 
follow is a comparative analysis of the two constitutions. For better understanding 
10 Nadeya Sayed Ali Mohammed, "Political Reform in Bahrain: The Price of Stability," Middle East 
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 4 No.9, September 2002, p. 225. 
11 Kingdom: beside it's common dictionary meaning (a country that is ruled by a king or queen), but 
it also mean a place that contain all different groups and ethnicities living together. 
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and clarity, the two constitutions are presented in Appendix-1. 12 The main 
differences between the amended Constitution of 2002 and the 1973 one are as 
follow: 
• The State became a Kingdom. 
• The Head ofState became 'King' instead of'Amir'. 
• The regime of the Kingdom was hereditary and now became hereditary 
constitutional monarchy. 
• Women are granted more rights. They have the right to vote and to stand for 
election. 
• The 1973 Constitution had five years period before it could be amended from 
the effective date of its commencement, where the 2002 one has no limitation. 
• The amended Constitution included that the State should take necessary 
measures for the protection of the environment and the conservation of wildlife. 
• Public jobs are a national service entrusted to their incumbents, and State 
employees should have the public interest in mind when performing their jobs. 
• Foreigners should not be entrusted with public posts except in those cases 
specified by law. Citizens are equal in the assumption of public posts in 
accordance with the conditions specified by law. 
• Dual nationality is allowed. 
• Sex discrimination is added in the Human Dignity and Equality article. 
11 The National Assembly consists of two chambers: the Consultative Council 
and the Chamber of Deputies. 
• The Chamber of Deputies comprises forty members elected by a direct, secret 
general ballot in accordance with the provisions ofthe law. 
• The King could extend the legislative season of the Chamber of Deputies by 
Royal Order for a period not exceeding two years. 
• Constitutional Court was established and comprised a president and six 
members, all of whom are appointed by a Royal Order for a period specified 
12For further reading see the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain 14 February; 2002, Bahrain 
Constitution of 6 December, 1973; Hussain AI Bohrna, "AI Bahrain bein Dostorain", Dar AI Konoz 
AI Adabyah, Beirut, Lebanon, 2005, and Abdul Rahman AI Noaimi, "AI Bahrain: AI Azma AI 
Dstoria", Dar AI Konoz AI Adabyah, Beirut, Lebanon, 2004. 
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by the law. The court's area of competence is to watch over the 
constitutionality of laws and statutes. 
• The Financial Control and Audit Commission established in the 1973 
Constitution was attached to the National Assembly. However, the Financial 
Control and Audit Commission of the 2002 Constitution reports directly to the 
King, does not review income or expenditures of the Royal Court, and the 
King can dissolve it. 
3.5 REFORMS TO THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
King Hamad made a few changes to the structure of his government to cope with the 
new reform and challenges (see Figures 3.1 & 3.2). Although the government is 
dominated by the executive but technically is formed from executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches. Therefore, each of these three branches will be discussed below in 
turn. 
3.5.1 The Executive Branch 
It should be noted that the King, as the Head of State according to Article 33 of the 
2002 amended Constitution, is the head of all powers in the Kingdom. 13 The 
following are some of the main powers ofthe King: 
• Appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the cabinet. 
11 Appoints the president and members of the Consultative Council. 
11 The Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 
11 The Chairman of the Higher Judicial Council and appoints judges. 
11 Has the right to call for a referendum on any issue he deems important. 
• Can rule by decree and dissolve parliament. 
11 Has the right to veto laws passed by the National Assembly. 
• Has the power to amend the constitution and propose, ratify, and promulgate 
laws. 
13 Ibid, Art. 33. 
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The Cabinet of Ministers consists of the prime minister, who is the president, and 
any number of ministers, as may be needed or as public interest may require. The 
ministers conduct all affairs of the state, both internal and external, in the name of 
the King. The prime minister, who is appointed by the King, only proposes and does 
not appoint the Cabinet of Ministers. The cabinet is entrusted with the responsibility 
of administering all affairs of the kingdom as specified in the constitution and the 
King's orders, verbal or written, do not absolve it of liability. The prime minister 
and the ministers are collectively responsible before the King in respect of the 
general policy of the state. In addition to this collective responsibility, each minister 
is exclusively responsible for the conduct of his respective ministry and departments 
before the House of Deputies. The ministers must attend sessions of two Houses of 
Parliament to answer questions put to them by members of parliament, explain the 
actions taken and the policies followed by the government, and seek approval for 
government-introduced draft legislation. 14 
3.5.2 The Legislative Branch 
Under Chapter III of the 2002 Constitution, the legislative power (that is, the 
National Assembly) is bicameral and consists of the Consultative Council (Majlis AI 
Shura) and the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis AI Nuwwab). The King appoints the 
member of the Shura, while deputies are directly elected by national suffrage, with 
men and women eligible for election. 15 
(I) The National Assembly: 16 
• Holds an annual session and can be called to an extraordinary session by Royal 
Decree if the King deems it necessary, or if so requested by a majority of 
members of either chamber. 
• It needs a quorum of more than half of its members to hold a valid meeting. 
• Passes resolutions by an absolute majority ofthe members present. 
14 Ibid, Art. 45, 46, 47, and 48. See also, Law of Internal Regulation of Deputies House, Art., 36, 37, 
and 56. 
15 Constitution 2002, Art. 51. 
16 Ibid, Part 3 and 4. 
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• Is chaired by the President of the Consultative Council or, in his absence, by 
the President of the Chamber of Deputies. 
• It does not monitor state financial affairs as, by virtue of Decree No. 16 of July 
2002, the National Audit Court reports directly to the King. Moreover, it does 
not review income or expenditures of the Royal Court. 
(2) The Chamber of Deputies: 17 
• Has 40 members elected by universal adult suffrage for four-year terms m 
forty electoral districts. 
• The Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is elected by the deputies at the 
beginning of every term. 
• Has a role in considering legislation, such as proposing and amending laws, 
but legislative authority still resides with the King. 
• Can be dissolved by the King. 
• There are five committees for the Chamber of Deputies: 
- The Legislative and Legal Affairs. 
-Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security. 
- Financial and Economic Affairs. 
-Services. 
- Public Utilities and Environment. 
(3) The Consultative Council 18 
• Has 40 members appointed by the King for four-year terms. 
• The King appoints the President of the Council and the President serves as the 
Chairman of the National Assembly and has the cast vote in the case of a tie. 
• There are same five committees to the Consultative Council just as in the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
17 Ibid, Part 2. 
18 Ibid, Part I. 
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3.5.3 The Judicial Branch 
The Bahraini Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and clearly 
states: "Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they 
are subject to no authority but that the law, while the King must approve the 
appointment and dismissal of judges." 19 In practice, these are supervised by the 
Higher Judicial Council, which makes independent decisions regarding periodic 
recommendations submitted to it by the Ministry of Justice?0 
The Courts of Law, in their varying types and degrees, exercise the judicial power 
and their judgments are given in accordance with the law and pronounced in the 
name of the King. These courts are open to all and are free from any interference in 
their affairs. Their sittings are public, unless the court considers that it should sit in 
camera in the interest of public order and morals.21 
The courts in Bahrain are divided into three main categories: 
• Regular courts that include Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal, and 
Courts of Cessation (the court of cessation is a court of law and not a trial 
court). This type of court has the jurisdiction of civil, criminal, and family law 
cases.
22 
• Sharia Court that rules on issues of Muslims' personal status according of 
Islamic law and jurisprudence. There are two branches as pointed out earlier: 
one for Sunnis and the other for Shia.23 
• Special Court, Police Court, and Military Court. These types of court have 
only a criminal cases of jurisdiction for military personnel accused of offences 
under the Military Code of Justice.24 
19 Article I 04 
20 Judicial Power Law, Article 2, and 5. 
21 Ibid, Article 3, 4, and 5. 
22 Ibid, Article 6. 
23 Judicial Power Law, Article I 
24 Constitution 2002, Art. 105 b, See also the Criminal Military Law, Art. 12. 
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It is important after all to explain briefly the process of legislation in Bahrain. When 
the government intends to introduce a new law, it first charges the Directorate of the 
Legal Affairs to present the first dratt of the law concerned. After preparing the first 
draft of the law, the Minister of State passes it to the Cabinet of Ministers for 
discussion. The Prime Minister, in turn, sends it to the Speaker of the House of 
Deputies along with good reasons for the introduction of such a law and a formal 
written letter requesting the approval of the House of the drafted law.25 The latter is 
under obligation to send the draft to the chief of the legislative and legal affairs 
committee.26 
The internal regulation of the House of Deputies neither defines any specific time 
within which the speaker should pass the draft law to the legislative and legal affairs 
committee chief, nor specifies the maximum time limit in which the chief and the 
members should meet and discuss the said legislative proposal. However, when he 
receives the first draft of the law, the chief of the committee is obliged to invite all 
members of the committee to discuss each article of the draft. Then, the committee 
members must write their report, including their suggestions and recommendations, 
and state whether or not the draft is satisfactory for the amendment of the defective 
articles.27 
The report, which contains the committee's discussions, suggestions and 
recommendations, has to be sent to the Speaker of the House of the Deputies, who is 
required by law to inform the government of the result of the legal committee 
meeting's. If the legal committee are satisfied with the draft law, the Speaker of the 
House of the Deputies is authorised by the constitution to arrange meetings for full 
discussion of the draft law. All members of the committee must sign the report.28 
25 Constitution 2002, Art. 81. 
26 Internal Regulations of Deputies Council Law, Art. 29. 
27 Ibid, Art. 38. 
28 Ibid. 
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In the House of Deputies, the law project should be read publicly, article by 
article.29 Then debates and votes on legislation in conjunction with the government 
should be arranged. The house speaker then passes a draft approved by the majority 
of the house members to the Consultative Council for debate and vote.30 
In the Consultative Council, the draft law becomes subject to the same process as in 
the House of Deputies. If approved by both houses, the draft is submitted to the 
King, who either grants consent through a royal decree or returns the draft appended 
with a statement justifying refusal. 31 
Finally, it is to be noted that in cases where the national council is not sitting or is 
dissolved, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister the King has the power 
to issue a provisional law covering matters which require necessary measures, no 
delay, or expenditures incapable of postponement. Such a provisional law, which 
shall not be contrary to the provisions of the constitution, has the force oflaw so that 
if it was placed before the Assembly at the beginning of the next session, the 
Assembly may approve or at least amend the law.32 
As part of the constitutional reforms, the government also announced the creation of 
an independent financial supervisory body on 3 July 2002, with a mandate to 
monitor state expenditure and investigate cases of embezzlement, negligence, and 
financial violations. 
29 Ibid, Art. 104. 
30 Ibid, Art. 121. 
31 Ibid, Art. 70. 
32 Constitution 2002, Arts. 38, and 39. 
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Figure 3.1: The System of Government Before the Reform 
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3.6 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
The first municipal elections since 1957 took place on 9 May 2002. For many 
Bahrainis, it was new experience of voting for political representation. Women had 
the right to both vote and stand as candidates. All Bahrainis from the age of 18 and 
over had the right to vote and the turnout was higher than expected. Three hundred 
and six candidates ran in these elections, including thirty-one women. The first 
round of voting saw 51.28% of registered voters coming to the polls. In some areas 
turnout was as high as 76%, whilst the lowest polling station recorded 40%. 33 
Women made up 52% of voters. The second round of voting saw a 55% turnout. 
Candidates with links to Islamist groups won the majority of seats as expected.34 
Although women made up 10% of candidates, none were elected. Out of the fifty 
municipal seats, candidates associated with Jslamist societies won thirty-eight, with 
the remainder won by independent candidates.35 
The local government consists of twelve municipalities. A nominal municipal 
system has been in place for several decades, but until 2001, these twelve 
administrative bodies enjoyed little autonomy. In 2001, King Hamad promised to 
give more autonomy to them. The result was the creation of elected councils in 2002 
to represent the views and interests of each municipality. 
3.7 THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
The parliamentary elections, which were scheduled for 2004, took place on 24 
October 2002. Although the King must have had a good reason to bring the 
parliamentary elections forward, the parliamentary election would be healthier if it 
had been kept to its initial date on 2004. Despite a boycott by some members of 
opposition, the elections were historic and the turnout for the parliamentary elections 
was a respectable 53.48 % in the first round. However, most of the elected and the 
electors were more or less excited passionate rather than matured enough to 
understand the principals of election and their contribution to the reform. 
33 The report of the Supreme Committee for 2002 Election, July 2002, Bahrain. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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From Plan I (The Golden Era) below, the three years from 2001 to 2003 was an 
opportunity to bring political, economic, and social adaptation to its maturity and 
brought together the different public opinion trends. It adopted liberalisation 
principles and educated Bahraini citizens to identify their rights and obligations 
towards their homeland versus the rights of their homeland towards them. It made 
the majority of citizens enter the reform phase with a better understanding of their 
responsibilities and the objectives of the liberalisation programme. This period may 
well serve as the link that establishes the prerequisites of the success of the 
upcoming experiment, not granted to the previous parliament, which came on the 
heel of Bahrain independence during the period from 1970 to 1973. 
The Golden Era underscores the paramount importance of developing a standardised 
and innovative curriculum of national education and the building of the character of 
the responsible citizen. These issues were the focus of the Crown Prince's concern 
in his address on his appointment as Chairman of the Charter Activation Committee. 
He stated: 
One of the fundamentals of building a modern state is the building of the 
character of the responsible citizen who pursues self development 
drawing on his/her own creative and innovative ideas and energies, the 
citizens who serves as an example for others to emulate in the area of 
ethics and good Samaritan ship.36 
The intent of this initiative, built on the recognition of the other, is to reinforce the 
politician, the economist, the sociologist, the military and the regular citizen in order 
to prepare the fertile social soil before the seeds of the liberalisation reform may 
germinate. 
36 AI-Ayam, 29 November 2000, www.alayam.com 
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Plan 1: "The Golden Era" 
Objectives of the Period between the Declaration of the Charter And 
The Establishment of the Parliamentary Two Chambers 
2000 
Period of the 
declaration of the 
National Action 
Charter 
2001 I 2002 I 2003 
This Golden period of time has crystallised 
into the following: 
• Gradual and measured thinking, planning, 
and transformation 
• Education of society for a future era 
(establishment of sophisticated civil 
culture) 
• Introduction of national education 
curricula and building up citizenship, 
belonging, and loyalty 
• Self-education 
• Melting and bringing closer the various 
attitudes and ideas for waging into a 
future political experience within a single 
national concept 
• Education of parliamentary candidates to 
ensure that national interest prevails over 
any personal benefit. 
• Education of electorates to ensure the 
selection of the right person 
• Elimination of religious, political, and 
ideological radicalism 
-
2004 
Establishment of 
the bicameral 
parliamentary 
houses legislative 
and consultative 
However, the new parliament has a lower elected chamber of 40 members, and an 
appointed upper chamber, or Shura (consultative) chamber also of 40 members. 
Both chambers would serve four-year terms. 
The elections were historic not only because they were the first for the country ' s 
new bicameral legislature, but also because it was the first time in which women cast 
a vote and run for parliament since their grandmothers voted in the first municipal 
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elections in the Gulf during the 1920s. The voting of military personnel from the 
BDF, NG, and the Ministry of Interior was debatable. At first the government was 
hesitant to allow armed forces personnel to vote because giving their vote to a 
candidate could shift their loyalties to his/her beliefs when the duty of these forces is 
to protect the country and not to be affected by political opinion. However, the King 
permitted the military personnel to vote since the inclusion of the entire population 
gave legitimacy to calling the assembly the Nationa l Assembly. However, in 
Kuwait (before allowing women to vote and run as candidates in May 2005), only 
about 15% of the total population has voting rights. All women and the men serving 
in the armed forces and men under twenty-one but above 18 were excluded from 
voting. Therefore, in this case it is not right to call the assembly the National 
Assembly. A national assembly should have the representation of the entire 
population in a country.37 
Meanwhile, the turnout for the parliamentary elections was a respectable 53.48 % in 
the first round, despite a boycott by some members of opposition in protest against 
the Shura Council's right of veto over legis lation proposed by the elected chamber. 
Not surprisingly, AI Khalifa fami ly members did not run for municipal or 
parliamentary elections. Over half of the 40 Members of Parliament elected were 
Sunn i Islamists, with just 12 Shia and a handfu l of businesspersons making up the 
rest, see Table 3.1.38 
Table 3.1:2002 Parliamentary Political Compositions 
Societies Number of Seats 
The Islamic Forum Society 8 
AI Islah (Reform) Society 7 
AI Shura (Consultation) Society 1 
The Islamic League Society 4 
Other Leftist and Liberal Parties 6 
Independent Candidates 14 including 4 for the NAC Society 
37 Mohamad AI Rumaihi , "Political Reform in Kuwait: Let 's Begin Everything with National 
Assembly," An Article in severa l newspapers in Bahrain and Kuwait, 25 February 2005. 
38 Retrieved frotn AL Nuwab web site, www.nuwab.gov.bh . 
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As women did not gam any place in the parliamentary elections, King Hamad 
attempted to redress this situation by appointing four women to the Consultative 
Council. The King appoints members of the Consultative Council and he included 
Shia, Sunni, Christian, Jewish, and Indian representation. The council's purpose is 
to debate and pass legislation alongside the elected Chamber in the bicameral 
parliament. The National Assembly held its first joint sitting on 15 December 2002. 
Its first term ran until the end of May 2003, and its second term began on 11 October 
2003. The extra parliamentary opposition continues to campaign for changes to be 
made to the amended 2002 Constitution or to bring back the 1973 constitution. 
As a result of King Hamad's compliance, the government put forward considerable 
resources to encourage as many people as possible to vote. The elections themselves 
were noted for the use of state of the art technology and for transparency. They 
were successful in terms ofthe government's neutrality, smooth in organisation, and 
the participation of women. It was an important step in the right direction to a 
constitutional monarchy. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
One of the most striking features of the reforms that have taken place in Bahrain 
since the onset of the reign of King Hamad is that they are directed towards a 
revolutionary overhaul of the political order. Not only have the reforms been far 
reaching in political and legislative spheres but they have also reconstituted the 
traditional social contact towards countering the dissatisfaction that existed under the 
old order of Amir Isa bin Salman. 
The origins of the reforms underscores that Bahrain's is a fascinating and unique 
case in political modernisation. The King has shown a realisation that policies 
pursued by his predecessor, though successful in preserving stability in the 
monarchic practice of power in Bahrain, were not a sustainable exercise. With 
rising unemployment, poverty and political decent, the need to combat these 
challenges head on was not only a necessity for King Hamad because of his 
121 
benevolent outlook, but pragmatically it was a strategy which he needed to achieve 
in order to ensure the survival of the AI Khalifa dynasty. Whilst it is outside the 
scope of this thesis to evaluate the origins of the reforms process, it is reasonable to 
conclude that this radical reformist agenda is progressive and tailored towards 
fulfilling the needs and aspirations of all of Bahrain's society.39 
The King's pledge to revive the liberalisation experiment in the Kingdom 
underscores an awareness of the popular basis of monarchic authority. The design 
of the charter, the debates around it, the nature of its introduction, and the 
implementation of its recommendations mark the first successful top-down 
execution of wide-ranging political reforms in the GCC. In this case, the leader is 
himself the revolutionary agent, rather than the protector of the status quo and of so-
called 'conservative values' .40 
Despite its small size, the structure of Bahrain's society is clearly very complex, 
particularly with regard to the Shia and Sunni divide. It is clear that an integration 
of interests must now lead to the establishment of a pluralistic political system: a 
new long-required sense of social agreement. The previous government was 
characterised by random, disorganised cabinet restructures while the present King's 
reforms, to some extent, seem measured and justified. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the character of the reforms was implemented in 
legislative and parliamentary spheres. The following chapter will provide an 
empirical account of economic restructuring, social initiatives and human rights 
issues. When combined with this chapter, the reader will have a comprehensive 
understanding of the essence of the reforms undertaken in this new era. The 
evaluation of these issues will then take place in subsequent chapters. 
39 The Middle East Quarterly (MEQ), Dec. 2000, Volume vii: Number 4 
40 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Reform from above: the politics of participation in the oil monarchies," 
Internatio-nal Affairs Volume 79, Number-), January 2003, p. 66. 
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Chapter IV 
The New Era of Reform 
1999-2005: 
Economic, Social, and Human Rights Initiatives 
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4.0 INTRODUCTION 
With the onset of King Hamad's reign, he was quick to recognise that there were 
some unintentional consequences from the previous regimes system of rule. Whilst 
Bahrain was able to achieve numerous successes, especially in structural terms, 
during its modernisation undertaken by Amir Isa bin Salman, it was not able to fully 
keep pace with the needs of its increasing population. Accordingly, the official 
unemployment rate in 1999 was approximately 15% and steadily rising. 1 
Compounding this, poverty was becoming a much more widespread problem 
throughout the country, especially amongst those groups who felt disenfranchised 
under the old order. The knock on effect of this was that such impoverished 
conditions, coupled with a growing level of unemployment and underemployment, 
were fostering dissent within civil society and creating a clear security challenge. 
The new era of reform in Bahrain was not limited to legislative and parliamentary 
restructuring, but also encompassed the key spheres of social, economic and human 
rights. In many respects, King Hamad initiated a reformist journey for Bahrain 
which was geared towards a complete overhaul of the status quo that epitomised the 
order under his late father. In terms of the enactment of reform in the spheres under 
question in this chapter, a two tired strategy was implemented: his vision was set out 
through a succession of speeches, dealing with social, economic and human rights 
issues, and he also gave a number of royal gestures in order to show both his 
seriousness for this new agenda and garner widespread support for this plan. Indeed, 
as has been highlighted earlier, King Hamad's vision for a more egalitarian 
stakeholder society required the active participation and support of a true cross-
section of society. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to build on the preceding exposition on 
parliamentary and legislative reforms by showing the other spheres of socio-
economic and human rights reforms that have been undertaken since 1999. The 
1 The 200 I census of population by the Bahrain Government. 
124 
structure of this chapter will firstly cover the initial generic initiatives. Here attention 
will be given to the importance of these steps prior to the actual implementation of 
reforms. Additionally, this chapter will then provide a detailed account of the King's 
speeches with regard to the economic, social, and cultural aspects in order to provide 
a clear account of his strategic vision. The spheres that will be examined fall into 
broad categories of: economic restructuring, social initiatives and human rights 
Issues. 
4.1 INITIAL GENERIC INITIATIVES 
Ahead of the referendum on 5 February 2001, The King took everyone by surprise 
when he emptied jails of opposition figurers and invited exiled opposition figures to 
return home. Twenty or more exiled entered Bahrain in the next few days. Two 
prominent exiles, Sheikh Abdul Nabi Ali Qafud and Sheikh Isa Qasim, returned 
home to Bahrain on 8 March 200 l after seventeen and nine years of exile 
respectively. 2 Sheikh Ali Salman (whose arrest in 1994 had triggered the unrest) 
returned on 19 March after six years in exile, and Sayid Hayder AI Sitri returned the 
following day after being deported in 1995. By April, nearly all exiles had returned. 
Monsoor AI Jamri, the son of Sheikh Abdul Amir AI Jamri and head of the Bahrain 
Freedom Movement in exile, returned for a visit in June and had his citizenship 
restored by the government in July. The King also abolished security laws that 
allowed police to hold prisoners without charge. The majority of the stateless 
Bidoons3 have been granted citizenship. 
Moreover, King Hamad called for independent judiciary, authorised a much freer 
press (the founding of the country's first independent newspaper "AI Wasat" in 
September marked an improvement for freedom of the press),4 and freedom of 
2 The reader should not be confused by the word 'Sheikh'. This world is commonly used in Bahrain 
for the individuals of the Royal Family and for the religious men. To distinguish between them one 
should follow the last name and if it ended with AI Kha/ifa then 'Sheikh' here mean the individual is 
from the royal family. 
3 Bidoons; are those individuals who has been living in Bahrain for a long time and has not been 
granted citizenship. Even those who have been born in Bahrain were also denied citizenship. 
4 In Bahrain there are five daily newspapers; Akhbar Alkha/eej, Alayam, Alwasat, Alwatan, and 
Alwaqt, and one weekly newspaper (A/ahad) every Wendsday. 
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religion. He declared municipal and parliamentary elections giving every Bahraini, 
male or female, the right to vote. Political societies were allowed to select election 
candidates, act as parliamentary blocs, hold internal elections, campaign for public 
support, and host political gatherings. The King permitted public gathering or 
demonstration, honoured the human rights, and generally provides all aspects of 
liberalise society. 
King Hamad has managed to reach out to his people through a number of royal 
gestures to repair the damages occurred through the past years and to meet the needs 
and demands of many Bahraini citizens. Some of these gestures have served short-
term needs; others served the long-term ones:5 
• Salary Bonus for government employees 
In December 2000, the King awarded all civil servants at various sections of 
the government ministries, directorates, and facilities a one-month salary bonus 
to cover up increasing living costs. 
• Exemption of electricity bills for 10,000 families. 
Among the Bahraini people, there are thousands citizens who live under or 
close to poverty. Accordingly, the King, in December 2000, exempted l 0,000 
families from full payment of electricity bills. He preferred transferring these 
expenses of a vital humanitarian service onto the Kingdom's account in an 
attempt to reduce the financial burden on his less fortunate people. 
Furthermore, in July 2002, the King ordered all overdue payments of electricity 
and water to be cancelled for families receiving social benefits. Approximately 
eight thousand eight hundred and fifty five families benefited from this act of 
generosity. 
5 An excellent Arabic/English book by the Ministry of Commerce showing most of the King's 
gestures, "Kingdom of Bahrain: a Year of Achievements," Bahrain, 2003, pp. 12-33. 
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• Pardoning of prisoners 
For many years, the rulers of Bahrain have always chosen special occasions to 
pardon and release prisoners to help them and their families have new start. 
The King was no different. Every year since his reign, the King orders the 
pardoning of numbers of prisoners on the National Day of each year. This 
showed his faith that those released would appreciate being pardoned before 
due time and given a chance to become constructive members of the 
community. 
• Collective wedding ceremony for 2000 citizens 
The King issued another goodwill gesture in January 2001 for many young men 
and women who cannot afford the high cost of wedding arrangements. He 
ordered to have a collective marriage scheme for 2000 couples on a single 
occasion, with all expenses taken care of by the royal gesture. 
• Pardoning of political detainees 
In February 200 I, the King ordered the release of all Bahraini who detained or 
imprisoned on politically related charges. This gesture saw hundreds of 
detainees and prisoners released overnight with all charges dropped regardless 
of their gravity. Due to this single initiative, the Kingdom became possibly the 
only country that had no political prisoners. The royal pardon included even 
those charged with vandalism, arson, and manslaughter. This step played a 
crucial role in clearing any shadows of doubt about the true intentions of the 
King towards the promised reforms. 
• Royal order of pardon 
On 31 December 2002, New Year Eve, a group of young men damaged hotels, 
shops, and vehicles. They were later accused of sabotage and vandalism. 
Investigations revealed that the perpetrators were merely a group of reckless 
youths who had wrongly expressed themselves, while taking advantage of the 
atmosphere of freedom and democracy in the Kingdom. 
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Despite their reckless behaviour, the King in March 2003 issued a royal order 
to pardon them, setting a good example of nobleness and forgiveness, to give 
the perpetrators the opportunity to repent and feel regret for their actions. 
• Royal order for returnees 
The king in October 2002 sent a special aircraft to bring the last group of 230 
citizens who were living in Iran back to their home nation. The new returnees 
were extremely delighted to become Bahraini citizens again with full 
citizenship rights. 
• Financial support for the unemployed 
Unemployment is world wide challenge that threatens vanous countries. 
Bahrain is one of the countries that experience unemployment aspect as many 
of the unemployed were undergraduates and postgraduates and as each year 
pass, these numbers are increasing. The situation was becoming increasingly 
worse as hundreds of new school and university graduates were pouring into 
the desolate world of unemployment year after year. In May 2001, the King 
decided to support the unemployed financially until each of them found a job. 
This open-handed financial aid helped those young Bahraini citizens to support 
themselves and remove some of the financial burden they were imposing on 
their families. 
In addition, the King ordered in January 2002 Bahrain Defence Force to recruit 
a large number of young men as military personnel. Overnight, hundreds of 
young Bahrainis had been given a bright future to look forward to, jobs that 
paid well, and a better quality of life. 
a Fees slashed at the University of Bahrain 
Free education during compulsory school years is a privilege that not many 
nations enjoy. The Ministry of Education has always offered thousands of 
Bahraini and non-Bahraini citizens free education during their elementary, 
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intermediate, and secondary schooling. However, hundreds of new graduates 
from public schools being deprived of going on to higher education due to high 
enrolment fees. A secondary school certificate was not enough to grant them a 
decent job. Therefore, for the thousands of students who could not afford to 
continue with higher education, they became yet another name on the 
unemployment list. The King, in May 2001 decided to solve this problem and 
ordered tuition fees at the University of Bahrain to be reduced by 
approximately 80%. Although he opened up the future for citizens to get what 
they have always dreamed to do, the wisdom behind this gesture was to insure 
the spread of education to among a wider group of citizens so his reform 
become more acceptable and applicable by an open minded people than 
inadequate sectarian ones. 
In February 2002, the King decided to go a step further by doubling the number 
of students fully exempted from all tuition fees at the University of Bahrain. 
Students were from needy families who deserved the financial support. The 
Royal Court supported some of the students, others were taken care of by the 
PM's Court, and others received support from the Ministry of Labour, Ministry 
of Defence, as well as many other societies and charities. 
• Sponsorship of Orphans 
Orphans are phenomenon appears all over the world, and Bahrain is no 
exemption. The common orphans' supports in Bahrain are through charities. 
But many wealthy families and corporations have also generously sponsored 
young orphans until they graduated from school, university or started working. 
Accordingly, the King, in July 2001 formed a fixed committee to take full 
responsibility for providing the necessary aid to every eligible orphan in the 
Kingdom. This gesture covered a large number of needy orphans and their 
families and ensured that the donations and aid were a fixed and continuous 
source of income covering their day-to-day expenses. 
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• Exemption of housing instalments for families 
There are enormous numbers of Bahrainis who have earned government houses 
and pay instalments to the Ministry of Housing. This was a burden on certain 
families whose sources of income had declined sharply with the passing away 
of their breadwinners or/and faced with the rapid increase of living cost. They 
had debts pilling up and even risked the evacuation from their homes. In 
September 200 I, King Hamad ordered that all the families within this category 
be exempted from paying housing instalments to the government and allow 
them to own the homes immediately with no further conditions. 
In January 2002, the King again ordered his government to reduce the monthly 
instalments for all homeowners to be half the amount they were paying. This 
gesture gave the opportunity for many Bahraini citizens to become owner of the 
properties they were living in faster than they expected to do so. 
11 Four new townships for 50,000 families 
Due to the rapid increase in population over the past years, many families have 
had their applications for home pending for ten years or more. The demand has 
become an alarming situation. Accordingly, in December 2001 the King 
ordered the building of four major cities built in different locations to 
accommodate more than 50,000 Bahraini families. 
Additionally, in order to give underprivileged citizens the right to secure family 
life, the King in August 2003 ordered the construction of a modern village, 
comprising 50 units for the inhabitants of Block No. 332 in Saqiya Area 
(Manama District). 
• Financial support for widows 
Following the King's decision to sponsor numerous orphans, and his decision 
to exempt many families from housing instalments, he, in November 2001 
turned his attention to all the nation's needy widows. Many of them were 
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unemployed and had depended on their husbands for income and a decent 
living. Following their partner's death, they often left with little or no income, 
and with huge responsibilities and debts. This gesture provided a fixed and 
continuous source of income to cover their day-to-day expenses. This humane 
and generous deed created a strong sense of security and stability for the 
beneficiaries. 
• Ramadan (fasting month) provisions for 10,000 families 
In November 2001 the King, offer Ramadan provisions to ten thousand 
families. Sheikha Sabeeka, Chairwoman of The Supreme Council for Women, 
carried this out in collaboration with the concerned Ministry, through social 
centres all over Bahrain. 
11 Distribution of 30% of See/Property Company shares 
For the improvement of the living standards of Bahraini citizens with limited 
income, the leadership made them active partners in the resources and wealth of 
the nation. The King in October 2001 passed his instructions to privatise AI 
Seef property Company and to distribute 30 percent of its shares to this class in 
order to advance their social conditions and allow them to participate in the 
nation's growth actively. 
11 Sitra 's new mall 
This is another project for Bahraini citizens with limited income. The King in 
December 2001 gave his directives to build a new shopping mall in Sitra 
village, and to have again a substantial percentage of this project allocated to 
the needy families of Sitra. Hundreds of families now have something new to 
look forward to, and future full of hope. 
11 Reduction of customs tariff to 5% 
Out of his keen desire to alleviate the burdens on citizens, the King in 
December 2001 issued an order to reduce customs tariffs from 7.5% on 
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commodities, and 15% on cars to only 5%, including all imported goods and 
vehicles as from January 2002. 
• Financial support for medical students 
Usually students of medicine who finish their studies in Bahrain or abroad have 
to do a one-year internship in one of the major hospital as the final part of their 
preparation. In December 2001, the King ordered a monthly payment to be 
paid for all medical students in their internship at Salmaniya Medical Centre. 
The young doctors welcomed the King gesture for many were in need for 
financial support at that period. 
• Citizenship 
Many residents in Bahrain do not enjoy Bahraini citizenship, and therefore do 
not benefit from the rights of citizenship. The King in October 2002 ordered 
the Directorate General of Immigration and Passport Affairs, to grant Bahraini 
passports for the remaining residents with no citizenship. He also issued a 
royal order, allowing the return of all individuals who were living abroad with 
no Bahraini passports and had Bahraini relatives. 
The King was hoping that such action would help all citizens to come together 
and take part in national development, to inspire the feeling of patriotism in 
young generations and evoked their allegiance towards the Kingdom. 
• Granting football players a villa and BD 20,000 
After their brilliant run but failing to qualify for the 2006 World Cup, the King 
in November 2005 met the national football team and gave words of support for 
the future competitions. The King ordered to grant each player a villa and BD 
20,000 ($53,000) and wished them better luck in the forthcoming events.6 
6 Gulf Daily News, "King Greets Soccer Team," 18 November 2005. 
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4.2 THE KING'S SPEECHES: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
REFORM STRATEGIES 
If the NAC and the amended Constitution were the essential tools to modernise the 
political structure of the state, the "Speeches" of the King were no less crucial too. 
The Speeches were uniquely brought about the others important aspects of reforms 
such as the economic, social, and the cultural. In each speech, since he came to 
power, King Hamad commits himself, and the government, to a program to improve 
Bahraini individuals' position in society and to participate in the reform process. He 
has believed that the economical situation of the society must be improved, because 
the reforms do have certain prerequisites. There has to be a minimum standard of 
living that allows an individual to be truly independent from economic coercion. 
Accordingly, he began encouraging the principal of free economy; invited external 
substantial capital inflows for investment; and big projects through the development 
of the law of ownership, which permitted foreign investors to buy and sell land and 
properties in the Islands. Such a program will create economic development and 
offer employment opportunities to citizens. To do so require a new public 
administration mindset, one that is oriented to a streamlined procedure, 
transparency, elimination of jurisdictional overlapping, improved services and 
updated economic legislation within a framework of integrity and equal opportunity. 
4.2. I Economical Aspects 
King Hamad pledged oil revenue windfall to improve citizens' standard of living.7 
He almost in every speech directs the concerned authorities in the Kingdom to deem 
the economic developments as the main strategic objective to raise the living 
standard of the citizens and revive the national economy. Some of the related 
speeches are as follow: 
7 All Bahraini Newspapers, "Bridges to a bright and vibrant Bahrain," Saturday, 4 February 2006. 
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l·v't Quote from the King's Speeches ., ·[I"::::: Key Observations ~ u~ 
In our persistence to boost the links of love Enhance foreign economical 
and friendship that Bahrain has always relationship with the entire world. 
been keen to promote with all, and The King visited All Gulf States, 
through our believe that Bahrain which most of the leading countries in the 
has an ancient civilisation must keep with Middle East, America, UK, China, 
pace with the cultural movement, we have Italy, France, and many other 
made several fruitful visits to a number of developed countries. Several 
brotherly and friendly countries with the Memorandum of Understanding were 
aim to enhance the status of Bahrain at signed during these visits to boost 
both Arab and international domains, and relations with these countries 
to continue the path of development and 
openness and also to achieve further 
development and investment with brothers 
and friends. 8 
We are greatly confident that our Bahraini Applying the consultation system on 
civilised society is blessed with much economic development and to 
potential of real progress upon which we diversify the national economy to 
can build in the path of political, benefit Bahraini citizens. 
administrative, and economic 
development. Such path we highly believe 
in and consider it as a source of richness 
for our traditions of consultation, and as a 
pattern for governmental development and 
for accomplishing the comprehensive 
progress and diversifying of the national 
8 Ministry of Information, "The Speeches of His Majesty King Hamad bin /sa AI Kha/ifa, King of 
Bahrain," Ministry of Information publication, Bahrain, 2002, p. 18. 
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economy in the interest of the people of 
this nation and every piece of this soi/.9 
We also closely view the intent of our The King brought new task for the 
Crown Prince and Commander in Chief of CP where he engages him to follow 
the Defence force Sheikh Salman bin up economic growth and encourage 
Hamad al Khalifa to come for the youth, investment with the aim to raise the 
develop of the BDF, keenness to follow up living standard of the citizens and 
economic growth and encouragement of enrich the national economy. 
investment with the aim to raise the living 
standard of the citizens and revive the 
national economy. These is fact reflect the 
aspiration of Bahrain youth towards better 
future. Certainly, the removing of barriers 
and restrictions before the economy and 
the opening of future investment 
opportunities, away from political and 
administrative procedures, are among the 
essential needs for the desired economic 
growth. In fact Bahrain has the solid 
growth and for free economy which 
streamline the achieving of this 
b. . 10 o '}ectlve. 
Certainly, the removing of barriers and Try to smooth the progress of the 
restrictions before the economy and the government bureaucracy from local 
opening of future investment opportunities, and foreign investment prospects. 
away from political and administrative 
9 Ibid, p. 50. 
10 Ibid, p. 51. 
135 
procedures, are among the essential needs 
for the desired economic growth. 11 
to reduce custom duties with aim to Reduce custom duties in a step to 
revive the economic drive in the country. 12 encourage trades and reduce 
investment costs. 
Since assumed the rule, we have pledged to The main concern of the King was 
bring in every goodness for the people of the Kingdom's ability to raise the 
this nation, giving priority to raise the living standard of the Bahraini 
living standard of the Bahraini citizen, citizen, notably those of limited 
notably those of limited income. We mcome. He wants all citizens to 
believe in involving all categories of the benefit from the fruits of growth and 
society in the economic and social from the wealth of the nation. 
development process and the need that 
every group receives its fair share of the Moreover, he requested the 
fruits of growth and of the wealth of the government to enhance free 
nation. In pursuance of this objective, we economy, the privatisation of 
continue to cultivate and distribute the projects, the drafting of laws and 
economic prosperity through further disciplines that tackle recession and 
policies of free economy, the privatisation unemployment and also overcome 
of projects, the drafting of laws and monopoly and avoid duality of 
discipline that tackle recession and interests. 
unemployment and also to open a wide 
scope for free trade competition that avert 
monopoly and avoid duality of interests. 13 
Bahrain also represents a financing and Showing the importance of Bahrain's 
investment centre benefiting the world location and the high standard of its 
economy, due to its sound economy and people as measures to attract foreign 
II Ibid, p. 52. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, p. 76. 
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liberalised system, a fact which gave investments. 
Bahrain the position of the most 
economically liberalised country among 
Arab and mid-eastern states. Therefore, 
this place has remained a destination for 
many international companies that chose 
Bahrain to be their headquarters. 14 
Internationally and where the whole world The key issue here is to show how 
turned to be an entity, which has common Bahrain work hard through the 
shares in sorrow and in joy. The history to fulfils international 
achievement Bahrain made in receiving the requirement and catches the highly 
status of a US-non NATO Major Ally has developed countries attentions. As 
not accidentally occurred due to a certain a consequence, Bahrain Received the 
event or passing interest, but in fact come status of a U.S-non NATO that will 
out as a objective expression of the gain economic benefits for Bahrain 
historical links over more than a century people. This strategic partnership 
and since was launched thorough gives Bahrain a seat in the forum of 
humanitarian projects, notably the advanced countries in Asia and the 
American Mission Hospital which remain Orient. 
and over a century provide true services 
for Bahrain and its neighbours in the Gulf 
Out of this Major-Ally status we shall 
mainly gain economic benefit for the 
prosperity of Bahrain people, since this 
strategic partnership gives Bahrain a seat 
in the forum of advanced countries in Asia 
and the Orient. Marking the event, I extend 
to the friendly US president George W 
Bush the gratitude of Bahrain over his 
14 Ibid, p. 77. 
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endorsing of our joint protocol that grants 
Bahrain this highly positioned status in the 
world. 15 
Our dear people, as we reiterate our pride Steering the legislative and the 
with what the legislative and executive executive branches to give economic 
branches have together accomplished in a reform top priority to exercise their 
short time, we wish to recall our directives role in restructuring the national 
at the beginning of the third session of the economy. 
Parliament's first term, about completing 
the nation's laws, reorganising the family 
status and focusing on the economic 
development issues that we consider 
paramount to the restructuring of the 
national economy for the sake of all 
people. 16 
The progress of reforms and modernisation The King focused on economic 
will continue incessantly. It encompasses aspects as one of the most important 
the areas of economy, education, factor of his reforms. 
d bl . . 17 management, an pu 1c serv1ces. 
The legislative bodies should work on The King is expressing his concern in 
improving the laws related to the workers' regard to the improvement of laws 
status and their working conditions in related to the labour market. 
order to benefit from the new opportunities 
created by the world's conversion to the 
15 Ibid, p. 78. 
16 All Bahraini Newspapers, The King speech in 16 Dec. 2004. 
17 Ibid. 
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market economy and to the free economy 
system. 18 
I am satisfied with the work of His The King was wisely using the 
Highness the Crown Prince and his team in encouragements statements to 
analysing and addressing the situation of motivate the CP for more work and 
the labour market in Bahrain. The final efforts in reforming the economy. 
account, which was approved after 
consultations with the various sectors in 
the country, will keep up with the demands 
of the economic activity in Bahrain. 19 
Based on my close knowledge about the The King praises and motivates the 
history of labour in Bahrain, I have deep national work force to better 
trust in the capabilities of our workers to performance. 
adapt to the economic changes. Our 
workers have a wealth of experience to 
draw on as they move forward. 20 
Within the framework of our anxiousness to Requesting all experts of the field to 
see effective participation by merchants cooperate, and to put more effort for 
from the country and businessmen from the economic development of the 
abroad in present and foture investment country. 
projects, the competent bodies must strive 
to further facilitate business and 
commercial procedures, for that is a 
priority of the economic reform you have 
begun through a more precise verification 
18 All Bahraini Newspapers, "Talks on National Awareness: Second Talk," 30 April 2005. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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of revenues and expenditure, in fruitful 
. . h h G 21 cooperatzon wzt t e overnment. 
We have directed the Economic Showing his concern towards the 
Development Board to set overall plans scarce of lands and the necessity to 
which cover the lands of the Kingdom for make the best use of it. 
25 years, to determine the proper 
utilisation of these lands for the welfare of 
all people. 22 
We also value the important role that is Showing the role of all governmental 
carried out by the Economic Development organisations m implementing the 
Council which is headed by His Highness EDB's 
the Crown Prince and BDF Commander- strategies. 
in-Chief The Council has undertaken the 
task of advancing economic policies that 
aim to bring about the participation of the 
private sector and honourable citizens in 
shouldering the responsibility, while the 
State coordinates and regulates the 
process. In order that the executive branch 
and all its directorates are better able to 
fulfil citizens' needs, each ministry will 
define the priorities of its work and its 
basic objectives as a starting point to 
renew the Government program in this 
stage, so as to serve everyone. You will 
21 All Bahraini Newspapers, The King speech in I Oct. 2005. 
22 All Bahraini Newspapers, The King speech in 16 Dec. 2005. 
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economic development 
have an important role in evolving that, for 
it is within your competence. 23 
Therefore, the legislative authority is Again requesting the legislative 
required to speed up the enactment of laws branch to speed up laws that help the 
which are necessary to safeguard political development of the economy. 
rights and economic freedoms, and protect 
the security of Bahraini community, 
particularly women and children, and 
security of all citizens in general. 24 
The reform of the labour market will Developing the labour market. 
continue to be a subject of discussion and 
attempts to reach understanding, 
accompanied by gradual progress in 
practice in accordance with current 
economic factors and the extent of their 
development. 25 
On activating the development of the economic aspects, King Hamad wisely 
transformed as indicated earlier, the long historical border dispute with Qatar from 
tension to a bright start for the future. He initiated joint ventures with Qatar, notably 
the causeway project, the supply of gas and the use of Bahraini skilled labour force. 
Furthermore, the Free Trade Agreement (FT A) with the USA, as revealed earlier, 
will reinforce the commercial, economic and investment sectors in the country and 
attract more foreign investment by advertising and marketing the FT A 
accomplishment.26 But the FTA with the USA which the King persevere for 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 
"Prime Minister call on private sector to benefit from FFA deaf', Bahrain Tribune, June 2"d 2004. 
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boosting Bahrain economic nearly causes difference of opinion between the most 
brotherly country Saudi Arabia. But, the ruler of Bahrain wisely overcome the 
disagreement in an exceptionally diplomatic approach to keep the long lasting 
relationship with the Saudis and without even disturbing the beneficially relationship 
with America. The incident happened in December 2004, when Saudi Arabia 
boycotted the annual summit of the GCC. Or, to be more accurate, Prince Abdulla, 
the de facto ruler of the Kingdom, decided to boycott the summit. The reason given 
for this absence was that Saudi Arabia was deeply annoyed by the fact that Bahrain, 
the host of the summit, had signed the FTA with the USA. Saudi Arabia complained 
that such a deal upset economic integration plans among members of the bloc, since 
it was offering to an outsider-namely the US-better trade conditions than those 
governing the trade between the GCC countries, which are supposed to achieve a 
common market. 
In contrary, on March 2005, Oman sought to ease Saudi concerns about this mater as 
it launched talks on FT A with Washington that would be concluded by year's end. 
"There is no clash between GCC economic integration and the signing of FTAs with 
the United States (by member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council)." Trade and 
Industry Minister Maqbool bin Ali bin Sultan said just before the start of the first 
round of Omani-US negotiations. He added that Muscat would be happy to see 
Saudi Arabia gaining membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which 
would pave the way for the kingdom to sign FT A with the United States. 
Additionally, UAE and USA officials also reassured Saudi Arabia after their 
meeting for the first round oftalks on FTA in March 2005.27 
Arguably, the point made by the Saudi government has some validity. But no-one 
believes it was the real motivation of the Saudi annoyance. This was an excuse, not 
the reason. In fact, there are many other reasons behind this argument: Firstly, 
broadly speaking, through the history of the region, Saudi Arabia has always been 
dominating over the Gulf oil monarchies. However, the Saudis have been steadily 
27 Bahrain Tribune, "Oman Seeks to Allay Saudi FTA Concerns," 25 March 2005. 
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losing its grip on them since September 11th, 2001, and even more so since the fall 
of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003. The second reason was that in 1987, 
Saudi Arabia attempted mediation to solve the territorial dispute over the Hawar 
Islands and the Fasht Al Dibal reefs, but it ended in failure. Qatar was irritated by 
the obvious bias in favour of Bahrain by the mediator. Bahrain, for its part, was no 
less disappointed in King Fahd's decision not to support fully and openly Bahrain's 
position. As a result, the referee has managed to anger both parties. Eventually, it is 
the judgment of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which succeeded in 
putting an end to the conflict in March 2001. This success underlines the scope of 
the Saudi failure, especially as for several years, the Grand Mufti of the kingdom, 
Sheikh Abdelaziz Ibn Baz, had ruled that resorting to the arbitration of a non-Islamic 
body was prohibited. 
Thirdly, the democratisation wave around Saudi Arabia especially Bahrain has 
weakened the authoritarian model of the House of Saud, who is further weakened by 
the consequences of September 11. Saudi Arabia, in I 970s had put a great deal of 
pressure on Bahrain and also Kuwait to end their parliamentary experiments but 
could not stop the 2000s' liberalisation reforms. However, as an anger management 
reaction, Saudi Arabia started to retain their share of the refinery by mid 2004 from 
Bahrain. The Forth reason is that under the sponsorship and protection of the United 
States of America, the smaller sheikhdoms are freeing themselves from Saudi 
trusteeship. They have become bold enough to openly pursue a different path from 
that advocated by the Saudis. And, by embracing a new pattern of political 
participation (thoroughly appreciated by Washington) the tiny emirates now go as 
far as presenting themselves as a model for Saudi Arabia, - once their suzerain.28 
The fifth reason is the United States, a key ally for more than half a century, is at 
present openly wary ofthe Saudi regime, and doesn't seem any longer to consider its 
survival a strategic priority. Saudi Arabia, long considered America's main ally in 
the Gulf, has been stripped of this position. Finally, some suggested that the 
28 Olivier Da Lage, "Saudia Arabia & the Smaller Gulf States: The Vassals Take their Revenge," 
CERI, 2005, p. 6. 
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transformation of Bahrain to a Kingdom and the Amir became King has annoyed 
Saudi Arabia as it was the only Kingdom in the region. 
Whatever were the reasons behind that disagreement, King Hamad manage, as a 
leader, to settled the matter and rebuild a stronger relation with Saudi Arabia. 
4.2.2 Social Aspects 
The social dimension of Bahrain's reforms, partly encompassed in the economic 
requirements (social national security), focuses more on issues related to culture and 
education. The King, almost in each speech states; "Bahraini citizens remain our 
top priority in all our actions." In his speech, on 16 December 2001, the King said; 
"Since assumed the rule, we have pledged to bring in goodness for the people of this 
nation, giving priority to raise the living standard of the Bahraini citizen, notably 
those of limited income."29 Then he added 
We do not restrict our endeavour to raising the national income, but 
also to bridge gaps among difftrent sectors of the community. The 
channel to achieve this objective is the expanding the base of ownership 
while grow the share of limited income group in the wealth and national 
. . h' 30 mcome m t rs country. 
"We launched the reforms process only to help the people of Bahrain achieve 
prosperity, through constitutional channels, and elevate their living standards." 31 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, The King granted many royal gestures to 
instantly treat the society. He ordered a number of steps to improve the situation of 
the citizens with limited income: 32 
29 Ministry of Information, "The Speeches of His Majesty King Hamad bin !sa AI Khalifa, King of 
Bahrain," Ministry of Information publication, Bahrain, 2002, p. 76. 
30 Ibid, p. 77. 
31 All Bahraini Newspapers, King Speech in 16 December 2003. 
32 Ministry of Information, p. 77. 
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• The privatisation of Al-SeefMall (the biggest shopping centre in Bahrain) and 
donating 30% of ownership to the needy families in this country on basis of 
criteria set by the concerned body. 
• The development of a new commercial complex in Sitra village for the benefit 
of limited income groups and the donating of ownership percentage to the 
needy families in the area, with the state retaining a certain percentage to 
secure the success of the project. Additionally, develop further projects in all 
parts of Bahrain and privatise the shareholding for the benefit of limited 
mcome groups. 
• Implementing a pan-national housing plan that benefits more than 50,000 
Bahraini families and developing of four new modern towns. 
• In the beginning of 2002, he reduced customs duties on all goods to 5% in 
order to stimulate the economy, improve the living standard, raised the 
purchasing power, and expands the investment business. This step was the 
subject of a resolution adopted by the cabinet with the aim to benefit the nation 
and the citizens. 
4.2.3 Cultural and Educational Aspects 
Referring to the national culture and education, The King has always declared that 
the time has come to embrace these dimensions with every care and attention under 
the umbrella of a broad modernisation national blueprint. He said; 
". . . the deep vision into the history of the nation is a crucial issue 
that led to consolidate this national formula, primarily viewing our 
national struggle as an exertion to achieve a single objective of both the 
leadership and the people, and representing the safeguarding of 
Bahrain's independence and assurance of its entity against foreign 
avidities. It has always been that our national resolve converged on this 
objective, whether through the endeavour of the leadership or through 
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the initiatives of national sectors with the aim to preserve independence. 
The means of actions have been inconsistent due to historical and 
political position, and thus our exertion showed implicitly at times and 
apparent at other times. This has also taken the form of political feature 
at time and educational, religious and economic at other time."33 
Accordingly, he ordered to have this noble national feature clearly evident when 
inscribing the history of Bahrain and drafting the national education curriculum and 
in all form of public life, including museums and the naming of road and streets as 
well as the building of grand national monument to be called the beacon of sacrifice, 
in memory of all those sacrificed in defending Bahrain. 
At the level of university and college education, he directed the relevant government 
bodies to establish a law college consolidates law studies into the national life, 
considering Bahrain as a constitutional monarch, which respects rights, code, and 
laws similar to those civilized democracies in the world. Along with this, he also 
directed the establishment of a section for teaching the Islamic laws to graduate 
religion scholars able to serve this tolerant Islamic society. He also orders the 
establishment of the political development-training centre. In general, the approach 
is to adopt an education policy that prepares Bahraini youth to meet the needs of 
labour market and to cope with the needs of the national economy and to ensure that 
curriculum in schools and universities aim at matching with the developments and to 
prepare the new generations to learn the latest technological skills. In collaboration 
with the king request, a comprehensive curricula will cover the students of the two 
religious institutions to make the graduates suitable for the labour market. 34 The 
new curricula of the Sunni religious Institute and the newly established Ja 'afari 
Religious Institute will not only focus on Islamic regulations and Quran but also 
cover educational social and scientific studies as well as information technology.35 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister, in Sunday 13 March 2005 Cabinet session, 
33 Ibid, p. 80. 
34 Bahrain Tribune, "New Courses at Religious Institute," Saturday 26 March 2005. 
JS Ibid. 
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approved the Chamber of Deputies' decision to introduce human rights and 
democracy as subjects at the intermediate and secondary levels and asked the 
Minister of Education to consider both subjects in its curricula development plans. 
4.3 NEW ROLE OF THE CROWN PRINCE 
The Crown Prince has played a vital role to develop Bahrain economy and on 
reforming the labour market. He came up, as the head of the Economic 
Development Board (EDB), with a proposal to develop a comprehensive reform 
program for Bahrain, including labour market, economic, and education and training 
reform, to prepare the Kingdom to proactively address the challenges it will face 
over the coming decade.36 The study was produced by the Economic Development 
Board, and based it on the 100,000 new Bahrainis that will enter the labour market 
over the next decade. Many of these will be young Bahrainis, recently graduated 
from high school or post-secondary studies, which will be looking for work. Other 
will be women, who are entering the work force in growing numbers. Still others 
are currently unemployed and many not have the skills to compete successfully for 
adequately paying jobs. Together, they will double the current Bahraini workforce, 
requiring Bahrain to provide three times more jobs than it did in the past decade. 
Will these job seekers find work that will meet their wage and skill expectations? 
Will Bahrain be able to provide it for them? If not, they will face unemployment, 
become restless in jobs that are not sufficiently rewarding, or be forced to leave the 
country to look for better opportunities elsewhere. 37 
Unfortunately, the study faced offensively by the citizens from different level. The 
reasons were that the people concerned in the market with long experience have 
been neglected, and the solutions were unrealistic. Again, the good things about this 
episode, as the research is not so much concern with detailed economical issues, 
were the highly professional and civilised dialogue held between the CP and the 
concerned individuals in the market. After extensive, hot, and fruitful discussions, 
36 See the EDB website, www.bahrainedb.com for all the key documents and material related to the 
reform initiative. 
37 Report of the Economic Development Board presentation on September 23, 2004, Bahrain, p. l. 
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the CP praised the courage of the Bahraini people, their representatives, and their 
vibrant social organisations, which focused on the economic problems confronting 
Bahrain. Paying tribute to the people's positive contributions to the forums that 
reviewed the labour market status, he confirmed that the interactions have fostered a 
better and deeper understanding of the problems plaguing the labour market, the 
options available, and the ways to tackle them successfully.38 The CP added that the 
fate of all suggestions and proposals by the various business and social sectors 
would depend on the consensus between the people and the state.39 Since when 
someone like the CP hold open and honest dialogues with the citizens. Before 1999, 
such market reform will be forced in Bahrain without considering any views from 
any one. But now, such event indicates the succession of the reforms and stirring 
towards modernisation in all area in Bahrain liberalisation programme. 
4.4 THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR WOMEN 
In August 24, 2001, the King ordered the setting up of a Supreme Council for 
Women (SCW) to empower the Bahraini women and uplift their role in society. His 
Order states that the council shall be under the authority of HM the King, shall have 
a legal status, and shall be considered the authority to which all official quarters will 
refer with regard to women affairs. The council is chaired by Her Highness Sheikha 
Sabeeka bint Ibrahim AI Khalifa, and includes 14 members from public figures 
experienced in women's affairs and related activities. The council main 
responsibilities is to propose public policy with regard to the development of 
women's affairs, enable women to carry out their role in public life, and merge their 
efforts with development programmes without discrimination. It is also responsible 
of devising a national plan to improve the situation of women and solve the 
problems they face in various fields. Moreover, the council represents Bahraini 
women in Arab and international forums and organisations pertaining to women's 
affairs. 
38 Bahrain Tribune, "Labour Market Reforms," Friday, March 25, 2005. 
39 Ibid. 
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A technical secretariat was established headed by the secretary-general of the 
council, which will assist the council in its work and convey its decisions, 
recommendations, and proposals to the competent authorities. The secretary-general 
shall be concerned with implementing the council's decisions and generally 
supervising the technical secretariat, personnel affairs and financial and 
administrative affairs. 
The establishment of this Council has played a vital role on matters regarding 
developing women of the Kingdom in all fields, whether at the level of the family or 
of the nation. In 2002, the SCW played a crucial role on encouraging women to 
exercise their new political rights. There was an enthusiastic response from women 
voters, assisted by Sheikha Sabeeka, who visited villages and universities urging 
women to take advantage of their rights. One hundred and seventy seven ( 177) 
candidates competed in the first round, including eight women. Only two of these 
women candidates made it for the second round. But in the run-off elections on 31 
October 2002, both women failed to get a seat. Afterwards the first lady with her 
influenced managed to have two female ministers and two other women, including 
the president ofthe University of Bahrain, with ministerial rank.40 
Sheikha Sabeeka has been chosen as the ninth most influential Arab Woman. Arab 
Forbes, the Arabic version of the Forbes, in its December 2004 issue, conducted the 
Survey of the 59 most influential women. She was praised for her role as a First 
Lady and the force behind women's action in Bahrain. Other criteria for choice 
included a strong Arab and International presence and close interaction with national 
ISSUeS. 
During 2004, the SCW has led a campaign on the importance of issuing a Family 
Law. The campaign was perceived with mixed reactions from the society and 
created a heated debate in Bahrain. The council argue that the lack of a codified 
40 The two females ministers were Dr Nada Haffadh (Health Minister) and Dr Fatima AI Balooshi 
(Social Development Minister). The two females with minister rank were Dr Mariam AI Khalifa 
(President of Bahrain University) and Lawyer Lulwa AI Awadhi (Secretary General of the Supreme 
Council for Women). 
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Family Law gives judges excessive discretion in their interpretation of the Sharia 
law and allow them to rule against women in cases of divorce, inheritance, and child 
custody. Some ofthe religious political societies led an opposition demonstration to 
the SCW's campaign showing their concern that the SCW was pushing for a Civil 
Law rather than an Islamic Law, and that only religious scholars should have a say 
in determining the law contents. 
In March 9, 2005, the King requested all government and civil administrations and 
organisations to help implement the National Strategy for the advancement of 
Bahraini women, stressing that women should have better opportunities. "The 
implementation of the national strategy, the first of its type in the country, will help 
us achieve our objective, which is to see women assume their roles fully as 
dependable partners to men and well capable of contributing to the building of the 
family, the society and the state and, eventually, to be involved in making decisions 
in modern Bahrain." The King said in his address to mark the International 
Women's Day.41 
4.5 THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 
Naturally, in any election there are a number of people who boycott the election for 
certain grounds. Bahrain is no different, and has experience this phenomenon. On 
the 3rd of September 2002, four political societies; Al-Wefaq (Islamic National 
Accord), The National Democratic Gathering, The National Democratic Action 
Society and The Islamic Action Society have boycotted the election for many 
reasons:
42 
4.5.1 Declared reasons: 
• Parliamentary reform has not remained true to the original National Action 
Charter. 
41 All Bahrain News Papers, King Hamad Speech marking the International Women's Day, 9 March 
2005. 
42 The term 'Society' or 'Association' is used to describe the political entities that were set up after 
inauguration of the reform projects. They are similar to political parties, but they are not officially 
classed as 'Parties' yet. Their legal status might be changed to parties in the future. 
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• Amendments to the constitution gave the Consultative Council appointed by 
the King the same legislative powers as those given to the elected chamber. In 
their view, this meant that the concentration of power remains in the hands of 
the un-elected authority.43 Disagreement between the elected chamber and the 
appointed one are to be resolved by a vote of all members, with 40 members 
each and the head of the National Assembly is from the appointed chamber, 
this gives elected deputies less power than they enjoyed under the I 973 
Constitution.44 
• Amendments must be made to the 2002 Constitution or restoration of the 1973 
Constitution. 
11 The powers of the King are too excessive, and they indicate that in 
constitutional monarchy the king rules but does not govern. 
• Courts are still subject to government interference regarding verdicts, 
sentencing, and appeals. 
a They reject the drawing of the Governorates (the Southern, AI Muharraq, the 
Central, the Capital, and the Northern Governorate) where this grouping does 
not guarantee justice and equal opportunities between citizens.45 
• The continuous granting of citizenship to non Bahrainis-mainly Sunni Arabs 
from around the region to mitigate Shia dominance. 
• Un-equal distribution ofwealth.46 
43 Omar AI Hassan, "The Kingdom of Bahrain In 2002," Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London, 
2003,p.9 
44 Michael Herb, "Emirs and Parliaments in the Gulf," Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 4, 
October 2002, p. 46. 
45 International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," Middle East Report number 40, May 
6, 2005, p. 6. 
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• En-equality between Bahraini citizens, especially the privileges granted to AI 
Khalifa members and their Arab tribal allies.47 
• Prohibiting Shia from joining the Armed Forces. 
4.5.3 Unofficial reasons:48 
• The ruling family to be removed from power, as the Shia consider themselves 
to be the real native of Bahrain and considers the AI Khalifa family as 
foreigners who moved to Bahrain from Qatar in the late eighteenth century. 
• The ruling family should give up their dominance of the ministries of 
sovereignty (armed forces, interior, foreign affairs, and finance) and let the 
parliament decides that. 
• The Prime Minister's post is to be given up to someone from outside the ruling 
family. 
These societies continue to organise processions in order to exercise pressure and 
extract constitutional amendments to the current Constitution. Although the 
Ministry of Interior banned a request for demonstration by Al-Wefaq society on 
Friday 25 March 2005 in Sitra area, the society went on demonstration and caused 
lots of embarrassment to the government and the citizens. The decision not to allow 
the demonstration was linked to the security situation in the region at the time and 
the need to preserve national safety, and to prevent the demonstration and the 
counter-demonstrations from disrupting public security and order and would harm 
investments and business activities and hurt people's interests. Several other 
societies, businesspersons, and citizens have condemned the demonstration via all 
kind of media and warned that rallies will hurt the economy and the security of the 
46 Concluded from the semi-interviews. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Such conclusions are based on discussions and part1c1pant observation by the author m 
government/security circles and through dialogue in key Majlis. 
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Kingdom. Six leading societies called to preserve democracy and the Kingdom's 
interest first on a full-page statement of all national newspapers and emphasised that 
such acts and practices must be in full compliance with the law, the rule of the 
regime and the protection of the homeland and citizens.49 These condiments did not 
affect the situation because all of these six societies happened to be Sunnis! 
Against all expectations, no legal action was taken against AI Wefaq for staging the 
Sitra rally despite a written warning from the Ministry of Interior. "In light of the 
commitment of Al Wefaq to comply with the law and to coordinate with the executive 
authorities, the ministry will not take any other legal action against the society on 
the Sitra rally, "50 the newly appointed, Minister of Social Development, Dr Fatima 
AI Belooshi, said after a meeting with a delegation from AI Wefaq. 51 
Observers had predicted a 45-day closure of the society or a strong warning. 
"The Ministry of Social Development chose not to take legal action against AI Wefaq 
to avoid the escalation of the issue," Dr AI Belooshi said. The Minister said that she 
supported societies, but stressed the need for them to comply with the laws and 
rules. "We all want the best for our country, and we should work together to ensure 
its progress and success. The meeting with AI Wefaq is a confirmation of our 
patriotic objectives," she said. 52 Such action gave an excellent sign of the new 
reform, because if this episode happened before the reform lots of people would be 
hurt and jailed. 
After the rejection of the draft of a law that would have allowed the formation of 
political parties by the National Assembly in June 2004, King Hamad ratified a 
controversial law for political associations in August 2005 despite vehement 
49 The societies were AI Asala Islamic Society, National Constitutional Grouping Society, Islamic 
National Forum Society, AI Shura Islamic Society, AI Mithaq Society, and Free Thinking Society. 
50 Bahrain Tribune, "Wefaq Faces Legal Action," Saturday, March 26,2005. 
51 On December 2004, Dr Fatima AI Belooshi appointed for the new Ministry of Social Development, 
after separating the Ministry of Labour and foreign Affairs to create the new ministry. On November, 
2005 the ministry renamed to "Ministry of Social Development". 
52 Bahrain Tribune, "Wefaq Rally," Tue'sday, Miirch29, 2005. 
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opposition from Bahrain's political societies. 53 The new law stipulates that 
associations can be formed as long as they are not based on class, profession, or 
religion and raises the minimum age of society members from eighteen to twenty-
one. It also imposes restrictions on foreign funding and requires all existing political 
societies to re-register with the Ministry of Justice by November 2, 2005. After 
months of protesting the new law that passed by parliament in July, Bahrain main 
political societies (AI Wefaq) and the National Democratic Action Society have 
decided to register under the new law. AI Wefaq witnessed a spilt in its ranks, with 
some I 00 members including the vice president and some board member to resign in 
protest of the decision to abide by the new law. 
In contrary, to many observers interested in Bahraini affairs, the view of the 
opposition societies is unjustified. They argue that the amendment was introduced 
to reinforce democracy in its infant stages, protecting it from being hijacked by anti-
democratic forces. It is widely believed that had the Bahraini monarchy not desired 
to enhance democratic governance and activate political leadership among the 
people, it would not have implemented such a series of substantive reforms in the 
first place. 54 On the other hand, the government argued that the open political 
participation is at its early stages, and as such, precaution needed to be taken to 
avoid any harm to the different ethnic or religious minorities, as well as women. 
However, the boycott was accepted as legitimate response and the experiment left to 
complete itself. The following Table 4.1 illustrate Bahrain's main political 
Societies. 55 
53 Gulf Daily News, August 20, 2005. 
54 Omar AI Hassan, "The Kingdom of Bahrain In 2002", Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London, 
2003, p. 9. 
55 Glada Lahan, "Democratic Transition in Bahrain: A Model for the Arab World," Gulf Centre for 
Strategic Studies Ltd., London, 2004, p. 54. 
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Table 4.1: Bahrain's main political Societies 
Societies Orientation 
AI Wefaq (Islamic National Accord) Shia Islamist 
Jameiat AI Amal AI Is/ami (Islamic Action Society) Shia Jslamist 
Jameiat AI Rabita AI Jslamya (Islamic League Society) Shia Islamist 
AI Menbar (Democratic Progressive Association) Leftist 
AI Wasat (Arab [slamic Democratic Association) Nasserist and Sunni lslamist 
Jameiat AI Menbar AI Watani Ails/ami (Nationallslamic 
Muslim Brotherhood 
Forum) 
AI Shura (Consultation Society) Sunni Islamist 
Allslah (Reform Islamic Society) lslamist 
AI Asala (Reform Society) Sunni Salafist 
AI Tajamu (National Democratic Gathering) 
Leftlists, Baathists, & Migrant 
workers 
Jameiat AI Amal AI Watani (National Democratic Action 
Leftists and Nationalists 
Society) 
AI Methaq (National Action Charter Society) Pro-government 
4.6 HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
Since there is no reform in any region without closely considering the human rights 
issues, the King has granted these issues excessive priority which fall at the top of 
his reform program. At the same time, the Human Rights groups have been 
routinely attacking the GCC countries as repressive states where the ruling family 
jealously guarded the reins of po litical and economic power. After II September 
2001 attacks, the USA became very insistent too on the issues regarding human 
rights, especially those countries that the US have bilateral relationship and/or 
threatens their national security. Along with the US policies, the European Union, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other trans-national 
institutions have linked their loans, investments, donations of aid to the 
improvements in human rights issues. Bahrain has earned US praise, in February 
2004 State department report on human rights, by instituting labour reform, 
including a 2002 law granting workers, including non-citizens, the right to form and 
join unions. There are now about 39 trade unions in Bahrain, and workers are 
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permitted to conduct work stoppages.56 The UN's Human Development Report of 
2003 ranks Bahrain 391h among 173 countries for "high human development," is a 
good source on quality-of-life trends in contemporary nations. However, observers 
should know that Bahrain is an Arab Muslim country and the Islamic legislations 
(Sharia) are a principal source for legislation as Article (2) of Bahrain Constitution 
point out.57 Human rights were blessed by Islam fourteen centuries ago, and in his 
last sermon, Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) said; ''people were equal like 
the teeth of a comb, and that an Arab has no superiority over a non Arab and white 
has no superiority over black except by piety and good action." Prophet Mohammed 
added; "All citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties. There is no 
discrimination between them on the ground of sex, origin, language, religion, or 
creed." Therefore, these issues have been applied and considered within the new 
reform, not as a cause of internal or external forces but from Bahrain's indigenous 
cultural. From the concept of supporting human rights and democracy in Bahrain, 
the United States seeks to accelerate the political reform. Through the State 
Department's "Middle East Partnership Initiative" (MEPI), the US launched an Arab 
judicial reform program in September 2003, hosted by Bahrain. Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor led the US delegation. Other MEPI funds have been 
used to assist the elected Council of Representatives, to advance women, and to fund 
projects with Bahrain labour organisations. 58 
For a practical evaluation of human rights issues, it is therefore, useful to list some 
of the Universal Declaration (UD) of Human Rights' Articles and find out how close 
Bahrain reform came to this concept:59 
56 Kenneth Katzman, "Bahrain: Key Issues for U.S Policy," CRS Report for Congress, March 24, 
2005, p. 2. 
57 Article 2 [State Religion, Shari'a, Official Language] "The religion of the State is Islam. The 
Islamic Shari'a is a principal source for legislation. The official language is Arabic." 
58 Kenneth Katzman, p. 3 
59 Articles that are not included mean that they are more or less not related to Bahrain. 
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(UD) of Human Rights' Articles The Reform Applicability 
Article 5 No one shall be subjected to The Security laws and the Security 
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or Court that allowed police to hold 
degrading treatment or punishment. prisoners without charge for up to 3 
years were abolished. See Bahrain High 
Constitution Article 19 (d), Art. 20 (a, 
b, c, d, e, and f). 
Article 9 No one shall be subjected to All political prisoners were freed and 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. all exi les were officially allowed to 
High 
return to the country. See Article 19 
(a, b, c) of Bahrain Constitution. 
Article 21 The "National Action Charter" was 
(3) The will of the people shall be the presented to the Bahraini pub lic in a 
basis of the authority of government; this referendum in February 2001. It was 
will be expressed in periodic and the first public vote in Bahrain since 
genuine elections, which shall be by 1972, and for the first time, women 
universal and equal suffrage and shal l be had the right to both vote and to stand 
held by secret vote or by equivalent free as candidates. On 9 May 2002, 
voting procedures. Municipal Elections, the first since 
1957, took place, fol lowed by the 
Parliamentary elections on 24 October 
2002. 
Moreover, arising out of the king' s 
Medium 
keen compliance, he directed the 
government to put considerable 
resources to encourage as many 
people as possib le to vote. The 
elections themselves were noted for 
the use of state of the art technology, 
and for their transparency. The 
elections were successful in terms of 
the government's neutrality, smooth in 
organisation and for the participation 
of women. Bahrain constitution 
Articles 56 and 60. 
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Article 22 Everyone, as a member of See Bahrain Constitution Articles I 
society, has the right to social security (e), Art 4, Art. 5 (c), Art. 7 (a and b), 
and is entitled to realisation, through Art. 9 (t), Art. 10 (a), Art. I3 (a, b, 
national effort and international co- and d), Art. (a and b). 
operation and in accordance with the 
Medium 
organisation and resources of each State, 
of the economic, social, and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and 
the free development of his personality. 
Article 23 See Bahrain Constitution Articles I3 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to (a, b, c, and d), Art. I6 (a and b), Art. 
free choice of employment, to just and 27. 
favourable conditions of work and to 
protection against unemployment. 
(2) Everyone, without any 
discrimination, has the right to equal pay 
for equal work. 
(3) Everyone who works has the right to 
Medium just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an 
existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other 
means of social protection. 
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to 
join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
Article 25 See Bahrain Constitution Article 5 (a, 
(I) Everyone has the right to a standard band c), Art. 7 (a and d), Art. 8 (a), 
of living adequate for the health and Art. 9 (t). 
well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, and housing High 
and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other 
-.-. 
, ... 
----·--
- __ ,. 
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lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control. 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are 
entitled to special care and assistance. 
All children, whether born in or out of 
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection. 
Article 26 See Bahrain Constitution Article 7 (a, 
(1) Everyone has the right to education. b, c, and d). 
Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. 
Elementary education shall be 
compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally 
available and higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of 
merit. 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality High 
and to the strengthening of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
It shall promote understanding, tolerance 
and friendship among all nations, racial 
or religious groups, and shall further the 
activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace. 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose 
the kind of education that shall be given 
to their children. 
Article 27 See Bahrain Constitution Article 7 (a, 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to b, and c). Art. 23 and Art. 24. 
participate in the cultural life of the 
High 
community, to enjoy the arts and to 
share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 
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(2) Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary, or artistic production of which 
he is the author. 
Comparing what the King has implemented with the above UD's Articles, one can 
hardly find gaps between the new reforms and the all-international human rights 
regulations. The amended constitution speaks of transparency, accountability, 
justice, equality between the sexes and among ethnic/religious groups, equal 
opportunity for all, respect for human rights, the establishment of an independent 
judiciary, and the introduction of a new two-chamber parliamentary system. 
In fact, Bahrain's strategy intends to fulfil all human rights issues to build up a 
reform based on the common standards set by the Universal Declaration and various 
other treaties. However, instead of defining human rights by reference to 
internationally acknowledged standards, the NAC and the constitution define them 
by reference to national law, which poses a risk of a diminution of international 
human rights standards. There were many statements from the government of 
Britain, which clarified that it does not want to impose any particular type of 
democracy on any nation, only serves to reinforce the fact that democracy is not 
rigid concept that can be applied in the same way, in any place or at any time. 
Rather, it is an arrangement of systems that can be applied in different ways to suit 
particular circumstances and particular places.60 The Bahraini Crown Prince Sheikh 
Salman repeatedly said that the Kingdom generally supported reform but cautioned 
that 'one-size-fits-all' is not going to work across the whole region. 61 He added: 
But we certainly support the general principles advocated by the reform 
process ... And you can ... summaries them in three basic principles. 
One is democracy. Two is rule of law. And three is adherence to afree 
market or capitalist system. I think those three pillar need to be 
60 Prof. Nabil Adawy, Dr Barrie Wharion, and Dr Omar Al-Hassan, "Bahrain: Challenges and Future 
Prospects," GCSS, London, p. 32. 
61 Bahrain Tribune,"Support vital to move on, says CP," February IO'h, 2004, Bahrain. 
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encourage, and each country needs to define how it wants to move and 
when it wants to move on these issues. 62 
On other occasion, President Bush said: 
As we watch and encourage reforms in the region, we are mindful that 
modernisation is not the same as Westernisation. Representative 
governments in the Middle East will reflect their own cultures. They will 
not, and should not, look like us. 
constitutional monarchies, federal 
systems.63 
Democratic nations may be 
republics, or parliamentary 
Certainly, the defence and protection of human rights is a noble goal, which every 
country must strive to realise. Fortunately, with the new King, the first and foremost 
task is to protect the rights of the citizens to live in freedom, security, and harmony 
with each other. However, consideration should be taken that human rights cannot 
be defined absolutely, and they vary from one society to another. The death penalty, 
for example, is considered as a violation from Human Rights Organisations, where 
Islam takes a different view in this respect. Meanwhile, Bahrain has two 
independent human rights non-governmental organisations: The Bahrain Human 
Rights Society (which has recently received authorisation to monitor prison 
conditions) and the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society. 
In year 2000, the U.S issued a new law to combat modern-day slavery around the 
world (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000). This Act targeted at combating 
the many forms of labour exploitation, such as sexual exploitation and coerced 
labour, which suffered by approximately 800,000 people, mostly women and 
children. U.S embassies around the world collect information regarding a country's 
efforts in combating Trafficking in Persons, and then divide countries into tiers as 
62 Ibid. 
63 President Bush's speech at the 20'" anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy in 6 
November 2003. 
161 
per their accordance with the Trafficking in Person's Act of2000 as illustrated in the 
following Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Tiers of Trafficking in Persons 
I 
Tier 1 Countries that fully comply with the Trafficking in Persons Act's minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking 
--- -- ----. -- - ··- ·- --· --- --- -
I 
Tier2 Countries that do not fully comply with the minimum standards but are 
I making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance. 
' 
--- --· -···- --- ·---· - - --·~ - --- . -~ ·-·-·· ···- -··----~--·. 
Tier 2 Watch List Countries on Tier 2 requiring special scrutiny because of a high or 
significantly increasing number of victims; failure to provide evidence of : 
! increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons; or an assessment as 
: 
Tier 2 based on commitments to take action over the next year. 
' I 
- ----- ----
... -
. ·- --------- ---··· ----------------------------------------- .. --· 
Tier3 Countries that neither satisfy the minimum standards nor demonstrate a 
significant effort to come into compliance. Countries in this tier are 
subject to potential non-humanitarian and non-trade sanctions. 
- ---- - ·- ------
The US State Department's Annual Report on Trafficking m Persons of 2004 
pointed out that: 
The Government of Bahrain does not fully comply with the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making 
significant efforts to do so. Bahrain is placed on Tier 2 Watch List 
because of the lack of evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe 
forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year. Although 
Bahrain has developed a national plan of action and created an inter-
ministerial taskforce on trafficking, these efforts were not accompanied 
by concrete actions to address the substantial trafficking problem it 
faces. During the reporting period, the government did not prosecute 
any person on trafficking charge, despite continued reports of foreign 
workers in conditions of involuntary servitude. A promised government-
run shelter for trafficking victims has not opened and some prominent 
Bahrainis reportedly continue to illegally sell "free visas" to workers, 
thereby indirectly facilitating the trafficking of victims. Bahrain should 
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develop and implement appropriate anti-trafficking measures to address 
these concerns. 
See Table 4.3 that shows the Bahrain ' s status in the world trafficking reports. 
Table 4.3: Bahrain's Status in the Trafficking reports throughout the years 
. 
Years Bahrain's Status 
2001 Tier 3 
2002 Tier3 
2003 Tier 3 
2004 Tier 2 Watch List 
Despite Bahrain ' s efforts in combating Trafficking in Persons, it has yet to adhere to 
further essential steps to comply with the U.S annual reports, and they are as 
follows: 
• Lack of investigation and prosecution in Trafficking cases, and lengthy cases 
languish in courts. 
• Lack of a database, statistics, and verdicts on cases regarding Trafficking in 
Persons. 
• Bahrain has not yet established a promised shelter or (safe houses) for extreme 
abuse victims. The location has identified for the shelter, yet due to the delays 
in defining by-laws, it has not yet launched. 
• Bahrain has not yet registered with the International organisation for 
Migration , which fundamentally assists m setting out a plan to combat 
trafficking and implementing procedures. 
• Bahrain is still drafting a new law, which criminalises Trafficking in Persons. 
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The Kingdom of Bahrain recognises that Trafficking in Persons is a problem that 
affects the entire world, but believes that planned measures will comprehensively 
address the issue, investigate and prosecute offenders, and provide the necessary 
assistance to victims. Her Highness the First Lady Sheikh Sabika bint Ibrahim AI 
Khalifa, is giving her personal effort in these issues and fully supports all 
governmental and non-governmental organisation to reduce such growing 
phenomenon. Accordingly, Bahrain is making significant efforts to eliminate the 
trafficking in persons and made several administrative and legal measures:64 
4.6.1 The Administrative Measures 
• Recognition of the increasing problem of labour exploitation. 
• Establishment of a governmental Task Force to combat Trafficking in Persons, 
which includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour, Ministry 
of Social Development, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Foreign 
Media Affairs department at the Ministry of Information, the Capital 
Governorate and the Legal Affairs department at the Ministry of Cabinet 
Affairs. 
• The Task Force has set a national strategy to combat Trafficking in Persons, 
and meets regularly to implement the strategy. 
• A Manual and Guide, outlining the rights and obligations of foreign workers in 
Bahrain has published in many languages and distributed among foreign 
embassies and entry points to Bahrain. 
• A telephone Hotline set up at the Ministry of Labour, to receive complaints 
related to Trafficking in Persons, and give advice and instructions to help the 
callers. 
• A large number of labour inspectors have appointed at the Ministry of Labour 
to investigate offences. 
64 A report given by Bahrain Task Force for Trafficking in Persons, 2005. 
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• Cooperation with local NGO's, especially the Migrant Workers' Protection 
Society, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has participated largely in their 
annual Fund-Raising events. 
4.6.2 The Legal Measures 
• Bahrain has acceded in 2004 to the UN Convention against Trans-national 
Organised Crime, and the Protocol against Trafficking in Persons. 
• Bahrain has signed a number relevant International Labour Organisation 
Conventions on the issue, including, for example, Convention C I 05 
(prevention of compulsory labour) and C29 (forced labour). 
• Bahrain is also a party to other relevant agreements, including the Agreement 
to Combat Trans-Arab Organised Crime, the Arab Agreement to Combat 
Terrorism, and bilateral extradition agreements. 
• Bahrain has participated in many trafficking-related conferences and 
workshops internationally. 
Bahrain has signed and /or ratified many human rights conventions and continues to 
do so, see Table 4.4. In contrary, there are still some agreements and accords under 
review, because we should not forgot the fact that Bahrain is member of the GCC 
and the Arab League, and could not just act unilaterally on such International 
accords. For example, Bahrain is still reviewing the signing of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) because it is working closely with other nations in the Arab 
League to iron out the differences and concerns related to the ICC. 
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Table 4.4: Some of the Human Rights Conventions 
Fol 
Conventions 
ltiinternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
121rnternational Convention on the Suppression and Punishment on the Crime Apartheid 
J3lconvention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
141Protocol amending the Slavery Convention of 1926 
lsl~upplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 
j6lconvention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
171rnternational Centre for Settlement oflnvestment Disputes 
isl~onvention Against all forms of Torture and other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment (CAT) 
191Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
flOiconvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) 
fl"ll convention on Creating Arabic Women Organisation 
~~Jntern~tional Labour Organisation's Convention against the Discrimination of Women in 
Recruitment and Careers 
fl31International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
~~International Labour Convention on the Training and Employment of the Handicapped 
~~International Labour Convention on Discrimination in Recruitment and Professions 
fl61International Labour Convention on Weekly Rest (Industry) 
~~International Labour Convention against Forced Labour 
~~International Labour Convention on Labour Inspection 
~~International Labour Convention Night Shift Women Labour 
1""201Intemational Labour Convention Abolition of Forced Labour 
Fllnternational Labour Convention on Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disable 
Persons) 
1221International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
~~International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
Flstockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
F llnternational Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1261Jnternational Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
.. 
-Sources: Bahram Mtmstry of f oretgn Affatrs and the Office of the UN Htgh Commtss10ner f or Human Rtghts. 
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Moreover, the following Table 4.5 shows a comparison between the life in Bahrain 
before the new reform by King Hamad and the life after the reform, excluding the 
period from 1973 to 197 5: 
Table 4.5: Situations Before and After the Reform 
Situations Before After 
Constitutional Monarchy No Yes 
Bicameral Legislation No Yes 
Constitutional Court No Yes 
Higher Judicial Court No Yes 
Economic Development Board No Yes 
National Audit Court No Yes 
Grievance Court No Yes 
Women rights Yes More 
Human rights Little More 
Parliament Elections No Yes 
Municipal Elections No Yes 
Women as candidates No Yes 
Women Votes No Yes 
Independent Judiciary No Yes 
Political Associations No Yes 
Demonstrations No Yes 
Free Media No Yes 
Free Speech No Yes 
Security Laws Yes No 
Exiles Yes No 
Bidoon (non-national residents) Yes No 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
The Kingdom's initiatives taken smce 1999 have laid the foundation for an 
exceptional start towards the new reforms on all aspects of political, social, 
economic, and human rights issues. King Hamad's implementation of his reformist 
vtston is interesting as it shows a clear understanding of the domestic problems 
facing Bahrain's society and also the potential threat this could pose to the AI 
Khalifa dynasty. The initial reform initiatives discussed above underscores the 
pragmatism of the young King: it was an undertaking geared towards fostering 
national consensus behind his liberalisation programme. 
All these revolutionary changes from above took place prior to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and thus emphasise that they were born domestically rather than reactively 
from external pressure on this issue which epitomised the era of the War on Terror.65 
Indeed, President Bush and many other developed countries, including human rights 
organisations and journalists, gave a positive opinion over Bahrain's transition and 
consider it to be a role model for developing countries.66 President Bush's invitation 
for the King to attend the Group of Eight (G8) summit of the world's major 
industrial nations, which was held on 8 June 2004 in Georgia, USA, to highlight his 
reformist vision, was an excellent indication of how the international community 
perceives Bahrain's evolution into modernity. So whilst the majority of the Arab 
world only began to implement measured reform as a result of mounting 
international pressure on this issue, Bahrain's journey was a home grown affair. 
Moreover, within the context of the GCC states, Bahrain's reform underlines the 
more preferable route of change from above rather than a Marxian revolution from 
below. 
The Kingdom has been shown to have experienced a sustained process of political, 
legal, economical, and social reform. King Hamad's steps are a welcome series of 
65 War on Terror refers to the grand strategic era in US foreign policy which occurred following the 
I I September 200 I terrorist attacks. This strategy placed the promotion of freedom and democracy as 
a national security necessity and thus shaped the character of US foreign relations in this era. 
66 President Bush in his speech at the 201h anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy in 6 
November 2003 addressed Bahrain reform as a positive step forward. 
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moves that are long overdue. They hold the real promise of reconciliation, of 
breaking a very long cycle of mistrust between the government and the people, and 
also between various sectors of the population whose mistrust has turned to, at 
times, violent opposition. At the same time, the moves made so far are merely 
preliminary and may be essentially characterised as promises for future substantive 
changes. They may well be necessary first steps, but they tackle only one part of a 
major set of problems and challenges facing Bahrain today and in the future. 
King Hamad has brought many changes to Bahrain since coming to power after his 
father's death on 6 March 1999. Since he took over the throne, drastic unexpected 
changes took place in the Kingdom. Royal pardon was granted to political detainees 
and exiles, women were given the right to vote and run for parliament, free speech 
and free media also became the norm. He believes that the world has changed and 
Bahrain must change too. What worked yesterday may not work today. If it does, it 
probably won't work much longer. People want more than just a pay check for their 
work today. They need to be appreciated, understood, acknowledged, and valued. 
The challenge is to create places that bring out the best in people while fulfilling 
their fundamental needs. 
With Bahrain having geographic, demographic, historical and economic advantages 
over its neighbours, it still, nonetheless, has many problems that need to be 
addressed. Through fostering social development and a sense of national solidarity, 
Bahrain can achieve its goal of fulfilling the aspirations of society as a whole. On 
reflection, the above discussion on Bahrain's reform presents several basic 
questions: can Bahrain's move towards a radical new order overcome all pessimistic 
beliefs that Islam and democracy maybe incompatible? How well can it address the 
concern that an oil based rentier economy is unable to coexist with democracy? Can 
we presume that Bahrain's new transition holds little difference from the experience 
of many Arab countries that attempted to reform but were ultimately held back? 
What more has to be done and what challenges might this pose? 
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Overall, this chapter has built on the preceding one in order to provide the reader 
with a comprehensive appreciation of the reforms undertaken by the King since 
1999. This chapter has established the character of reforms implemented in the key 
spheres of society, the economy and towards human rights in general. Given this, 
the following chapter will evaluate the reforms, highlighted in these last two 
chapters, through an analytical methodology, by showing the challenges that also 
need to be tackled in order for a sustainable modernisation programme to be 
achieved. 
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Chapter V 
ChaHenges to the Reform Programme: 
Liberalisation or Democratisation? 
171 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
King Hamad repeatedly said on different occasions, "There can be no return to the 
past, and the clock will not be put back."1 The reform started in 2000 with national 
gathering and collaboration between all sects. It was the first time to see such 
unified agreement and admiration by the people towards the ruler. Citizens began to 
practice a great deal of freedoms and rights than existed under the old regime. So 
far, it will be argued that the reform has, to some extent, satisfied the political 
appetite of the people, but has not fully addressed the economic and social ones. 
However, after 2002 citizens started to be pessimistic about further progress actually 
being undertaken. The mixed up priorities combined with the slowness in the 
implementation process have made some of the Bahraini people lose confidence in 
the reform. The overlap of political, economic, social, and sectarian tensions, which 
could conceivably arise from this experiment, could cause a negative upheaval to the 
Kingdom that is often touted as a model of Arab reform. 
The political power by AI Khalifa and their Najdi allies, together with the economic 
deprivation of the Shia and Sunni, produced continuous pattern of civil dissidence 
through the 201h century. The first half of the century witnessed a lack of 
cooperation between Sunni and Shia dissidents. However, an agreement was forged 
during the 1953-1956 uprising, which held through the periods of 1965 and the mid 
of 1970s. 2 Therefore, Bahrain's problems go beyond sectarian discrimination to 
include protracted conflict between government and opposition, mounting 
unemployment, high rates of poverty, and a rising cost of living: establishing a 
stable political system requires altering relations between government and citizens as 
a whole.3 The government has been unable to address the needs of the lower and 
middle classes by reducing unemployment, transparency and human rights, 
improving its provision of social services, counter the critics about corruption and 
1 Ministry of Information, "The Speeches of His Majesty King Hamad bin !sa AI Kha/ifa, King of 
Bahrain," Ministry oflnformation publication, Bahrain, 2002. 
2 J. E. Peterson, "Bahrain's First Steps Towards Reform," Asian Affairs, London, Vol. 33, Part 2, 
June 2002, pp. 216-227. 
3 International Crisis Group, "&zhrain 's Sectarian Challenge," ME Report No. 40, May 6, 2005, p. i. 
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incompetence, and developing the private sector. These issues, exacerbated by the 
inequitable distribution of opportunity, were central to Shia discontent and 
contributed to the riots of 1994-98.4 
A major dilemma facing the reform programme is that although the King instructed 
for immediate action to be taken on the social, political, and economic fronts, as will 
be outlined in his speeches later in this chapter, progress has not been forthcoming. 
In essence, the King's reformist vision will be shown to have been hampered by the 
very government tasked with implementing it. Given bureaucratic inefficiency, a 
reluctance to take on board new ideas and also adopt change, it has become apparent 
that the realisation of the reform vision will be a longer term process than the King 
had envisaged. Given this, the government has not been able to deliver the changes 
mandated by the King in several key areas. The slow progress has brought the 
government at odds with parliamentary demands for progress in securing equality 
between citizens, challenging issues such as the high rate of poverty, rising cost of 
living, and the growing social claims coming mainly from the unemployed youth. 
The reality of many Bahrainis is that the government is still disconnected from its 
people. Since 2003, several of demonstrations by opposition parties and individuals 
have begun to take place. 5 The political liberalisation experiment has therefore 
become more fragile. The equation of accomplishment needs both parties, the 
government and the opposition to work together and compromise here and there to 
reach a mutual understanding to let the country start from a solid ground and make 
the reform something all people may taste. 
On the other hand, the reform has started to make some headway to repair what was 
once a dysfunctional autocracy riddled with sectarian bias and one, which failed to 
come up with the right political, economic, and social system. The opposition, 
4 Nadeya Sayed Ali Mohammed, "Political Reform in Bahrain: The Price of Stability", Middle East 
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 4 No.9, September 2002, p. 221. 
5 
"The number of rallies organised in Bahrain from July 2004 to May 2005 was more than 180, and 
this is a high number.", An interview given by the Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of 
Interior, Bahrain Tribune, Friday, June 10, 2005. Bahrain used to be called "The country with a 
million trees." Now, it is called "The country with a million rallies." 
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which has increased since 2003, believe that the reform did not serve any party in 
the country except for the royal family themselves. The people need a government 
system to be more transparent, citizens to have a voice in how they are governed, 
and all sects to have a public platform from which they can set out their views. For 
there to be affective reform, this thesis will argue that there must be substantial 
freedom of the press, speech, a more powerful assembly, and so forth. This creates 
an arena for public debate in which oppositions ideas can be challenged too so a true 
and just national reconciliation process can take place. 
King Hamad's recent steps are a welcome series of moves to address the unsettled 
grievances that has existed in Bahrain for a very long time. He raised the hopes of 
the people and promised to vastly improve the political, social, and economical 
situations in the Kingdom. In his talks on National Awareness, he indicated;6 "I 
dreamt of a homeland that embraces all its citizens."7 Then added; 
The fact is that I relied above all on Almighty God, and then on my 
confidence in the awareness, civilised attitude, and political maturity of 
the people of Bahrain. I personally made a decision that entailed an 
historic responsibility by holding a free referendum in order to release 
the country from a bottleneck. It was an unprecedented referendum in 
our political history and hesitation and apprehension toward it persisted 
to the last moments of holding it.8 
At the same time, the reform made so far was preliminary and may be characterised 
as essentially promises for future substantive changes. They may well be necessary 
first steps, but they tackle only one part of a major set of problems facing the 
country today.9 
6 King Hamad AI Khalifa, "Talks on National Awareness: First Talk," All Bahrain's Official 
Newspapers, Wednesday 9 February 2005. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 J. E. Peterson, "Bahrain's First Steps Towards Reform." 
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Given all the facts about King's Hamad reforms from 1999 to 2005, the purpose of 
this chapter will be to provide detailed challenges to the reforms that have been 
undertaken in this timeframe. These challenges, if not considered, and also action 
taken to address them, there is a risk that the reforms will be very highly jeopardised. 
The future of the reform lies in the hand of King Hamad given it is an elite driven 
process. Having looked to his personality and intentions, he is capable of 
implementing solutions for all these challenges. The majority of Bahraini citizens 
have lost interest in the reforms and now it is up to the King to prove to all of the 
opposition, and those who started to have doubt in their mind, that the reform is 
designed to enhance the future of Bahrain and end discrimination, rather than a 
superficial exercise to calm international criticism. 
The structure of this chapter will firstly revisit the key factors that the reforms so far 
have dealt with. It will then move onto the main substantive element of the thesis, 
which will see an analysis of the shortcomings of the amended constitution of 2002. 
Secondly, it will analyse the issues that need to be reconsidered or modified and 
include the King's speeches and the action taken from the government, conflicts 
within the ruling family and frictions between the ruling family and the majority of 
its population as a manner of justifying the conclusions made. It will also looks to 
challenges such as education, the opposition, the structure of the present parliament, 
economic factors, and administrative ones. 
5.1 COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE OLD REGIME AND KING 
HAMAD'S REFORMS 
King Hamad has brought several changes during his reign different from those 
practiced during his father regime. Table 5.1 shows comparisons between Sheikh Isa 
regime and King Hamad reforms. 
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Table 5.1: Comparisons between the old Regime and King Hamad's Reforms 
Old Regime New Re~ime 
• Emarah I Hereditary Monarchy. • Constitutional Monarchy. 
• Amir. • King. 
• The Commander in Chief of the armed • The Commander in Chief of the 
forces. armed forces. 
• Can rule by decree and dissolve the • Chairman of the Higher Judicial 
Consultative Council. Council. 
• The Amir is the head of the three branches • Can rule by decree and dissolve the 
(Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary). Parliament. 
• Appoint and dismisses the PM and the • The King Heads all three branches 
Counci l of Ministers, Judges. The Amir (Legislative, Executive, and 
and the PM appoint all governments ' Judiciary) . 
Undersecretary, Assistance • The right to veto laws passed by the 
Undersecretary, and Managerial level. National Assembly. 
• Appoint all Consu ltative Council. • The powers to amend the 
• The Judiciary branch is not independent. constitution and propose, ratify, and 
• The ruling family holds monopoly on the prom ulgate laws. 
cabinet portfolios of defence, interior, and • National Action Charter. 
foreign affairs (the "ministries of • Amended Constitution. 
sovereignty" as they called), along with • Appoint and dismisses the PM and 
numerous other posts- all of which afford the cabinet, Judges. The president 
the dynasties tremendous political and members of the Consultative 
security. Council. 
• The Media is censored. • The King and the PM appoint and 
• Women rights are limited. fire all government Undersecretary, 
• Security Law with Security Court. Assistance undersecretary, 
• Exiles. Managerial level, and Governors. 
• Excessive Political Prisoners. • Bicameral system with a directly 
• Aggressive riot and demonstrations. elected legislative house and a 
• Rare government cabinet changes. consultative appointed house. 
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• Municipal elections. 
• Independent Judiciary branch. 
• Controlling the ministries of 
sovereignty. 
• Free media and free speech. 
• Full women rights. 
• No Security Law or Security Court. 
• No exiles. 
• No political prisoners. 
• Allowed political societies. 
• Allowed public gathering or 
demonstration. 
• Granted citizenship to stateless 
Bidoons. 
• Honoured Human Rights issues. 
• Regular government cabinet 
changes. 
• Higher Judicial Council 
• Constitutional Court. 
• National Audit Court 
• Administrative Monitoring Bureau. 
• Grievances Court. 
• EconomicDevelopment Board 
• Excessive roya:l gestures. 
What can be recognized from the above table is that the new regime has 
implemented a variety of changes that encompass both structural and administrative 
changes. The importance of these change are that they underscore that the new 
reforms implemented, following the generational change to King Hamad as ruler of 
Bahrain, are a clear break from the old order. However, despite the pioneering 
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nature of the changes, there are clearly identifiable challenges facing the full 
realisation of this new political journey. Therefore, the following section will aim to 
highlight the shortcomings of the reforms 
5.2 CHALLENGES TO THE REFORM PROCESS 
The King pledged that safeguards should be drawn and precautions taken so that the 
country does not return to the bitter experiences and impasses that have impeded 
overall development in the past. However, the King is faced with several significant 
challenges such as a hereditary monarchy, cultural trends, political opposition, 
religious tensions, oppressed citizens, unplanned education and training strategies, 
unemployment and an unsatisfied citizenship. This situation raises many questions: 
Could the King be able to keep all his promises? Can the existing government 
manage and cope with the new reform? Moreover, are Bahraini citizens competent 
to deal with the new era? Is the reform programme achievable? Such trends could 
affect the marching of the King's political liberalisation programme and have 
important implications for the current and future situation if handled incorrectly. 
5.2.1 The Constitution 
Usually, the most vital strategic objective of any nation is to apply what the 
constitution has illustrated and promised to give to citizens. There are a number of 
rights and obligations specified in Bahrain's amended constitution; if applied the 
situation would conceivably be better as people could practice more freedoms. The 
relevant section reads: 
(I) Preamble 10 
". . . The citizen will enjoy greater welfare, progress, development, stability, and 
prosperity through earnest and constructive cooperation between government and 
citizens which will remove the obstacles to progress. " 
10 Bahrain Government, "Constitution of the Kingdom ofBahrain," 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
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In the timeline of this study, the situation in Bahrain did not improve as was 
expected. The government was still detached from its people. In the immediate 
aftermath of the reforms, a lack of confidence between the government and the 
elected chamber was clear; this has unfortunately been at the cost of people's 
welfare. Citizens were still not experiencing any welfare, development, stability, 
and prosperity except for the King's royal gestures that he gives his people on 
special occasions. There were dozens of draft bills awaiting the immediate attention 
of the chambers but inefficiency was stifling progress. 11 The bills mostly related to 
reforms and regulations affecting the people in general which in tum would 
strengthen the weakened social framework in the country. Some of them are as 
important as any relating to international and regional relations. 12 Cronyism 
continued from the old regime, as there were no substantive changes to benefit those 
citizens in need. Several times the PM came out with relatively encouraging 
statements such as: 
The government will continue to develop and strengthen the political 
institution. In order to achieve more participation in decision making 
and building the future for coming generations . . . development in any 
field will not be exclusive to the existing ones, but it will include creating 
and building new institutions. 13 
In real terms, the government was not fully cooperating with the legislative branch. 
This policy created more frustration, demonstrations, and lead to the migration of 
some citizens seeking better life. The government has not been able to put an end or 
even plan to do so for the most vital issues of the majority of Bahraini society. 
Unemployment, improving its provision of social services, high rates of poverty, a 
rising cost of living, and favouritism is still annoying lower and middle classes of 
Bahraini citizens. It is generally accepted that the people in Bahrain wanted to see 
real improvements in their standard of living from economic reforms. The real test 
11 Akbar AI Khaleej Newspaper, 29 September 2005. 
12 Several members ofthe elected council indicated these issues through my interviews with them. 
P Al-Quds at-Arabi, London, 5 August 1999. 
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of any policy change is whether it can provide more good jobs, give families a 
livelihood, and allow them to live in peace with the fruits of their labour. 14 
(2) The State15 
Article I [Sovereignty, Constitutional Monarchy} 
d. The system of government in the Kingdom of Bahrain is democratic. sovereignty 
being in the hands of the people, the source of all powers. Sovereignty shall be 
exercised in the manner stated in this Constitution. 
e. Citizens, both men and women, are entitled to participate in public affairs and 
may enjoy political rights, including the right to vote and to stand for elections, in 
accordance with this Constitution and the conditions and principles laid down by 
law. No citizen can be deprived of the right to vote or to nominate oneself for 
elections except by law. 
Amongst the changes, King Hamad brought since coming to power in 1999 was an 
amnesty that granted to political detainees and exiles. Bahrain's state security law 
was repealed, municipal and legislative elections were held; the first since his father 
dismissed the legislature in 197 5. Women were given the right to vote and run as 
candidates. A national assembly should include the representation of the entire 
population in a country. In view of that, Armed Forces individuals and any citizen 
18 and above has been included so that the assembly can be called National 
Assembly. 
The challenge that the reform will face is whether Bahrain is undertaking a 
democratisation or a liberalisation process. The word 'democracy' came into 
English in the sixteenth century from French democratie, its origins are Greek. 16 
'Democracy' is derived from demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos 
(people) and kratos (rule). 17 Democracy means a form of government in which, in 
14 Scott Waalkes, "Reflections on Bahrain," Malone College, January 16, 2005, www.malone.edu. 
15 Chapter I, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
16 David Held, "Models of Democracy," Second Edition, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxfo,rd, UK, p. I. 
17 -Ibid. ~ ...... · ... . 
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contrast to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a 
political community in which there is some form of political equality among the 
people and rule by the people. 18 'Rule by the people' includes: 19 
• All should govern, in the sense that all should be involved in legislating, in 
deciding on general policy, in applying laws, and in governmental 
administration. 
• All should be personally involved in crucial decision-making, that is to say, in 
deciding general laws and matters of general policy. 
• Rulers should be accountable to the ruled; they should, in other words, be 
obliged to justify their actions to the ruled and be removable by the ruled. 
• Rulers should be accountable to the representatives of the ruled. 
• Rulers should be chosen by the ruled. 
• Rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the ruled. 
• Rulers should act in the interests of the ruled. 
Some commentators, such as Daniel Brumberg, have concluded that most of the 
regimes in the Arab world, including the Gulf States, are for the coming 15 to 20 
years only capable of becoming liberalised autocracies and in no way can full 
democratisation be realised.20 The amended constitution specifically indicated that: 
[l]t is not permissible to propose an amendment to (Article 2/1 of this 
Constitution, and it is not permissible under any circumstances to 
propose the amendment of the constitutional monarchy and the principle 
of inherited rule in Bahrain, as well as the bi-cameral system and the 
principles of freedom and equality established in this Constitution. 22 
18 Ibid. 
19 J. Lively, "Democracy," Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, UK, p. 30. See also Thomas Carothers, 
"Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Wahington, D.C .. 
20 See "Brumberg on Bush's Democracy Speech," Published at http://cfr.org/. 
21 Article 2 [State Religion, Shari'a, Official Language] The religion of the State is Islam. The Islamic 
Shari'a is a principal source for legislation. The official language is Arabic. 
22 Article 120 [Constitutional Amendments], Chapter VI General and Final Provisions, point (c), The 
Constitution of the Kingdoin of Bahrain,T4 FebrUary 2002. 
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This clearly confirms that Bahrain is far from a democratisation path. Additionally, 
the reform did give some political and social rights, but the challenge that remains; 
could voting improve the living standard of the people of Bahrain? Is the 
government considering people as a source of all powers? Is liberalisation able to 
address the socio-economic issues that are Bahrain's greatest challenge? 
(3) Basic constituents of society, public rights and duties, and public authorities23 
Article 4 [State Principles] 
Justice is the basis of government. Cooperation and mutual respect provide a firm 
bond between citizens. Freedom, equality, security, trust, knowledge, social 
solidarity, and equality of opportunity for citizens are pillars of society guaranteed 
by the State. 
Article 10 [Economy] 
a. The national economy is based on social justice, and it is strengthened by fair 
cooperation between public and private business. Its objective, within the limits of 
the law, is economic development according to a well-ordered plan and achievement 
of prosperity for the citizens, all within the bounds of the law. 
Article 13 [Work] 
a. Work is the duty of every citizen, is required by personal dignity and is dictated by 
the public good. Every citizen has the right to work and to choose the type of work 
within the bounds of public order and decency. 
b. The State guarantees the provision of job opportunities for its citizens and the 
fairness of work conditions. 
Article 15 [Taxes] 
a. Taxes and public costs are based on social justice, and their payment is a duty 
under the law. 
23 Chapter II, the Constitution ofthe Kingdom of Bahrain, 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
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b. The law regulates exemption of low incomes from taxes in order to ensure that a 
minimum standard of living is safeguarded. 
Article 16 [Public Jobs] 
a. Public jobs are a national service entrusted to their incumbents, and State 
employees shall have the public interest in mind when performing their jobs. 
Foreigners shall not be entrusted with public posts except in those cases specified 
bylaw. 
b. Citizens are equal in the assumption of public posts in accordance with the 
conditions specified by law. 
Chapter Ill Public Rights and Duties 
Article 18 [Human Dignity, Equality} 
People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public 
rights and duties. There shall be no discrimination among them on the basis of sex, 
origin, language, religion or creed. 
Article 30 [Military Service} 
a. Peace is the objective of the State. The safety of the nation is part of the safety of 
the Arab homeland as a whole, and its defence is a sacred duty of every citizen. 
Performance of military service is an honour for citizens and is regulated by law. 
Chapter IV Public Authorities General Provisions 
Section 2 the Executive Authority 
Article 48 [Departments, Incompatibilities J 
b. While in charge of his Ministry, a Minister may not assume any other public 
office, nor may he even indirectly practise a profession or conduct industrial, 
commercial or financial business, nor may he participate in contracts concluded by 
the Government or public institutions. or combine his ministerial position with the 
membership of the board of directors of any company except as a non-remunerated 
Government representative. Also during this period, the Minister may not purchase 
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or rent a State asset even by way of public auction, nor may he lease, sell, or barter 
any of his assets to the State. 
The above articles ofthe constitution highlighted above carries invaluable principles 
that should be considered to enhance the reform further and summarise as follow: 
• Equality of opportunity for citizens is pillars of society guaranteed by the 
State.24 
11 The national economy is based on social justice. 
• Every citizen has the right to work and to choose the type of work within the 
bounds of public order and decency. 
• The State guarantees the provision of job opportunities for its citizens. 
• Taxes and public costs are based on social justice. 
• The law regulates exemption of low incomes from taxes in order to ensure that 
a minimum standard of living is safeguarded. 
• Foreigners shall not be entrusted with public posts except in those cases 
specified by law. 
• People are equal in human dignity. 
• Citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties. 
• Its defence is a sacred duty of every citizen. 
• State employees shall have the public interest in mind when performing their 
jobs. 
• While in charge of his Ministry, a Minister may not assume any other public 
office, nor may he even indirectly practise a profession or conduct industrial, 
commercial, or financial business. 
As shown in the literature review, the Bahraini opposition and Western writers 
continuously criticise the 'Justice' phenomenon in Bahrain. They jointly agree on 
the fact that the national economy in Bahrain is not based on social justice as many 
sects, especially the royal family, have many benefits such as monthly salaries, 
24 Ralf Dahrendorf, "Citizenship and Social Class", in the Book of Martin Bulmer and Anthony M. 
Rees, Edited, "Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T H. Marshall," UCL Press, 
1996. 
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allowances, lands, VIP passports, distinguished car registration numbers, etc. while 
other citizens are suffering and annoyed by this favouritism. They argue that the 
constitution points out that every citizen has the right to work and to choose the type 
of work within the bounds of public order and decency, while in reality, some sects 
cannot for example enrol in the Armed Forces. On the other hand, they argued that 
members ofthe royal family and their Arab allies are highly distinguished and enjoy 
many privileges, misuses of powers, and tax exemptions.25 
In terms of the political citizenship programme where the nationality was granted to 
non-Bahraini's Sunnis in order to create a balance of power between the two 
dominant sects. Indeed, this has actually worked as a disadvantage for society. In 
the 1990s, the Bahraini government conferred citizenship between eight thousand 
and ten thousand Sunni foreign families from Saudi Arabia's Bedouins, Pakistan, 
Syria, Yemen, and Jordan to work in the Armed Forces. 26 This understandably 
fostered a perception by the Shia that they were discriminated against. This 
exclusion has led to bitterness among the Shia and some Sunnis families who ask 
whether their loyalty as Bahrainis is being put in doubt. Many Shia think that the 
ultimate goal of importing Sunnis for the security establishment and awarding them 
Bahraini citizenship is to change the demographic composition of the population and 
the balance between Shia and Sunnis. 27 The Shia also hate the fact that while 
unemployment is high, especially among their community, newcomers in key 
security jobs are given legal residency, good salaries, and suitable housing.28 
25 Based on authors exposure and involvement in various high-level government circles. 
26 Based on authors exposure to privileged national security information. 
27 Mansoor AI Jamri has written, "Such a large number of families imply 40,000 to 50,000 additional 
population, or about 13 percent of the native population. There is no doubt that many Syrian 
Bedouins can be seen in Bahrain now, and most of them are working for the security forces. No one 
can be absolutely certain of their number." See Mansoor AI Jamri, "State and Civil Society in 
Bahrain," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Chicago, 
1998. 
28 Louay Bahry, "The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain," 
Mediterranean Quarterly, 11.3;2000, p. 132. 
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The concept of justice however, cannot be interpreted as underwriting the basis of 
the government during the period in question. Article (16) and Article 48 (b) 29 of 
Bahrain's constitution points out that a state employee shall have the public interest 
in mind when performing their job and a Minister may not assume any other public 
office. A common problem is that some public workers, especially those in high 
positions, have their own business, misuse their governmental authority to facilitate 
the running of the business?0 Additionally, this has ramifications on the efficiency 
of output by governmental employees given the time spent doing nongovernmental 
work. 
Even indirect taxes and public costs are not based on social justice and the law did 
not regulate exemption of low incomes from taxes in order to ensure that a minimum 
standard of living was safeguarded. A bank for example registers a car for BD25 
($66) which is a fee applicable to all. This often proves a difficult expense to bear 
for low incomes families as they are charged the same rate. 
In fact, the government is not taking serious steps to encounter equality of 
opportunity for citizens, social justice, citizen to work and to choose the type of 
work, guarantees the provision of job opportunities for its citizens, and to prevent 
poverty, as the numbers of citizen in the range of poverty are increasing. 31 
Consequently, poor and discriminated people will not be interested in the reform as 
their basic needs are not satisfied and usually lead to dissatisfaction and violence. 
Human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs, and that certain lower needs need 
29 Article (16) of the Bahrain constitution "State employees shall have the public interest in mind 
when performing their job." 
Article 48 (b) "While in charge of his Ministry, a Minister may not assume any other public office, 
nor may he even indirectly practise a profession or conduct industrial, commercial or financial 
business, nor may he participate in contracts concluded by the Government or public institutions, or 
combine his ministerial position with the membership of the board of directors of any company except 
as a non-remunerated Government representative. Also during this period, the Minister may not 
purchase or rent a State asset even by way of public auction, nor may he lease, sell, or barter any of 
his assets to the State." 
30 Author's observation. 
31 United Nations Development Programme, "The Arab Human Development Report 2004," National 
Press, Amman, Jordan. See also "Poverty in Bahrain," Documentary, Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights; www.bchr.net. 
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to be satisfied before higher needs can be satisfied. The theory of the hierarchy of 
needs by Maslow, which was explained in the first chapter, is an appropriate theory 
to explain this mechanism and allow an identification of the challenges being 
produced by the abuse of privileges and enforced inequality. 
The Physiological needs are not fully satisfied in Bahrain. The unemployment rate 
is high: approximately 13,000 Bahrainis are out ofwork.32 Unemployment could hit 
70,000, or 35% of the workforce, by 2013 if the trends in job growth and Bahraini 
participation continue as they are today.33 As troubling as these numbers are, they 
do not fully reveal how serious the problem is, because of those who are working, 
one-third are already working in jobs below their skill levels and that will grow to 
70% by 2013 at current trends. 34 This means that they are not able to earn income 
commensurate with their education, experience, and expectations. In 16 March 2006, 
the Minister of Labour with a statement to all Bahraini newspapers indicating that 
there are more than 33,000 Bahraini employees earning monthly salary less than 
BD200 about $529.35 One can imagine how these people are living. 
For that reason, such people will become an obstacle to the reform because they do 
not care about liberalisation reform, as their basic needs are not fulfilled. Therefore, 
these people will not move to the second layer of needs (Safety needs) unless the 
government looks after their basic needs. Similarly, those who are in the safety level 
could be stuck at this layer as Maslow indicated, because in Bahrain, security is 
leaking and many of Bahraini society are crying for law and order because they are 
not feeling safe enough. Many burglary cases has been reported and experienced by 
households, shops, banks, and even mosques. 36 Some relate this burglary to the 
poverty of some citizens; others relate it to the misunderstanding of liberalisation 
32 The Minister of Labour indicated in an interview in AlA yam newspaper in December 2005 that the 
registered unemployed people in the Ministry until December 2005, were about 13,000. 
33 Economic Development Board, "Reforming Bahrain's Labour Market," Bahrain, Sept. 23, 2004, p. 
4. 
34 Ibid. 
35 AI Wasat, Thursday 16 March 2006. 
36 Every day newspapers report few burglaries cases and Friday prayer speeches by Mullah highlight 
these issues too. · 
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rights. Moreover, road safety is also declining and there is rapid increase in traffic 
fatalities and injuries in Bahrain.37 These things have to do with the confused and 
soft action of the Ministry of Interior, as reaction to change citizens' views of the 
nightmare of the security law, but some people have misused this gentleness 
behaviour and mess around with the rules. 
As the concept of the hierarchy of needs point out that safety needs sometimes 
motivate people to be religious. Religions comfort us with the promise of a safe 
secure place after we die and leave the insecurity of this world. These feelings is by 
itself threat to the development of the country as these people will become passive 
citizens and create in some cases various forms of extremism and fundamentalism. 
Religious fundamentalism could generate in some cases those who translate their 
needs and demands by the use of force and violence. Moreover, in Bahrain, many 
citizens are still lack the security of owning a private residence and this is 
compounded by the cost to get married and have family given their low incomes. 
Again, such group will get stuck in this layer of Maslow's hierarchy of needs and 
will not be able to move to the 'Social Needs' and may indeed move backward to the 
'Physiological Level'. As pointed out earlier, violence and other evils occur when 
human needs are dissatisfied. In other words, people who are deprived of lower 
needs such as 'Safety' may defend themselves by violent means. 
Now, in keeping with Maslow's theory, if one wants to be truly self-actualising, to 
become everything that one is capable of becoming, one needs to have one's lower 
needs taken care of, at least to a considerable extent. This makes sense: If one is 
hungry, one are scrambling to get food; if one is unsafe, one has to be continuously 
on guard; if one is isolated and unloved, one will need to satisfy that need; if one has 
a low sense of self-esteem, one will be defensive or compensate. When lower needs 
are unmet, one cannot fully devote oneself to fulfilling one's potentials.38 
37 A!Ayam Newspaper, 7 April 1999, 16 April 1999, "In Bahrain: One Road Accident every 17 
Minutes," 23 March 2002, 3 September 2004. 
38 Recommended source: Frank Goble, The Third Force, Grossman, New York, 1970. Field research: 
Gerald Huizinga, Maslow's Hierarchy in the Work Situation, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groninggen, 
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Consequently, for the majority of Bahraini citizens, there is no higher layer for them 
than the belonging needs (see Figure 5.2 below). In Bahrain, not everyone can be 
fully be "himself' and become everything that one is capable of becoming according 
to Maslow's definition. This is because the government still makes appointments 
based on patronage rather than through a meritocracy. If the majority will not reach 
this level, and those that do are not 'himself, then the outcome will be ineffective to 
the development of the self-esteem and so can never be active and productive citizen, 
whether in the classical tribal way of living or indeed through a liberalised system. 
Fieure 5.2: Maslow's Hierarchv of Needs in Relation to Bahrain Societv 
Safety Needs 
Physiological Needs 
Not all citizens in Bahrain could reach 
these stages. The Esteem Needs and 
Self-actualization are to some extent 
limited to selected group. Others who 
wanted to be included will go through 
different criteria than the normal human 
self-Actualization 
As Maslow indicated earlier, people, who have all of their lower needs satisfied, 
often drive very expensive cars because doing so raises their level of esteem. 
However, in Bahrain, people are confusing. While their lower needs are not satisfy, 
they try to move to the esteem level and often drive very expensive cars, nice 
registration numbers, well-dressed, latest mobiles, and travel abroad every summer, 
because doing so raises their level of esteem. Unfortunately, all these make-up done 
Netherlands, 1970. Andrew Neher, "Maslow 's Theory of Motivation: A Critique," Journal of 
Humanistic Psychology George Norwood, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, June, 1996. Abraham 
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2"d ed., Harper & Row, 1970. 
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by heavy loans just to be respected and avoid laws and regulations. In Bahrain, you 
are judged by the above cosmetics rather than by your personality. The government 
of Bahrain with the cooperation ofthe commercial banks try to limit personal loan in 
order to put an end to the damage people causing to their personal life. Bahrain 
Monetary Agency issued rules and regulations to limit the personal loans. Banks 
should not give loans, credit cards, and overdraft facilities to an individual where the 
instalments exceeding half of his salary and should not exceed seven years as a 
maximum period for paying off the whole amount of his loan. These rules and 
regulation for protection of Bahrain families did not yet work, as there is an increase 
in the personal loans from year 2004 to 2005 as shown in Table 5.2 below. 39 
Table 5.2: Distribution of Loans and facilities from Commercial Banks in Bahrain 
2004 2005 
Descriptions 
BD Million •;. BD Million % 
Personal Loans 1015 45.5 1194 45.5 
Business Loans 341 15.3 436 16.6 
Constriction & Real Estate 187 8.4 302 11.5 
Manufacturing 298 13.3 283 10.8 
Government 207 9.3 203 7.7 
Total including other loans 2231 100.00 2624 100.00 
Source: Bahrain Monetary Agency, 2005 
Depending heavily on foreigners, especially at the level of advisors, judges, and by 
recruiting many foreign consultation organisations, the net effect seems to destroy 
the confidence in a Bahraini meritocracy by the educated and experienced citizens as 
well as the younger generation. The young generation's perception can be 
understood by the following question: Why should I work hard when I am not 
trusted and higher posts go to foreigners and promotions take place for reasons other 
than productivity and/or talents? 
39 Economic Research Directorate, Bahrain Monetary Agency, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, Volume 
3 1, Number3, September 2005 . 
190 
Bahraini citizens do not have the ability to choose the leader with the most power in 
Bahrain, such as the King, CP, PM, Ministers, and many others vital positions in the 
government. On the other hand, they cannot aspire to become one of the Executive 
or Judiciary branches given the need for Wasta. 40 According to Bahrain's 
constitution, the King is the head of all three branches of government. He appoints 
cabinet ministers, members of the Consultative Council, and appoints all judges. 
See Figure 5.3. 
Fil(ure 5.3: The Kin!(, CP, and PM in the I(Overnment of Bahrain appoint all these Positions 
The King 
Min ister 
Judges Under-Secretary 
Governors Asst. Under-Secretary 
In wrapping up, Maslow's theory, these four types of needs must be satisfied before 
a person can act unselfishly. Democracy or any liberalisation reform shou ld give 
people "opportunities" to become what they want. People ambitions can be satisfied. 
In most developing countries, an individual can choose his leaders and can become 
one. He can dream to become a president, vice president, a minister, an actor, 
wrestler, athletic, scholar, etc. The ceiling of his/her ambitions is widely open and 
can make his/her dream become true and consequently become active and unselfish 
citizen ... So can People in Bahrain do so! 
40 Wasta is an Arabic term used to describe connections with people in higher authority to which they 
can parlour favours/benefits . 
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( 4) The Famil/1 
Article 5 [Family] 
b. The State guarantees reconciling the duties of women towards the family with 
their work in society, and their equality with men in political, social, cultural, and 
economic spheres without breaching the provisions of Islamic canon law (Shari'a). 
c. " ... It strives to safeguard them against ignorance, fear, and poverty. " 
This constitutional article challenge very sensitive social issues. No one really 
experience that the state is trying to guarantee reconciling the duties of women 
towards the family with their work in the society. No practical procedure ever taken 
to consider women's works in the society with her duties towards her children and 
husbands. Moreover, work atmospheres in the public and private sectors do not 
comply with the Shari'a in this regard. These inconsideration lead to the creation of 
Islamic fundamentalists that threat the situation and also generate less family 
solidarities. 
(5) Natural Resources42 
Article 9 [Property} 
g. The State shall make the necessary arrangements to ensure the exploitation of 
land suitable for productive farming, and shall strive to raise the standards of 
farmers. The law lays down how small farmers are to be helped and how they can 
own their land. 
Article II [Natural Resources] 
All natural wealth and resources are State property. The State shall safeguard them 
and exploit them properly, while observing the requirements of the security of the 
State and of the national economy. 
41 Chapter II, the Constitution ofthe Kingdom of Bahrain, 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
42 Ibid. 
192 
The country is transforming all lands suitable for productive farming to urban 
buildings. Furthermore, influential individuals own the majority of such lands. 
Desertification resulting from the degrading of limited arable land, period of drought; 
coastal degradation (damage to coastlines, coral reefs, and sea vegetation) resulting 
from oil spills and other discharges from large tankers, oil refineries, and distribution 
stations; lack of freshwater resources, groundwater and seawater are the only sources 
for all water needs. Map 5.1 shows that the majority of the islands are privately 
owned. Observers, businessmen, and many other analysts find it very distractive to 
live over an island and do not have beaches. 
In April 2005, the Kingdom of Bahrain selected Skidmore Owings & Merrill LLP to 
prepare "National Planning Development Strategies" that would set forth a strategic 
vision for the Kingdom until 2023. Led by the Economic Development Board and 
chaired by Ali Saleh AI Saleh, the Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture, this 
project will provide the Kingdom with the tools to make critical land use decisions. 
The first draft ofthe study indicated that only 3% of Bahrain's beaches are available 
to the population.43 
43 A/A yam Newspaper, "Skidmore Report," Saturday 25 March 2006. 
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Map 5.1: Land in Bahrain 
EZJ Military Area 
- Tourists and Industrial Area 
- Privately owned Area 
Sources: Different newspapers articles and the repast of Skidmore 
Ebrahim Sharif Alsayed, head of the National Democratic Action Society, gave 
presentation about "Bahrain: State-Sponsored Corruption" in 25 August 2005 in 
London and in 7 September 2005 in Jameiat Al Amal Al Watani (National 
Democratic Action Society). He said; "Three decades of absolute rule resulted 
virtually all public lands misappropriated. In 1974, the parliament tried to pass 
legislation that regulates the distribution of government land, but the government 
objected and defeated it. By year 2000, over 90% of habitable lands went to private 
hands (source: Ministry of Housing). Today the government instead of returning 
those lands it started to reclaiming sea or repurchase lands in to build new housing 
projects, a very expensive proposal both environmentally and financially. He added 
that since independence at least 200 km of government lands may have been 
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misappropriated; add to it most of the 60 km of the reclaimed lands. Moreover, tens 
of km of sea lands yet to be reclaimed but has already been distributed to people in 
power. See Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3: Value of Land Misappropriated 
Land Reclaimed To be Reclaimed Total 
kilometre 100 30 100 230 
Meter for kilometre 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Feet for kilometre 10 10 10 
BD per feet 5 15 10 
Value 5,000,000 4,500,000 10,000,000 19,500,000 
Source: Ebrahtm Sharif presentatwn "Bahram: State-Sponsored Corruptwn" m 25 August 2005. 
Ebrahim Sharif used Toobli Bay as an example to show how the government in 
Bahrain was irresponsible. He pointed out that Toobli Bay was one of the richest 
marine habitats on the Island with significant fish and shrimp stocks. By 1990's this 
habitat was virtually destroyed by reclamation of land largely owned by members of 
the ruling family. Area of the Bay shrank from 25 sq km to only 11 sq km, and 
continues to shrink. Today's market value of reclaimed Toobli sea is estimated at 
over$ 3 billion, most of which went to the ruling family. Moreover, he challenges 
the affirmation of Bahrain government of the land scarcity. He illustrates the 
following hypothesis: 
There are 70,000 Bahraini families, 500 sq m per family, and 35 sq km required to 
satisfy all Bahrainis. In the Last 30 years, over 60 sq km of land was reclaimed, 
enough to give a plot to each Bahraini. He added that one island owned by a leading 
member of the ruling family has sufficient area, 20 sq km, to solve the whole so-
called land scarcity. 
A nice picture by cartoonist Khalid AI Hashemi in Al Ayam Newspaper in Sunday 
19th June 2005 explained exactly the situation of beaches in Bahrain and confirm the 
195 
saying of 'a picture paints of thousands words.' It says; ''put 100 fils to see the 
beach." 
Picture 5.1: Seeing Bahrain's Beaches 
(6) Compensation44 
Article 12 [Compensation} 
The State guarantees the common liability of society in bearing the burdens arising 
from public disasters and ordeals, and for compensating those affected by war 
damage or as a result of performing their military duties. 
The government should seriously look at the poverty and social prejudice in the 
country and admit that these consequences happened because of the corruption and 
inequality between citizens that took place before King Hamad succeeded the throne 
in March 1999. King Hamad repeatedly said the word 'reform', which in Arabic 
means 'Eslah '. This term means correcting a given situation for the better. This 
clearly indicates that there were problems that needed to be reformed in his opinion. 
What the old regime did to the society could be considered, as 'public disasters' and 
the State should compensate those affected as stipulated in Article 12 as illustrated 
above. Accordingly, the government should compensate these people with money to 
44 Chapter ll, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
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enable them to get rid of debts, the negative perception of the government, violence, 
and start over in a healthier environment. Otherwise, there would be no reform if 
these people have been neglected. A suggested solution will be proposed in the 
chapter that follows. 
(7) The Power of the King45 
Section 1- The King 
Article 33 [Head ofState, Powers] 
d. The King appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister by Royal Order, and 
appoints and dismisses Ministers by Royal Decree as proposed by the Prime 
Minister. 
h. The King chairs the Higher Judicial Council. The King appoints judges by Royal 
Orders, as proposed by the Higher Judicial Council. 
m. The Royal Court is attached to the King. A Royal Order shall be issued to 
regulate it. Its budget and the rules for the budget's control are set by a special 
Royal Decree. 
Article 54 [Term] 
d. The King shall appoint the President of the Consultative Council for the same 
period as the Council, and the Council shall elect two Vice-Presidents for each 
convening period. 
Article 58 [Term] 
(2) The King may, when necessary, extend the legislative season of the Chamber of 
Deputies by Royal Order for a period not exceeding two years. 
Article 67 [Limitations] 
d. If the National Assembly decides by a majority oftwo thirds of its members that it 
is not possible to cooperate with the Prime Minister, the matter is submitted to the 
King for a decision, either by relieving the Prime Minister of his post and appointing 
a new Government, or by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. 
45 Chapter IV, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
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Article 70 [Legislation] 
No law shall be promulgated unless approved by both the Consultative Council and 
the Chamber of Deputies, or the National Assembly as the situation demands, and 
ratified by the King. 
Article 120 [Constitutional Amendments] 
a. Exceptionally to clauses b, c and d of Article 35 of this Constitution, for any 
provision of this Constitution to be amended the amendment must be approved by a 
two-thirds majority of the members of whom both the Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies are composed, and the amendment must he approved by the 
King. 
It is well understood that the King inherited a position where he enjoyed excessive 
powers. This was a relic of the old regime. However, it had its uses in that his 
position was under attack from opposition quarters. Such powers gave him security 
and the confidence to move ahead with the reforms and into the uncharted future. 
As a first step, the King should start delegating some authority to relieve the stress of 
the people and to lighten the burden of his responsibilities. This also will be a first 
stage in a quid pro quo with the opposition groups. He could for example, make the 
Audit General Court reports to the Chamber of Deputies instead of reporting to the 
Executive branch. The present scheme on appointing the Ministers and the other 
executives is not based on professional criteria. Appointments are still limited to 
security and tribal issues. They are not selected for their skills and professions that 
could in return improve the work and could eliminate corruption. Additionally, 
there are numbers of qualified Bahraini lawyers and judges with long experience, 
but the government continues appointing foreigners for these posts. This has led the 
general opinion to conclude that these appointments are purely to control the judicial 
branch and be able to interfere when needed. Such actions have served to widen the 
gap of trust between the government and citizens. 
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The legislative authority46 
[Part 3 General Provision] 
Article 51 [Chambers} 
The National Assembly consists of two Chambers: the Consultative Council and the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
Part 1- The Consultative Council 
Article 52 [Composition] 
The Consultative Council is composed of forty members appointed by Royal Order. 
Part 2- The Chamber of Deputies 
Article 56 [Composition] 
The Chamber of Deputies comprises forty members elected by direct, secret general 
ballot in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
Article 67 [Limitations] 
a. The subject of corifidence in the Prime Minister shall not be raised in the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
b. If, two-thirds of members of the Chamber of Deputies consider it not possible to 
cooperate with the Prime Minister, the matter will be reforred to the National 
Assembly to consider it. 
c. The National Assembly cannot issue its decision on the lack of possibility of 
cooperating with the Prime Minister prior to seven days from the date the matter 
was referred to it. 
Section 3- The Legislative Authority National Assembly 
Part 3 Provisions Common to Both Chambers 
Article 70 [Legislation] 
461bid. 
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No law shall be promulgated unless approved by both the Consultative Council and 
the Chamber of Deputies, or the National Assembly as the situation demands, and 
ratified by the King. 
Article 80 [Quorum] 
(1) For a meeting of both the Consultative Council and the Chamber of Deputies to 
be valid, a quorum of more than half the members of each chamber must be present. 
Decisions shall be taken on an absolute majority of members present, except in 
cases where a special majority is stipulated. In the event of a tied vote, the matter 
shall be decided in favour of the side that includes the President of the chamber. If 
the voting relates to the Constitution, voting shall be conducted by calling upon 
members by name. 
Article 81 [Initiative] 
The Prime Minister shall present bills to the Chamber of Deputies, which is entitled 
to pass, amend or reject the bill. In all cases the bill shall be reftrred to the 
Consultative Council, which is entitled to pass, amend or reject the bill or to accept 
any amendments which the Chamber of Deputies had introduced to the bill, or had 
rejected or amended them. However, priority of debate shall always be given to bills 
and proposals put forward by the Government. 
Article 82 [Reconsideration] 
If the Consultative Council does not approve a bill passed by the Chamber of 
Deputies, whether the Consultative Council's decision involves rejection, 
amendment, deletion or addition, the President of the Council shall return it to the 
Chamber of Deputies for reconsideration. 
Article 83 [Submission] 
If the Chamber of Deputies accepts the bill as it receives it from the Consultative 
Council, the President of the Consultative Council shall reftr it to the Prime 
Minister who will submit it to the King. 
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Article 84 [Amendments} 
The Chamber of Deputies may reject any amendment made to a bill by the 
Consultative Council, and may insist on its previous decision without introducing 
any new amendments to the bill. In such a case the bill shall be returned to the 
Consultative Council for reconsideration. The Consultative Council may accept the 
decision of the Chamber of Deputies or insist on its previous decision. 
Article 85 [Disputes, Joint Session] 
If the two Chambers diffor twice over any bill, the National Assembly shall convene 
in joint session under the chairmanship of the President of the Consultative Council 
to discuss those clauses in dispute. For the bill to be accepted, the decision of the 
National Assembly must be taken on a majority of members present, and when the 
bill is rejected in this manner it shall not be presented to the National Assembly 
again in the same convening period. 
Article 86 [Approved Bill] 
In all cases in which a bill is approved, the President of the Consultative Council 
shall refer the approved bill to the Prime Minister so that he submits it to the King. 
Article 102 [Chairmanship} 
The joint National Assembly meeting shall be chaired respectively by the President 
of the Consultative Council, or in his absence by the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies, followed by the First Vice-President of the Consultative Council, followed 
by the First Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 103 [Quorum] 
In the cases other than those in which the Constitution requires a special majority, 
joint sessions of the two chambers of the National Assembly shall not be deemed 
legally valid unless they are attended by the majority of the members of each 
individual chamber. Decisions shall be taken by a majority of the votes of members 
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present with the exception of the President, who is to cast the decisive vote in the 
event of a tie. 
Chapter VI General and Final Provisions 
Article 120 [Constitutional Amendments} 
a. Exceptionally to clauses b, c and d of Article 35 of this Constitution, for any 
provision of this Constitution to be amended the amendment must be approved by a 
two-thirds majority of the members of whom both the Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies are composed, and the amendment must be approved by the 
King. 
c. It is not permissible to propose an amendment to Article 2 of this Constitution, 
and it is not permissible under any circumstances to propose the amendment of the 
constitutional monarchy and the principle of inherited rule in Bahrain, as well as the 
bi-cameral system and the principles of freedom and equality established in this 
Constitution. 
The articles regarding the Legislative Branch are relatively disappointing for some 
observers. The 40-member elected Chamber of Deputies and 40-member 
Consultative Council appointed by the King share equal, although limited, 
legislative authority. In the event of a deadlock, the president of the appointed 
council can cast the tie-breaking vote as it is illustrated in Article (I 02) and (I 03) of 
the constitution above. When people voted overwhelmingly in 200 I for the NAC, 
they thought that the appointed council would be smaller and only consultative. 
Instead, the structure of the new parliament virtually guarantees that ultimate 
decision-making power remains in the palace.47 This means that, in practice, the 
King can exercise veto power through his control of the appointed chamber. This 
disregards the 1973 constitution, which gave the elected legislature the exclusive 
right to pass laws. When compared with those appointed purely at the decision of 
the King, it can be seen as unfair that for someone to run for a position in the elected 
47 International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's sectarian Challenge," Middle East Report No. 40, May 6, 
2005, p. 6. 
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chamber they have to go through several time consuming registration processes in 
addition to the costly expense of election campaigning. 
In addition, the King may when necessary, extend the legislative season of the 
Chamber of Deputies by Royal Order for a period not exceeding two years. The 
subject of confidence in the Prime Minister cannot not be raised in the Chamber of 
Deputies, and no law shall be promulgated unless approved by both the Consultative 
Council and the Chamber of Deputies, or the National Assembly as the situation 
demands, and ratified by the King. It does seem fair or logical that ministers may 
be questioned by the Chamber of Deputies and be forced to resign, whilst the PM, 
who gives these ministers their objectives and responsibilities, is not subject to this 
rule. 
Article (3)- point (4) of the Law of the Shura Council and the Parliament (Issued by 
Law by decree No. 14 for the year 2002) reads: "The selected person must either be 
experienced and (or) one of those who have performed distinguished service(s) to 
the Country in one ofthefollowingfields: 
• Members of the ruling Family. 
• Former minister. 
• Those who have worked at the post of ambassadors and minister 
plenipotentiary. 
• Former Members of the judicial bodies. 
• Retired security officials. 
• Former Senior Scholars, businessmen and professionals. 
• Former members of the parliament. 
• Those who have exceptional popular trust and support. 
Specifying members of the ruling family as a category of the honouree citizen is 
commonly seen as frustrating. No one will object if members of the ruling family 
are one of the other categories on the list. At least they have not been distinguished 
as a higher gene, where the constitution has mentioned in several articles that people 
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are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and 
duties, and that there shall be no discrimination among them on the basis of gender, 
origin, language, religion or creed. 
The more vital challenge faces the King in the next election and the new appointed 
council is the selection of the members. As most of the opposition societies that 
boycotted the 2002 parliamentary election will enter the 2006 one, the King need to 
be very selective and careful in his new decision. Table 5.4 below shows the 
performance of the most loyal personnel during the three session of the Consultative 
Council meeting. The table illustrate that the selected individuals especially the x-
military, women, and AI Khalifa where not up to the challenge in comparison with 
the members of the elected chamber shown in Table 5.5 below.48 In general, their 
contributions were very weak. 
Table 5.4: Performance of member of the Consultative Council 
(October 2002 to October 2005) 
Contribute in 
Number of 
The Consultative 
Number of 
recommendations 
present 
Questions directed 
Council's members recommendations 
for draft laws to Ministers 
for draft laws 
X-Military Personnel 0 0 0 
Women 2 7 3 
AI Khalifa 0 1 0 
Others 14 27 25 
Total 16 35 28 
48 A detailed analyses of both chambers illustrated in AI Wasat Newspaper, Sunday 2 October 2005. 
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The Elected 
Chamber's 
members 
Total 
Table 5.5: Performance of member of the Chamber of Deputies 
(October 2002 to October 2005) 
.. Contribute in .. 
Number of 
I Willingly present 
recommendation 
recommendations recommendations 
s for draft laws 
·-- l_~_t 'A'l'~ l for draft laws 
147 63 206 
Number of 
Questions 
directed to 
inisters 
94 
The constitution is the most critical challenge to the King, and he may reconsider the 
power of the appointed council and the consequences of doing so. The opposition 
wi ll continue boycotting the process arguing that by doing so they will provide de 
facto recognition to the parliament and the Constitution. 
The challenge that the King faces is the never-ending demonstration by oppositions 
groups against the constitutional amendment reform that spilt legislative power 
equally between the elected chamber and the appointed consultative council. These 
demonstrations reach the point where people call Bahrain nowadays "the country 
with million rallies" rather than what it is used to be called "the country with million 
trees." 
Again, as mentioned earlier, these restricted delegation and conservation could be 
acceptable as start of the reform, but it shou ld be reconsidered in the coming election 
in 2006. 
5.2.2 The King' s Speeches 
The research pointed out in chapter three that the King's Speeches are to be 
considered as strategic planning for the government and all citizens to consider and 
comply with. However, after all changes and challenges the King put to his 
government and his people, the implementation of the reforms is very slow and 
produced lots of frustrations. Below are some of the strategic issues that the King 
pointed out and the actions taken accordingly by the government to unite the society. 
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Date of 
Speech 
Quote from the King's Speeches ~..r};t Action Taken ff.P? r!i,'; 
"In line with this, we need to meet The government is trying hard 
the demands and changes o[the and started several steps to 
future, in a world rite with develop and meet the internal and 
volatility, by means ofBahrain 's external demands. But the 
potentialities comprising the process of the government is 
ability to develop and revitalise slow. 
since the start o[process of On the other hand, Bahrain was 
modern progress and leading the region but not any 
development. For that, Bahrain more. Most of GCC countries are 
has been leading the drive among heading away from the Kingdom. 
brotherly states and closely Their citizens are proud of the 
working with them in this vital process and the returns of the 
13 March region of the Arab nation and the development are distributed 
fairly. 1999 whole world."49 
"It would be necessary to express The King showed his appreciation 
to all of you all gratitude over the to his people for their loyalty and 
cohesion and sincere loyalty you sustained allegiance through the 
have demonstrated at this history of the country. However, 
historical situation, representing inequality is still the base of the 
your sustained allegiance which government. There is a 
reflects true unity between the differentiation between citizens 
people and their leadership in this based in their beliefs and origin. 
cherished country. I would like to A good example is the 
say it clearly that as a son of !sa discrimination of Shia, A jam, and 
and as an adherent to the duty, l Hawala in working in the armed 
49 Ministry of Infonnation, "The Speeches of His Majesty King Hamad bin /sa AI Khalifa, King of 
Bahrain," Ministry oflnfonnation publication, Bahrain, 2002, p. 9. 
50 Ibid, p. 10. 
51 Ibid. 
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shall raise the standard o[_his 12ath forces. 
which does not dif.lj!rentiate 
between the J2eo{l.le o[_the single 
nation, regardless o[_their belief§ 
and origin, and which onlY. 
consider the honesty_ o[_national 
association, and which consider 
the true citizenshi]2 which seeks 
even: goodness (gr Bahrain and 
her J2eOJ2le. "50 
"We are greatly confident that our The government of Bahrain still 
Bahraini civilised society_ is has no confident in its citizens. 
blessed with much {l.Otential o[_real The increasing number of 
12rogr_ess U{l.On which we can build foreigners, especially for the high 
in the 12ath o[]!_olitical, posts and advisory jobs, does 
administrative, and economic prove the in confidentiality of the 
develo12ment. Such path we highly government towards the citizens. 
believe in and consider it as a 
source of richness for our Moreover, the changes made by 
traditions of consultation, and as a the King in the government still 
{l.attern (gr governmental do not meet the people 
develoJ2ment and (gr expectations. The national 
accom12lishing the com{l.rehensive economy that the country is 
12rogr_ess and diversi{j!_ing o[_the following by making lots of 
national economJ!. in the interest of tourism projects is only targeting 
the J2eOJ2le o[_this nation and even: the already wealthy group and 
J2iece o[_this soi/."51 does not include the in need 
citizens. 
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31 July 
1999 
16 Dec. 
2000 
52 Ibid, p. 18. 
53 Ibid, p. 50. 
"It has been clear that the steps we The King has made some steps to 
have taken for the sake of{Ostering overcome the restless Shia by 
the national unity thmugh the emptying persons from them and 
Amiri pardoning of those misled allowing exiles to return home. 
groups. a matter which received But the government, on the other 
every acknowledgment and hand, is not following the same 
positive response from all. We wisdom andpath. They still 
shall keep on, and forever, joining frustrating citizens and is not 
efforts with the sincere groups of putting enough efforts to build up 
our people, regardless of their strong nationlll spirit, which 
creeds or origin, on basis of strong considered to be the most 
national spirit and through important factor for development. 
consulting on mutual views and 
vision in seek {Or a better 
future. "52 
"Our approach drives from our 
common aspiration for the sake of 
developing the institutional bodies 
and system of the state and move 
from the formula of progressing 
state that was established by 
fathers and for a new stage of 
modern state that mirrors yours 
ambitious and cope with various 
international changes. "53 
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The King here requests to 
transform Bahrain to a modem 
state. Since that date people in 
Bahrain only experience 
structural changes but nothing has 
change in implementing new 
system that speed up process, jobs 
depend on qualification rather 
that tribal management system, 
fair distribution ofwealth, and all 
aspects of modem countries. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, p. 52. 
"A cosmopolitan and sate Bahrain still could not compete 
financial and economic centre. with the neighbouring countries 
governed by legislation and rules in facilitating the rules and 
in this vital region of the world." regulation of local and foreign 
investors. These old complicated 
governmental administrative 
procedures make investors flee 
from Bahrain to Dubai, Qatar, 
and Oman for better services. 
"We also closely view the intent of Since the time ofihe speech until 
our Crown Prince and the date of the research and the 
Commander in Chief of the CP is still struggling with the 
Defence force Sheikh Salman bin government and private sector in 
Hamad al Khalifa to come for the removing the administrative 
youth. develop of the BDF, procedures to encourage 
keenness to follow up economic investment. However, the visible 
growth and encouragement of challenge the CP faces is BDF. 
investment with the aim to raise As this organisation is directly 
the living standard of the citizens under his father and his direct 
and revive the national economy. control, he may do healthier 
56 Some ministries are not included in the list of the NAC to be audited. The Royal Court, the 
Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defence are examples of this situation. 
57 All official Bahraini Newspapers reviewed some issues of the NAC's reports, Saturday 7 January 
2005. 
58 Article 97 [Auditing) of 1973 Constitution 
"A financial control and audit commission shall be established by a law, which shall ensure its 
independence. The commission shall be attached to the National Assemblv and shall assist the 
Government and the National Assembly in controlling the collection of the State revenues and the 
disbursement of its expenditures within the limits ofthe budget. The commission shall submit to both 
the Government and the National Assembly an annual report on its activities and its observations." 
59 Omar AI Hassan, "The Kingdom of Bahrain in 2002," Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London, 
2003, p. 9. 
60 Michael Herb, "Emirs and Parliaments in the Gulf," Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 4, 
October 2002, p. 46. 
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These is fact reflect the aspiration development to it to meet the new 
of Bahrain youth towards better challenges of the reform. He may 
future. Certainly, the removing of create an administrative system to 
barriers and restrictions befOre be as a proto type for the other 
the economy and the opening of governmental ministries. 
future investment opportunities, 
away from political and 
administrative procedures. are 
among the essential needs fOr the 
desired economic growth. In fact 
Bahrain has the solid growth and 
for free economy which streamline 
the achieving of this objective." 
"As we pointed out in our address A comprehensive and balanced 
during the new term of the Shura modernizing ofthe powers, the 
council, we need to state that executive, the legislative, and the 
advancing to the stage of modern judiciary have not change to 
state, entails a comprehensive and advance to a modern state. The 
balanced modernising of the King still controls the three 
powers, the executive, the powers. On the other hand, the 
legislative and the judiciary. In government sti'H too has power 
regard to the executive power, over the judiciary branch and did 
there is a need to continue the not improve and upgrade of the 
improving and upgrading of the administrative performance. The 
administrative perfOrmance. level of transparency by the 
together with the stimulating of government is not yet meeting the 
vehicles of accountability and King's expectations. The 
control and to promote the level of National Audit Court's (NAC) 
transparency in all institutions. 
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report on selected ministries56 
indicated that there is no full 
cooperation by the ministries with 
the court. Moreover, there were 
dark areas in the financial 
transaction that could not been 
cleared. 57 
In contrary, the Financial Control 
and Audit of 1973 Constitution 
was reporting directly to the 
National Assembly. 58 
-
As regard to the legislative body, In regard of the legislative body, 
we view that the democratic and the bicameral system has failed to 
constitutional developments in the meet citizens' prospects. 
world require the adopting and Amendments to the constitution 
introducing of a bi-cameral gave the Consultative Council 
system, whereby the members of appointed by the King the same 
the deputy chamber are freely and legislative powers as those given 
directly elected by the citizens and to the elected chamber. This 
~shall have the legislation task. meant that the concentration of 
Beside that, a Shura (consultative) power remains in the hands of the 
council, made of well vision, and un-elected authority. 59 
professionalised figures that are Disagreement between the elected 
able to give proper advice and chamber and the appointed one 
guidance. The scope shall be open are to be resolved by a vote of all 
for all concerned bodies and members, with 40 members each 
institutions to, legally and and the head of the National 
constitutionally, absorb and adapt Assembly is from the appointed 
to this modern formula. chamber, this gtves elected 
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deputies less power than they 
enjoyed under the 1973 
Constitution.00 
In regard to the judiciary power, The National Assembly does not 
we seek to actuate the judicial monitor state financial affairs as, 
bodies with the aim to speed up the by virtue of Decree No. 16 in July 
processing of legal cases while 2002, the NAC reports directly to 
emphasise the independence of the King and does not also review 
these bodies. In fact, Bahraini income or expenditures of the 
judiciary has been independent Royal' Court. Moreover, the King 
since its inception. This has can dissolve it. 
always been and shall remain one 
of the solid guarantees for 
protecting human rights that are 
well legislated and documented in 
the holy book." 54 
"On other hand, we are pleased to The King has managed to reach 
declare on this dear occasion and out to his people through a 
during this holy month, that we number of royal gestures to repair 
gave order to grant a one month the damages occurred through the 
basic salary to citizens employees past years and to meet the needs 
of the government to reduce the and demands of many Bahraini 
monthly instalments for all citizens. Some of these gestures 
beneficiaries of housing services, have served short-term needs; 
to reduce electricity fees for the others served the long-term ones. 
benefit of limited income citizens However, the government did not 
and to reduce custom duties with follow suit and try to solve 
aim to revive the economic drive poverty, unemployment, and 
in the country."55 
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many other socioeconomic 
problems. 
"The process of actuating the The King pushed for several law 
charter, following the drafts in order to run the country 
overwhelming endorsement, as constittttional monarchy. The 
emerged as a serried national government comply with his 
action plan of formulating the instructions but unfortunately 
blueprints, law drafts, and social theydo not when it come to 
care programs. This include implementations. The 
adopting of executive steps, the bureaucracy system is not 
latest of which was the plan of sufficient and people always 
administrative discipline in our complaining of slow processing, 
government body, a move which inequality, corruption, and run by 
leads to further competence. mediation (Wasta). Pulling 
16 Dec. productiviiJ! and fairness in the strings, intercession, and 
2001 oldest government body in the nepotism play a role and have 
region. The civil code has been great influence in society.66 
improved to allow for valid legal Employments, for example, are 
accountability in terms of the based on whom you know to be 
performance of the civil servant, employed and not on your 
while there was restructuring of qualification. 
61 Ibid, p. 76. 
62 Ibid, p. 77. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, p. 81. 
65 Ibid. 
our court to include a department In the contrary, the department of 
for grievances and complaints in grievances and complaints has 
order to maintain the rights of played a vital role in solving 
citizens."61 several people grievances. The 
government should also follow 
suit and have a srnaH section for 
the same purposes in each 
66 Farid Hasan, "No need to pull strings to get something done," Local Issues, Bahrain Tribune, 
Sunday 27 March 2005. 
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ministries in order to preserve the 
right of citizens. 
"Since assumed the rule, we have The King repeatedly shows 
pledged to bring all goodness for concern of poverty of his people 
the people of this nation, giving and demands his government to 
priority to raise the living raise the living standard of the 
standard of the Bahraini citizen. Bahraini citizens especially those 
notably those of limited income." oflimited income. Steps taken by 
We believe in involving all the government are not affective 
categories of the society in the and the poverty level is 
economic and social development increasing.67 Moreover, from the 
process and the need that every development projects that 
group receives its fair share ofthe Bahrain adopting in building 
fruits of growth and of the wealth several high standard cities, the 
ofthe nation. In pursuance of this majority ofthe Bahraini citizens 
objective, we continue to cultivate will not receive any share ofthe 
and distribute the economic return of such growth. These 
prosperity through further policies strategic projects will only add 
of free economy, the privatisation more money to the buckets of the 
of projects, the drafting of laws wealthy people. Additionally, 
and discipline that tackle people who are using dual 
recession and unemployment and interests suck Bahrain wealth. 
also to open a wide scope for~ Because the majority of the 
trade competition that avert government employees have 
67 United Nations Development Programme, "The Arab Human Development Report 2003," National 
Press, Amman, Jordan. 
68 More details are explained in the educational challenge in this chapter. 
69 A details argument regarding citizenship education programme will be elaborated in chapter five. 
70 In 2004, Member of the Chamber of Deputies Jassim al Saeedi and other Islamists forced an Arabic 
network to scrap an Arab version of the reality television show 'Big Brother' because it involved 
unrelated men and women under the same roof. Protests on the streets of Manama denounced 'Sin 
Brother' even though the producers had modified the show with separate living quarters for men and 
women. Pressure from Islamists also forced the authorities to drop the champagne-spraying ritual at 
the Formula I motor racing grand prix in Bahrain. 
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monopoly and avoid duality of private businesses and shift most 
interests. "62 
"All such initiatives in the field of 
social, development, and 
educational growth represent the 
foundations for further national 
plans which aspire the improving 
ofliving standard and meeting the 
needs ofthe citizen."63 
governmental projects to their 
businesses. 
"While the nation is proud of its The King here refers to the armed 
achievements, and with the forces as something people 
blessing of security and stability, should be proud with as he 
we need to speak fully about the specifically mentions them almost 
role of the armed fOrces and in every speech. Accordingly, 
public security in maintaining the Bahraini citizens are admiring the 
stability and defending the soil of role ofthe armed forces and 
Bahrain. This role is becoming wishes that their children could 
more important to protect the join such sophisticated 
national accomplishments. It is organisation. Unfortunately, 
certain that the men of the armed some sects ofthe Bahraini society 
forces and public security have a are still not allowed to enrol. 
civilised mission and a cultured 
role in all modern democracies to 
protect the nation and safoguard 
the security and the freedom of the 
citizen in such a way that every 
citizen becomes a guard for his : 
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nation." 
"Generally speaking, our A law college was established in 
approach is to adopt an education the University of Bahrain as 
policy that prepares our sons to directed by the King to teach all 
meet the needs of labour market law specialisation in order to 
and to cope with the needs of the consolidate law into national life. 
national economy and to ensure Islamic and political institutions 
that curricula in schools and have been established too. On the 
universities aim at matching with other hand, the educational policy 
the developments and to prepare is not cooperating with the labour 
the new generations to observe market.68 However, citizenship 
latest technologies."64 education programme to serve the 
injured, and complex Bahraini 
society has not yet been applied.69 
"In regard to streamlining the Tourism is dominating the 
tourism in Bahrain, and in Bahraini newspapers, the majority 
pursuance of providing a modern of Majalis, and Imam speeches in 
tourism through the foundations of Friday prayers. There are 
Bahrain cultural, social. and constant conflicts between liberal 
natural features. we shall retain people and Islamic regarding the 
high values and will not allow for issues of tourism. Liberal wants 
low standard tourism. Those to have all sort of western 
concerned with the tourism sector attraction such as attractive 
have been giving extended time to females' singers, alcohols, mixing 
enforce necessary steps, while we genders programmes (Big 
assert that there shall be no Brother)70, and females' dancers 
communism when it comes to as the Islamist campaign may 
216 
16 Dec. 
2003 
considering the values and prove costly for Bahrain, which 
tradition of Bahrain. And in the relies on tourism and is investing 
same manner that we apply our heavily to attract foreign visitors 
approach in accountable political and their much-needed cash. 
freedom, we remain committed to 
be open within our tolerant But the challenge is that wither 
religion."65 the King could keep his 
obligations as indicated in his 
speeches and the Islamists stand 
against those people who sell 
alcoholic beverages and provide 
western entertainments which 
they have found ways to coexist 
for decades in Bahrain. 
"It is the high morals of the The King should seriously think 
Bahrainis those initiatives have of the Bahraini citizens. Some of 
been called gestures, but in fact them, especially those around him 
these came to fulfil the duty and become hypocrites. They started 
the task of serving the goodness of to confused duties with gestures. 
the nation." They even call the 'fountain' that 
the King order to be made in 
Manama in January 2006 as 
gesture from him. How could a 
fountain become a gesture to 
people? 
"We renew our call to every loyal Citizen of Bahrain has, through 
citizen, regardless of his opinions the history, proved through the 
and views, to join hands with us in several pledge of alliances that 
serving our people who strive for they are loyal to the land of these 
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the dignified living which they Islands. All they need is the trust 
richly deserve and which covers of their government on them. 
housing, education, employment The government therefore, should 
and comprehensive welfare. This look wider when they are looking 
is an issue that does not tolerate for citizens to occupy certain 
hesitation no matter what the posts. Citizens' loyalty should be 
justifications and whether it is the tested practically as the King did 
Government or any political fOrce. with some opposition figures to 
Everybody must assume the take over a post of ministers in 
responsibility in light of national the government. The process 
action, democracy, and proves to be successfl;ll. The 
transparency, and the ultimate Minister of Labour isoa good 
word lies with the national example. 
conscience and people's 
determination." 
"the Kingdom of Bahrain is ready This step is a real challenge to the 
to join hands with its sister states King. Because if it applied most 
to achieve a unified Gulf of the unemployment problems in 
citizenship, a project that will offer Bahrain will be solved. It will 
better privileges and rights to the also raise the living standard of 
GCC citizens and will lead to a the Bahraini citizens by replacing 
single Gulf currency according to the foreigners in the GCC 
plans." countries. 
"Our dear people, as we reiterate The fami1Jy status law is creating 
our pride with what the legislative many problems in the country. 
and executive branches have Liberal people want liberal family 
together accomplished in a short law where Islamists insist on 
time, we wish to recall our having a law mostly derived from 
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directives at the beginning of the 'Sharia.' There is also another 
third session of the Parliament's dilemma arise within the Islamists 
first term. Completing the themselves. Shia Islamists want 
nation's laws, reorganising the their own family law and Sunni 
family status and focusing on the Islamists want their own. On the 
economic development issues that other hanp, GCC committees also 
we consider paramount to the discussing a unify family status 
restructuring of the national law for all Gulf States. 
economy for the sake . of all 
people." 
"The progress of reforms and Modernisation ofthe education, 
modernisation will continue management, and public services 
incessantly. It encompasses the is very slow ifthere is any. These 
areas of economy, education, issues are very sensitive as it 
management, and public services." concern citizens' day-to-day 
dealing. 
"In exercising your role of The situation that people 
overseeing Government experiencing and reading in daily 
performance, you have laid down- newspap~rs tell different story. 
in cooperation with the The government is not being 
Government-the traditions of transparency with legislative 
responsible parliamentary work, branch, people, and the press. 
traditions that achieve The King should put more 
constructive and fruitful pressure on his government to 
cooperation in the relationship cooperate better with these people 
between the legislative and for the benefit of the liberalisation 
executive authorities within the programme. 
framework of the separation of 
powers as prescribed by the 
Constitution. You have exercised 
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your full right through available 
constitutional means. The 
Government has also been keen to 
provide the necessary data and to 
respond positively to many 
motions. All that had a clear 
effect in supporting the democratic 
march and safeguarding citizens' 
interests." 
"On this historic day, each Citizen~s are proud and patient yet. 
Bahraini citizen is eligible to be But if the process continue as it is 
proud of the achievements of the then the situation will be very 
comprehensive development critical. Unemployment rate is 
process, and all fields of life. He increasing, poverty too, and most 
should also participate in facing of the development projects do 
the challenges, and fulfilling the not include people with limited 
aspirations of the homeland and mcome. 
nation of further advancement, 
prosperity, and brighter future." 
"The leading experience Bahrain When the National Audit Court 
witnessed under the modernisation established and reports directly to 
and reform process that began the King and does not review 
with the adoption of the National income or expenditures of the 
Charter, and the popular Royal Court, the people slightly 
reforendum, and which received become disappointed. Again, the 
the admiration of all and the Administrative Monitoring 
appreciation of the civilised Bureau, which should have been 
international community, established at the earlier stages, is 
represent a continuation of the not very encouraging to citizens. 
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national action programme which The Bureau is reporting to the 
we started together, and the steps King too. However, there is a hot 
that we decided to adopt to debate taking place in the 
develop the administrative Chamber of Deputies to make it 
performance in the government directly reporting to the elected 
sector, through ordering the Council. On the other hand, the 
establishment 
Administrative 
of the government is fighting 
Monitoring aggressively to make the Bureau 
Bureau as called for in the reporting to it.71 The situation 
National Action Charter, which has not been solved until the 
would insure further efficiency, writing of the research. 
production, and transparency in 
one of the oldest and most deep-
rooted government administration, 
that has made many achievements 
despite its limited resources, a 
matter which deserves our 
appreciation to the former 
government staff, who contribute 
to setting-up the government 
organisation." 
"The fact is that I relied above all on Almighty God, and then on my confidence in 
the awareness, civilised attitude and political maturity of the people of Bahrain. I 
personally made a decision that entailed a historic responsibility by holding a free 
referendum in order to release the country from a bottleneck. It was an 
unprecedented referendum in our political history and the hesitation and 
71 AI Wasat, "Transeferring the Administrative Monitaring Bureau to the Council of Ministers," 
Saturday, 11 March 2006. 
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apprehension towards it persisted until the last moments."72 The King did start new 
path for the Kingdom, trusting his people that they wi II stand up to the challenge. 
He is risking every thing his family built since 1783. From all the above speeches, 
the King has brought about most of vital issues that could initially steer the country 
to a better future. He urged new legislation to match recent developments and 
amendments to many existing laws, which hinder advancement and investments. 
Urging a speedy and comprehensive revamp of the entire legal structure, 
discrimination against women must be addressed urgently. Action on private sector 
and jobs reform by the Crown Prince was also highlighted especially his mission to 
prepare 'young leaders of the future.' He also lunched a series of talks on national 
awareness, as the progress of the reform plan requires a national awareness that 
guides its march. King Hamad also pledged oil revenue windfall to improve 
citizens' standard of living. 73 While acknowledging the positive contribution of 
expatriates, he said their presence should not be detrimental to citizens, the 
economy, or social values.74 In many other occasions, the King has promised a new 
and efficient housing policy to cater to people's needs. In 16 December 1999, in his 
speech in the occasion of the National Day, the King point out that he is planning 
with the government to grant every Bahraini family a land and all the facilities to 
build a home for them. In 2006, again he brought the same issue by saying: 
"Housing costs have to be reasonable and not exceed citizens' budget . .. Currently, 
the waiting period for houses is very long and costs exorbitant which means that our 
housing policies have to be reconsidered," and added "My aim is to allocate each 
citizen a free plot of land on which he can build his house and feel secure about 
his future," the King told editors-in-chief during an audience at Sa.friya Palace. 75 
However, the processes of implementation, which considered also as crucial 
challenge to the King, are very slow and suspicious. It looks that there are many 
72 King Hamad AI Khalifa, "Talks on National Awareness: First Talk," All Bahrain's Official 
Newspapers, Wednesday 9 February 2005. 
73 King Hamad AI Khalifa, "Bridges to a bright and vibrant Bahrain," All Bahrain Newspapers, 
Saturday, 4 February 2006. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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parties in the country who find such reform does not serve their benefits and could at 
the end of the day hurt them and their beneficiaries. The opposition members note 
that the government created an institutional and legal framework in which neither 
the King nor his advisors are accountable. 
Moreover, The King' s gestures were made for wise reasons. In May 200 I, for 
example, he ordered tuition fees at the University of Bahrain to be reduced by 
approximately 80%. Although he open up the future for citizens to get what they 
have always dreamed to do, but his wisdom behind this gesture was to insure the 
spread of education to all part of the Kingdom that make his reform more acceptable 
with open minded people than sectarian ones. See Figure 5.4 below. The 
government fails to construct the labour market to contain the higher number of 
graduate citizens. [n general, the government is not following suit with all the 
honourable steps by the King and are not are considered. 
Mixing up 
people from 
different 
background to 
get urbanisation 
rather than 
close limited 
villages 
thinking. 
Figure 5.4: University Reduction Fees 
Educate the 
opposition to 
usc dialogue 
techniques 
rather than the 
riots and rallies. 
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To have highly 
educated 
citizens who 
could interact 
and accept 
changes or any 
future 
development 
Improve the 
level of 
education and 
culture 
5.2.3 Conflict within the Ruling Family 
The King is so patient with the government and does not want to retire it because he 
does not wish to form division in the AI Khalifa family, which will weaken their 
power and could end their ruling over the Islands. The King knows well what could 
happen to his family and the Kingdom, if he attempt to do so. Because, historically, 
there were several occasion where AI Khalifa went through disputes and even war 
between each other. After AI Khalifa inhabited Bahrain, they coped well with their 
changing pattern of life but one thing they did not manage to change was the 
constant bickering and disputes between the various factions within the ruling family, 
who allied themselves with one or another of their allied tribes, or foreign powers.76 
At the initiation of their ruling, the AI Khalifa adopted a system of dual form of 
ruling, where the father being assisted his lifetime by two of his sons, and on his 
death, the two sons continued with their duties and shared all authority. Sometimes 
the grandsons were also called upon to perform various functions of the ruler.77 This 
system was used frequently in Bahrain until the accession of Amir Isa in 1869, 
starting from the death of Amir Ahmed AI Fateh in 1795.78 (See Figure 1: The 
Ancestry of AI Khalifa) from chapter one. AI Fateh was succeeded by his two sons 
Amir Salman (1795-1821) and Amir Abdulla (1795-1842) who ruled Bahrain jointly. 
When Amir Salman died in 1821, Amir Abdulla the brother tried to establish himself 
as absolute ruler of Bahrain. This provoked a bloody conflict within the ruling 
family itself. The consequences of Amir Abdulla's attitude not only influenced the 
political situation in Bahrain, but also placed a great strain on the people and the 
economy. 79 Lorimer, quoting Captain Macleod, the British Resident in Bush ire, 
reporting on his visit to Bahrain in 1823, indicated: "The authority of the Sheikhs of 
Bahrain in their own dominions did not appear to be as absolute as might have been 
76 M. G. Rumaihi, "Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War," Bowker 
Publishing Co., London 1976, p. 4. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ahmed Mustafa Abu Hakima, "History of Eastern Arabia 1750-1800," Khayats, Beirut, 1965, p. 
117. 
79 Rumaihi, p. 5. 
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expected, and that it was born with much reluctance by the inhabitants of the 
islands."80 
Referring to the state of the economy at that time ( 1836-1838), Lorimer remarks: 
The lot of the Sheikh's Abdulla subjects in Bahrain was growing, from 
day to day, less endurable, and the Islands were being rapidly 
depopulated by emigration. The towns were in a state of ruin and decay, 
and house rents had fallen to one-eighth of what they had been only a few 
years before . . . Six sons of the Sheikh pretended to exercise separate 
and independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to 
extracting money from merchants and other men ofmeans".81 
The incident did not end by the deportation of Amir Abdulla in 1843, by his great 
nephew, Amir Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Salman, but the two branches of the AI 
Khalifa went through war in 1869. It made the British interfere and deport the two 
rivals, Amir Mohammed bin Abdulla and Amir Mohammed bin Khalifa, and put in 
office Amir Isa bin Ali who was only 21 years old (see Fig-1 I The Ancestry of AI 
Khalifa) from chapter one. Bahrain started losing its political independence and the 
people suffered. 
These incidents and even the deportation from the homeland by the foreigner have 
left deep and painful marks since the childhood of King Hamad as he indicated in 
his Article "Talks on National Awareness." He pointed out: 
Those included the bitter memories of how the foreigner presence had 
sought to diminish the factors that make the homeland's independence 
and constantly sought to 'deport' the senior leaders who had insisted 
on independence since the nineteenth century, and deported with them 
sincere patriots who were working for the country's independence, in 
80 J. G. Lorimer, "Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf', "Oman and Central Arabia", Superintendent of 
Government Printing, Calcutta, Historical Part, 1915, Part IB, 850, Reprinted and published in 1970 
by Gregg International Publishers, London. 
81 Ibid, 858 .. 
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collaboration with the legitimate regime in their homeland. .. That has 
instilled in us a string aversion to deportation measures. 82 
Nevertheless, will the current government be able to cope with the progress of the 
reform or not and could the situation afford the patient of the King for the sake of 
not creating fraction in the ruling family while the other citizens undergo the 
consequences. 
5.2.4 Political Structure 
Each country at its formative stages derives the methods of ruling according to the 
surrounding status. When Bahrain started its journey with the AI Khalifa dynasty 
there were external and internal threats that shaped the policies ofthis tribe. Persian 
Empire, Portuguese, Omanis, Wahhabis, Qataris, British, and many other Arab tribes 
were among the external threats. Where, the internal threat came from within the 
family itself, the Shia, some Sunnis, Ajam, and other Arab tribes that were not in 
agreement with them. From these sets and facts, the AI Khalifa shaped the policy of 
the country in regard of its foreign policies and internal affairs. It also decided the 
level of power and security that the state should have to maintain its survival. 
Colonialism whether for the purpose of extending the empires' territories such as the 
Russian Tsars or for commerce and strengthen the empires' imperial interest in a 
region have all affected the natural development of the colonise countries. Signing 
many protections and controlling treaties with the British Empire has affect Bahrain 
independent thinking and advancement. These treaties made the ruler of Bahrain 
always depend on powerful countries to think and plan their future. Beside the 
advantages of the British colonisation to Bahrain in areas such as education, laws, 
structural development, labour union, etc., it taught Bahrain government the doctrine 
of the use of force for the reign to survive. For example, British colonisation had 
constantly used the concept of "deportation" of people that considered, from their 
point of view, as threat to their existing. This illness has inherited by Bahrain's ruler 
82 King Hamad AI Khalifa, "Talks on National Awareness: Second Talk," All Bahrain's Official 
Newspapers, Saturday 30 April 2005. 
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and deported sincere patriots who were working for the country's development and 
human rights. The mentality of security law and the fear of citizens have formed the 
Bahrainis personality. In fact, country's policy is the main factor on shaping the 
citizens' state of minds. So if, for example, a country decided to be a commercial 
state and be very open to the outside world, then its people become very 
commercially thinkers and extremely open minded. But, Bahrain has to some extent 
been very restricted on security. The government has always treated all outbreaks 
by; relying on threats, power, and repression by the Armed forces to keep full 
control of the situation while waiting for the opposition to lose its steam. 
Consequently, these techniques widened the gape between the ruling family and 
several groups of the society, which can be experience nowadays as a result. 
This strategy has caused the problem of social stratification, which is far more rigid 
in Bahrain than anywhere else in the Gulf. The ruling family and its tribal allies can 
be described almost as a caste: one has to be born into it. This level holds a 
monopoly of political power and demonstrates an increasing presence as economic 
elite. In doing that, the system has formed also the long cycle of mistrust between 
the ruling family and the people and between various sectors of the population, 
mistrust which has turned to opposition and which, in tum, has turned to violence. 
Accordingly, the King is challenged with the ability to raise the fears of his citizens 
and try to build up positive new generation capable of developing the country. 
5.2.5 The Pearl Industry 
Another historical trend that become as a challenge factor to the reform is the pearl 
fisheries. As the industry was the main source of income for the people of Bahrain 
for several years, it has caused many social problems then and nowadays. The 
workers who were involved such as the divers, the divers' pullers, and others 
suffered poverty and fatigue because of the method by which the expeditions were 
financed. Although they do the hardest work, their wages was very little. These 
people are given three kinds of loans while they are in the business. First loan was 
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given by the start of the season to support their families while they were away. 
Second payment were given after they return from the sea, and the third was given in 
the winter when there was no pearl fisheries in anticipation of his diving for the 
same captain the following year.83 It was very rare that a diver or a puller could get 
ride of these debts to the captain. These loans carried forward year after year with 
interest charge until each workers own all his live to the captain. Moreover, when 
the general reforms in the administration were started in 1923 in Bahrain, even death 
was not enough for the divers and other workers, as their debts were then inherited 
by his sons or brothers, who were forced to enter the pearl industry themselves 
unless they had money or property to clear the debts with. Some of the more 
inhuman of the captains would insist on marrying the widow of the employee as 
payment for the debts and, in doing so, obtained for themselves the employee's 
children to act as servants in his house and later, to be trained as divers themselves.84 
The position ofthese employees was summaries by Harrison who wrote in 1924: 
The diver is known as a slave for the rest of his life. It is probably easier 
for a Negro slave on the Pirate Coast to escape, than it is for a Bahraini 
diver to regain his freedom. As long as he is in debt he cannot change 
his employer, no matter how badly he is treated, nor can he leave the 
town, except under bonds to return before the diving season begins and 
he will never be able to get out of debt, he cannot read or write, there is 
no witness to the transactions that take place between the captain and 
himself It is the recognised thing for the divers to receive a loan of 
rice ... The sum written into the books is regularly about 50% greater 
than the market value of the rice. If necessary entirely are required, false 
entries are written in. The upshot of the matter is that their men never 
get out of debt, not one in a thousand of them. In seven years residence 
83 Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in 
an Arab State, the University of Chicago, U.S.A., 1980. 
84 M. G. Rumaihi, Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War, Bowker 
Publishing Co., London 1976. 
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in Bahrain, I have never yet met a diver who had escaped from the 
account book, as the Arab put it.85 
Captains also fall into debts as they forced to obtain finance from merchants to 
equipped and provision their boats and to pay the advanced money to their 
employees. This in a way caused a huge cape between rich and poor in the society 
of Bahrain that continue to exist in the 21st century. 86 
The majority of the Bahraini citizens, since that period, did not think of their future 
and try to live their time even with all the debts. They resisted all initiative of the 
British Political Agents to restructure the rule of this industry where they often made 
mention in their reports of the harsh conditions suffered by the men in the pearl trade. 
Strangely, the divers and pullers themselves were among the main opponents of the 
reform introduced in 1924 by Major C. Daly, the political agent (1921-1926), which 
could ease the workers stress and debts. The principal features of these laws were as 
follows: 87 
• All hereditary debts were abolished. When a diver died, his debts died with 
him. 
• The amount advanced to a diver, and the rate of interest was strictly controlled 
and no other charges were to be debited against the diver. 
• Merchants and captains were compelled to keep regular accounts which were 
scrutinised by number of diving clerks appointed by the Bahrain Government. 
• The divers were given the right to seek other jobs on condition that they repaid 
part of their debt each year. They could no longer be forced to provide unpaid 
labour for their captains after the end of the pearling season. 
The divers and pullers main objection were the restriction of the advances payable. 
They presumably preferred to have the cash to spend and to worry about repaying it 
85 P. W. Harrison, "&onomical and Social Conditions in East Arabia," The Moslem World, Crowell, 
New York, vol. XIV, April1924. 
86 M. G. Rumaihi, 1976. 
87 The Bah~ain Government Annual Reports 1924-1956, Volume 1, p. 93. 
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later. This way of thinking genetically moved from one generation to the other, so 
that you may experience it these days with the same concept. Nowadays, people in 
Bahrain drug themselves on massive loans and debts, some for their basic needs, and 
others for luxury and maintain respect. See Table 5.2 earlier in this chapter. 
In general, the pearl fisheries, beside there advantages to some, it has widen the gab 
between poor and reach and increase the number of poor people in Bahrain. The 
phenomenon consequences are showing up in Bahrain today, as poverty rate 
increasing. 
5.2.6 The Opposition 
The King is challenged with three kinds of oppositions that could hold his reform 
from advancing: 
• Shia opposition who believe that Bahrain belong to them and should be return 
to them. 
• Shia and Sunni opposition whom are frustrated from social and economic 
worries such as unemployment, poverty, high cost of living, and inequality. 
• Shia and Sunni who resist the reforms because it stand against their power and 
benefits that they us to have before King Hamad reign. 
The King is faced with the unpredictable Shia opposition who are living in Bahrain 
but are loyal, led and steered by power from abroad to take over the country.88 In 
many Shia religious ceremonies especially Ashura commemoration, several 
individuals carry out posters, flags, and pictures of foreign leaders (Khamini, 
Khoemini, from Iran and Hassan Naser Alia from Lebanon), not related to the 
occasion that make Bahrain government concerned about their loyalties to the 
Kingdom. 89 See Picture 5.2 below. 90 However, one of the Shia interviewee 
indicated that such action does not mean there is a dual loyalty. A person may 
88 In some Shia's villages, you can see many posters in the walls of foreign leaders such as Ayatollah 
AI Khoemeini and many other leaders from Iran or Iraq. 
89 A/Hayat Newspaper, 26 February 2005. 
90 These foreign leaders pictures are commonly hanged on wall in some Shia villages. 
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become loyal to a case, a sect, or an ethnic but his loyalty always be for his sole 
country. 91 On the other hand, the president of the Islamic National Accord 
Association (Al Wefaq) Sheikh Ali Salman, indicated that: 
We are proposing gradual change, which we hope will eventually lead to 
the development of the political system ... I am not calling for a Shia 
state in Bahrain. I am calling for an Arab Islamic state.92 
On the other hand, the King is confronted with Sunni and Shia whom are frustrated 
from social and economic worries such as unemployment, poverty, high cost of 
living, and inequality. Before the politicalliberalisation programme of King Hamad, 
most of Bahrain population shared certain expressed goals of the opposition, 
including: 93 
• End discriminatory practices against the Shia and Sunni (different from the 
royal family and its allies). 
• Restoration ofthe parliament that was dissolved in 1975. 
9 1 An interview made in 15 April 2006 with Dr Nada Abdulla AI Wady, a journalist in AI Wasat 
Newspaper. The interview was intended to be with Dr Mansoor AI Jamri, Responsible Editor of AI 
Wasat Newspaper who apologised and recommend her to take his place for the interview. 
92 Ali Salman, Interview in Al-Mushahid AI-Siyasi, London, reprinted in Middle East Mirror, London, 
14 October 1997. 
93 For an excellent report regarding recommendations to the government of Bahrain, the opposition, 
and even the US government, see the Crisis Group' s report, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge", Middle 
East Report No. 40, 6 May 2005, p. i-ii. 
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• Ceasing manipulation of Bahrain's demographic makeup through political 
naturalisation of foreigners to increase loyal voters. 
• Recruiting Shia into the Armed Forces. 
• Bahrain government gave citizenship (and the right to vote) to many tribal 
members in order to counterbalance the opposition. 
• Ending informal and formal practices that prohibit Shia and Ajam from living 
in predominantly the royal and Arab tribes' areas. 
• Ensuring that appointments to high government office are based on merit and 
appointing persons who are not members of the AI Khalifa family to key 
ministerial positions. 
• Enforcing transparency in government financial dealing. 
• Ending political motivated arrests and freeing political prisoners. 
• Freedom of expression. 
• Freedom of all kind of media. 
• Permitting the formation of political parties and halting harassment and 
surveillance of non-violent opposition activities. 
• Stopping the expansion of unemployment opportunities for Bahrainis. 
• Rehired all those removed from government jobs for political dissent. 
• An end to corruption in the government. 
Through the years, some of the Sunni and the Shia people went through lots of 
trouble with the government of Bahrain as they were led to believe that it is only 
through confrontation that political and social grievances will be heard. 
Discrimination, unemployment, poverty, democracy, and many other issues was the 
centre of the conflict with the government. Traditionally, all demonstrations by the 
Shia, and to some extent, the Sunni for the feeling of increasingly politically 
marginalised and socially disadvantaged were faced with brutal and aggressive 
reaction by the security to maintain order. Thousands of demonstrators were 
arrested and tortured, and opposition leaders were exiled. The opposition has 
learned from that experience and started educating themselves, internally and 
externally, as opposition and become more professional in how to deal with such 
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situation and wmmg international support. Where, on the other hand, the 
government stayed on the only way they mastered; the use of force. With the new 
reform, the government is faced now with very talented and experts opposition 
leaders and the security are not able to use force and get confuse on handling 
demonstration and winning opposition and international human right organisations. 
Such situation is new to them and they have not been trained for it then and not even 
now. 
The new King stopped most of these harsh treatments and brutal reaction by the 
government since he succeeded his father in 1999, but what went wrong? Why there 
are mounting demonstrations by opposition? See Figure 5.5 below. 
Fif!ure 5.5: Estimated Numbers of Riots throuf!h the History of Bahrain 
No. of 
Riots 
The Shia oppositions repeatedly indicated that the political reforms were seen as a 
way to bolster the country's standing internationally. Others think that the King was 
only reacting to the municipal elections that were held in March 1999 by Qatar. The 
King of Bahrain wanted to put Bahrain on equal footing with its centuries' old rival, 
perhaps with an eye toward influencing the ruling of the International Court of 
233 
Justice on the two countries' dispute over Hawar Islands (which were awarded to 
Bahrain on 16 March 2001 ).94 
Additionally, the London-based Bahraini opposition on a number of grounds 
criticised the National Charter: 
• The change of the Amir's title to king appeared to codify the AI Khalifa 
family's position as Bahrain's ultimate authority. 
• The lower assembly, though elected, would not have any law-making powers. 
• The process of preparing the charter did not involve public consultation. 
• It excluded longstanding opposition demands for the legalisation of political 
parties, labour unions, acceptance of Shia into sensitive government and 
security positions, the return of deported opposition leaders, and the release of 
all political prisoners. 
• Economic justice and "Islamisation" of public life were not addressed. 
King Hamad submitted the charter to a referendum and met many oppositions' 
demands that made them concurred the charter and urged the population to support 
the referendum. Despite its limitations, many Bahrainis supported the prospect of 
change as an alternative to the status quo. 
After few years of the reform, the main matters that secure the future of all citizens 
has not changed. Most of the real reform measures that have been implemented are 
not democratic advances, per se, but human rights advances. 95 Accordingly, the 
opposition is growing day after day as the political, social, and economic situations 
worsens. People are complaining that, although the National Charter's pledge, as 
summarised earlier, is unsatisfactory vague, and did not specify, mainly, how the 
legislative body was to be constituted beyond the promise of the bicameral system, 
Bahraini people have given the King pledge of allegiance for his promises for butter 
life to all citizens. For those promises, people of Bahrain voted by passions and 
94 Nadeya Sayed, "Political Reform in Bahrain: The Price ofStability," p. 221, 
95 Ibid, p. 224. 
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perceptions overwhelmingly "Yes" to the NAC trusting that the King will secure 
people's rights and assumed that after having fully elected National Assembly a 
quarter of century ago, Bahrain will have powerful appointed house. Where in 
reality, the government confirmed that the new appointed Majlis al Shura would be 
as a consultative council, but the amended constitution gave it equal power to the 
elected body and would hold 51% of combined votes (due to its president serving 
also as president of the overall body) moves that promptly provoked renewed 
objections from the opposition. 
Another vital issue that bother the opposition in Bahrain is the decree of establishing 
the district boundaries for Bahrain's parliamentary elections that took place in 
October 2002, and for the future ones. The opposition leaders complained that the 
single-member districts did not take into account the country's "demographics." 
They believe that the decree is to reduce the votes of the Shia. Some districts 
contain as many as 12,000 registered voters, while others have as few as 500. As 
Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 illustrate, Bahrain is split into five governorates (Capital, 
Central, Muharraq, Northern, and Southern), and divided into twelve municipalities 
(Manama, Muharraq, Hidd, Riffa and AI Janubiyah, Madinat !sa, Madinat Hamad, 
Sitrah, AI Mintaqah AI Gharbiyah, AI Mintaqah AI Shamaliyah, AI Mintaqah AI 
Wusta, Jidd Haffs, and Juzur Hawar).96 
The voter turnout of more than 50 % cannot be taken as an indicator of approval for 
the manner in which reforms were managed, as citizens were pressured into going to 
the polls. A notation was stamped into the passports of voters, who were also issued 
a "certificate of good behavior," something which led many to fear that participation 
in the boycott could have negative consequences. Moreover, those affiliated with the 
security forces, the National Guard and the military were ordered to participate in 
the voting. 
96 Retrieved and edited from: http://common.wikimedia.org/wiki/lmage:Bahrain governorates 
numbered. 
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Bahrain 's existing institutions cannot yet be described as democratic. State 
institutions such as the administration and judiciary are, with the limitations on the 
rule of law already mentioned, stable. However, significant actors regard both the 
new national constitution and the Parliament as illegitimate. The major forces of 
opposition, which in Bahrain have traditionally consisted of left-wing and Shia 
groups, regard all legislation enacted since the last Parliament was dissolved as 
unconstitutional. 
Figure 5.6: Bahrai11 Govemorates 
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Figure 5. 7: Governorates97 
Governorates Numbered 
1. Capital 2. Central 3. AI Muharraq 
4. Northern 5. Southern 
97 Retrieved and edited from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Maps of Bahrain. 
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Figure 5.8: Municipalities98 
Municipalities Numbered 
Juzur Hawar Madinat Isa Muharraq Ar Rifa and al Janubiyah 
• 
Sitrah AI Mintaqah al Gharbiyah AI Mintaqah al Shamaliyah Jidd Haffs 
AI Hidd AI Manama AI Mintaqah a l Wusta Madinat Hamad 
98 Retrieved from http: //commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/Maps of Bahrain. 
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5.2.7 Parliament 
King Hamad was very aware of the risk of having a parliament body in Bahrain 
from historical experience. Parliament is an arena of constant confrontation between 
the executive and the legislature and many other groups in the country. When one 
talks of reform under these circumstances, one invariably implies a redistribution of 
power or at least a reorganisation of how power is held and wielded. For this reason, 
efforts at reform usually come up against resistance from within and outside 
parliament. Parliamentarians who belong to the ruling majority may embrace reform 
when they are convinced that this reform will provide better guarantees for the 
future and enable them to be better heard and even to gain power if they should lose 
it. The opposition is generally more eager for reform in a bid to assert the 
parliament's authority in relation to the executive and to ensure that all voices are 
adequately taken into consideration. 
Of course, one of the main areas of reform is to assert the parliament's independence 
vis-a-vis the executive and to ensure that parliament can exercise proper oversight 
over government. Government is therefore a major obstacle to reform. Usually, fear 
of the unknown leads to resistance to reform. 
The challenges and important domains of parliamentary development are as follow: 
• Among the most important basis of the effectiveness of the parliamentary 
institution is very effective when it offers citizens the experience in 
parliament's work.99 This is why the principle of publishing and broadcasting 
the proceedings of parliamentary sessions should be applied, except when 
sensitive issues, such as national security, have been discussed. 
• The legislative are not available to the public. 
• Interaction, communication, and exchange of information between MPs, and 
the public, media, and civil society are weak. 
99 Karim Sayed, "What to Reform? A platform for Parliamentary Reform," Parliamentary 
Pr()gramme, Faculty of Economics & Political Science, Cairo University, ISBN, 2003, p. 24. 
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11 A serious challenge faces the development of Bahrain parliamentary action and 
should be taken into account, is the delay in the development process itself. 
There are no priorities on issues rising. Issues such as unemployment, poverty, 
inequality, are not prioritised. 
11 The cost involve for the election process is mounting. This will affect the 
quality and effectiveness ofthe members. 
11 Minority's rights are not protected or raised in parliament. Ethnic or other type 
of minority seems to be permanently out of political influence, there is a great 
risk that its interests are neglected. 
5.2.8 Education 
Usually the effects of education are measured by political, social, and economic 
development, the ability of citizens to influence the process of decision making, the 
level of foreign workers in the country verses the level of unemployment, and most 
importantly, ifthe education overcome sectarianism and tribalism in any region. 
The second Arab Human Development Report (UNDP 2003) emphasised that: 
long term economic development in the Middle East would only be 
possible through the development of a knowledge based society - with a 
large pool of skilled knowledge based workers that would drive 
enterprise, innovation, productivity and knowledge based exports and 
tradable services. 
Along with other key factors, a cluster of growth, based business sectors, a 
supportive business environment, and an attractive physical and cultural 
environment, the quality and availability of human capital is therefore 
fundamental. 100 
100 United Nations Development Programme, "The Arab Human Development Report 2003," 
~ National Press, Amman, Jordan. 
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Within Bahrain, this means that the character and quality of educational provision 
will play a crucial role in shaping human capital resources whether this relates to 
kindergartens, schools, or universities, or to other post-formal training and 
continuing professional development activities, research centres, research 
commercialisation centres and other knowledge transfer activities. 101 
The government of Bahrain is not spending in the education sector or other social 
development ministries as it spends in the Armed forces. See Table 5.6 below. 102 
The total amount spent on the armed forces for the year 2006 (Ministry of Defence, 
Interior, NG, and NSA) is totalled to BD320,034,000. The education budget is 
approximately half the budget of the Armed Forces. 
Table 5.6: Recurrent Expenditure by some Ministries for the Fiscal years 2005 & 2006 
Description Budget - 2005 Budget - 2006 
Ministry of Defence 176,700,000 181,700,000 
Ministry oflnterior II 0,94I ,000 1I4,9I2,000 
National Guard I0,5Il,OOO 11,422,000 
National Security Agency I2,000,000 12,000,000 
Ministry of Education 144,678,000 149,264,000 
Ministry of Health 92,055,000 100,4I5,000 
Ministry of Labour 3,769,000 3,808,000 
Ministry of Social Development 9,27I,OOO 9,350,000 
Ministry of Information 9,07I,OOO 8,922,000 
In spite of all the huge efforts of the Bahraini government in the field of education, 
serious inconsistencies due to lack of planning still exist within the education policy. 
Like almost every other sector in Bahrain, no long-range developmental plans has 
yet been established, and ifthere are written planes, unfortunately, no one is working 
to achieve or implement them. As a consequence of this unorganised growth, 
several situations present themselves. Why has it not totally solve the problem of 
101 Skidmore Owings & Merrill, USA, "Development Requirements of the Kingdom of Bahrain: 
Bahrain National Planning Development Strategies," Bahrain, 2005. 
102 Press Report, "Bahrain Budget for the Fiscal years 2005 & 2006," Ministry of Finance, 20 June 
2005. 
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foreign labour in Bahrain? Why has there not been any effective coordination 
between the educational system and the country's social and economic needs? 
Finally, has education actually contributed to the development of a Bahraini 
citizenry, that is, has education contributed to the Bahraini polity in general? 
Educational planners in Bahrain have been occupied with the attempt to establish an 
equilibrium in which the school would act as an agent of political socialisation, 
primarily in the 5 to 19-year-old age group, and in which the school would 
simultaneously produce technicians in different skills to man the country's 
industrialising economy. 103 Most of developing countries view education as a 
functional rather than a sociological process. Like other developing countries in the 
immediate post independence years, the importunate question asked by Bahrain is 
how education can contribute to economic development. 
The annual report that Bahrain submitted to the Conference of Arab Ministers of 
Education held in Yemen, 23-30 December 1972, 104 stated that the educational 
policy of the state was to campaign against illiteracy in order to aid the country in its 
development programmes and to improve the quality of education in the country. 
The report identified the following steps that could achieve those goals: 
• Continuation ofthe system of mass education. 
• Provision of in-service training for teachers and other efforts to upgrade their 
qualifications. 
• Constant revision of school curriculum. 
• Improvement ofthe Ministry of Education's administrative system. 
• Diversification of the curriculum, especially on the high school level, to create 
a system of vocational training, which would be able to meet the country's 
manpower needs in economic and social field. 
• Improvement of the physical facilities of the schools. 
103 Emile A. Nakhleh, "Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society", Lexington Books, 
London, 1976,p. 14. 
104 Ministry of Education, State of Bahrain, "AI Ta 'lim fi AI Bahrain: Waqi 'uhu wa Mustaqbaluhu" 
(Education in Bahrain: Its Present and Future), 1972, p. 3. 
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Because of many political forces, most of these goals have not been achieved, 
especially the one concerning the diversifying of the curriculum to meet the 
country's manpower needs. Moreover, the goals are lack of citizenship programme 
that bring about the sense of loyalty, belonging and patriotism. Again, the new 
reform also revealed Bahrain's 80-year old educational tradition was not teaching 
the right curriculum to meet the present political participation. It has confirmed the 
lack of the long-term plans. One could argue that who would expect any ruler to 
come out with such a liberalisation programme in this country. But, in general, any 
healthy developed education system may well provide highly opened minded citizen 
that require slight fine-tuning to cope with any situation. 
In 1970s, the level of illiteracy particularly in the rural areas has negative effect over 
the development of participatory government. The government of Bahrain initiate 
the Constitutional Assembly in 1972, to bring about some degree of popular 
participation in the government process. In 1976, Emile A. Nakhleh, in her book 
"Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernising Society," was absolutely right 
when she indicated that the election to the 1972 Assembly that revealed Bahrain's 
50-year old educational tradition was not as widely spread as had been believed. 105 
In fact, the level of illiteracy in rural areas negatively influenced the country's first 
national election in that rural representatives in the Constitutional Assembly were 
generally under qualified for serving in such a body. Moreover, the effects of 
education did not enhance the ability of citizens to influence the process of decision-
making, and did not overcome the historical sectarianism and tribalism in the 
Kingdom. The same problem arises through the new reform different election, 
where people voted without realistic reasons. 
Most of the people in Bahrain are nowadays complaining about several issues like 
the authority given to the King to overrule the court verdict. Where, these 
authorities were given in the drafted National Action Charter (NAC) that most of 
these people voted in fever in 200 I with 98.4%. The case of education in Bahrain is 
105 Emile A. Nakhleh, p. 66. 
243 
very interesting. The illiteracy rate among Bahrainis registered a significant drop 
during the last ten years between the 1991 and the last census of population in 
Bahrain that took place in 2001. The illiteracy rate was only 7.5% for males, 17% 
for females, and 12.3% for both sexes. 106 Correspondingly, illiteracy rate in 1991 
was 13.3% for males, 28.7% for females, and 21% for both sexes. 107 The 2001 
census reported a total of 121 ,918 Bahrainis who finished at least secondary 
education (53.0% ofBahraini population ages 18 years and above), ofwhom 61,794 
(53.7%) were males and 60,124 (52.2%) were females. The number of Bahrainis 
who finished at least university education almost doubled. In 2001, there were 
24,760 (12.5% of the 22 years old and above) persons, of whom 13,012 (13.2%) 
were males and 11,748 (11.8%) were females. 108 Bahrain is a nation of young 
people, which places the education system under a tremendous strain in trying to 
serve the large numbers of children who are of school age and those who graduate 
and will join the labour forces, see (Table 5.7 and 5.8) below. Moreover, the annual 
population increase is 2. 7%, which mean more responsibilities and commitment are 
required. 
106 The 2001 census of population by the Bahrain Government. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
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Table 5. 7: Population by Age Groups, According to Nationality and Sex -2001 
Age Nationality I Sex Bahraini Non-Bahraini Total 
Groups Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Sexes Sexes Sexes 
0-4 24105 23616 48321 6249 5815 12064 30954 29431 60385 
5-9 25666 25059 50125 5802 5623 11425 31468 30682 62150 
10-14 25281 23879 49160 5033 4641 9674 30314 28520 58834 
15-19 22729 21511 44240 3603 3152 6755 26332 24663 50995 
lt-24 19681 18677 38358 12482 7835 20317 32163 26512 58675 
25-19 15303 14957 30260 27526 11589 39115 42829 26546 69375 
30-34 13942 14635 28577 30823 12889 43712 44765 27524 72289 
35-39 14039 15298 29337 25882 10196 36078 39921 25494 65415 
40-44 11 816 12936 24752 23619 6887 30506 35435 19823 55258 
45-49 9489 8893 18382 15522 3873 19395 250 11 12766 37777 
50-54 6573 5468 12041 7521 1769 9290 14094 7237 2 1331 
55-59 4 198 4358 8556 2939 761 3700 7 137 5119 12256 
60-64 3822 4 172 7994 11 15 392 1507 4937 4564 950 1 
65-69 2705 3027 5732 448 221 669 3153 3248 640 1 
70-74 2220 2259 4479 276 124 400 2496 2383 4879 
75-79 1294 12 14 2508 83 73 156 1377 1287 2664 
80-84 737 640 1377 58 41 99 795 681 1476 
85-89 272 277 549 30 19 49 302 296 598 
90 & 151 168 319 15 I I 26 166 179 345 Over 
Total 204623 201044 405667 169026 75911 244937 373649 276955 650604 
*Sources: The 2001 census of population by the Bahrain Government 
Table 5.8: Percentage Distribution of Population by Age Groups, According to Nationality and 
Sex-2001 
Age Nationality I Sex 
Bahraini Non-Bahraini Total 
Groups Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Sexes Sexes Sexes 
0-4 12.07 11.75 11.91 3.70 7.66 4.93 8.28 10.63 9.28 
5-9 12.54 12.46 12.50 3.43 7.41 4.66 8.42 11.08 9.55 
10-14 12.35 11.88 12.12 2.98 6.11 3.95 8.11 10.30 9.04 
15-19 11.11 10.70 10.91 2.13 4.15 2.76 7.05 8.91 7.84 
10-24 9.62 9.29 9.46 7.38 10.32 8.29 8.61 9.57 9.02 
25-29 7.48 7.44 7.46 16.29 15.27 15.97 11.46 9.58 10.66 
30-34 6.81 7.28 7.04 18.24 16.98 17.85 11.98 9.94 11.11 
35-39 6.86 7.61 7.23 15.3 1 13.43 14.73 10.68 9.21 10.05 
40-44 5.77 6.43 6.10 13.97 9.07 12.45 9.48 7.16 8.49 
45-49 4.64 4.42 4.53 9.18 5.10 7.92 6.69 4.61 5.81 
50-54 3.2 1 2.72 2.97 4.45 2.33 3.79 3.77 2.61 3.28 
55-59 2.05 2.17 2.1 1 1.74 1.00 1.5 1 1.91 1.85 1.88 
60-64 1.87 2.08 1.97 0.66 0.52 0.62 1.32 1.65 1.46 
65-69 1.32 1.5 1 1.4 1 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.84 1. 17 0.98 
70-74 1.08 1. 12 1.1 0 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.67 0.86 0.75 
75-79 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.37 0.46 0.4 1 
80-84 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.25 0.23 
85-89 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0. 11 0.09 
90 & Over 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.0 1 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Figures may not add to totals due to rounding 
*Sources: The 2001 census of population by the Bahrain Government 
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However, the increasing number of unemployed citizens caused several problems to 
the government: 
11 The government is not employing the right person for the right position. 
• There are no motivations for employees to be promoted for higher position, as 
the Executive Branch usually appoints them. 
• Training is considered as a motivation factor and not to increase productivities. 
• Education has been politicalise between the two main sect of the Bahraini 
societies. 
• Schools and the system of education are not acting as inculcators of 
particularistic values, especially in the area of citizenship. 
At the present time, the labour market is not capable of taking all graduated students 
which made the unemployment level increase year after year. Just recently the 
Bahrain officials acknowledged this problem, but unfortunately the facts of 
increasing population, political citizenship, limited resources, the lack of high-level 
guidance on the type of college specialisation that prospective Bahraini students 
should enter, and the lack of coordination between education and manpower 
requirements are real disabilities and must be faced by short and long-term solutions. 
Many representative bodies for foreign universities for graduate and postgraduate 
studies opened in Bahrain without strict control from the Ministry of Education. The 
participation rates for entry into Higher Education are relatively high. There are two 
public universities and up to 14 private universities. 109 Most of these universities are 
purely trying to make money out of the students without taking into consideration 
any ethical principles. In addition, shortcuts such as cheating and grade haggling 
may be attempted, because it is the receipt of the degree and not the method used in 
obtaining it that seems most important. This kind of education will generate high 
percentage of defected educated individual that the country may depend on them for 
the development of its future. On the other hand, will increase the current Bahraini 
109 Skidmore Owings & Merrill, USA, "Development Requirements of the Kingdom of Bahrain: 
Bahrain National Planning Development Strategies," Bahrain, 2005. 
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workforce, which required the labour market to provide three times more jobs than it 
did in the past decade and jobs that meet these graduates' skill too. The issue of 
strategic links with other international universities and where the Bahrain university 
system has a strategic international competitive advantage (to attract international 
students, staff, and research) is important but has not been explored within the scope 
of this assignment. Whether the curricula, the student experience, and the graduate 
output best serves the needs of the Bahrain economy is less clear. Initial 
impressions are that course alignment may be poor and that an analysis of the 
courses portfolio would be beneficial. 110 
Education in Bahrain has also created divisions in the Bahraini society. Many of the 
Bahraini who continued their studies in commonest countries became communism 
or leftists, others who went to Egypt and Lebanon became nationalism. Others 
became capitalism, Bathisim and so on. These different thoughts have created clash 
of civilisation in the citizenship development. 
5.2.9 Knowledge and learning Orientation 
The academic difficulties encountered by Arab students in general and Bahrain in 
particular, emerges mostly out of an orientation to knowledge and learning that has 
very different roots from the Western approach. 111 In Islam, knowledge is giving by 
Allah (God), and the teaching methods used in religious school have adopted by 
secular schools as well. Knowledge is not generally regarded as a product of human 
reason and thus subject to expansion and interpretation; rather it is a gift one 
captures and with which one is "adorned." Cause and effect relationships are not 
stressed. Memorisation and imitation are primary learning methods. As this method 
of teaching spread to political, social and economic relations as well as to 
metaphysical matters, the result is conformity, fatalism, and authoritarianism 
contrast with emphasis accorded individualism and self-determination in, say, UK 
110 Ibid. 
111 For further information regarding the socio-cultural trends, see the excellent report by Anthony 
Pascal, Michael Kennedy and Steven Rosen; "The Human Factor in Military Modernization", The 
RAND Corporation, 1979. · 
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society. Most of the governments in the Arab Muslim countries adopted these 
methods as it serves them in a way that citizens are not also allowed to criticise them 
or recommend political issues. 112 
Moreover, because memorisation is a literal technique, knowledge acquired in this 
way is difficult to transfer to new, unfamiliar situation as ~ahrain experiencing now. 
In this approach to learning, powers of analysis and generalisation go undeveloped. 
The technique of memorisation limits flexibility and adaptability of learning. 
Individual creativity is not promoted. 113 The strong Bahraini students' sense of 
shame may also make them somewhat timid and unadventurous as students. Fear of 
being wrong, of losing face, will inhibit them from going beyond the conventional 
bounds of the subject under study. Outcome that are unfortunate are regarded as 
risks worth taking in the deliberate search for novel solutions. Originality and 
initiative are not highly regarded. Bahrain students' academic behaviour also 
reflects an emphasis on groups or collective accomplishment, as opposed to the 
Western norm, individual achievement. One of the consequences of this value 
system is the high reported incidence of cheating. To refuse to help a fellow citizen 
is thought dishonourable. 114 
Bahrain students also tend to be goal-oriented rather than process-oriented. The 
attainment of a Western university degree is considered a desirable objective, 
leading to improved social status and financial condition. However, the process of 
education that must be pursued to earn the degree is under emphasised. Thus, many 
students go, proud and confident, expecting to advance quickly to their goal once 
selected for foreign study. They often face a severe shock on discovering that a 
good deal of hard work must precede the end they seek. Again as mentioned earlier, 
112 Waheed AI Qassim, "Restructuring GCC Security Policy after the Gulf War: Problems and 
Priorities," Master Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, p. 49. 
113 Ibid. 
114 For more information regarding the socio-cultural trends, see the excellent report by Anthony 
Pascal, Michael Kennedy, and Steven Rosen, "The Human Factor in Military Modernisation," The 
RAND Corporation, 1979, p. 34. -
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cheating, buying certificates may be attempted, because it is the receipt of the degree 
and not the method used in obtaining it that seems most important. 115 
Government officials, observers, writers, and Bahraini citizens are constantly made a 
self-importance statement of educated Bahraini and they were the first in the region 
to be educated. Moreover, they bring out the level of illiteracy in Bahrain as 
something they should be proud off. In reality, the private sector in Bahrain has, to 
some extent; make full use of the educated personnel and that why we notice, to 
some extent, that they are well organised and well established. In contrary, the 
public sector are not benefiting from most of the educated personnel, where they are 
not placing the right educated person for the right job. Educated people are not a 
number that a country should be proud off if it is not using these forces for the 
development of the country. 
In itself, the benefits of student involvement in community service are limited. It is 
wrong-headed to presume that students should gain such broad civic lessons in 
public responsibility, accountability, and toleration solely through working m 
community-based organisations. The organisation's narrowly tailored mission and 
constituency mitigate against the inculcation of such broad civil values. 
5.2.1 0 Technical and Science Facilities 
In the absence of any planning or goal setting, universities have conducted most of 
the research, which often been poorly financed, with inadequate equipment, poor 
library or other documentation support, and murky priorities. The school attended 
by these students would have had much less in the way of labs and science 
equipment than the typical European, American, or Japanese high school. 116 
Research activity within the universities appears low - although time constraints 
limited a more in-depth analysis of this issue. Links with business and knowledge 
exchange activities are given prominence at the University of Bahrain but again the 
115 Anthony Pascal, Michael Kennedy and Steven Rosen; "The Human Factor in Military 
Modernization", The RAND Corporation, 1979, p. 13. 
116 Ibid. 
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extent and sectoral focus of this was not explored for the same reasons, nor was the 
issue of spinouts, incubators, and science parks. 117 
The scientific and technological enterprise in Bahrain is affected by low financial 
rewards, poor chances for advancement, low social status, heavy administrative 
burdens, and isolation from world of science. Industry has played a minimal role in 
sponsoring R&D in the Kingdom. In government, industry, and the military, 
technically trained people quickly become managers and cease before long to be 
technical. The shortage of middle-level managers in developing economies 
accelerates the drain. The result is often a waste of much of the investment inherent 
in the training. 
5.2.11 Economic Reform 
Economic challenges are more complex than most commentators would have us 
believe. Some specialists think that there are only two economic problems in 
Bahrain: jobs and housing. Ordinary people care about these issues. When a young 
father cannot find work or his family is living in a small one bedroom flat, he gets 
crank. Unemployment stands around 15%, if not higher. 118 With joblessness 
concentrated mainly in the youth, there are worries for the future. It is very common 
in Bahrain, unlike in other GCC countries, to find native working as car washers, 
porters, and even beggars. Such basic economic issues have huge political 
consequences. People want to see real improvements in their standard of living from 
economic reforms. The real test of any policy change is whether it can provide more 
good jobs, give families a livelihood, and allow them to live in peace with the fruits 
of their labour. 119 
The implications of the presence of foreigners for the nation country effectiveness 
may be quite complex. For example, foreign supervisor-trainers may have little 
incentive to ensure that their trainees-subordinates advance in skill level, because 
117 Skidmore Owings & Merrill, USA, Bahrain, 2005. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Scott Waalkes, "Reflections on Bahrain," Malone College, January 16,2005, www.malone.edu. 
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sufficient advancement would mean that the foreigners are not longer needed. 
Further, host employees may use the presence of foreigners to avoid making 
decisions and taking responsibility for mistakes, thereby losing useful command and 
leadership experience. 
Some 100,000 Bahrainis will enter the job market over the next decade, requiring 
the economy to provide three times more jobs than in the past 10 years, according to 
a report for the country's Economic Development Board by Mckinsey. 
Unemployment in Bahrain runs at around 16 per cent among the highest rates for 
Gulf states, all struggling to varying degree with a demographic wave set rolling 
during the 1970s oil boom. 120 
Most of the Shia people who are a block away from the glossy mall district or the 
huge villas still do not trust the government or see much in the way of results. 
Hence, the Crown Prince has been pushing the report by the Mckinsey consultancy 
that advocates labour market reform, economic reform, and education and training 
reforms all in the hope of creating jobs for young Bahrainis. 121 
In an interesting article by Dani Rodrick of Harvard University, suggested that 
countries need their own "home-grown business plans" for development. He argues 
that, instead of looking to global integration as a simple solution, countries should 
build on their own domestic strengths and tailor policies to fit their local economies. 
Rather than supporting painful reforms and sudden openings to the world for 
transitional economies, on other words is to builds from within. 
During the 1970s, Bahrain did well as a financial centre for the Gulf region. 
However, political unrest in Bahrain during the 1980s and 1990s, along with the 
Iraq-Iran war and the rise of Dubai as competing financial centre, hurt the Bahraini 
economy. The economy is also constrained by competition from other countries in 
120 William Wallis, "Jobless Corner of Bahrain a Far Cry from Glossy Malls," The Financial Time, 
November 25, 2004. 
121 Akbar AI Khaleej Newspaper, Money and Economy, Sunday 19 June 2005. 
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the area, notably Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, which are also looking for foreign 
investments and welcoming foreign banks and financial institutions into their 
countries. Bahrain needs political stability as a condition to attract and keep foreign 
investment. 
Another challenge faces Bahrain's Market is the 'Free Visa Labour.' The CP should 
end the "Free Visa" process. The government awards certain people the right to 
import foreign labour by the hundreds. Once the labourers are in Bahrain, they are 
allowed to seek jobs on their own. In return, the imported labourer pays his sponsor 
a monthly sum, normally around one hundred Bahraini Dinars, whether or not he 
woks. This system allows sponsors to make huge profit at the expense of the foreign 
labourer in Bahrain. 
The labour force is estimated at 350,000 (2003 estimate) and by occupation 79% are 
in commerce and services, 20% in government, I% in agriculture. Around 44% of 
the workforce, aged 15-64 year old is non-national. 122 Last year 65,000 jobs were 
created and 53,500 (82%) went to non-nationals and 11,500 (18%) to Bahrainis 
(Ministry of Labour). This suggests that growth in the economy is increasingly 
dependant on the use of the non-Bahraini workforce and population. 123 
Finally, Bahrain government on one hand is indicating that it is short of budget to 
increase governmental salaries. On the other hand, it continues to give citizenship to 
many Arab countries, for political reasons, which increase their liabilities towards 
their original citizens. 
5.2.12 Islamic Movement 
At a time when a collapse of values and ethics is often claimed, it suggests a new 
climate of emerging moralities and ethics. America believes that freedom is the 
122 Skidmore Report, 2005. 
123 Ibid. 
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solution for all countries and Islamists believe that Islam is the solution in a region 
largely ruled by totalitarian regimes that reject religious extremism. 
There is a wonderful passage quoted by Noble Prize novelist Naguib Mahfouz 
talking about a typical Muslim struggling with the paradoxes, generated daily by a 
long-term historical secularisation process, glimpsed by most only intermittently and 
through a glass darkly: 124 
He leads a contemporary (i.e., "modern") life. He obeys civil and penal 
laws of Western origin, is involved in complex tangle of social and 
economic transactions, and is never certain to what extent these agree 
with or contradict his Islamic creed. Life carries him along in its current 
and forgets his misgivings for a time until one Friday he hears the Imam 
or reads the religious page in one of the papers, and the old misgivings 
come back with a certain fear. He realises that in this new society he has 
been afflicted with a split personality: half of him believes, prays, fasts, 
and makes the pilgrimage. The other half renders his values void in 
banks and courts and in the streets, even in the cinemas and theatres, 
perhaps even at home among his family before the television set. 
This exactly the life of an ordinary Bahraini. For a long time, the idea of 
secularisation has been under attack, because religion seems to be gaining influence 
in society. Yet the dualistic life that so many people experience does seem to have 
something to do with secular or alien norms that are now deeply rooted in daily life. 
The solution would seem to be a vision that can bridge the religious world and these 
new worlds of Western-style institutions. Can globalisation or democracy be 
Islamic? Can Islam be democratic and globalise? The challenge is of bringing these 
two worlds together in an authentic way. 125 Islamic banking or Islamic finance is an 
example of making Islam to become globalise. 
124 Scott Waalkes, "Reflections on Bahrain," Malone College, January 16,2005, www.malone.edu. 
125 Ibid. . 
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Most of liberal group in Bahrain and maybe in all Muslim countries think that Islam 
Protectors (IPs) would bring them back to the Dark Ages. Liberal elite totally 
oppose Islamic principle and worried that it could harm Bahrain's economy and 
scare away possible investors. Unfortunately, they are out of touch with middle 
Bahraini, both Sunni and Shia, which is quite conservative and still takes religion 
seriously. Bahrain should find a common ground with the conservative element 
rather than just sit on a high horse and tell them that our way is the right way. IPs 
are worried that Bahrain will follow pace Western culture specially in the issue of 
sexuality right as the Western has gone to fare in their freedom, to the point where 
the family is being destroyed. 
Muslim Brotherhood probably represents a majority in many Arab countries but they 
are banned from politics. Therefore, a dangerous gap between public expectation 
and the reality could emerge. Young people are depressed by problems like 
unemployment and poverty, so they are easily provoked by lslamists pursuing their 
political aims. 126 As pointed out earlier in Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, safety 
needs sometimes motivate people to be religious. Religions comfort us with the 
promise of a safe secure place after we die and leave the insecurity of this world. 127 
Maslow also placed religious inclination on the safety layer because he saw that 
tendency as an attempt to bring about an ordered universe with no nasty shocks. 
5.2.13 Bahrain's Neighbours 
To some extent, the King overcomes the pressure from Saudi Arabia against his 
reform. However, the sudden interest of Bahrain's rulers in reform does not indicate 
a genuine change of heart. Following similar ventures into controlled reform in 
other Gulf countries, most notably Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman, this interest reflects a 
growing realisation among the autocratic governments in the region that they are 
becoming increasingly anachronistic. It exposes the brittleness of dynastic regimes 
that stake their claims to legitimacy on formula combining repression with economic 
126 Isa Mubarak, "Feature-Jslamist fervour tests liberal Bahrain," Alert Net Organisation, 7 June 
2005. 
127 Religious application: Keith Miller, The Becomers, Word, Waco, Tex., 1973, p. 89-109. 
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performance, in order to mask a vacuum resulting from the severance of virtually all 
associational links between the people and the government. The regimes problem is 
that whatever they are willing to concede (or can afford to concede) is almost bound 
to be too little, as well as to late. 128 
Qatar and UAE choose globalisation as a substitute to their lack of sovereignty. 
Therefore, they assert their existence through an ambitious programme of 
economical transformations based on a very liberal economic policy. The local 
technocrats who are emerging as the new generation of the business community are 
at the very heart of this policy. But this situation does not lead at all to the 
transformation of the political structures of Qatar and the UAE. 129 On the contrary, 
the successful economical choices of these countries reinforced the authority of their 
rulers. They are popular because they give their national populations a source of 
pride. 
Bahrain citizens are comparing themselves with other GCC countries. Most of their 
citizens are proud and earning more than enough. The King has therefore, have to 
do something about the living standard of the Bahrainis to meet their needs, and 
become proud of the Kingdom. 
5.2.14 Society Segments 
Even after the transformation to civil society, Bahrain society remained divided as 
indicated in chapter two to several groups or sects. It did not end up as Arab, 
Bahama, Hawala, and Ajam, but it includes foreign Sunni Syrians, Jordanians, 
Indians, Pakistanis, Y emenis, and many other who became citizens after the reform. 
Although these groups still did not came under one citizenship education and loyalty, 
they are not considered to be the dominant danger to the country. There are very 
128 Abbas Murtada, "Cosmetic Reforms Unlikely to Change Realities of Despotic Rule in Bahrain," 
Muslim Media, January 16-31, 200 I, Bahrain. 
129 Fatiha Dazi-l-Ieni, "A Typology of Transition in the Arabian Gulfian Monarchies," Colloquium, 
CERI, 10-Il January 2005, p. 3. 
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dangerous unintended segments anse in Bahrain society. The segments are 
illustrated in Figure 5.9 below. 
The phenomenon of segmentation in Bahrain society came to surface as result of the 
poverty, way of selecting high posts, benefits, privileges, and protection. Most of 
the people in Bahrain as a way of securing their future work hard to become part of 
one of the segments shown in Figure 5.9. Enrolling in one of these segments mean 
most of your problems will be solved. Whether you are at high post or working as 
cleaner in one of these segments the power wi II be yours. Once you need something 
from any public work and you said the magic word that you are talking from for 
example the CP court or even from the minister office then you would have priority 
to you whatever business you are demanding. 
This phenomenon is very dangerous and damaging Bahrain society, as they become 
something they do not want to if they are living in a healthier atmosphere. In 
Bahrain, the power of these people is frightening. For example, a director of a 
minister office can decide who meet the minister, what letter he should take for him, 
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and what kind of people the minister should meet. He will bloc any person that 
could bring to the minister's attention what are the problems they are facing or 
propose excellent ideas for work improvements. Because the Director does not want 
his minister to trust and delegate authorities, except to him. In some occasions, the 
directors of the minister office become more powerful than the minister himself. In 
general, once you are in one of the segment, you will get a house, a car, nice car 
registration number, nice house and mobile numbers, power, rapid services, and 
good allowances. 
Moreover, these people working in these segments are putting all their efforts and 
capabilities to satisfy their bosses and never work for the benefits of the society in 
particular and the Kingdom in general. They are ready to make any thing to keep 
other people out of the circle. They do not want them to decrease their share of 
benefits. There loyalty is for individuals and not the public or the country. 
The segments hurt the strategic decision process in the country. Each segment 
makes and implements strategy in isolation of the other. They work, as they are 
independent states. An example of this situation is the citizenship. The King is 
granting few Arab countries citizenship for the purpose of political balance. The CP 
on the other hand is granting some African athletics Bahraini citizenship for making 
Bahrain well known internationally. The first lady grants Bahraini citizenship for 
the children from Bahraini mother and foreign father. These are all acceptable 
situation but the point is there were no joint strategic plan for granting citizenship 
between the segments. They never sat and decide a plan for such process and 
calculate the cost for each individual that granted Bahraini citizenship and let the 
government plane for agreed number of people to be granted Bahraini citizenship in 
the future budget. Therefore, the King should challenge this phenomenon and try to 
apply the law over all people starting his segment and moving to the other. 
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5.2.15 Unintended Consequences of Liberalisation 
Each cultural form, once it is created, is gnawed at varying rates by the forces of life. 
As soon as one is fully developed, the next begins to form; after a struggle, long or 
short, it will eventually succeed its predecessor. 130 There are few countries in the 
world where there isn't intense discussion about sexual equality; the regulations of 
sexuality and the future of the family. The transformations affecting the personal 
and emotional spheres go far beyond the borders of any particular country .131 
Over a string of candidates have arrived to try to fill this 'post socialist' space: 'life 
politics', the 'politics of difference', 'radical pluralism', 'dialogic democracy' and 
others. Although they differ in specifics, they do suggest certain common features 
which include a recognition that politics is about difference and ways of living life, 
about dialogues between different groups, about not bringing fixed closures or 
strong agendas, but keeping things open. 
Some emerging arenas of public debate across the personal life such as homosexual, 
heterosexual, bisexual or multi-sexual, test-tube babies, lesbian and gay 'marriages 
and families', single parenting, safer sex, cyber-sex (and its linked cyber-stalking, 
cyber-rape, cyber-harassment, cyber-pom, and so on), sexual correctness, sexual 
violence of all kinds, transgender and bisexual politics, the appearance of 'hate 
crimes'-and many more- as examples of these critical new discourses are all 
arising in democratic countries. 132 
130 P. Lawrence, "Sociologist and European," London, Nelson, 1976. 
131 A. Giddens, "Runaway World," London, Pro. le Books, 1999. 
132 See B. Adam, J. W. Duyvendak, and A. Krouwel, "The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian 
Politics," Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1998, D. Anderson, "The Loss of Virtue: Moral 
ConfUsion and Social Disorder in Britain and America", Social Affairs Unit: A National Review 
Book, 1992. Z. Bauman, "Post-modern Ethics," Cambridge, Polity, 1993. D. Bell and J. Binnie, "The 
Sexual Citizen: Queer Political and Beyond," Oxford, Polity, 2000. J. Dean, "Solidarity of Strangers: 
Feminism after Identity Politics," Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996. N. Ellison, 
"Towards a new Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in late Modernity," Sociology, 31, pp. 
697-717, 1997. R. Parker, "Beneath the Equator: Cultures of Desire, Male Homosexuality and 
Emerging Gay Communities in Brazil," London, Routledge, 1999. A. Wolfe, "Democracy Versus 
Sociology: Boundaries and their Consequences," in M. Lamont and M. Fournier (Eds}, Cultivating 
Differences, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
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Once these diverse publics are recognised, we enter public worlds that are far from 
homogeneous or agreed upon but which are deeply pluralised, heterogeneous and 
subject to what has been called the 'culture wars'. 133 At an international level, it is 
the 'clash of civilisations' or 'Jihad versus Mac World' .134 The post-modernisation 
of intimacies has led, then, to an ongoing moral and political struggle over the kinds 
of lives people should be leading. There is nothing especially new about this 
debate. 135 
Yet in recent times, the disharmony of voices around 'sex wars', 'family wars', 
'identity politics', 'body politics', 'gender' and the like have surely become very 
strident and visible. 136 Hunter in his book When the Shooting Begins (1994) sees the 
United States as a culture being torn apart by a series of escalating moral conflicts. 
Most of these conflicts centre over the body, as a key symbol of the wider social 
order; and the so-called 'abortion wars' must be seen as its prime exemplar. Here, 
indeed, are matters of life and death: and the notorious abortion clinic bombings 
vividly demonstrate how culture wars may indeed become shooting wars. 137 He 
finds advocates on all sides culpable of seriously debasing public and democratic 
discussion; even those who claim to be neutral are in fact duplicitous, and have their 
own axe to grind. 
A court in the Abu Dhabi I United Arab Emirates has sentenced 26 men each to five 
years in prison after being discovered preparing for a gay wedding. 138 The public 
prosecution had accused the group (the men including UAE citizens, an Indian and 
three nationals of neighbouring Arab countries) of homosexuality. Homosexuality is 
133 J.D. Hunter, "When the Shooting Begins," Oxford, Free Press I Macmillan, 1994. 
134 SeeS. P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization: Remaking the World Order," New York, Simon 
and Schuster, 1996. B. Barber, "Jihad vs Me World: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the 
World," New York, Ballentine Books, 1995. 
135 E. Showalter, "Sexual Anarchy," London, Bloomsbury Press, 1991. 
136 Ken Plummer, "The Square of Intimate Citizenship: Some Preliminary Proposals," Citizenship 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, 200 l. 
137 D. A. Blanchard, "The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious Right: From Polite 
to Fiery Protest", New York, Twayne, 1994. 
138 
"5 Years Handed to 26 UAE Gay Guests," Bahrain Tribune, No. 3265, Monday, February 13, 
2006~ 
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a serious offence in the UAE and neighbouring Gulf countries, where offenders 
could face flogging along with imprisonment, while foreigners could also face 
expulsion. The challenge here is whether Bahrain has counted these unintended 
consequences of its liberalisation reform and has the anti solutions for them. 
5.2.16 Administrative & Management challenges 
Bahrain society has developed very rapidly from an agriculture, fishing, and pearl 
diving to modern technologies of oil production, which negatively affected the 
natural maturity of its society. 
All people in Bahrain are talking about corruption. You open the newspaper and 
you will find ethical crises like embezzlement, fraud, or misuse of ministries 
products or services making the headlines. Usually they are referring corruption 
solely to the stealing of public money. This is just part of the problem of Bahrain. 
Therefore, before attacking this issue, people need to define the word corruption in 
relation to Bahrain situation. Corruptions in Bahrain cover the following matters: 
• Most writers and analysts criticised the isolation of AI Bahama as a cause of 
threat and against urbanism, where the isolation of some of the Arab tribes 
has not been considered as threat to the citizenship and loyalty of Bahrain. 
Arab tribes' individuals have isolated themselves from the society, as they 
are benefiting from the ruling family, which made them failed to contribute 
in the economic development such as the oil industries and commerce, which 
lift a gap on their self-development and maintain the necessary skills for 
future challenges. For example, these tribal families, until resent days, did 
not allow their daughters to be educated and only marry from same clan. 
• Another administrative challenge is the system of appointing higher posts 
and the period they stay in their posts. As been explained earlier, that higher 
posts are appointed by the King, PM, and CP. Most of these appointments 
are based on security rather than professions. Accordingly, people rarely 
expecting any positive development from these people, and usually get 
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frustrated as they have serve for years and targeting these position and in a 
sadden someone from no ware take their dream posts. 
• Moreover, the appointed intruders stay in their position almost for life. This 
situation makes Bahraini employees when one of these intruders happened to 
be unfair, inequitable, wrongful, and unjust wish him to pass away because 
people know that he will stay forever and they cannot report him nor they 
can do anything about the situation. They can only wish him death and 
suffer. Such allocated posts are not appraised by superiors to find out how 
they are treating their staff. On the other hand, their staff also not appraised 
up on objectives but they are judged and promoted according to their level of 
loyalty to their bosses. 
• Bahrain problem lay in the way the government is dealing with retirements. 
There is no real retirement scheme in Bahrain. There are people in the 
government working for more than 50 years and some of them are in the 
same post. Moreover, some individuals are holding more than one post. An 
example of this miss-management is Sheikh Ahmed bin Atiyatallah AI 
Khalifa. He is the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, the President of 
Central Information Organisation, and President of the Civil Service Bureau. 
Another example is Dr. Mohammed AI Ghatam. He is the Chairman of 
Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research Board of Trustees, Chairman of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, and Chairman of Alba. 
Although these individuals are very intellectual, and hard workers but in 
management a person should not have such excessive power and 
responsibilities. If the government is adopting such managerial policy, then 
this will create unemployment and frustration in Bahrain society. The 
opposition in Bahrain took such assignment to confirm their point of view 
about employment on the base of security rather than qualification. 
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11 In the government of Bahrain, most of the ministers, undersecretary, and 
managers focus on international issues rather than the internal ones. They 
travel abroad almost twice a month and spend thousands of Bahraini Dinars 
with no return at all internally. If you ask them to stay home and concentrate 
in the issues that Bahrain needs, they will tell you that this is part oftheir job 
and part of the international commitments and political requirements. Indeed, 
the average money spent on these abroad travel meetings and conferences is 
BD 60,000 ($159,000) a year in a very conservative ministry. 139 Again, the 
majority of the government high posts in Bahrain work for their benefits and 
dose not care about the development of the country and finding solutions to 
the citizens. 
11 Government ministries and directorates systems can be so inefficient and 
bound up with red-tape, they are bound to drive away not only foreign 
investors but also the people of the country who experienced the mountain of 
bureaucracy, which only those who have powerful contacts or wield 
influence are able to climb. The simplest transactions take days to be 
completed at a government ministry where eight o'clock means eleven 
o'clock and where Saturday means Tuesday, because there is no 
consideration for citizens' time or nerves. 140 
( 1) The Process of decision-making 
In Bahrain, the process of decision-making is incomplete. When the King, CP, or 
the Executive branch decides to take a strategic decision, they close the arising 
issues from that main decision. For example, if a decision is taken to grant a 
foreigner Bahraini citizenship, the only thing that will matter is the issuing of the 
Bahraini passport. Whereas, there are several issues need to be studied prior to the 
decision and others to be considered after the decision. See Figure 5.1 0. The 
Minister of Housing, for instance, should be informed to provide him with 
139 Privileged information available to the author 
140 Lamees Daif, ''Bureaucracy," Bahrain Tribune, Saturday 12 March 2005. 
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accommodation; the Minister of Finance should count him in the GOP (medical cost, 
education, job, housing, etc.), the Minister of Education to enrol him or his children 
in school and to teach him the history of Bahrain and how to make him loyal to the 
Kingdom. On the other hand, the decision-maker should realise that original citizens 
would be irritated as he is contending with them on employment and many other 
issues. All the money that he will make in Bahrain will hurt Bahrain economy, as 
this money will be transfer abroad. Finally, is the culture ofBahrain ready to have a 
Bahraini citizen by the name 'Ali John Michael or Mohammed Raj Suresh?' 
Figure 5.10: Decision-Making Process 
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The following table shows the conflict of civilisation that cou ld anse from the 
unsystematically political citizenship. See Table 5.9 below. 
Table 5.9: Comparison between Original Bahraini and naturalised 
O riginal Bahraini 
Poli t ical Citizenship Criteria Citizens 
Low Me d. High Low Me d. High 
Loyalty ...J ...J 
Bahrain Culture 
" " National Awareness 
" " Bahrain History 
" " Education 
" " Birth Control 
" " 
5.2.17 Population Size 
As indicated earlier in chapter three, Bahrain is fortunate because of its small size, 
which has meant there is daily eye-to-eye contact between the ruler and its 
population. However, the small size and small popu lation make the enforcement of 
law and regulation very difficult. Moreover, traditions and culture are also behind 
these disobediences. Given Bahrain's small size, familiarity is a genuine issue and 
this encourages discrimination in the application of rules and regulations by some 
officials. Such instances cou ld include preferential treatment in skipping queues, 
cancelling violations or breaches of the law, promotion, and many other day-to-day 
activities. 
Figure 5.11 below is a hypothetical example that could clarify this phenomenon 
where if we take a simple traffic policeman and find out how many persons could be 
allowed to vio late traffic law without being charged. Assuming he is un likely to 
charge his parents, friends, re latives, and possib ly good- looking women, we cannot 
discount that the corruption would end at this level. It could conceivably spread 
further to cover the friends of his relatives, friends of his family, friends of the good-
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looking women, and friends of his friends. An average traffic policeman could give 
preferential treatment to approximately 90 persons. Accordingly, if it could be 
assumed that there are about I 00 traffic police, and then this means that 
approximately 9,000 (90 x 100) people will be exempted from traffic violations. 
To apply this observable fact to the individuals shown in Fig 5.11, that could have 
special treatment then a total of 234,000 person will not be violated because of 
culture grounds. To make the above example more reliable 100,000 should be 
deducted from the total as some of these people have the same friends, relatives, and 
good-looking women. Therefore, around 134,000 people will not get any road 
violations. The total figure considered very high compared to the total Bahraini 
population of 405,667, as we should only consider those people who are from the 
age of 20 and above that could drive that come to 198,257. 141 As a result, 198,257 -
134,000 = 64,257 are the people who may be violated bearing in mind that some of 
these are not driving or do not have cars. 
141 Se.e population by age groups, according to nationality and sex- 2001 in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 5.11: A hypothetical example to illustrate the complications of enforcing laws and 
regulations 
A Traffic Policeman 
Friends Relatives Family Good-looking 
, a a 
t! ff~! tftt 
women 
t 5 20 
15 5 
Friends of the Friends of the Friends ofthe Friends of the 
Friends Relatives Fami ly Good-looking 
• a a • a a , a a Women ,,,,,~, tlltf~! tlltf~! •' a tllff~! 
10 10 2() 5 
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Table 5.10: A hypothetical example to illustrate the complications of enforcing laws and 
1 r regu a tons 
Number of Exempte Place facilitators Equation 
Employee d People 
Police Force 500 500 X 90 45,000 
Bahrain Defence Force 500 500 X 90 45,000 
National Guards 100 100 X 90 9,000 
Royal Family 1000 1000 X 90 90,000 
Kin~ Court 100 100 X 90 9,000 
PM Court 50 50 X 90 4,500 
CP Court 30 30 X 90 2,700 
First Lady Court 5 5 X 90 450 
Ministers 20 20 X 90 1,800 
Advisors 5 5 X 90 450 
MPs 80 80 X 90 7,200 
Government 50 50 X 90 4,500 Undersecretaries 
Government Directors 60 60x 90 5,400 
Businessmen 30 30 X 90 2,700 
Ordinary individuals 
working in services 
organisations: 10 10 X 90 900 Telecommunication 10 10 X 90 900 Electricity 10 10 X 90 900 Municipalities 10 10 X 90 900 Banks 10 10 X 90 900 Constrictions 
Housing 10 10 X 90 900 10 10 X 90 900 Labours permit 
Total 234,000 
The level of connections between people in the Kingdom is too high. Accordingly, 
each citizen could directly watch other citizens' degree of living, and become very 
sensitive towards any differences in his way of living and feel deprivation. 
Moreover, people in Bahrain also went one-step further as they started to compare 
themselves with citizens of the other Gulf States. Again, these comparisons add up 
to Bahrainis sorrows and lead to the negative behaviours towards their jobs, way of 
living, and reforms, which lead some of them refer to the use of force to show these 
feelings. 
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An excellent cartoon in AI Ayam Newspaper illustrates the complications of 
imposing rules and regulations in Bahrain are shown in Picture 5.3 below. The 
policeman's caption says: "0 my God, you are talking on the mobile while you are 
driving and not wearing the seatbelt and your licence and insurance are expired and 
on top of this you are drunk! What am I to do? The driver's caption: "Don't do 
anything, just look carefully to my registration number!" 
Picture 5.3: the complication of imposing rules and regulations in Bahrain 
5.2.18 Citizenship and National Education 
In the light of the sweeping global changes, whose most salient feature is the 
phenomena of globalisation, which will culminate in reshaping the world in lines 
with new economic fundamentals that the World Trade Organisation will contribute 
to their propagation, and in accordance with cultural principles through conversion 
of global culture into a reality by seeking the preponderance of western culture 
leading to undermining the standards of the individual's loyalty and weakening the 
very entity of the national state through the tools of globalisation in the form of 
companies, satellites, associated satellite stations and the internet which do not 
recognise the boundaries of time and place. 142 
142 Francis Fukuyama, "Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity," The Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1998, p. 17. 
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This reality highlights the significance of citizenship and national education for 
preserving the identity of the community in the face of the threats and dangers of 
globalisation and its institutions. This does not mean that the solution resides in 
turning into a recluse and keeping the world, which has grown into a small village, 
at a safe distance, but rather having each individual acquire immunity through a 
valid national education that provides him/her with the knowledge, values, principles 
and skills that enables citizens to interact with the new liberalisation reform and the 
contemporary world without having an impact on their national identity. 143 This will 
bring us to the importance of citizenship principles. Citizenship's issues have been 
raised long time ago due to its importance to the continuity and stability of the 
different communities and preservation of their identities, institutional and living 
cultures, traditions, and customs. When the citizenship is intact and sound, the 
communities will develop and flourish and will enjoy welfare and stability. 
However, when the citizenship grows weak and feeble among the citizens, it 
becomes fragile, vulnerable and a fair prey to evil ambitions. Many characteristics 
have widely spread, such as egotism, gratification of self-interests, aggressive 
behaviour towards the group, and the various forms of extremism. 144 
In the old days, citizenship in the Arab tribal way of living need not to take root as 
individuals brought up in an atmosphere that has no differences in culture, religion, 
colour, sect, and their interest was common. The time has change and Bahrain 
become an arena for different people who have different religion, different interest, 
different colour, sect, religion, and many other things. With all these differences, 
people should remain having a sense of loyalty to the Kingdom. Unfortunately, 
Bahrain continues to live on a tribal way even after its independence, development, 
and become a member of several international organisations. This situation has 
affect Bahrain negatively on building its national state and common citizenship for 
the society. In Bahrain, citizenship is weak among the citizens. The majority of the 
society is agreeing that several behavioural diseases rose in the society. The 
143 Ibid, p. 35 
144 Saif AI Mamrey and Mohmood Toosan, "Moghawmat AI Mowatana," Paper presented in the 
conference of Bahrain University, 29-30 September 2001, Bahrain, p. 2. 
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characteristics that mentioned above have widely spread, in Bahrain community. 
However, not only Bahrain, but the whole world is experiencing a citizenship crisis 
represented, as certain studies indicate, in the forms of diminished drive to serve the 
community and the nation, lack of detailed knowledge of government institutions, 
shallow concepts formed by the community members of citizenship, loyalty, history, 
language, and democracy. 145 The issue of citizenship and national affiliation has 
been one of the subjects of major interest in the various disciplines of human 
sciences for a number of reasons, including: 
• The existence of a positive correlation between belonging and the political and 
social stability and between affiliation and development. 
• The momentous technological development in the recent year and the dictates 
of cultural immunisation for the youth against the factors, which may severely 
undermine their sense of belonging. 
11 The global migration towards liberalisation and democracy. 
11 The substantial social and economic changes and upheavals that have affected 
the societies and caused a shock in the community thinking in general and that 
of the youth in particular. The struggles are no longer of a military nature but 
of a cultural and heritage nature. 
• External cultural impacts on the society's values and principles. 
The historical and chronological development of human communities confirms the 
fact that each community has its unique peculiarity or historical identity, which took 
shape over the years. The religion, language, history, customs, tradition, governance 
system, and societal institutions are considered key and significant factors in the 
shaping of the cultural patterns prevailing in the community and which in tum shape 
the system of values and beliefs that set the community apart from the other societies. 
This rule applies to the Bahraini society with all its originality, contemporariness, 
145 See Dawn Oliver and Derek Heater, "The Foundation of Citizenship," Hareaster Wheatshe, New 
York, 1994, pp. 202-210., B. Garman, "Civic Education Through Service Learning," ERIC Digest, 
Document No. ED390720, 1995., C. Hobson, D. Zock, "Education for Democracy: The close Up 
Story," The Social Studies, Vol. 84, No. 5, 1993., J. D. Hoge, "Civic Education in School," ERIC 
Digest, Document No. ED30 1531, 1988., J. Patrick, "Teaching the Responsibilities of Citizenship," 
ERIC Digest, Document No. ED332929, 1991., R. Woyacht, "Leadership in Civic Education," ERIC 
Digest, Document No. ED351270, 1992. 
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heritage, complexities, Bedouin spirit, civilisation, and the essence of its tripartite 
experiment which combines at a time the past, the present and the future. Bahrain, 
has started the national education drive many ages ago, which took the form of the 
ability to co- exist within a community with a wide array of assorted cultures, 
religions and sects and with people of different nationalities and affiliations. 
Nevertheless, Bahrain's social fabric has not been put into question; this was 
underlined by the unanimous endorsement of the National Action Charter project 
and the eager participation to realise the objectives and ambitions of the King of 
Bahrain. 
The generalisation of modern citizenship across the social structure means that all 
persons as citizens are equal before the law and therefore that no person or group is 
legally privileged. 146 The 2002 Constitution of Bahrain confirms too these right in 
Chapter III, Article 18 "People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal 
before the law in public rights and duties. There shall be no discrimination among 
them on the basis of sex, origin, language, religion, or creed." 141 Therefore, it is the 
case with the citizenship sought in Bahrain by King Hamad. He is aiming to base it 
on social liberty, justice, equality, tolerance, prevalence of peace, casual social 
connectedness within the framework of a unified code of concepts. It covers the 
relationship between the individual and the state that includes the rights and 
obligations and the strong sentiments that the citizen feels towards the country as 
translated in elevating the interests of the community and the nation and voluntary 
willingness to participate in activities and functions that target the public interest 
over the personal interest and readiness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of the 
beloved country. 
Moreover, the responsible citizen, in the words of the Crown Prince, "is the one who 
develops himself using his own creative and innovative thoughts and energy and 
who serves as an example to the others in ethics and good citizenship." 148 In 
146 J. M. Barbalet, "Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality", University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1988, p.2. 
147 Bahrain Government, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain," 14 February 2002. 
148 Most ofthe"Bahraini Newspapers,24July 2003. 
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contrary, Bahraini citizenship is not meeting the required political participation and 
other reforms aspects. There has no consistent or tradition of civic education in the 
Kingdom. There are minus concerns expressed by politicians, media, and voluntary 
bodies about society in general and young people in particular. Concerns for low 
levels of participation in local and national elections, social exclusion leading to 
anti-social and criminal behaviour, the lack of a feeling of national identity, the need 
to combat racist attitudes and behaviour, the need to foster international awareness, 
developing thinking skills, enabling young people to engage effectively in rational 
public discourse, females to understand their equal rights without conflicting 
religion issues, and citizens understand clearly their rights, responsibilities and the 
law, are not seriously considered. 
Civic values are the principles that guide both the government and the public life of 
the people. They define the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The civic 
values incorporated in Bahrain's constitution are derived from many sources. There 
were spiritual and liberalise principles from the Holy Quran and culture. These 
principles built upon the fact that people are born with certain natural rights, given 
by God, which no one including the government, should violate. Some defined them 
as life, liberty, and property. Others described equality, democracy, and protection 
from harm by others as other natural rights. It is vital that citizens understand not 
only the structure and laws of their government, but especially the purpose and civic 
values that the government represents. 
There are several reasons that may lead to poor affiliation, including: 
• The gap between aspirations and available resources. 
• Lack of example to be emulated at work sites. 
• Dominance of personal interests in life where new concept have been 
introduced, causing human relations to be tainted with the materialistic aspects 
of life. 
• Preponderance of luxurious or extravagant consumption patterns and imitation 
resulting from travel and tourism abroad. 
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11 Lack ofthe twin principles of reward and punishment. 
11 The great variation between the incomes of the various classes of the 
community and absence of fair distribution of wealth within a single 
community. 
11 Poor political upbringing of the youth. 
11 Weak religious deterrence. 
• Failure by the individual to secure his rights guaranteed by law and the 
constitution. 
• Poor bondage and relations between the individuals of the community because 
of increased reliance on alternative means of communications, such as mail, 
telephone, e-mail, and fax that reduced the levels of direct contacts between 
humans. 
• Wide spread of unemployment. 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
In his 1971 National Day Speech, the first since independence, Amir Isa bin Salman 
announced that the country would have a constitutional form of government. Such a 
constitution would protect the society's unity and cohesion, and guarantee the 
citizenry their basic individual freedoms of education, work, social welfare, health, 
and the free expression of opinions. It also provided the people with the right to 
participate in the management of their country's affairs in a context of legitimacy 
and constitutionalism. 149 Amir Isa did try but could not handle the reform. 
What is clear from the above analysis is that King Hamad launched ambitious 
changes to Bahrain since coming to power after the death of his father in 1999. He 
brought political openness, released political prisoners, invited the opposition back 
from exile, reformed the security forces, and promised elections. All this marked a 
vast improvement over the situation in the 1990s, when the regime busied itself with 
brutally repressing its opposition. Bahrain's previous experiment with a parliament, 
from 1973 to 1975, foundered not on the sectarian issue but because the ruling 
149 State of Bahrain, Ministry of Information, Htina AI Bahrain, December 1971, p. 3. 
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family grew, exasperated at the legislature's refusal to agree to a restrictive law on 
public security. The main Shia opposition group in the 1990s has been quite 
moderate, focusing its demands on the restoration of the 1973 Constitution and 
eschewing any demand that the ruling family be removed from power. 
There is the problem of social stratification, which is far more rigid in Bahrain than 
anywhere else in the Gulf. The ruling family and its Najdi tribal allies can be 
described almost as a caste: one has to be born into it. This stratum holds a 
monopoly of political power and demonstrates an increasing presence as economic 
elite. More attention must be paid to sharing power, increasing political 
participation, applying strict management policies, and encouraging a more 
egalitarian society without negative emphasis on sectarian or community distinctions. 
Weak parliaments are a way to look good while not giving up real power. The 
partial election of a parliamentary body addresses some grievances but the pattern of 
discrimination against Shia and Sunni remains as serious as ever. Shia and second 
and third class of Sunni representation in the higher levels of government remains 
limited, they are systematically excluded from employment in the Arm forces, and 
job opportunities are scarce. 
Some would argue that change must come slowly, partly to moderate the powerful 
neighbour Saudi Arabia and partly to ensure internal stability. But times have 
changed for Saudi Arabia as well as its GCC allies. A Majlis al-Shura sits in Riyadh, 
an appointed consultative body represents all the GCC, and the Saudis have shown 
greater toleration of developments throughout the Gulf, including elections in 
Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. Still, just possibly, a Bahraini crisis would leave fellow 
GCC members - and Saudi Arabia in particular - in a quandary over whether to 
intervene to save the ruling family. Nevertheless, is such a scenario likely? After all, 
it can also be argued that changes to the political status quo in Bahrain pose a far 
greater threat to those individuals and groups enjoying entrenched positions than 
they do to social cohesion. The system in Kuwait has not been threatened by an 
assertive elected parliament and Bahrainis have long regarded themselves at least as 
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sophisticated as the Kuwaitis. In fact, the greater potential for fracture would seem 
to derive from the denial of real reforms, rather than the pace of actual reforms. 
It could be argued that King Hamad needs time to exert his full authority over his 
state. Thus, government reshuffles since 1999 was essentially inconsequential. The 
first phase of King Hamad's strategy necessarily been focused on defusing the 
conditions of the unrest and gaining the trust of his people, thus creating personal 
legitimacy. Only once this has been secured can he enjoy the requisite strength to 
take over the full reins of government. It must be a slow process, the old 
government grew around the serving of many individuals own interests. In the 
process of transition, the main challenge for the ruling elites, and in particular the 
new generation, will be of course to maintain their distributive power. For their 
partners (merchant families, influential old tribal allies and the newcomer 
technocrats), it will be to strengthen and maintain their position as challengers of the 
ruling elites to provide economic welfare to the population. In addition, there are 
substantial elements within the AI Khalifa who fear that any changes represent 
concessions, and that concessions spell the beginning of the end. 
The reality for many young people is that the government is still disconnected from 
its people. Few links have been developed between civil society and the government. 
One powerful way to forge more links would be for the leadership to make some 
public sacrifices and share some of the economic pain. Sheikh Zayed of the UAE 
was respected in Bahrain for his simple lifestyle and commitment to relative equality. 
Observers think that most of the real reform measures that have been implemented 
are not democratic advances, per se, but human rights advances. 150 The real 
challenge for the King was whether he prepared himself enough prior to the actual 
declaration of his liberalisation programme and had the answers for the following 
questions to insure the continuation of the reforms: 
150 Nadeya Sayed, "Political Reform in Bahrain: The Price ofStability," p. 224. 
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• Did the King think about all oppositions' demands and prepared solutions and 
precautions? 
• What could happen if half of the Consultative Council becomes elected? 
• What if the government directly or indirectly resist the reform? 
• What if the Prime Minister retired? 
• How to over come the problem of unemployment? 
• How to over come the increasing level of poverty? 
• How to maintain more Human Rights issues for all citizens? 
• How to apply equality? 
Finally, after identifying some of the significant trends that prevent the Kingdom 
from practicing liberalisation, a citizenship strategic plan is needed to overcome 
such socioeconomic and political-cultural trends. However, encouraging citizenship 
to such a society with the forgoing trends and background will not be an easy task to 
be accomplished. The political aspects by itself will not work in such arena. There 
are worrying level of apathy, ignorance and cynicism about public life. These, 
unless tackled at every level, could well diminish the hope for building 
constitutional reform and ofthe changing nature of the welfare state. 
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6.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters, this research study has offered the first detailed qualitative 
analysis on Bahrain's reforms during the time frame 1999-2005. An examination 
was provided on the socio-economic, legislative, and parliamentary restructuring 
whilst also examining the important case of human rights. When we view this in 
light of the historical context of Bahrain, as was provided in chapter 2, we can 
recognise at this stage that King Hamad's reform programme is nothing short of 
revolutionary. It has become clear that it is a comprehensive programme which is 
radically overhauling the system, but is encountering genuine challenges which both 
restrict its rate of progress and more significantly its overall viability in the long 
term. This is something which has become very clear in the last chapter which 
identified the challenges facing this new wave of reform. 
Given what has been identified, there is an opportunity for this thesis to not only 
show what problems the reforms are experiencing, but also to brainstorm where the 
government should go from here and make selected proposals. Indeed, this thesis 
seeks not only to ascribe new meaning and provide information for scholarship, but 
also aims to be a policy relevant research study that can impact on the future course 
of Bahrain. Moreover, by recognising the opportunities and by proposing new 
policy initiatives, this study will be able to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the 
reforms in the time frame under question. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will 
be to provide a series of recommendations, not in any particular order, based on the 
challenges facing the reform project, with the purpose being to offer practical 
solutions of how to overcome them. 
6.1 Recommendation 1: The King 
In an article by Ahmad AI Robai, an intellectual from Kuwait, indicates that in one 
of the British elections, the Conservative Party leader was interviewed on BBC 
television. He was asked "Do you think that the Conservative Party will win this 
time for the third time by majority votes?" Without hesitation the leader replied "I 
am afraid-Yes." The interviewer asked him "Why you said 'you are afraid'?" The 
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leader of the Conservative Party said "I am afraid from the several times that we 
govern; we forget in the future how we could become an opposition." And he added 
"I am also afraid tor the Labour Party for being opposition for a long time that they 
forget to run the government effective in the future."' The British politician was not 
thinking of his party but he is thinking of his country. Moreover, he was not 
thinking of himself but his family. This spirit did not come by coincident but as 
result of highly developed democracy. King Hamad has a number ofthings to do to 
march forward the reform programme steadily and firmly before it is too late. 
Therefore, the thesis came up with few recommendations: 
• The King should continue closely monitoring the government process and 
steer them to the main purpose of the reform. He should, for the time being, 
focuses in the small issues as these issues that bring the main strategy alive. 
For instant, when Mohammed Bin Rashid of UAE broke the glasses that 
separated the government's employee from customers with his stick, he 
declared a new wave of change that put Dubai in the right track with the right 
managerial philosophy. 
• Reduce the size of the Consultative Council to twenty or appoint twenty 
members with the rest being elected. 
11 Steps such as appointing a young minister (Fahmy AI Jawder) should be 
repeated consistently in the governmental cabinet and the Consultative 
Council reforms. 
• Steer the ruling family to enrol in the business sector rather than 
concentrating in the government. 
• Personally, the King should look at the issue of poverty and calibrates with 
all government's branches to practically solve this disease that could hold the 
reform to go any further. As mentioned in chapter 5, from the concept of 
1 AI Hayyat Newspaper, 24 September 2005. 
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compensation, the King should compensate for the damaged caused by the 
old regime to his citizens. The constitution indicate in Article 12: "The State 
guarantees the common liability of society in bearing the burdens arising 
from public disasters and ordeals, and for compensating those affected by 
war damage or as a result of performing their military duties."2 King Hamad 
repeatedly said the word 'reform', which mean in Arabic 'Eslah '. This 
clearly indicates that there was damaged that have been caused and needs to 
be reformed. 
The thesis here suggested a theoretical scheme that could be adopted and 
transfer to reality by experts. Instead of giving huge amount of money in the 
form of grants, it could be transfer to a new project that make all the 
approximately 70,000 to 80,000 poor families in Bahrain productive and 
overcome their poverty situation on no time. The following steps should be 
followed: 
r:rr The government should create a fund from the protracted oil boom. 
r:rr Request the trans-national institutions that have linked their 
investments and donations of aid to the improvement of Human Rights 
issues such as GCC states, USA, the European Union, World Bank, 
private businessmen, and International Monetary Fund, to participate in 
this fund in order to secure the processing of the liberalisation 
programme. 
r:rr Add to it the fund of the Zakah money. 
r:rr Forgive bank loans of all these targeted Bahrainis families. 
r:rr Secure them with houses. 
r:rr Buy them all the basic needs. 
r:rr Secure their education expenditures. 
r:rr With the cooperation with the Bahrain Economic Development Board 
invest some of the money for them. 
2 Chapter II, the Constitution of the Kingdom ofBahrain, 14 February 2002, Bahrain. 
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c:EF Facilitate their enrolment in small business (Microfinance initiative). 
Increase financing opportunities for the region's small entrepreneurs, 
especially women. 
c:EF Save a portion of the amount for their new generation. 
There are several advantages for the proposal. 
c:EF It will create a strong middle class society. 
c:EF Increase investment. 
c:EF Create job opportunities. 
c:EF Decrease pressure in the government to create more jobs. 
c:EF Promote more loyalty and patriotism. 
• Guarantee that all citizens and residents of Bahrain, including members of 
the ruling family, are held accountable for offences. 
a Put an end to the appointment of advisors with the rank of minister of the 
retired ministers as this does not give place for new generation to be 
promoted and the gap of the thinking tanks will be wide and will not work to 
the benefit of the youth. Moreover, retired individuals should be left in the 
society to be as an asset for information and advisory business in the private 
sector and/or could replace the mounting number of foreign advisors in the 
government. By constitution, he should retire all government employees that 
have their own business to avoid conflict of interest and open up more 
vacancies for the unemployed. 3 
3 Chapter IV Public Authorities General Provisions, Section 2 the Executive Authority, Article 
48 [Departments, Incompatibilities] 
b. While in charge of his Ministry, a Minister may not assume any other public office, nor may he 
even indirectly practise a profession or conduct industrial, commercial or financial business, nor may 
he participate in contracts concluded by the Government or public institutions, or combine his 
ministerial position with the membership of the board of directors of any company except as a non-
remunerated Government representative. Also during this period, the Minister may not purchase or 
rent a State asset even by way of public auction, nor may he lease, sell, or barter any of his assets to 
the State. 
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• Impose transparency in government financial dealings and the financial 
holdings and interests of all officials of cabinet rank and above through the 
more authorities to the National Audit Court. 
• Expedite the establishment of the Administrative Monitoring Bureau making 
sure that the appointed individuals are highly qualified and mostly from the 
private sector as they have better managerial skills than the government ones. 
For better performance the Bureau ought to be reporting directly to the 
parliament. 
• Delivers a wise strategic plan for the usage of remain land in the Kingdom. 
• Develop new specialities in Bahrain Defence Force such as fish farms and 
agriculture and recruit Shia individuals on these fields for the time being 
until they settle down with the progress of the reform. Such action could 
reliefthe Shia opposition. 
• The King should insist on regular bases to remind the government to keep 
close contact with citizens and meet their needs. 
II The King should be very cautious of using the term 'democracy' whether 
formally or informally in his speeches. Because democracy, as explained in 
chapter four, mean many things that the Kingdom of Bahrain could not meet. 
On the other hand, if the constitution, by any mean, re-opens for further 
amendment the word 'democracy' in Article (I) should be re written to 
'Liberalisation. 4 
4 Article 1 [Sovereignty, Constitutional Monarchy] 
d The system of government in the Kingdom of Bahrain is democratic. sovereignty being in the hands 
of the people, the source of all powers. Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner stated in this 
Constitution. · 
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• King Hamad should create a group of young, educated, and loyal individuals 
to work as his eye in the community and report to him regularly of any miss 
used of authority by government employees, slackness, and any act that 
could affect the advancement of the reform. He may call them "Hawk or 
Falcon Team." 
• Some officials who are described as YIPs and/or dignitaries react with regard 
to their positions as if these were a bequest inherited from their forefathers 
and with regard to the establishments they run as if these were private feudal 
estates or home garden. Probably this is due to an Arabian legacy back to the 
time of the Umayyad Dynasty, which has entrenched the principle of "the 
eternal official" in his position, which he will abandon only to the grave. 
The principle of the "official position succession," especially those important 
and sensitive positions, was a major reason for the corruption of the French 
Empire during the regime of the Bourbons who ended up in the guillotines of 
the French Revolution. The King should retire those people who been too 
long in the government as they are not able to give more effort; they are not 
cooping with reform process, and could not cope with new generation 
requirements. 
• The King should delete the sentence that distinguished the ruling family in 
Article (3)-point (4) of the Law of the Shura Council and the Parliament 
(Issued by Law by decree No. 14 for the year 2002) that reads: "The selected 
person must either be experienced and (or) one of those who have performed 
distinguished service(s) to the Country in one of the following fields: 
r::iF Members of the ruling Family. 
r::iF Former minister. 
r::iF Those who have worked at the post of ambassadors and minister 
plenipotentiary. 
r::iF Former Members ofthejudicial bodies. 
r::iF Retired security officials. 
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rff' Former Senior Scholars, businessmen and professionals. 
rff' Former members of the parliament. 
rff' Those who have exceptional popular trust and support. 
Such action will reduce the frustration of many citizens. On the other hand, 
no one will object if members of the ruling family are one of all the rests of 
the list. 
• Usually, in Bahrain, intellectual individuals are fought back and kept away 
from promotions by the top management in the government. This action is a 
kind of protection for the higher management to keep the elite people to 
secure their position and give the government 30% effort and the rest to be 
used for personnel benefits. The King, therefore, should closely follow these 
mismanagement issues and protect the young intellectual for better 
performances. 
• For the selection of individual for the high posts in the government, the King 
instead of asking the people surrounding him or choosing from newspapers, 
he may carry out the following steps: 
rff' Decide the post. 
rff' Decide the profession needed for the post. 
rff' Decide the range of the age of the appointee. 
rff' Ask the Central Informatics Organisation (CIO) to give him all citizens 
who have the qualification and the experience for the job required. 
rff' Request the National Security people to provide him with security 
information about the individuals in the CIO's list. 
rff' The King can then shorten the list with some settings such as age limit, 
gender, sect, culture, tribal, others. 
rff' The final list will include the best individuals with the profession 
required for the job. Therefore, the decision of appointing the 
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governmental higher post will, to some extent, be sufficient and will 
generate better output. 
• King Hamad should always put in mind that the West is pushing for secular 
countries that keep the religion away from politics. This might from the first 
glance become as protection for the Monarchies, and it could in the short-
term. But in the long-run the hereditary monarchies will be threaten as 
people will be brought up on democratic bases and will soon demand for 
secular country that chooses their leader in a democratic process. 
Accordingly, the King should come up with his own liberalisation system 
that meet Bahrain's capability, culture, religion. He should take into 
consideration that the supper power that exists today and dictate its political 
system peacefully or by force might not be there tomorrow. Therefore, 
Bahrain ought to build its own system that work for the present and the 
future from its prospective and not to flow with external influences, because 
if it did not then let us be ready to change to China's doctrine soon. 
• King Hamad need to collaborates with his wife Sheikha Sabeeka to contain 
all the women that have been chosen to high posts in the kingdom and 
constantly train them in management skills and leadership so that they can 
prove their qualification of the post they are holding. The common view in 
Bahrain about most of these women is that they are running the organisation 
as they run their homes. They temperamental manage their employees and 
their feminine touches reach the organisation's image and many other things. 
They even decorate their offices as their houses. The First Lady therefore, 
should pay this issue more attention through the Supreme Council for 
Women and never make the King be disappointed for appointing them. 
• The new Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah AI Ahmad in February 2006 ordered 
the government to band putting his pictures on the streets.5 Previously, Amir 
5 AI Ayam Newspaper, Friday 21 April 2006. 
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of Qatar also did the same. In Bahrain, were the percentage of poor people 
are massively higher than those two countries; the streets of Bahrain are 
crowded by the pictures ofthe leaders. There are thousand of Dinars involve 
in such action. Moreover, all Bahraini newspapers got filed with the leaders' 
pictures in the National Day, Eids, and many other occasions that make 
individuals, government, private sectors again wasted millions on 
unreasonable action. This money could be transferred to charities for the 
poor or other humanitarians' funds. Therefore, the King should urgently stop 
this act ofhypocrisy and duplicity. 
• The National Security Organisation (NSO) in Bahrain is not delivering as it 
should. The State Security Law is still the dominant philosophy of the new 
NSO. The King should steer them to take over issues such as education, 
citizenship, violent behaviour, disloyalty, increase violation behaviour, 
corruptions, and many other social, economic, and political issues. There is 
rum our that the NSO will be again under the Ministry of Interior organisation. 
If this is true, then it is only greediness of some individuals to gain more 
power by joining the two organisations. Such decision, to some extent, could 
be unwise. There are enormous differences between the two institutions. 
The NSO should be saved by the King and should also divert its reporting 
process to himself. 
• Because of the inexperience appointed ministers in the government, Bahrain 
need to have VIP managerial condense courses. They required the skill to 
manage their employees, manage the resources, deal with the press, know 
how to be diplomatic, and less dependent on foreign advisors. Moreover, the 
King should meet with all Ministers regularly to steer them to the objectives 
of the reforms programme and teach them his doctrine. 
• King Hamad may continue naming roads and streets by the names of 
dignitaries' Bahrainis who become a source of prides to Bahrain. He should 
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not wait until these people pass away and then honoured their memory. He 
should privilege them why they are still alive as this will work as a cause of 
national education and strengthen the concept of loyalty by the honoured 
individuals, their family, and friends. Moreover, it will work as a motivation 
perception for others to follow base. 
• The national anthem of Bahrain does not, to some extent, match with the 
reform programme philosophy. It is not motivational to the people of 
Bahrain. The King may need to request the rewriting of the anthem to be the 
number one aspect of citizenship inspiration. The wording should 
concentrate on the people and the land rather than the ruling issues. The 
wording should be promoting loyalty and patriotism. 
• King Hamad should be aware of the rapid modernisation and high economic 
growth that rushed a change from tribal to high-tech societies in one 
generation or less. When traditional norms and social patterns crumble or 
are made to seem irrelevant, new radical ideologies (sometimes based on 
religion and/or nostalgia for a glorious past) may become attractive to certain 
segments of society. Modern society also facilitates violence by providing 
access to rapid transportation and communication, news media, weapons, etc. 
• The reform should redistribute the power and authority of each branch of the 
government system avoiding domination and inequality of power to one 
branch from the other. When local or international powers possess an 
overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter see no 
other realistic ways to forward their cause by normal political means, they 
may turn to the use of force to be heard and recognised. 
• An essential factor that causes the rise of violence and opposition is the 
credibility of the government. The King should always have an eye on the 
performance of the government and frequently replace the unproductive 
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• 
members with a more credible and legitimate ones. He should continue what 
he started at the beginning of the reform by appointing new and young 
citizens in the government. The King should demand the government to 
follow his revolutionary programme and represents the values and interests 
of citizens and also the opposition movement. 
Some groups are excluded because they hold views or represent political 
traditions considered irreconcilable with the basic values of the state. Large 
groups of highly educated young people with few prospects of meaningful 
careers within a blocked system will tend to feel alienated and frustrated. 
Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels through which 
to express and promote political influence and change. To some, terrorism 
can seem the most effective and tempting option. 
• The reform should also carefully remove the experience of social injustice 
that some people in Bahrain used to reside before the reform programme. 
Relative deprivation or great differences in income distribution (rather than 
absolute deprivation or poverty) in a society have in some studies been found 
to correlate rather strongly with the emergence of social revolutionary 
political violence and terrorism. 
• The King should continue his wisdom on calming the opposition and insist 
on the government to follow base. As sometime the continuation of the riots 
and violence is just as a reaction of past experiences such as contested 
elections, police brutality, or other provocative events that call for revenge or 
action. Violence is often sustained for reasons other than those which gave 
birth to it in the first place. It is therefore not certain that it will end even if 
the grievances that gave rise to it, or the root causes, are somehow dealt with. 
Opposition groups may change purpose, goals, and motivation over time. 
Some continue even if many of their political demands have been met as it is 
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happening in Bahrain where King Hamad almost met all of oppositions' 
demands but they continue what they have been always doing. 
6.2 Recommendation 2: The Government 
The government of Bahrain, through the years, made numerous developments but 
was not skilful in communication with citizens and opposition. King Hamad's 
reform programme open up new challenge to the government. The boycotting of the 
parliamentary elections of October 2002 by the opposition was a disadvantage for 
the government. The government shows weak cooperation with the present 
parliament because of the lack of experience. The some of the MPs gave the 
governments member hard time in some occasion, but did not caused any damages. 
While, if the opposition were enrolled the situation would be worse. Therefore, the 
2002 parliament was a good exercise arena for the government and to be ready for 
the 2006 one. There are several issues for the government of Bahrain to consider 
making the reform more successful: 
• The executive power should cooperate with parliament in the provision of 
information. The executive branch is the major source of information for 
MPs and the more they can cooperate with it easily, the better will their 
legislative and monitoring performance will be. It should also help in 
responding to voters' needs and requests. 
• Transport is expected to be a key challenge in the future. The forecasts are 
that in a few years from now, traffic will be nine times what it was in 2002, 
with the number of private vehicles increasing by 9% annually. To cope 
with this increase the government need, besides the planning of finding 
reliable public transportation, to think of making people work from their 
home through the E-government. As women already make up about 30% of 
the workforce in the country, it will be wise to make most of them work from 
home. Such a process will win the government several advantages: 
r:IF Decrease the traffic. 
289 
---~-----
r:Jr Win the Islamic extremists who are against women work and mixing 
genders. 
r:Jr Limit the expansion of government facilities that involve high cost and 
scarce land. 
r:Jr Keeping mothers or sisters close to their needy children and/or elders. 
r:Jr Decrease family expenditures (car fuel, clothes, makeup, etc.) 
• Bahrain government need to put some public employees on retirement in 
order to allow younger, less expensive Bahrainis to fill their slots. 
• In Bahrain, not every one can be fullest "himself' and become everything 
that one is capable of becoming, because the government on unclassified 
measures recruits all potential leaders. Accordingly, the government should 
create profession criteria for the position of Directors, Undersecretary, 
Secretary, and Ministers. This step will encourage citizens to educate 
themselves to be qualified to these positions. Moreover, it will, somehow, 
ensure quality and fairness on the appointment process. 
• The government through all kind of media is required to educate citizens in 
other issues than politics. As the later is the new spread disease in the 
society. People every where, young and old, male or female, are talking 
politics. This disease is putting more anxiety in the government. Therefore, 
Bahrain TV the most affective media today could tum people mind to other 
field and profession and calm the society and relieve the government but not 
by bringing "Big Brother Show" that created more tension in the country. 
UK television for example is always bringing issues like drugs, alcohols, 
overweight, child abuse, sex, fun and pleasure programme, fun and 
intellectual contests, sports, and many social and economic problems rather 
than focusing on politics. In contrary, Bahrain television is so boring and 
indicates that there are no problems in Bahrain of any kind. 
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11 The government of Bahrain ought to determine ways to reinforce laws and 
regulations. For instance, the Minister of Interior could organise a voluntary 
team from his ministry, BDF, NG, and few civilian to create a team of about 
300 individuals to control the traffic violations when ever they are using their 
own cars any time during the day. The objective of the team is to reduce 
traffic violations and avoid deadly accidents that become very common in 
the street of Bahrain. The Minister should obtain the following steps: 
r:Ir Organise the team. 
r:Ir Name the team. 
r:Ir Make an ID for them. 
r:Ir Personally, he should explain clearly to them their task and the 
procedures of their duties. 
r:Ir Make them give an oath of honour to deliver their duty in full and 
without discrimination. 
r:Ir Sign them a disciplinary commitment form. 
r:Ir Take them to the King or the CP to give them words of encouragement 
and discipline and not to misuse their authority. 
r:Ir Provide them with portable police siren to be used for the chasing. 
r:Ir Change the vehicles registrations numbers by using for instance letters 
and number to avoid the present illness of distinguishing people by 
their registration number that avoid them the violation tickets. 
r:Ir Announce the idea and the task of the team in all media. Ask for full 
cooperation from citizens with the team. 
Why the Team? Simply, reducing the expenditure of the mission and on the 
other hand, generate social unity and joint responsibilities. If the Ministry 
want to take over the task by itself it will cost million of Dinars on buying 
the vehicles, employing more staff, high cost of fuel, and many other 
expenditures. Overtime, people will be afraid of speeding and will by time 
gain the required self-discipline 
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• Put an end to citizens who hire expatriate labours with illegal work visas. 
• Encourage and strengthen the field oftechnical and professional training and 
grants graduates adequate salaries. 
• Encouraging the principal of free economy; invited external substantial 
capital inflows for investment; and big projects through the development of 
the law of ownership, which permitted foreign investors to buy and sell 
investment land in the Islands. Such a program will create economic 
development and offer employment opportunities to citizens. The process 
required a new public administration mindset, one that is oriented to a 
streamlined procedure, transparency, elimination of jurisdictional 
overlapping, improved services, and updated economic legislation within a 
framework of integrity and equal opportunity. 
• Limit foreign investors on buying lands categorise as investment one rather 
the one categorise for living as this process has already heart the citizens by 
increasing the price of land to a level unbearable by the nationals. 
11 There are massive numbers of Mosques in the Kingdom. Millions of Dinars 
are spent in these mosques where the money of Sadaqah Jaryah could be 
spent on other project and have the same faith return. 6 Building school, 
libraries, shelter, sponsoring student for education, and many others social 
protection project could be more effective than building mosques. Excessive 
mosques could lead to disunity ofthe society. As in the old day people meet 
at mosques and find out about each other affairs and when someone did not 
show up then every one will go and ask about him. 
6 Sadaqah (righteousness) is a voluntary giving of alms (as opposed to Zakah which is obligatory) to 
the needy. Building a mosque is an ordinary charity that fall under a sadaqah Jarya that secured a 
continuous blessing from God. 
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• There is an intangible illness spreading in Bahrain crystallise in the power of 
the Directors of the Ministers offices. They are containing excessive 
authority that make them decide who the minister should meet, what issues 
he report to him, and make people believe that what ever they want to be 
done by the minister could not happened without his conformation. In some 
cases, the director becomes more powerful than the minister himself. They 
are using all the authority towards their own benefits by focussing on 
becoming known to all internal and external YIPs, travelling with ministers 
(where as a director he should be available to run the office when the 
minister is away), and get all the personal benefits from the society. They 
are combining between the personal secretary of the minister and the director 
of his office, the two that should not be merged as they are at conflict. The 
government, therefore, should urgently look at this issue and find managerial 
means to limit their authorities and prevent it form spreading all over the 
offices. 
11 Boost the level of civilisation task in the government environment by 
preventing smoking in public and in government offices. There are several 
people (negative smokers) suffering from inhaling smoke in their offices and 
many public places and been victimise by those positive smokers. There is a 
law prohibiting smoking in the government organisations, but never been 
activated as most of the high ranks are smokers. 
6.3 Recommendation 3: The Parliament 
A prerequisite for successful reform is to have a powerful parliament to carry out 
reforms. The most important aspects in developing Bahrain parliamentary action are 
the following domains: 
• The power of the Chamber of Deputies in Bahrain needs to be expanded, 
strengthening its ability to oversee government acts. It has little if any 
control over the appointed governors of the five governorates. While these 
steps would stop short of the reinstitution of parliament and the constitution, 
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as demanded, it would provide greater experience in self-government and 
move the country towards a more liberal political system. Transparency 
towards society and giving power to MPs to represent the citizens. 
• It is important for parliament to be able truly to exercise the rights and 
powers entrusted to it. In order to do so, the institution, its members and 
those who provide backup support, need to develop new capacities, new 
procedures and new working methods. It is important that parliament should 
be in a position to implement. 
• Measures to be adopted to Improve upon its functioning including its 
relations with the Executive.7 
• All the processes of institutional development in Bahrain should link to one 
major issue: "How to make parliament a strong political institution." They 
should concentrate on the following issues: 8 
rff> The nature of electoral arrangements. 
rff> The relation between the legislative power and government and effect 
of political elites in power and political societies and influential groups 
on the efficiency of parliament and the nature of parliamentary 
committees. 
rff> The type of rules and listed regulations of parliament's action as well as 
the extent of information provided to the MPs and the way it affects the 
role of parliament in its move towards liberalisation. 
• A non-government research centres that act as centres of experience and are 
self financed or financed through the government itself. 
7 Mr. Martin Chungong, "The IPU'S Perspective on Parliamentary Reform," Officer-in-Charge, 
Programme for the Study and Promotion of Representative Institutions, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
Geneva,2003,p. 13. 
8 Karim Sayed, "What to Reform? A platform for Parliamentary Reform," 2"d Annual Conference of 
the Parliamentary Program of the Faculty of Economics & Political Science, Cairo University, In. 
cooperation with Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Egypt, July 2003, p. 28. · 
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• MPs should be encouraged to visit world parliaments and the different 
international organisations. 
• More attention should be giving to the youth parliament that has been 
established in 2005, to be as a 'training tank' for future MPs. 
• Running for parliament happened to be very expensive for poor citizens to 
afford. Accordingly, the government of Bahrain have two choices of 
recommendations to empower the poor to participate in making decisions 
and policies affecting their daily lives: 
r:tr Support few intellectual poor citizens to run for parliament. 
r:tr Appoint some ofthem in the Consultative Council. 
6.4 Recommendation 4: The Opposition 
Oppositions in Bahrain should be very wise and team up with the King. They 
should use the space and authority given to them by the King and make the best of it 
and more authority will be amended. They should not challenge the situation and 
make sure that 1975's experience does not be repeated. The opposition, therefore 
ought to consider the following: 
• Collaborate with King Hamad initiatives and try not to make him lose 
interest and uses other ways of authority. 
• Deepen participation in the political process. 
• Cooperate with members of the parliament who seek to resolve the current 
situation. 
• Strengthen relations with the government officials and the Crown Prince, 
who are able to improving the social and economic pressures that affect the 
community. 
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II 
a 
II 
6.5 
• 
II 
• 
Cooperate with the government through social NGOs on training the 
unemployed individuals and not to make it an issue and add tension to the 
situation. 
Promote non-violent activism and avoid threats of confrontation. 
Do not adopt the opposition movement as a career. 
Recommendation 5: Education 
Education is becoming more and more a fundamental security worry for the 
Arab world and GCC States in particular. The declared American strategy 
after 9/11 is to link education with international security issues and to focus 
on changing cultural and educational environment in order to transform 
minds, thoughts, and trends. In October 2002, the American Secretary of 
Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, requested the world to start political changes that 
focuses on "War on thoughts, wining minds and hearts." He believed that 
beating terrorism could not be accomplished exclusively by military forces 
but with attacking thoughts that feed it too. 
Commonly, the education process becomes the most vital aspect that 
influences the shaping of values and principals that spread in the society 
whether they were unconstructive such as sectarianism, corruption, 
retardation, and despotism or constructive as the tolerance, freedom, and 
justice. Accordingly, Bahrain should restructure their educational curriculum 
to overcome the society's illness of violence and extremism.9 
In Bahrain, as in other developing societies, the relationships between 
education and political socialisation and education and manpower must be 
jointly examined even though they exist on different planes. One must at the 
outset recognise the contradiction between these two essentially different 
9 
"Tatweer manaly a/taleemfe Dowal A/Majlis," Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London, 2003. 
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roles performed by the systems of education in developing societies. The 
school and the system of education must act as inculcators of particularistic 
values, especially in the realm of citizenship, yet they must also transmit a 
body of knowledge that reflects man's philosophical view of the universe 
and the universal values based on this conception. 10 To overcome such a 
dilemma, a national strategic plan set by a national committee, similar to the 
Supreme National Committee assigned to prepare the draft of the NAC, to 
develop citizenship values and belonging must brought forward. To do so, it 
is necessary to explain what are a strategic plan and the national citizenship 
programme that would create loyal, educated, and responsible citizen capable 
of living a liberal society. 
• The challenge today is to transform information into knowledge. With the 
extraordinary and rapid development of information technology, the present 
trend is towards the development of a knowledge management system, 
recognising that knowledge is a complex process, made up of information, 
expertise, experience, and intuition, meaning that knowledge is never final, 
and always evolving. 
• The Bahrain's education system needs a massive shake-up to dramatically 
improve standards, learning by rote in favour of teaching pupils to think for 
themselves, to nurture students with 'total personality competence', and for 
students to move from being the consumers of ready-made knowledge to a 
producers of knowledge. The project will also base on the philosophy that 
education has an enormous responsibility to build patriotism and boost 
cultural values and public spirit. 
• As illustrated in Chapter two, educations in Bahrain is over 86 years old and 
people of Bahrain obtain education before anyone else in the Gulf States. 
10 James S. Coleman, ed., "Education and political Development," Princeton University Press, 1965, 
Princeton, N.J., p. vi, vii. 
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Illiteracy rate is 2.7%, among the lowest in the Arab and Muslim countries. 
However, Bahrain is not using this low rate of illiteracy to its benefit. It 
continues to put the wrong people for high posts in the government sector. 
When unqualified individual take over a post not related to his specialty, then 
he becomes an illiterate. Such action is very common in Bahrain, therefore 
in reality the illiteracy rate is not 2. 7 percent but literally higher from this 
concept. 
• Bahrain has a well-developed state system of primary and secondary 
education and a state-supported university system. During the 1995-1997 
periods, the state's educational expenditures amounted to 4.4% of GDP; 
more recent figures are lacking. Experts complain that too much emphasis is 
placed on memorisation in the schools, and that critical thinking IS not 
encouraged. Moreover, the increase numbers of foreign advisers in the 
government also indicate two things. First, it shows that the government still 
dose not trust the educational and experience maturity of Bahrainis citizens 
to be advisers and secondly, the people of high post are weak and depend 
fully on the foreign advisers that will not show their weakness in Bahrain 
societies. 
• The International Labour Organisation criticised the Ministry of Education in 
1995 for being too poorly organised to prepare young Bahrainis for their 
entrance into the job market. Since then, educational providers have been 
attracted from abroad to establish new institutions. New educational 
offerings are focused on information technology and technical occupations. 
It is too early to assess the quality of these measures. Unemployment among 
young people remains a problem with considerable explosive potential for 
the future, despite the effectiveness of private solidarity networks. 
• Beside the enormous advantages of the increasing number of schools that 
almost cover every village in the kingdom, it has contributed on increasing 
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sectarianism. People are not mixing through all level of school. Shia and 
Sunnis are not integrated to exchange ideas and making friendship. The only 
place now in Bahrain for these young generations to come together is in 
universities after they already built up foundational sect beliefs for 
themselves. A sold national education programme and citizenship could 
overcome the phenomenon. 
• The Ministry of Education developed the social subjects and citizenship 
building curriculum and representatives of the Ministry visited some Arab 
countries, the last visit being to the Arab Republic of Egypt in November 
2004. The Ministry also requested several similar studies and curriculum 
from European countries. On the other hand, the University of Bahrain is 
currently developing the sociology, civics, and history curriculum and 
textbooks, and is organising related seminars. There may also be other 
institutions doing the same effort. All these are outstanding efforts 
emanating from the love ofthe homeland. However, the problem is that the 
individual efforts of the state will scatter the general concepts of the national 
education and the building of citizenship. 
recommend as follows: 
The research, therefore, 
w First: formation of a higher national committed comprising members 
from all sectors of the state to conduct an in-depth study of this 
important issue, to be headed by Sheikh Salman, the Crown Prince, or 
else the Minister of Education, or the Board of Trustees of the Research 
and Studies Centre. Upon completion of the development of the 
necessary curriculum, the curriculum is to be presented to the 
parliament for review and subsequent referral to the Council of 
Ministers for approval. 
w Second: activation of the national education and citizenship-building 
committees in the GCC states considering the common denominators, 
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identical values, regional affiliations, and neighbourhood ties that 
combine and bring them together. The committees involvement should 
not be limited to the government level because the "Manama 
Declaration" issued by the GCC Supreme Council in its ninth session 
headed by the King of Bahrain, made clear and reconfirmed, after 
presentation of the executive steps taken by the member states relative 
to the implementation of the Unified Economic Agreement and the 
positive results achieved in the form of the strong economic ties 
between the citizens of the GCC states and the establishment of a solid 
economic, cultural, and social base, the following "the comprehensive 
and integrated nature of the GCC' objectives in all fields and the need 
to realise further achievements in the Council's modus operandi, 
particularly in the social, cultural and information fields and 
achievement of equality in citizenship rights among the member 
states ... etc." 
6.6 Recommendation 6: Economy 
Bahrain needs to downsize its governmental role and allow the market to take over. 
To achieve economic growth, Bahrain must steer away from being government led 
to market led. It must move from the demand side to the supply side. Government's 
role should be limited to helping create conditions for businesses to flourish (supply 
side) rather than employing people (demand side). Government should stop 
employing people in ministries or state-owned companies. It should invest its oil 
money more wisely in ways that encourage Bahrainis to get out there and create 
wealth. Moreover, a smarter and better government is also needed. 
Property rights and acquisition are well defined. Business formation and investment 
in the private economy are encouraged. However, the privatisation of existing state-
owned companies has not made significant progress in the last few years, except for 
the liberalisation of the mobile phone market in May 2003. 
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The basic features of the economic system have remained unchanged. During the 
second half of the period there was a slight growth in the economy as a result of 
rising oil prices. Progress was made with the initiation and planning of new 
projects. 
The "free visa" trade, which brings guest workers into the county in circumvention 
of official law, is a profitable business in which members of the elite are occupied. 
Until this practice is abolished, it is unlikely that there will be much change in the 
high rate of domestic unemployment. 
6.7 Recommendation 7: The West 
Moderate praise of Bahrain as a model of reform and urge the government to: 
• Recognise that Bahrain is being progressive through King Hamad's 
liberalising agenda and so encouragement rather than criticism would be the 
best way of further reforms being enacted. 
• Jointly with Bahrain government try to solve the issue of poverty. 
6.8 Recommendation 8: The Zakah 
Zakah is one ofthose unique forms ofworship that bring out both the individual and 
the social aspects of ibadah (worship). Consider its socio-political value: It frees 
society from the ill feelings arising out of class hatred. It opposes an individualism 
that is blind to the travails of one's neighbours and stands against a socialism that 
shackles individual freedom. It fosters neither selfishness nor renunciation. It also 
strengthens a sense of brotherhood and establishes social cohesion. 
Zakah means the giving of a specific share of one's wealth and savings to persons or 
causes that Allah (God) mentions in the Quran. The normal share to be paid is two 
and a half percent of one's saved earnings. This applies to cash, bank savings, and 
jewellery. The rate for cattle and agricultural produce is different. The Quran 
mentions Zakah, together with Salah (ritual Prayer), as a form of worship; and in 
that respect it differs from ordinary charity, which is optional, and from tax, which a 
government imposes from time to time at variable rates and for various uses. The 
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money from Zakah can be used only for specific purposes under fixed headings like 
helping the poor, the needy, to pay the salaries of those collecting it, to free captives 
and debtors, for travellers in need, to win over hearts and for the cause of Allah (God) 
(Quran at Taubah 9: 60) 
The payment of Zakah is a way of purifying one's wealth. It saves one from greed 
and selfishness and encourages him to be truthful and God-fearing in his financial 
dealings. Another purpose is to help the poor and the needy and to assist other 
causes in the way of Allah (God). Muslims know that it is a profitable investment 
(and not a loss) to help the cause of Allah (God) because it will establish economic 
balance and social justice, and at the same time earn an immense reward in the 
Hereafter. 
Therefore, the King, the government, the parliament, and Muslim citizens should 
jointly bring the system of Zakah to Bahrain by Law. They ought to do so to solve 
poverty as it is one of the key obstacles for the advancement of the reform process. 
6.9 Recommendation 9: How to Build Up Citizenship and the Responsible 
Citizen 
The aspirations of King Hamad and his fresh methodology as epitomised in his 
strategy, plans, blue prints, dialogues, public addresses and meetings with the 
various public sectors and popular national gatherings and his proposition of the 
NAC project for the promotion of political, economic and social life, all paved the 
way for zeroing in on the national education and upbringing to keep pace with his 
aspirations and hopes. Therefore, it is now the time to initiate the formulation of the 
strategic plans and curriculum through to resolve the deeply entrenched societal 
problems of factional, tribal and ethnic affiliation which has the upper hand on 
national affiliation and the social and territorial discrepancies which have aggravated 
the severity of secular, tribal and sectarian divisions in Bahrain and culminated in 
serious defaults and cracks in the concept of citizenship and which may be the key 
cause of the failure and frustration of all aspirations to a better future. Furthermore, 
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the process must not allow the material consumer progress and conspicuous 
behaviour grow in a way that would overcome the balanced thinking in favour of the 
homeland. 
The best part of citizenship is acquired through education and training rather than 
from innate nature. The birth of a person in a special location is not enough to 
practice true citizenship, along with its rights and obligations. A person may be 
brought up and receive a cultural education that fosters his knowledge or a 
professional education that enables him to earn a living but if he does not receives 
along with them well-built citizenship education, his professional will always be 
unconstructive. Herbert Spencer defines national education as: 
If education is preparation for public life, then national education is 
preparation of the responsible citizen and hence it is part of the whole ... 
and added the definition of the citizen by the homeland where he lives not 
only by its rules and regulations, but also by its traditions, norms, and 
customs is what we call national education. 11 
It is therefore necessary now to draw up a national strategic plan that covers all 
aspects of the state and mobilises the sectors of the society, decision makers, 
investors, influential persons, and beneficiaries to maximise their roles in the 
development of the citizenship and affiliation values and taking advantage of the 
community's cultures for the benefit of this development. On the other hand, it 
needs to reconsider the social subjects, national education, history and the Arabic 
language curriculum and attempt to develop them in a way conducive to fostering 
national affiliation, blending, spiritual, and cultural openness, and consolidation of 
this curriculum to cover all educational and public cultural levels and standards. 
11 Herbert Spencer, "The Man versus the State," London, Williams & Norgate, 1884; with additional 
essays and an introduction by Albert Jay Nock, [adds "From freedom to bondage," and "Over-
legislation"] lntro. A. J. Nock, Caldwell, 10, Caxton, 1940. 
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History too is one of the basic subjects, which can contribute to straightening the 
citizen if its contents are based on historical objectives and positions and cultural 
heritage and if it is expanded to cover all tribes and the outstanding dignitaries and 
pillars of the community, and not to limit it over the AI Khalifa tribe. History also 
contributes to the development of the educated people's sense of the responsibility 
for safeguarding the achievements of those who came before us and preserving and 
building on this development. It also makes members of the community aware of 
their rights and duties to their community and the significance of contributing to the 
resolution of the problems they face through either emotional sympathy or practical 
participation. History is, too, a source of wisdom for acquisition of good manners, 
teaching of politics and the acquisition of the ability to visualise, imagine, and 
contribute to the development of the responsible citizen. History lessons must be 
dedicated to develop the concepts of the love of the homeland, global peace, 
cooperation, understanding, and citizenship more than the concepts of war and 
bigotry. 
On the other hand, the national education curriculum must provide for a method that 
fosters the growth of the character of the Bahraini individual as a good, producing, 
liberal, free and law abiding citizen, a true believer in the principles and imperatives 
of the homeland and a wholehearted contributor to the establishment of an highly 
developed, integrated and cohesive community in an environment where freedom, 
justice, democracy and equality prosper and prevail. Citizens must be provided with 
the information related to the general national issues and how to best take advantage 
thereof. On the Intellectual Level citizens should: 
• Have faith in Bahrain as a homeland of freedom and liberalisation. 
• Understand the constitution and knowledge ofthe governance system with its 
three authorities (Legislative, Executive, and Judicial). 
• Know the role of media institutions and their impact on the formulation of 
the public opinion. 
• Have education on his I her personal rights as a citizen. 
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• Understand the nature of the individual's relationship with the state and the 
other citizens. 
• Have training on accurate rationalisation and thinking and the use of 
information in the country's best interests 
On the other hand, on the Emotional or Social Level citizens ought to: 
• Implant the love of, loyalty, and belonging to the homeland from early 
childhood. 
• Be committed to his I her Islamic heritage and religion. 
• Be committed to moral and ethical values. 
• Respect of individual and collective freedom guaranteed by the constitution. 
• Participate in the social and political initiatives. 
• Be aware of the implications of the social problems, such as population 
density, water shortfall, and pollution. 
• Be committee to have the public interest prevail over the personal interest. 
• Participate in volunteer work. 
6.9.1 National Education Mediators 
There are a number of vehicles and tools to boost and strengthen the feelings of 
citizenship, belonging, and loyalty in the individuals of the community. Anything 
that a person may rely on for education is considered an educational mediator 
including the following: 
(1) The Family 
The civil society which is composed of the commercial enterprises, volunteer 
organisations, NGO, educational institutions, clubs, the media and charitable 
societies relies in tum on the family which forms the most essential tool for the 
individual's cultural upbringing and acquisition of the skills that would enable 
citizens to live and survive in the larger community and through which the 
community's knowledge and values are communicated to the upcoming generations. 
Civics values start from the family, and the youth perception of the patriotism is 
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coloured by the beliefs and directives of the mother, father and older brothers and 
sisters. The family is the first homeland of the child and ifhe or she truly loves and 
faithfully belongs to it, this will subsequently have a great impact on his I her love 
for the homeland. The seed of patriotism starts to germinate here in the family. 
The importance of this mediator comes from the fact that it covers the most 
important formative years of the national trends and convictions of the youth. This 
mediator will develop the political concepts and national values and ideals 
prevailing in the community, sustain the unity and cohesiveness among the citizens, 
and eliminate the ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and social class differences existing in the 
society. 
(2) Mosques and Religious Societies 
The mosques and religious societies do play an important role in the national 
education. Religious education is political education, too, because Islam is indeed 
both a religion and a state. The Holy Quran has covered all human and social ties as 
well as the traits that each Muslim must cultivate and which are part and parcel of 
the national education and the responsible citizen requirements (such as advocacy of 
goodness and prevention of vice, congregation etiquette, unity, adherence to the 
right path, cooperation, brotherhood, tolerance, pardon, truth, patience, chastity ... 
etc). This mediator should contribute to the support of the religious values, which 
encourage and foster a united and cohesive community in the face of challenges. It 
also promotes the spirit of tolerance, love, and sacrifice during Friday congregation 
speeches and preaching which must deal with the community issues and public 
political affairs and lead the citizens to respect the law and the leaders in charge of 
the community. 
(3) Clubs and Youth Centres 
This mediator is believed to be a positive social forum where the citizens can 
exchange political information, opinions, and thoughts, and will consequently help 
in the formulation of political trends and convictions. On the other hand, it provides 
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experts and skills that would develop the spirit of liberalisation, deepen the national 
unity sentiments, respect for the other opinion, surrender to the views of the majority 
and adherence to its resolutions. The fact that this mediator embodies different 
categories of the community provides ample and rich opportunity to consolidate the 
bridges of communication, friendship, and love and constitutes a rich forum for the 
exchange of opinions and views that are likely to eliminate many of the causes of 
misunderstanding and differences, if any. It will also help to dissolve the feelings of 
sectarian, tribal, regional, and ethnic bigotry and intolerance. Similarly, the spirit of 
cooperation, cohesion, competition, and tolerance that characterises group sports and 
which the club promotes will grow, develop and migrate to the national teams and 
thus acquire a general characteristic that represents the solidarity and cooperation of 
the greater community, a token of the loftiest values of belonging and citizenship. 
(Include more information from Emile Book regarding this mediator) 
(4) The Media 
The role of the different media vehicles is very effective in the development of 
patriotism and the building of the responsible citizen through well-planned 
presentations of TV and radio programs and press articles. This mediator propagates 
the various values of the Bahraini society, the love of the family, community, and 
the land, through highlighting the historical and cultural entity and heritage of the 
state, the national issues, social dilemmas and the citizen's role in resolving them. 
Their role must also be channelled to educating the citizens and encouraging them to 
engage in volunteer initiatives and common activities considering their importance 
to the stability of the country. The media should also highlight the efforts of all 
organs and institutions of the state in the service of the citizens. 
Therefore, a careful strategic plane for the media, especially the one the government 
control, must be established to create unity in the society and support the reform 
progress. In fact, Bahrain TV did not contribute in the reform process in a wisdom 
broadcast. It has continued to focus mainly on Royal events on its programme 
without showing the role of other citizens in the progress of the reform or the history. 
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Table 6.1 below depicts the strategic chart for activation of the various educational 
institutions and projecting their role in promoting the building of responsible 
citizenship and loyalty and belonging to the homeland. 
Table 6.1: The Role of Educational Institutions 
Educational 
Ser. Action to be taken 
Institutions 
New curricula of national education, history, and Arabic 
language for all educational levels: kind~ergartens, schools, 
I Ministry of Education 
Universities, and institutes for learning the following: The 
homeland and its history, government, culture, custom 
traditions, ambitions, aspinttions, various problems, critic 
thinking, voluntary work, Discipline, and tolerance. 
Highlight the historical and cultural special identity, 
Government's goals and aspirations, Highlight social 
2 Ministry of Information 
problems, Participation of citizens in training on constructive 
criticism, Freedom of expression 
Respect of human rights, Setting pacesetters in dedication, 
3 Armed Forces 
bravery, self-sacrifice, integrity, and self-denial. 
Ministry of Foreign 
Monitoring citizens receiving education overseas, providing 
4 them with national principles and Islamic ethics, and 
affairs 
protecting their interests. 
Love, Respect, Islam, Arabic language, Responsibility, Self-
5 Family reliance, Confidence, Consideration of others, Respect of the 
law, Self-discipline, Dedication to work 
Prayers, Islamic ethics, Arabic language, Responsibility, 
6 Mosques Islamic scholars, Integrity, Patience, Consideration of others, 
Respect of the law, Self-discipline, Dedication to work 
Co-operation, Teamwork spirit, Loyalty, Consideration of 
7 Clubs & youth centres 
others, Punctuality, Voluntary work, Dedication to work 
Co-operation, Teamwork spirit, Loyalty, Consideration of 
8 Societies others, Punctuality 
Voluntary work, Dedication to work 
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(5) The Government and Private Institutions 
Each individual is born to be a citizen, but the state organs are in a position to 
transform him/her into a good and responsible citizen. This sector is considered the 
executive arm of the King's policies and strategies, by reflecting the King's 
aspirations through work plans that boost this relationship between the citizen and 
his community on the one hand and the citizen and the state and the nation on the 
other hand. Moreover, this sector explains each party's rights and obligations to the 
others, achievement of social justice and equality, control of administrative 
corruption, prevalence of peace, equal opportunity to achieve patriotism, belonging 
and loyalty so that the interests of the community and the nation may prevail over 
personal interests. Such plans to ensure realisation of the national strategy will 
include: 
• Development of the national education curriculum 
• Development of the national history curriculum and highlighting the roles of 
the pioneers, both males and females. 
• Formulation of programs for sponsored students on scholarships abroad to 
continually link them to the homeland. 
• Training and education of judges to ensure fair and speedy procedures 
• Training and education of religious men (imams, preachers ... etc) 
• Highlighting of the historical and cultural heritage and identity of Bahrain 
through the various media. 
• Paying attention to the social problems and issues of the country. 
• Consolidation of the role ofthe volunteering initiative 
11 Provision of medical treatment and health education 
• Provision of education opportunity to all citizens 
• Provision of appropriate housing. 
• Provision of aid to needy families 
• Guarantee of appropriate jobs and minimum wage or income for the citizens. 
• Respect of human rights 
• Consolidation of the citizen's confidence m the armed forces and 
highlighting the importance of their roles 
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• Rewarding ofthe faithful, creative, and penalisation ofthe delinquent. 
• Appointing the right person for the right position. 
The more the citizen is solidly aware of the keen desire of the state organs and 
institutions to provide him and his family members with a decent life as well as with 
employment opportunities, treatment and basic service, the more the citizen will be 
anxious to discharge his patriotic duties to his country and demonstrate his loyalty 
and preparedness to defend it when the need arises. 
(6) Citizens 
Each citizen must be aware that his role in citizenship and progress is no less 
important or great than that of the government and its institutions. The feelings of 
the Jove and adoration for the homeland must not stop at the mere expressions and 
words. It should be translated into good deeds that serve the public interest over the 
personal interest, that he/she must contribute to the resolution of the state problems, 
create constructive foundations within their family that must embrace the honourable 
values and ethics of the religion as well as the customs and traditions ofthe country. 
The citizen can also mirror the feelings of love, loyalty and good citizenship by 
showing respect to the rules and regulations, by participating in enforcing them, by 
reflecting this attitude in his dealings with the others, by respecting the other opinion 
and liberating himself from mediocre personal whims as shown in the attitudes 
indicative of: 
• Self-focus (egotism) 
• Impotence in confronting problems and difficulties 
11 Accusing others of failure and default 
11 Rejection of development 
• Rejection of the other opinion 
Citizenship and patriotism need practical behaviour through which the individual 
expresses the feelings and sentiments they harbours for the country. The Jove of the 
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homeland must take the shape of ongoing and everlasting endeavour for its 
development and progress. The skills that any citizen must acquire include: 
11 Critical thinking skills 
• Effective participation in the political life (elections) skills 
• Social service and volunteer work skills 
• Group work skills 
Many specialists and experts in the field of patriotism and citizenship have identified 
the major characteristics on which the effective patriotism rests. Dynneson has 
summarised these characteristics as follow: 12 
• Knowledge of contemporary events 
• Involvement in community affairs 
• Acceptance of liability 
• consideration to other peoples' affairs 
• Compliance with the rules of immaculate behaviour and ethics 
• Acceptance and obedience of those in authority (the rulers) 
• Ability to air and discuss opinions and views. 
• Ability to take the right decision. 
• Knowledge of the state systems, laws, and regulations. 
a Patriotism (love ofthe homeland) 
The King has provided Bahrain with the fertile soil from which all citizens can 
quietly proceed with the modernisation drive in utmost social grace and cohesion 
based on spontaneous confidence, which will make them trust each other like they 
candidly and unconditionally trust the physician. People are confident that the 
physician will not deliberately set out to hurt them because they expect him to abide 
by the Hippocratic Oath and the standards of the profession of medicine. So, how 
can they do not have confidence in their King who made a pledge to his people to 
promote them and guarantee their security and welfare? 
12 Thomas L. Dynneson, "Civism: Cultivating Citizenship in European History," Jan 2002. 
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6.9.2 Proposed Methodology ofthe National Education and Building of Citizenship 
The following is a broad proposed curriculum for the National Education and 
Building of Citizenship in Bahrain: 
Chapter One 
The Concept of Citizenship 
Characteristics of Effective Citizenship 
The Responsible Citizen 
National Education Tools and Media 
National Security (Military, Economic, Social) 
Social Service 
Military Service 
Civilisation 
Philosophy 
Chapter Two 
Rulers of Bahrain across the Ages 
King Hamad CV 
Pages from the First Book of Light 
Bahrain Pioneers 
Chapter Three 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain 
The Three Powers (Legislative, Executive, Judicial) 
The National Act Charter of the Kingdom Of Bahrain 
Parliamentary Life 
The Foundations of Bahrain Liberalisation, Not the Western Democracy 
Government Institutions 
The Resources ofthe State 
The Social Composition of Bahraini Society 
Role of the Armed Forces in Preserving the Kingdom's Security and Stability 
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Chapter Four 
Islam, a State, and a Religion 
The Role of Islam in the Clarification of the Citizens' Rights and Liberties 
The Most Significant Islamic Personalities 
Islam and Woman 
Chapter Five 
Bahrain and the World Map 
Bahrain and the Progress of the GCC 
Bahrain and the World 
Bahrain and the United Nations 
The Importance of Entire Global Economic Integration in the Light of International 
Contemporary Changes and Upheavals 
Human Rights 
International Agreements and Conventions (Economic, Political and Social) 
Chapter Six 
The Most Important Islamic Wars 
The Case of Hawar Islands 
The National Movement in Bahrain 
The Arab Israeli Dispute 
Historical Foreign Ambitions in Bahrain 
Analysis of the Leadership Personality in the Leaders of Historical Wars 
In the light of the proposed curriculum for the national education subject, it is 
important to satisfy and meet the scientific control requirements to help in the 
identification of the material suited for each classroom, what should be taught in a 
certain stage to begin with and the level at which it should terminate, and what 
should continue in more than one class room or educational level. The proposed 
curriculum also calls for standardisation, unique teaching methodology, select 
material and focus on practical applications and volunteer works so that the output 
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will be a student or a graduate whom we expect to have mastered the following 
skills: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
II 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
II 
• 
Sense of loyalty and belonging 
Adherence to ethical and virtuous traits 
Recognition and appreciation of the state's effort to develop the country 
Full awareness of the social, economic, and political problems and 
difficulties. 
Attention to the environment. 
Refection of social discrimination 
Rejection of violence and extremism 
Knowledge of the public rights, liberties and duties 
Ability of critical thinking 
Building of leadership personality 
Cooperation and participation in the decision making process 
Participation in problem solving 
The consequences of disrespect for the laws and regulations on the individual 
and the community 
• Ability form allowing the material and consumer progress and conspicuous 
behaviour to prevail over balanced mature thinking 
• Peaceful co-existence with all members of the community 
• Tolerance 
• Ability to gather data and draft research papers and articles 
• Ambition of reading books, newspapers and journals 
• The arts of managing debates and discussions 
• The art of toast mastering and public speech 
• Ability to apply the principles of democracy in dealing with others 
6.9.3 How to Develop the Virtues of Civics in the Military Sector 
Many countries which embraced national education sciences and democratic 
systems have been confronted with several problems in applying their problems to 
the military sectors because of the incompatibility of military methods and 
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regulations with the concepts of democracy and civics. The military systems are 
based on the independence of opinion, criticism, and accountability in favour of 
decision centralisation on the pretext of the leader's inspiration, wisdom, and 
infallibility. 
King Hamad's citizenship transcends all that to include the military sector which has 
thwarted many of the attempts by the other countries which adopted the initiative of 
building citizenship and the responsible citizen because some of the major intentions 
of the military sector do conflict with the process of building the citizenship and 
democracy. However, the King, with his own waviness, made the military forces 
contribute to the building process and participate in achieving his cultural virgin 
expectations without upsetting their main missions. 
However, if we take into consideration the fundamental characteristics and character 
traits that each military must acquire, we will not face any difficulty in the 
application of the concepts of democracy and civics, which include: 
11 Sacrifice for the homeland and the citizens 
11 Belonging and affiliation to the homeland 
11 Obedience and loyalty 
• Cohesion 
• Group endeavour 
• The art of leadership 
• Respect for the laws and regulations 
• And the other characteristics that are considered the foundation and bed rock 
of national education 
If the military sector adopts these strategies and inculcated them in its personnel and 
have them followed based on innate conviction, rather than on sporting the military 
uniform only, it would have achieved a high level of national education. if the 
military sector in the developing countries is the main source of technological and 
scientific progress and inventions, we can excel in the administrative and pedagogic 
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field because we are consumer countries and thus become an example to be 
emulated by the individuals of the civilian society as well as consolidate the 
ambitions of the King by injecting the civilian sector with highly qualified military 
elements with total loyalty to the nation and the King. 
We must also focus on having the personnel ofthe armed forces acquire good ethics 
and morals when they mix with the civilian society, such as good appearance, ideal 
driving habits, compliance with the civilian systems and codes, providing assistance 
to the needy, refraining from dumping trash on the streets, cultivation of the habit of 
reading, respect for the rights of others, fostering the spirit of love, cooperation and 
camaraderie while dealing with the civilians. 
6.9.4 How the Armed Forces can contribute to the Evolution of the National 
Education and the Good Citizen 
The armed forces can contribute through the following actions and procedures: 
11 Highlight their role in reassuring and sustaining the security of the 
community and the homeland through the media (TV, radio, newspapers and 
magazines). 
• While the military are allowed to vote, they must be protected against total 
identification with the plans and intentions of their representatives. The 
military must not be left under their influence of matters that may be in 
conflict with their lofty duty of protecting the nation and the King. The 
examples of incentives will include: 
w Pay raise to meet their basic requirements. 
w Cancellation of customs duties on cars. 
w Provision of shaded parking for their cars. 
w Granting personal loans to those who need them. 
w Provision of suitable housing. 
w Any other incentives and services that will make them appreciative of 
the military service. 
• Appreciation, recognition, and development of creative initiatives. 
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• Highlighting their role in teaching the sons of the nations in the various 
universities of the world. 
• Highlighting the role of the medical services and the sophisticated semi free 
medical care, they provide. 
• Highlighting their role in crisis and disaster management and the potential 
support, they will give to the civilian society in such circumstances. 
• Conservation of the environment. 
• Assistance to needy families. 
• Cleaning up of the beaches and villages. 
• Establishment of national investment projects such as fisheries farms. 
• Participation with the educational institutions in teaching and research. 
• Organisation of summer courses for civilian student to teach them the 
fundamentals of military service, such as discipline, cooperation, physical 
fitness ... etc. 
• Initiation of charitable projects (construction of a mosque, school... etc). 
• Respect for human rights when dealing with people accused in cases. 
• Setting an example of dedication, courage, sacrifice, loyalty, and self-denial. 
• Upgrading the standards of training and education to develop and enhance 
job performance. 
11 Participation by the armed forces personnel in the sophisticated upbringing 
of their children to excel in their studies and acquire physical fitness based 
on the ethical values derived from religion. 
• Encouragement of the military to participate m societies and convey a 
favourable image ofthe military, their skills, and capabilities. 
• Participation in sports clubs within the civilian associations to mitigate the 
sensitivity of the relationship between the military and the civilians and 
encourage camaraderie between them. 
• Encouragement of volunteering initiatives. 
• Amendment of the regulations and laws to better suit the upcoming stage. 
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Hence, the armed forces must formulate a strategic plan derived from the supreme 
commander's plan, covering the acceptance of change, development of creative 
potentials, and not allow the armed forces established by the supreme commander 
frustrate the hopes and aspirations for the building of a new future for Bahrain as did 
happen in many countries. This means that the armed forces must assume an 
effective role in the civilian endeavour and the construction of the new and modem 
state, besides the basic duties assigned to them. 
6.9.5 Results and Findings 
The following are the most important conclusions we reach from the discussion of 
the concept of citizenship and building the responsible citizen: 
• Establishment of a national centralised administration to be responsible for 
the development and monitoring of citizenship character across all levels of 
the state. 
• The civics and national education must be one of the important imperatives 
ofthe efforts ofthe social education institutions. 
• Focus on the local concept (state) ofthe citizenship and due observance of its 
global implications. 
• Focus by the character building media on fostering affiliation, loyalty, and 
accountability. 
11 Inculcation of the Islamic faith and true Arabic values in the citizen. 
11 Development of a standardised curriculum for the national education subject 
to be taught according to the needs ofthe various educational levels. 
11 Re-evaluation of the history curriculum in the light of modem citizenship 
dimensions and repercussions. 
• Development of teacher training programs and teaching methodology in the 
light of the new citizenship concept. 
• Fortification of the citizenship values against the impacts of globalisation 
values. 
• Due attention to the media and culture which will have a greater role in 
highlighting and projecting the historical and cultural identity of Bahrain, as 
318 
well as the national Issues and social problems and the citizen's role in 
resolving them. 
• Attempts should be made to identify the causes leading to low civics 
standards, such as unemployment, the housing crisis, low living standards, 
appearance of class differences in the community, lack of political and 
economic stability, absence of freedom of expression. 
• Activation of educational research in the concepts of citizenship and the best 
approaches to develop it within the family and the school. 
• Launching of educational campaigns for the mothers on how to raise good 
and well-adjusted generations. 
• Encouragement of volunteering initiatives and launching of awareness 
campaigns. 
• Support for needy families by using scientific and social methods to make 
them progressively producing until they attain self-sufficiency. 
• Paying due attention to sports as a field of educational investment that 
consolidates the piles of affiliation and citizenship. 
• Accommodation of critique curriculum in human studies, such as criticism of 
racism and discrimination in all their forms, critique of superstitious and 
mythical mentality, interpretation of irrational behaviour ... etc. 
1!1 Translation of the civics textbooks into most languages of the expatriate 
communities living in Bahrain so that they may understand the basic 
objectives of the citizenship concept and not to impede the progress. 
• Attempts to discourage material and consumer progress and conspicuous 
behaviour to prevail over balanced thinking. 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
The King has established the foundations of the national education and building of 
patriotism and has set forth a fresh page in the history of Bahrain. The onus for this 
is on the King himself to monitor closely the implementation of reforms and to 
intervene directly when the pace of implementation has slowed. 
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The people of Bahrain can use this as a launching pad to complete and see the 
journey through if they can understand the objectives and aspirations of their leader 
and if all government, private institutions and the citizen themselves contributed to it. 
In essence, the central recommendation which is required as a first step to provide 
security and also enable further stable reform is the development of a sophisticated 
and achievable citizenship programme. Here, the key to achieving this is through a 
national education programme. 
Each individual is born to be a citizen, but the state organs are in a position to 
transform him/her into a good and responsible citizen. This sector is considered the 
executive arm of the King's policies and strategies, by reflecting the King's 
aspirations through work plans that boost this relationship between the citizen and 
his community on the one hand and the citizen and the state and the nation on the 
other hand. Educational bodies are a key ingredient in this mix. 
Generations should be educated now in school on how to become effective citizens. 
Ignite their imagination to renew the vision of the past and adapt it to the awesome 
challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Engage them in the improvement 
of their community, nation, and the world. Let us resolve to promote a revitalised 
citizenship education and empower youth to create a positive vision for the future 
and to participate in its manifestation. 
Bahrain could not advance forward if it will not look out for weakness of the 
individual that was created by the previous political system, because he becomes 
loyal to individuals and not the country, selfish, egotism, aggressive behaviour 
towards group, various forms of extremism, and weakness of the moral fabric of the 
society. Accordingly, any strategic plan for advancement and educating people for 
the new environment must start attacking those issues considered as critical ones. 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusions 
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This research study into Bahrain's new era of reforms has underlined the 
interpretation that a new departure from the political order of the past has taken 
place and is a genuine product of elite driven reform. The reforms predated the 
initial post 9/11 international context which saw political reform at the heart of the 
Bush administration's grand strategy. All these changes underline that they were 
born domestically rather than reactively from external pressure on this issue which 
epitomised the era of the War on Terror. The initial years after King Hamad's 
succession to the throne can be understood as a historic period of upheaval and a 
fundamental reordering of the political order of Bahrain. Its importance should not 
be underestimated as such reforms have begun Bahrain's journey into a new era 
which holds a true promise of optimism that crosscuts age old sectarian divides. 
Whilst progressive and identifiable changes have taken place, the thesis has also 
provided a detailed contextualisation of the actual character of the reforms by 
evaluating them against the challenges which remain inherent in the Bahraini 
political system. This has also allowed recommendations to be posed to enhance the 
policy relevance of this thesis. Together, these features allow this thesis to fill a 
void in the existing literature on Bahrain and make an original scholarly contribution. 
What follows in this chapter will be a revisiting of the thesis and some concluding 
observations on the overall original contribution of the study to scholarship in this 
field. It will also seek to identify further areas for scholarship from which this thesis 
has shown would allow for a yet greater understanding of the political processes 
within the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
As has been shown, Bahrain has existed for more than two hundred years under the 
AI Khalifa clan. The Sunni AI Khalifa family took over Bahrain in 1783. Prior to 
King Hamad's reign, Bahrain suffered from clear problems in several key areas. 
The country showed a level of socio-political division which was laced with 
inequality that caused the longstanding unruly and violent unrest. This was 
exhibited in the 1994-1999 period but also occurred in 1921, 1938, 1953-1956, 1965, 
and in a more limited situation, in the early 1970s and the early 1980s. 
322 
Since its independence in 1971, Bahrain has attempted to reform its political system 
and, by 1973, had its own constitution which guaranteed legislative powers to the 
elected members of parliament. This reform process ultimately failed given the 
manner in which Bahrain's sectarian character and adoption of a liberalisation 
agenda threatened the position of the ruling family. Although the government 
suspended the National Assembly in 1975, it was a period in which economic 
growth continued. Nevertheless, political development effectively ground to a halt 
until the new era under question in this thesis came into being. This underlines the 
importance of this period of reform under King Hamad. Under the rule of Amir Isa 
bin Salman, its policy can be generally characterised as desiring to maintain and 
develop within the status quo - a policy typical of some of the other GCC states at 
that time. However, the regional context of the Iran Iraq war further inflamed the 
Sunnis and Shia identity within Bahrain which came to dominate the internal 
security priorities of the country. This was further compounded by the well 
documented Iranian sponsored coup attempted in 1981. 
The other contextual feature which this thesis has shown is critical to understanding 
the political process in Bahrain is the tension inside the ruling family between the 
older conservative bloc and the younger new generations whom can be understood 
as the pragmatists. The youngest generation is mainly integrated into the process of 
globalisation and is pushing hard to promote a liberal age. King Hamad and Crown 
Prince Salman are typical of this new and progressive mindset. Meanwhile, the 
older conservative bloc still perceives the world according to a black and white Cold 
War mindset which seeks to continue rule through the old traditional system. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Bahrain, it is economic factors that undercut all of these 
factors and remain the historical cause of political grievances and insecurity. 
In terms of the substance of the reforms, this thesis can conclude that the reforms 
have been far reaching in political and legislative spheres but they have also 
reconstituted the traditional social contact towards countering the dissatisfaction that 
existed under the old order of Amir Isa bin Salman. The King's pledge to revive the 
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liberalisation experiment in the Kingdom underscores an awareness of the popular 
basis of monarchic authority. The design of the National Action Charter, the debates 
around it, the nature of its introduction, and the implementation of its 
recommendations mark the first successful top-down execution of wide-ranging 
political reforms in the GCC. In this case, "the leader is himself the revolutionary 
agent, rather than the protector of the status quo and of so-called 'conservative 
values' ." 1 
King Hamad has brought many changes to Bahrain since coming to power after his 
father's death on 6 March 1999. His steps are a welcome series of moves that are 
long overdue. They hold the real promise of reconciliation, of breaking a very long 
cycle of mistrust between the government and the people, and also between various 
sectors of the population whose mistrust has turned to, at times, violent opposition. 
At the same time, the moves made so far are merely preliminary and may be 
essentially characterised as promises for future substantive changes. They may well 
be necessary first steps, but they tackle only one part of a major set of problems and 
challenges facing Bahrain today and in the future. The changes to the 1973 version 
of the constitution of Bahrain under King Hamad are instructive. The adoption of a 
bicameral structure as opposed to a unicameral one that existed in the 1973 
constitution indicates that the reform to the political sphere can be understood as a 
gradualist liberalisation process. Given the broad context of Bahrain's political 
history, especially the unruly opposition and sectarian character, reform is bringing 
Bahrain into a new era which is seen by some as a threat to the status quo. It is 
possible to conclude that King Hamad is having to carefully navigating and 
compromise between those who seek maintenance ofthe historical political situation 
and those pragmatists who believe security can only be achieved in the long-term 
through dealing with these challenges. Amongst other factors, King Hamad is 
seeking to maintain the AI Khalifa dynasty for the future and so it is not 
unreasonable for him to proceed with caution and at a gradual pace. This however 
1 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Reform from above: the politics of participation in the oil monarchies," 
ltiternational Affairs Volume 79, Number I, Janu-ary 2003, p. 66. 
324 
does not detract from the actual significance and substance of the reforms enacted 
thus far. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to further liberalisation is the opposition's own lack of 
common purpose. The opposition agree that there ought to be a parliament, and they 
cooperated in demanding a resumption of parliamentary life after the suspension of 
the Assembly in 1973. But that is about the extent of their common programme. 
They have certainly not cooperated much in recent years to further trim the power of 
the government. Given the character of the reform process being partly geared 
towards ensuring the traditional rule of the AI Khalifa dynasty, it is important for the 
opposition to recognise that challenging the King and the very concept of rule by the 
AI Khalifa will only undermine the prospect of future reforms actually being 
undertaken. Indeed, given the need for King Hamad having to operate within a 
tribal structure, he has to work hard to overcome and persuade the powerful 
conservative elements in the ruling family. It is possible to conclude here that the 
future pace of reform has a great deal to do with the opposition: it needs to realise 
that only by supporting and encouraging the King's initiatives whilst being mindful 
not to be seen as a threat through demonstrations and radical rhetoric, may the King 
overcome the reluctance typical amongst the conservatives to implement yet more 
reforms. 
The constitution shows that the power is concentrated in the executive arm of the 
government, and in particular with the head of state. The reforms can be understood 
as a controlled liberalisation in several spheres but have not extending to the actual 
powerbase of the monarchy. Indeed, the textual analysis of the constitution shows 
that the reforms have not taken away the powers of the head of state when compared 
to the situation prior the adoption of the amended constitution in 2002. What can be 
concluded from this analysis, and indeed from the critical discourse analysis of the 
speeches of the King, is that there is uncertainty as to what the final political 
structure of Bahrain should be. This tells us that Bahrain has an elite driven and 
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controlled reform process that is liberalising in character but not at the expense of 
the power enjoyed by the ruling elite. 
After discussing the reform, one can be sure that King Hamad's reforms are way 
from democratisation. Democracy means a form of government in which, in 
contrast to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a 
political community in which there is some form of political equality among the 
people and rule by the people.2 All the steps provided and implemented could only 
be described as liberalisation practices. What can be concluded from the 
parliamentary and legislative restructuring is that a blueprint for the future political 
system in Bahrain has come into being. It is likely to be an initial blueprint as 
changes will understandably take place. However, it is informative in that it gives 
an indication that Bahrain is moving towards a more liberalised political system and 
one where there is a greater separation of powers between the three arms of 
government. This point in particular is very important and has been illustrated in 
chapter three through the comparative analysis of the Bahrain's systems before and 
after the new reforms. 
Furthermore, it is telling that the liberalised environment is already beginning to 
show tangible results. The number of NGOs, both political and social, operating in 
Bahrain has risen markedly under King Hamad when compared to the old system. 
One can infer from this that the King is seeking to promote a new political culture 
and political arena for civil society which ideally will receive backing from a unified 
responsible citizenry. Here the development of citizenship will be key element to 
future success. Indeed, it is possible to speculate that this top down reform process 
is aiming to promote changes at the very base of society, not necessarily so it 
becomes a driver of reforms, but so the benefits of the new reforms can be felt by a 
cross section of society. 
2 1bid. 
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The new reforms in the social, economic, and human rights issues are further 
evidence of the revolutionary character in which King Hamad has steered Bahrain. 
The reforms show a clear understanding of the domestic problems facing Bahrain's 
society and also the potential threat this could pose to stability. The initial reform 
initiatives discussed show the pragmatism of the young King: it was an undertaking 
geared towards fostering national consensus behind his liberalisation programme. 
King Hamad has brought drastic and unexpected changes took place in the Kingdom. 
Royal pardons were granted to political detainees and exiles, women were given the 
right to vote and run for parliament, free speech, and free media also became the 
norm amongst several others. The key interpretations that can be made from the 
analysis contained in chapter 4 is that the major substance of King Hamad's reforms 
concern a progressive liberalising of the economic and social spheres whilst also 
taking into account key human rights concerns. These changes at civil society level 
are not necessarily a democratisation initiative, but such progressive liberalisation 
most likely will foster the development of a healthier socio-political culture that 
makes an eventual move towards democracy more likely. In other words the King 
has planted the seeds for reform that eventually may grow into a political system that 
caters for all of its citizens with respect, equality, and justice. 
Despite the reform initiates being progressive, the thesis was able to highlight in 
chapter 5 that genuine challenges still remained. It became clear that despite it being 
an elite driven process, there was a general lack up 'follow-up' by the elites on what 
has been done. There is a need for the King to go beyond setting a strategic vision 
and actually check on the specific details of what has or has not been implemented. 
Whilst this is undoubtedly time consuming, changing the culture and system of 
government in Bahrain is unlikely to be realised unless the ruling elite actually adopt 
this. This is all the more important as a reform process being driven by the elites 
cannot simply rely on the government to enact a strategic vision when it is but one 
feature of what the King seeks to reform. In other words, there is a need for the 
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King and Crown Prince to take a direct and proactive role in the implementation of 
the reforms at a detailed rather than just only a strategic level. 
In fact, the government is not taking senous steps to encounter equality of 
opportunity for citizens, social justice, citizen to work and to choose the type of 
work, guarantees the provision of job opportunities for its citizens, and to prevent 
poverty, as the numbers of citizen in the range of poverty are increasing.3 Although 
more freedoms have been enacted to civil society through the liberal aspects of the 
constitution amongst others, the implementation process has been identified as a 
clear challenge which brings into question the substance of the reform process. 
Examples include the equality which is guaranteed in the constitution: the question 
of Bahraini Shia and certain Sunni tribes being not accepted into the military is a 
prime example of discrimination which, for many observers, underlines that the 
rights guaranteed in the constitution are not fulfilled in practice. Privileges enjoyed 
by the elites are yet a further example of inequality and discrimination which goes 
against the very rights on equality that is enshrined in the constitution. However, it 
is important to realise the caveat that given this thesis focusing on the immediate 
period of the unveiling of the reform process, it is understandable that it may take 
some time for the system to adjust to the new reality. Therefore, the question of 
implementation would be an area for future research as a long-term retrospective 
study will allow for a valid interpretation to be formulated. 
Many obstacles stand in the way of any further movement toward reform. First, the 
ruling family will not lightly give up its control of the ministries of sovereignty, nor 
is it likely to allow the parliament to decide which AI Khalifa sheikhs get which 
posts. These are core prerogative of the family, tied directly to its internal balance 
of power and to its method of resolving internal disputes. Second, while there is a 
strong desire for more democracy in some quarters, the ruling family enjoys real 
3 United Nations Development Programme, "The Arab Human Development Report 2004," National 
Press, Amman, Jordan. See also "Poverty in Bahrain," Decumentary, Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights, www;bchr.net. 
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legitimacy. The 2002 Constitution, calls for a parliament but also grants the 
executive branch a major role in country. 
Overall, some questions, though, still remain: whether reform can be pushed from 
above and whether the intervention of the King reinforces the sense of an arbitrary 
process of rule. The government's strategy, consisting in a mixture of control, co-
opting and political bargaining, has undermined the autonomy of the interest groups 
and has frequently caused leading figures to give in. Civic organisations 
demonstrate great willingness to engage in cooperative bargaining. Bahrain is 
playing a war of attrition. It is wearing away its resources in wining loyalty. 
Shia have supported liberalisation of the system since the 1920s. Disappointment 
with the limited role of the new institutions and with a series of royal decrees has 
shattered a short-lived faith in the government's capacity for liberalisation. While 
the civic-organisational dynamic takes a progressive course, a decline in 
"liberalisation enthusiasm" is becoming apparent. Many opposition regard the new 
institutions as a means for stabilising the ruling family under a new look. Whatever 
their beliefs, the opposition should be wiser and use the good faith of the uniqueness 
character of King Hamad for their future. They should not forget the fact that the 
King, as modernist, was raised up as a tribal man, and could easily return to his 
dynasty ruling technique. The opposition should work together with the King and 
win his support for better future to their sects. 
With its plans for reform, the new political elite in Bahrain have demonstrated a 
certain flexibility and capacity to learn. But public discussion of mistakes or 
perceived problems remains, to some extent, prohibited, and this could limit the 
political actors' ability to learn. Although the government has sufficient political 
authority to implement reforms, it appears to lack the will to overcome ingrained 
habits in forming policy. Here the onus is on the elites to not only deliver the vision, 
but also to ensure it is implemented. However, one can be optimistic for the future 
of Bahrain as the King's agenda holds the promise of a new system being adopted 
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which addresses the pressing social, political, and economic problems that exist 
within Bahrain. Indeed, the lesson that can be learned from Bahrain for the wider 
Gulf region is that over time and after the gradual depletion of oil revenue, a need 
for political change to keep check with the political appetite of the people in a post-
oil political economy will become the norm. Full parliamentary democracy in GCC 
states will not be achieved any time soon. But the parliamentary life that is 
underway in Kuwait, and on the way in Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, should not be 
dismissed lightly. Here, neighbouring states can learn from Bahrain that a failure to 
adopt a long term political development strategy is the key obstacle to the realisation 
of a rapid reform process. In other words, reform should be enacted as a long term 
pragmatic vision and not left to when a national security crisis is being faced. 
Fortunately Bahrain has not reached a crisis point and King Hamad is acting with 
long term pragmatism. This is a lesson neighbouring states should learn if they are 
to be also ruled with vision, wisdom and courage. 
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Appendix 1 
Comparison between the amended constitution of 2002 and the 1973 one. 
The Constitution of The Constitution of 
14 February 2002 6 December 1973 
Chapter I The State Part One The State 
Article 1 !Sovereignty, Constitutional Article 1 [Islamic State] 
Monarchy] 
a. The Kingdom of Bahrain is a fully (a) Bahrain is an Arab Islamic State, 
sovereign. independent Islamic Arab State independent and fully sovereign, and its 
whose population is part of the Arab nation and people are part of the Arab nation. Neither its 
whose territory is part of the great Arab sovereignty nor any part of its territory shall 
homeland. Its sovereignty may not be assigned be relinquished. 
or any of its territory abandoned. 
b. The regime ofthe Kingdom of Bahrain is (b) The rule ofBahrain shall be hereditary, 
that of a hereditary constitutional monarchy, the succession to which shall be transmitted 
which has been handed down by the late from His Highness Sheikh lsa bin Salman AI 
Sheikh !sa bin Salman AI Khalifa to his eldest Khalifa to his eldest son and then to the eldest 
son Sheikh Hamad bin !sa AI Khalifa, the son of this eldest son and so forth, generation 
King. Thenceforward it will pass to his eldest after generation, unless during his lifetime, 
son, one generation after another, unless the the Amir appoints one of his sons other than 
King in his lifetime appoints a son other than the eldest as his successor, in accordance with 
his eldest son as successor, in accordance with the provisions of the Decree of Succession 
the provisions of the Decree on inheritance provided for in the next clause. 
stated in the following clause. 
c. All provisions governing inheritance are (c) All rules of succession shall be regulated 
regulated by a special Royal Decree that will by a special Amiri decree, which shall be of a 
have a constitutional character, and which can constitutional nature and thus shall not be 
only be amended under the provisions of amended except in accordance with Article 
Article 120 ofthe Constitution. I 04 of this Constitution. 
d. The system of government in the Kingdom (d) The system of government in Bahrain is 
of Bahrain is democratic, sovereignty being in democratic, under which sovereignty lies 
the hands of the people, the source of all with the people, the source of all powers. 
powers. Sovereignty shall be exercised in the Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner 
manner stated in this Constitution. specified in this Constitution. 
e. Citizens, both men and women, are entitled (e) The citizens shall have the right to 
to participate in public affairs and may enjoy participate in the public affairs of the State 
political rights, including the right to vote and and enjoy political rights, beginning with the 
to stand for elections, in accordance with this right to vote, in accordance with this 
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Constitution and the conditions and principles 
laid down by law. No citizen can be deprived 
of the right to vote or to nominate oneself 
for elections except by law. 
Constitution and the conditions and 
procedures set forth in the law. 
f. This Constitution may be amended only (f) This Constitution shall not be amended 
partly, and in the manner provided herein. except in part and in the manner provided for 
therein, and no amendment thereto shall be 
proposed before the expiry of five years 
from the effective date of its 
commencement. 
Article 2 [State Religion, Shari'a, Official 
Language) 
The religion of the State is Islam. The Islamic 
Shari'a is a principal source for legislation. 
The official language is Arabic. 
Article 3 [Flag) 
The State flag, emblem, logos, honours, and 
national anthem are laid down by law. 
Chapter II Basic Constituents of Society 
Article 4 I State Principles J 
Justice is the basis of government. 
Cooperation and mutual respect provide a firm 
bond between citizens. Freedom, equality, 
security, trust, knowledge, social solidarity, 
and equality of opportunity for citizens are 
pillars of society guaranteed by the State. 
Article 5 )Family) 
a. The family is the basis of society, deriving 
its strength from religion, morality, and love of 
the homeland. The law preserves its lawful 
entity, strengthens its bonds and values, under 
its aegis extends protection to mothers and 
children, tends the young, protects them from 
exploitation, and safeguards them against 
moral, bodily, and spiritual neglect. The State 
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Article 2 [Sharia) 
Islam shall be the religion of the State, 
Islamic Sharia a main source of legislation, 
and Arabic the official language. 
Article 3 [Flag, Anthem) 
The law shall specify the State's flag, 
emblem, insignia, medals, orders and national 
anthem. 
Part II Fundamental Constituents of 
Society 
Article 4 [State Principles] 
Justice underlies the system of government. 
Co-operation and mutual understanding are 
firm bonds among citizens. Liberty, equality, 
security, tranquillity, education, social 
solidarity, and equal opportunities for citizens 
are the pillars of society guaranteed by the 
State. 
Article 5 [Family] 
(a) The family is the comer stone of society 
and its strength lies in religion, morality and 
patriotism. The law shall preserve its legal 
integrity and strengthen its bonds and values, 
and shall protect motherhood and childhood 
within the family. The law shall also protect 
the young and defend them against 
exploitation and moral, physical, and spiritual 
cares in particular for the physical, moral, and 
intellectual development of the young. 
b. The State guarantees reconciling the 
duties of women towards the family with 
their work in society, and their equality with 
men in political, social, cultural, and 
economic spheres without breaching the 
provisions of Islamic canon law (Shari' a). 
c. The State guarantees the requisite social 
security for its citizens in old age, sickness, 
disability, orphanhood, widowhood, or 
unemployment, and also provides them with 
social insurance and healthcare services. It 
strives to safeguard them against ignorance, 
fear, and poverty. 
d. Inheritance is a guaranteed right governed 
by the Islamic Shari'a. 
Article 6 (Arab and Islamic Heritage] 
The State safeguards the Arab and Islamic 
heritage. It contributes to the advancement of 
human civilization and strives to strengthen the 
bonds between the Islamic countries, and to 
achieve the aspirations of the Arab nation for 
unity and progress. 
Article 7 [Education ( 
a. The State sponsors the sciences, humanities 
and the arts, and encourages scientific research. 
The State also guarantees educational and 
cultural services to its citizens. Education is 
compulsory and free in the early stages as 
specified and provided by law. The necessary 
plan to combat illiteracy is laid down by law. 
b. The law regulates care for religious and 
national instruction in the various stages and 
forms of education, and at all stages is 
concerned to develop the citizen's personality 
and his pride in his Arabism. 
c. Individuals and bodies may establish private 
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neglect. The State shall take particular care 
of the physical, mental, and moral growth of 
youth. 
(b) The State shall ensure the accomplishment 
of necessary social security for citizens in old 
age, sickness, inability to work, orphanhood, 
widowhood or unemployment. The State 
shall also provide them with services of social 
insurance and medical care, and strive to 
protect them from ignorance, fear, and 
poverty. 
Article 6 [Arab Heritage] 
The State shall preserve the Arab and Islamic 
heritage, it shall participate in the furtherance 
of human civilisation, and it shall strive to 
strengthen ties with the Muslim countries and 
to bring to fruition the aspirations of the Arab 
Nation for unity and advancement. 
Article 7 [Sciences and Education] 
(a) The State shall patronise the sciences, 
literature and the arts, and shall encourage 
research . It shall ensure educational and 
cultural services of citizens. Primary 
education shall be compulsory and free in 
accordance with the law. The law shall lay 
down the necessary plan to eliminate 
illiteracy. 
(b) The law shall regulate the various aspects 
of religious education and attention also be 
given to the strengthening of the citizen's 
personality and pride in his Arab 
Nationalism. 
(c) Individuals and bodies may establish 
schools and universities under the supervision 
of the State and in accordance with the law. 
d. The State guarantees the inviolability of the 
places ofleaming. 
Article 8 )Health Care) 
a. Every citizen is entitled to health care. The 
State cares for public health and the State 
ensures the means of prevention and treatment 
by establishing a variety of hospitals and 
healthcare institutions. 
b. Individuals and bodies may establish private 
hospitals, clinics, or treatment centres under 
the supervision of the State and in accordance 
with the law. 
Article 9 )Property! 
a. Ownership, capital and work-- in 
accordance with the principles of Islamic 
justice-- are basic constituents of the social 
entity of the State and the national wealth, and 
are all individual rights with a social function 
regulated by law. 
b. Public funds are inviolate, and it is the duty 
of every citizen to protect them. 
c. Private ownership is protected. No one shall 
be prevented from disposing of his property 
within the limits of the law. No one shall be 
dispossessed of his property except for the 
public good in the cases specified and the 
manner stated by law and provided that he is 
fairly compensated. 
d. Public expropriation of funds is prohibited, 
and private expropriation shall be a penalty 
only by judicial ruling in the cases prescribed 
by law. 
e. The relationship between the owners of land 
and real estate and their tenants shall be 
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private schools under the supervision of the 
State and in accordance with the law. 
(d) Inviolability of the educational institutions 
shall be guaranteed by the State. 
Article 8 [Health! 
(a) Every citizen shall have the right to health 
welfare. The State shall care for public 
health, and ensure means of prevention and 
treatment by establishing various kinds of 
hospitals and provide medical faci lities. 
(b) Individuals and bodies may establish 
hospitals, clinics, or infirmaries under the 
supervision of the State and in accordance 
with the law. 
Article 9 [Property, Work] 
(a) Property, capital and work, in accordance 
with the principles of Islamic justice, shall be 
fundamental constituents of the social 
structure of the State and the national wealth. 
They are all individual rights with a social 
function regulated by the law. 
(b) Public property shall be inviolab le and its 
protection shall be the duty of every citizen. 
(c) Private property shall be well protected. 
No one shall be prevented from disposing of 
his property except within the limits of the 
law. No property shall be expropriated 
except in the public interest, in accordance 
with the law and provided that just 
compensation is paid. 
(d) General confiscation of property shall be 
prohibited. Confiscation of private property 
as a penalty may not be inflicted except by a 
court judgment and in the circumstances 
specified by the law. 
(e) The law shall regu late, on an economic 
basis with due regard being given to social 
regulated by law on economic principles while 
observing social justice. 
f. The State shall endeavour to provide housing 
for citizens with limited income. 
g. The State shall make the necessary 
arrangements to ensure the exploitation of land 
suitable for productive farming, and shall strive 
to raise the standards of farmers . The law lays 
down how small farmers are to be helped and 
how they can own their land. 
h. The State shall take the necessary 
measures for the protection of the 
environment and the conservation of 
wildlife. 
Article 10 [Economy[ 
a. The national economy is based on social 
justice, and it is strengthened by fair 
cooperation between public and private 
business. Its objective, within the limits of the 
law, is economic development according to a 
well-ordered plan and achievement of 
prosperity for the citizens, all within the 
bounds of the law. 
b. The State endeavours to achieve the 
economic union of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council states and the states of the Arab 
League, and everything that leads to 
rapprochement, cooperation, coordination 
and mutual assistance among them. 
Article 11 [Natural Resources[ 
All natural wealth and resources are State 
property. The State shall safeguard them and 
exploit them properly, while observing the 
requirements of the security of the State and of 
the national economy. 
Article 12 [Compensation[ 
The State guarantees the common liability of 
society in bearing the burdens arising from 
336 
justice, the relationship between landlords 
and tenants. 
(f) The State shall strive to provide housing 
for citizens with limited income. 
(g) The State shall make the necessary 
arrangements to ensure the utilisation of 
arable land in a productive manner, and shall 
endeavour to raise the standard of farmers. 
The law shall specify the means whereby 
assistance and ownership of land are granted 
to small farmers. 
Article 10 [Economy) 
(a) The national economy shall be based on 
social justice. It shall be founded on fair co-
operation between public and private sectors. 
Its aim shall be economic development 
within a well-conceived plan and 
achievement of prosperity for citizens, all 
within the limits oflaw. 
(b) The State shall strive for the attainment of 
Arab economic unity. 
Article 11 [Natural Resources] 
All natural resources shall be the property of 
the state. It shall ensure their preservation 
and proper utilisation, due regard being given 
to the requirements of the State's security and 
national economy. 
Article 12 [Solidarity, Duties[ 
The State shall ensure the solidarity of society 
in shouldering burdens resulting from 
public disasters and ordeals, and for disasters and natural calamities, and shall 
compensating those affected by war damage or provide compensation for damages or injuries 
as a result of performing their military duties. suffered by people as a result of a war or as a 
Article 13 [Work[ 
a. Work is the duty of every citizen, is required 
by personal dignity, and is dictated by the 
public good. Every citizen has the right to 
work and to choose the type of work within the 
bounds of public order and decency. 
b. The State guarantees the provision of job 
opportunities for its citizens and the fairness of 
work conditions. 
c. Compulsory work cannot be imposed on any 
person except in the cases specified by law for 
national exigency and for a fair consideration, 
or pursuant to a judicial ruling. 
d. The law regulates the relationship between 
employees and employers on economic basis 
while observing social justice. 
Article 14 (Savings, Credit] 
The State encourages cooperation and saving, 
and supervises the regulation of credit. 
Article 15 [Taxes[ 
a. Taxes and public costs are based on social 
justice, and their payment is a duty under the 
law. 
result of performing their military duties. 
Article 13 [Work] 
(a) Work shall be the duty of every citizen 
necessitated by personal dignity and public 
good. Every citizen shall have the right to 
work and to choose his type of work in 
accordance with public order and moral 
standards. 
(b) The State shall ensure that work is made 
avai lable to the citizens and that its terms are 
equitable. 
(c) No forced labour shall be imposed on 
anyone except in circumstances specified by 
the law for national emergency and with just 
remuneration, or as an implementation of a 
judicial decision. 
(d) Relations between employers and 
employees shall be regulated by the law on an 
economic basis, due regard being given to the 
principles of social justice. 
Article 14 [Savings, Credit[ 
The State shall encourage co-operation and 
saving, and supervise the regulation of credit. 
Article 15 [Taxes, Duties, Offices] 
(a) Taxes and public imports shall be based 
on the principles of social justice, and the 
payment thereof shall be duty in accordance 
with the law. 
b. The law regulates exemption of low incomes (b) Citizens shall have equal opportunities to 
from taxes in order to ensure that a minimum hold public offices in accordance with the 
standard of living is safeguarded. conditions specified by the law. 
Article 16 [Public Jobs[ 
a. Public jobs are a national service entrusted 
to their incumbents, and State employees shall 
have the public interest in mind when 
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performing their jobs. Foreigners shall not be 
entrusted with public posts except in those 
cases specified by law. 
b. Citizens are equal in the assumption of 
public posts in accordance with the conditions 
specified by law. 
Chapter Ill Public Rights and Duties 
Article 17 (Citizenship[ 
a. Bahraini nationality shall be determined by 
law. A person inherently enjoying his Bahraini 
nationali ty cannot be stripped of his nationality 
except in case of treason, and such other cases 
as prescribed by law. 
b. It is prohibited to banish a citizen from 
Bahrain or prevent him from returning to it. 
Part Three Public Rights and Duties 
Article 17 (Citizenship] 
(a) Citizenship shall be defined by the law, 
and no person enjoying citizenship by origin 
may be deprived of it except in cases of high 
treason and dual nationality and in 
accordance with the conditions specified by 
the law. 
(b) Citizenship may not be withdrawn from 
a naturalised citizen except within the 
limits of the law. 
(c) No citizen shall be deported from Bahrain, 
nor shall he be denied re-entry. 
Article 18 [Human Dignity, Equality( Article 18 [Human Dignity] 
People are equal in human dignity, and citizens People are equal in human dignity, and 
are equal before the law in public rights and citizens shall be equal in public rights and 
duties. There shall be no discrimination among duties before the law, without discrimination 
them on the basis of ru. origin, language, as to race, origin, language, religion or belief. 
religion or creed. 
Article 19 (Personal Freedom] Article 19 (Personal Liberty( 
a. Personal freedom is guaranteed under the (a) Personal liberty is guaranteed in 
law. accordance with the law. 
b. A person cannot be arrested, detained, (b) No person shall be arrested, detained, 
imprisoned, or searched, or his place of imprisoned, searched or compelled to reside 
residence specified or his freedom of residence in a specified place, nor shall the residence of 
or movement restricted, except under the any person or his liberty to choose his place 
provisions of the law and under judicial of residence or his liberty of movement be 
supervision. restricted, except in accordance with the law 
and under the supervision of the judicial 
authorities. 
c. A person cannot be detained or imprisoned (c) No detention or imprisonment shall be 
in locations other than those designated in the imposed in places other than those specified 
prison regulations covered by health and social in prison laws. In these places, health and 
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care and subject to control by the judicial 
authority. 
d. No person shall be subjected to physical or 
mental torture, or inducement, or undignified 
treatment, and the penalty for so doing shall be 
specified by law. Any statement or confession 
proved to have been made under torture, 
inducement, or such treatment, or the threat 
thereof, shall be null and void. 
Article 20 [Criminal Trials I 
a. There shall be no crime and no punishment 
except under a law, and punishment only for 
acts committed subsequent to the effective date 
of the law providing for the same. 
b. Punishment is personal. 
c. An accused person is innocent until proved 
guilty in a legal trial in which he is assured of 
the necessary guarantees to exercise the right 
of defence at all stages of the investigation and 
trial in accordance with the law. 
d. It is forbidden to harm an accused person 
physically or mentally. 
e. Every person accused of an offence must 
have a lawyer to defend him with his consent. 
f. The right to litigate is guaranteed under the 
law. 
Article 21 !Asylum] 
The extradition of political refugees is 
prohibited. 
Article 22 [Conscience, Religion! 
Freedom of conscience is absolute. The State 
guarantees the inviolability of worship, and the 
freedom to perform religious rites and hold 
religious parades and meetings in accordance 
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social welfare shall be observed, and they 
shall be subject to the supervision of the 
judicial authorities. 
(d) No person shall be subjected to physical 
or mental torture, enticement or degrading 
treatment and the law shall provide the 
penalty for these acts. Any statement or 
confession shall be null and void if it is 
proved to have been made under duress or 
enticement or degrading treatment of threat 
thereof. 
Article 20 [Penalty] 
(a) No crime or penalty may be established 
except by virtue of law, and no penalty may 
be imposed except for offences committed 
after the relevant law has come 
(b) Penalty is personal. 
(c) An accused person shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty in a legal trial in 
which the necessary guarantees for the 
exercise of his right of defence in all the 
stages of investigation and trial are ensured in 
accordance with the law. 
(d) No physical or moral injury shall be 
inflicted on an accused person. 
(e) A council for the defence of any person 
accused of a felony shall be appointed with 
the approval of the accused. 
(f) The right to trial shall be guaranteed in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 21 [Asylum] 
Extradition of political refugees is prohibited. 
Article 22 [Conscience, Religion] 
Freedom of conscience is absolute. The State 
shall guarantee the inviolability of places of 
worship and the freedom to perform religious 
rites and to hold religious processions and 
with the customs observed in the country. 
Article 23 [Expression) 
Freedom of opinion and scientific research is 
guaranteed. Everyone has the right to express 
his opinion and publish it by word of mouth, in 
writing or otherwise under the rules and 
conditions laid down by law, provided that 
the fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine 
are not infringed, the unity of the people is 
not prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism 
is not aroused. 
Article 24 [Pressj 
With due regard for the provisions of the 
preceding Article, the freedom of the press, 
printing and publishing is guaranteed under the 
rules and conditions laid down by law. 
Article 25 (Home[ 
Dwellings are inviolate. They cannot be 
entered or searched without the permission of 
their occupants exception in cases of maximum 
necessity as laid down and in the manner 
provided by law. 
Article 26 (Communication[ 
The freedom of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, 
and electronic communication is safeguarded 
and its confidentiality is guaranteed. 
Communications shall not be censored or their 
confidentiality breached except in exigencies 
specified by law and in accordance with 
procedures and under guarantees prescribed by 
law. 
Article 27 [Associations, Trade Unions[ 
The freedom to form associations and unions 
on national principles, for lawful objectives 
and by peaceful means is guaranteed under the 
rules and conditions laid down by law1 
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meetings in accordance with the customs 
observed in the country. 
Article 23 [Expression, Science) 
Freedom of speech and freedom to carry out 
scientific research shall be guaranteed. Every 
person shall have the right to express and 
propagate his opinion in words or in writing 
or by any other means, in accordance with the 
conditions and procedures specified by the 
law. 
Article 24 [Press) 
Freedom of the press, printing and publication 
shall be guaranteed in accordance with the 
conditions and procedure specified by the 
law. 
Article 25 [Homej 
Places of residence shall be inviolable. They 
may not be entered or searched without the 
permission of their occupants except in the 
circumstances and manner specified by the 
law. 
Article 26 (Communication) 
Freedom ofpostal, telegraphic, and 
telephonic communications and the secrecy 
thereof shall be guaranteed. No 
communications shall be censored nor the 
contents thereof revealed except in cases of 
necessity prescribed by the law and in 
accordance with the procedures and 
guarantees stated therein. 
Article 27 [Associations, Trade Unions) 
Freedom to form associations and trade 
unions on a nationa l basis and for lawful 
objectives and by peaceful means shall be 
guaranteed in accordance with the conditions 
provided that the fundamentals of the and procedures prescribed by the law. No 
religion and public order are not infringed. one shall be compelled to join or remain in 
No one can be forced to join any association or any association or union. 
union or to continue as a member. 
Article 28 [Assembly( 
a. Individuals are entitled to assemble privately 
without a need for permission or prior notice, 
and no member of the security forces may 
attend their private meetings. 
b. Public meetings, parades and assemblies are 
permitted under the rules and conditions laid 
down by law, but the purposes and means of 
the meeting must be peaceful and must not be 
prejudicial to public decency. 
Article 29 [Petition( 
Any individual may address the public 
authorities in writing over his signature. Group 
approaches to the authorities may only be 
made by statutory bodies and corporate 
persons. 
Article 30 [Military Service) 
a. Peace is the objective of the State. The 
safety of the nation is part of the safety of the 
Arab homeland as a whole, and its defence is a 
sacred duty of every citizen. Performance of 
military service is an honour for citizens and is 
regulated by law. 
b. Only the State may establish the Defence 
Force, National Guard, and Public Security 
services. Non-citizens are assigned such tasks 
only in case of maximum necessity and in the 
manner prescribed by law. 
c. General or partial mobilisation shall be 
regulated by law. 
Article 31 (Restrictions( 
The public rights and freedoms stated in this 
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Article 28 (Assembly) 
(a) Individuals shall have the right of private 
assembly without permission or prior 
notification, and no member of the security 
forces may attend such private meetings. 
(b) Public meetings, processions and 
gatherings shall be permitted in accordance 
with the conditions and procedures prescribed 
by the law, provided that their purpose and 
means are peaceful and not contrary to 
morale. 
Article 29 [Petition) 
Any individual can address the public 
authorities in writing and with his signature. 
Only duly constituted organizations and 
corporate bodies shall have the right to 
address the public authorities collectively. 
Article 30 [Military Service) 
(a) Peace shall be the objective of the State, 
and the safety of the country shall be part of 
the safety of the Great Arab Homeland, and 
defending it shall be the duty of every citizen. 
Military service is an honour for the citizens 
and regulated by law. 
(b) The State alone shall establish armed 
forces and public security bodies. Duties of 
this kind shall be entrusted only to citizens 
except in cases of dire necessity and in the 
manner regulated by the law. 
(c) Full or partial mobilisation of forces shall 
be regulated by the law. 
Article 31 [Restrictions) 
Public rights and liberties laid down in this 
Constitution may only be regulated or limited 
by or in accordance with the law, and such 
regulation or limitation may not prejudice the 
essence of the right or freedom. 
Chapter IV Public Authorities General 
Provisions 
[Section 0 General Provision] 
Article 32 (Separation of Powers[ 
a. The system of government rests on a 
separation of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial authorities while maintaining 
cooperation between them in accordance with 
the provisions of this Constitution. None of 
the three authorities may assign all or part of 
its powers stated in this Constitution. 
However, limited legislative delegation for a 
particular period and specific subject(s) is 
permissible, whereupon the powers shall be 
exercised in accordance with the provisions of 
the Delegation Law. 
b. Legislative authority is vested in the King 
and the National Assembly in accordance with 
the Constitution. Executive authority is vested 
in the King together with the Council of 
Ministers and Ministers, and judicial rulings 
are issued in his name, the whole being in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
Section 1 The King 
Article 33 I Head of State, Powers I 
a. The King is Head of State, and its nominal 
representative, and his person is inviolate. He 
is the loyal protector of the religion and the 
homeland, and the symbol of national unity . 
b. The King safeguards the legitimacy of the 
government and the supremacy of the 
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Constitution shall neither be regulated nor 
defined except by a law or in accordance 
therewith. Such regulation or definition shall 
not affect the essence of the right or liberty. 
Part Four Powers 
(Chapter 0 General Provision) 
Article 32 [System of Government] 
(a) The system of government shall be based 
on the principle of separation of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 
functioning in co-operation with each other in 
accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. None of the three powers may 
relinquish all or part of its competence 
prescribed in this Constitution. However, 
legislative authorization, limited for a certain 
period and in respect of a specified matter or 
matters, may be made, and shall be practiced 
in accordance with the law of authorisation 
and the condition thereof. 
(b) Legislative power shall be vested in the 
Amir and the National Assembly in 
accordance with the Constitution; and the 
Executive power shall be vested in the Amir, 
the Cabinet and the Ministers. Judicial 
decrees sha11 be passed in the name of the 
Amir, all in accordance with the provisions 
ofthe Constitution. 
Chapter I The Amir 
Article 33 [Head of State, Government) 
(a) The Amir is the Head of the State, his 
person shall be immune and inviolable, and 
he shall exercise his powers through his 
Ministers who shall collectively report to 
him on the general policy of the 
Government, and each Minister shall be 
responsible for the affairs of his Ministry. 
constitution and the law, and cares for the 
rights and freedoms of individuals and 
organisations. 
c. The King exercises his powers directly and 
through his Ministers. Ministers are jointly 
answerable to him for general government 
policy, and each Minister is answerable for 
the business of his Ministry. 
d. The King appoints and dismisses the Prime 
Minister by Royal Order, and appoints and 
dismisses Minjsters by Royal Decree as 
proposed by the Prime Minister. 
e. The Cabinet shall be re-formed as aforesaid 
in this article at the start of each legislative 
season of the National Assembly. 
(b) The Amir shall, after the traditional 
consultations, appoint the Prime Minister or 
relieve him of office by an Amiri decree. The 
Amir shall also appoint Ministers or relieve 
them of office by an Amiri decree, upon the 
recommendations of the Prime Minister. 
(c) Ministers shall not be appointed from 
f. The King appoints and dismisses members of amongst the members of the National 
the Consultative Council by Royal Order. Assembly in the first legislative term, but 
they may be appointed from amongst the 
members of the National Assembly or 
others with effect from the second 
legislative term. Ministers appointed from 
amongst outsiders shall become ex officio 
members of the National Assembly. The 
total number of ministers shall not exceed 
14.(d) The Cabinet shall be reconstituted in 
the manner set out in this article at the 
beginning of everv legislative term of the 
National Assembly. 
g. The King is the Supreme Commander of the (e) The Amir shall be the Supreme 
Defence Force. He commands it and charges Commander of the Defence Force. 
it with national tasks within the homeland 
and outside it. The Defence Force is directly 
linked to the King, and maintains the 
necessary secrecy in its affairs. 
h. The King chairs the Higher Judicial 
Council. The King appoints judges by 
Royal Orders, as proposed by the Higher 
Judicial Council. 
i. The King awards honours and decorations in (t) The Amir shall confer Orders of Honour in 
accordance with the law. accordance with the law. 
j . The King establishes, grants and 
withdraws civilian and military ranks and 
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other honourary titles by Royal Order, and 
can delegate others to carry out these 
functions on his behalf. 
k. The currency is issued in the name of the 
King in accordance with the law. 
I. On ascending the throne, the King takes the 
following oath at a special meeting of the 
National Assembly: 
"I swear by Almighty God that I shall respect 
the Constitution and the laws of the State, that 
I shall defend the freedoms. interests and 
assets of the people, and that I shall safeguard 
the independence of the nation and the 
integrity of its territories. " 
m. The Royal Court is attached to the King. 
A Royal Order shall be issued to regulate it. 
Its budget and the rules for the budget's 
control are set by a special Royal Decree. 
Article 34 I Deputy Head of State) 
a. In the event of his absence abroad and the 
inability of the Crown Prince to act for him, 
the King shall appoint a Deputy by Royal 
Order to exercise his powers during his period 
of absence. This Order may include a special 
regulation for the exercise of these powers on 
his behalf or may limit their scope. 
b. The conditions and provisions of Clause (b) 
of this Constitution shall apply to 48of Article 
the King's Deputy. If he is a Minister or a 
member of the Consultative Council or the 
Chamber of Deputies, he shall not participate 
in ministerial or parliamentary business 
during the period he deputises for the King. 
c. Before exercising his powers, the King's 
Deputy shall take the oath prescribed in the 
preceding Article, including the phrase: "and I 
shall be loyal to the King. " The oath shall be 
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(g) Currency shall be minted in the name of 
the Amir in accordance with the law. 
(h) The Amir shall protect the legality of 
the government and the supremacy of law, 
and shall take the following oath at a special 
sitting of the National Assembly: 
"I swear by Almighty God to respect the 
Constitution and the laws of the State, to 
defend the liberties. interests and properties 
of the people, and to safeguard the 
independence and territorial integrity of the 
country." 
(i) The Amir shall have an annual privy 
purse to be determined by a special Amiri 
decree. The privy purse may not be 
revised throughout the reign of the Amir, 
and shall thereafter be fixed by the law. 
Article 34 )Deputy) 
(a) In the event of his absence outside the 
country and the inability of the Heir Apparent 
to act as deputy for him, the Amir shall 
appoint by an Amiri Order a deputy who 
shall exercise his powers during his absence. 
The said Amiri Order may include a specified 
arrangement for the exercise of powers on 
behalfofthe Amir, or a limitation on their 
scope. 
(b) The provisions of item (b) of Article of 
this Constitution shall apply to the Amir's 
deputy. If the Amir's deputy is a Minister or 
a member of the National Assembly he shall 
not take part in the functions of his Ministry 
or the National Assembly during the period 
he is acting as deputy for the Amir. 
(c) Before assuming his powers, the Amir's 
deputy shall take the oath set forth in the 
previous article, with the fo llowing phrase 
added thereto: "and be loyal to the Amir." 
taken in the National Assembly if in session, 
and if not it shall be taken before the King. 
The Crown Prince shall take this oath once, 
even if he deputises for the King a number of 
times. 
Article 35 !Legislative Powers! 
a. The King may amend the Constitution, 
propose laws, and is the authority for their 
ratification and promulgation. 
b. A law shall be deemed ratified and the King 
shall promulgate it if six months have elapsed 
from the date on which it was submitted to him 
by the Consultative Council and Chamber of 
Deputies without it being returned to these 
Chambers for reconsideration. 
c. With due regard for the provisions pertaining 
to amendment of the Constitution, if within 
the interval prescribed in the preceding clause 
the King returns to the Consultative Council 
and the Chamber of Deputies for 
reconsideration the draft of any law by way of 
a Decree in justification, he shall state whether 
it should be reconsidered in that same session 
or the next. 
d. If the Consultative Council and the 
Chamber of Deputies, or the National 
Assembly, re-approve the draft by a majority 
of two-thirds oftheir members, the King shall 
ratify it, and shal l promulgate it within one 
month of its approva l for the second time. 
Article 36 !Declaration ofWarl 
a. Aggressive war is forbidden. A defensive 
war is declared by a Decree, which shall be 
presented to the National Assembly 
immediately upon its dec laration, for a 
decision on the conduct ofthe war. 
b. A state of national safety or martial law 
shall be proclaimed only by Decree. In all 
cases, martial law cannot be proclaimed for a 
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The oath shall be taken in the National 
Assembly if it is in session, otherwise it shall 
be taken before the Amir. The oath by the 
Heir Apparent shall be taken only once even 
if he acts as a deputy for the Amir more than 
once. 
Article 35 [Legislation] 
(a) The Amir shall have the right to initiate 
laws, and he alone shall ratify and promulgate 
the laws. 
(b) A bill shall be considered to have been 
ratified and shall be promulgated by the Amir 
if a period of thirty days from the date of its 
submission by the National Assembly to the 
Amir has expired without the Amir returning 
it to the National Assembly for re-
consideration. 
(c) If, within the period prescribed in the 
preceding clause the Amir returns the bill, by 
a decree stating the grounds therefore, to the 
National Assembly for re-consideration, then 
it shall be decided whether such re-
consideration should take place during the 
same or the next session. 
(d) If the Assembly re-confirms the bill by a 
majority vote of its members, the Amir shall 
ratify and promulgate the bill within one 
month from the date of the re- confirmation. 
Article 36 [War] 
(a) Offensive war is unlawful. The 
declaration of defensive war shall be made by 
an Amiri decree, which shall be referred to 
the National Assembly immediately after the 
declaration has been made, for decision. 
(b) Martial law shall be proclaimed only by 
law, unless otherwise dictated by urgent 
necessity to be by a decree giving the 
period exceeding three months. This period 
may not be renewed except with the consent of 
the majority of the members of the National 
Assembly present. 
Article 37 (Treaties] 
(I) The King shall conclude treaties by 
Decree, and shall communicate them to the 
Consultative Council and the Chamber of 
Deputies forthwith accompanied by the 
appropriate statement. A treaty shall have the 
force of law once it has been concluded and 
ratified and published in the Official Gazette. 
(2) However, peace treaties and treaties of 
alliance, treaties relating to State territory, 
natural resources, rights of sovereignty, the 
public and private rights of citizens, treaties 
pertaining to commerce, shipping and 
residence, and treaties which involve the State 
Exchequer in non-budget expenditure or which 
entail amendment ofthe laws of Bahrain, must 
be promulgated by law to be valid. 
(3) Under no circumstances may a treaty 
include secret clauses, which conflict with 
those openly declared. 
Article 38 (Decrees( 
(I) lfbetween the convening of both the 
Consultative Council and the Chamber of 
Deputies sessions, or during the period in 
which the National Assembly is in recess, any 
event should occur that requires expediting the 
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justification therefore, provided that the 
matter shall be referred to the National 
Assembly within two weeks for decision. ln 
all cases the period of martial law shall not 
exceed three months, but this period may be 
renewed in whole or in part once or more, 
provided that approval by a majority vote of 
the members constituting the National 
Assembly has been obtained. If the 
proclamation or renewal of martial law 
takes place during the period in which the 
National Assembly is dissolved, the matter 
shall be referred to the new Assembly at its 
first meeting. 
Article 37 [Treaties] 
(I) The Amir shall conclude treaties by 
decree and shall transmit them immediately to 
the National Assembly with the appropriate 
statement. A treaty shall have the force of 
law after it has been signed, ratified, and 
published in the Official Gazette. 
(2) However, treaties of peace and alliance; 
treaties concerning the territory of the State, 
its natural resources or sovereign rights or 
public or private rights of citizens; treaties of 
commerce, navigation and residence; and 
treaties which entail additional expenditure 
not provided for in the budget of the State, or 
which involve amendment to the laws of 
Bahrain, shall come into effect only when 
made by a law. 
(3) In no case may treaties include secret 
provisions contradicting those declared. 
Article 38 [Decrees] 
(I) Should necessity arise for urgent measures 
to be taken whi le the National Assembly is 
not in session or is dissolved, the Amir may 
issue decrees in respect thereof which shall 
have the force of law, provided that they sha ll 
adoption of measures that brook no delay, the not be contrary to the Constitution or the 
King may issue relevant Decrees that have the appropriations included in the budget law. 
force of law, provided they do not contravene 
the Constitution. 
(2) Such Decrees must be referred to both the (2) Such decrees shall be referred to the 
Consultative Council and the Chamber of National Assembly within fifteen days 
Deputies within one month from their following their issue if the Assembly is in 
promulgation if the two chambers are in session. If it is dissolved or its legislative 
session or within a month of the first meeting term has expired such decrees shall be 
of each of the two new chambers in the event referred to the next Assembly at its first 
of dissolution or if the legislative term had meeting. If they are not thus referred, they 
ended. If the Decrees are not so referred, their shall retroactively cease to have the force 
legal force shall abate retrospectively without a of a law without the necessity of any 
need to issue a relevant ruling. If they are decision to that effect. If they are referred 
referred to the two chambers but are not and the Assembly does not confrrm them, 
confirmed by them, their legal force shall also they shall also retroactively cease to have the 
abate retrospective ly. force of law, unless the Assembly approves 
their validity for the preceding period or 
settles in some other way the effects arising 
there from. 
Article 39 (Administrative Decrees) 
a. The King shall lay down the regulations for 
implementation of the laws, by Decrees, which 
shall not include amendment or suspension of 
those laws or exemption from their 
implementation. The law may prescribe a 
lower instrument than a Decree for 
promulgation of the regulations necessary for 
their implementation. 
b. The King shall lay down the control 
regulations and the regulations necessary for 
the organisation of public directorates and 
departments, by Decrees in a manner, which 
does not conflict with the laws. 
Article 40 [Officersl 
The King shall appoint and dismiss civil 
servants, military personnel, and political 
representatives in foreign States and with 
international organisations, within the bounds 
and on the conditions prescribed by law, and 
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Article 39 (Administrative Decrees) 
(a) The Amir shall by decrees, issue the 
regulations necessary for the execution of 
laws without amending or suspending such 
laws or making any exemption from their 
execution. A law may describe a less formal 
instrument than a decree for the issue of the 
regulations necessary for its execution. 
(b) The Amir shall, by decrees, issue 
regulations for public order and health, and 
regulations necessary for the organisation of 
public services and administration, not 
conflicting with any law. 
Article 40 [Officers[ 
The Amir shall appoint and remove civil and 
military officials and diplomatic 
representatives to foreign countries and 
international organisations in accordance with 
the law and in the manner prescribed therein. 
shall accredit the representatives of foreign 
States and organisations. 
Article 41 [Pardon, Amnesty[ 
The King may abate or commute a sentence by 
Decree. A total amnesty may be granted only 
by law, and shall apply to offences committed 
before the amnesty was proposed. 
Article 42 (Electoral Orders) 
a. The King shall issue the Orders for elections 
to the Chamber of Deputies in accordance with 
the provisions of the law. 
b. The King shall invite the National Assembly 
to convene by Royal Order, and shall open its 
proceedings and bring them to a close in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
Article 43 [Popular Referendum) 
The King may conduct a popular referendum 
on important laws and issues connected with 
the interests of the State. The issue on which 
the referendum has been held is considered to 
have been agreed upon if approved by a 
majority of those who cast their votes. The 
result of the referendum shall be binding on all 
and effective from the date it is declared and it 
shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
Section 2 The Executive Authority 
Article 44 (Composition] 
The Council of Ministers shall consist of the 
Prime Minister and a number of Ministers. 
Article 45 [Eligibility[ 
a. The incumbent of a Ministry must be a 
Bahraini, aged not less than 30 years by the 
Gregorian Calendar and must enjoy full 
political and civil rights. Unless otherwise 
provided, the provisions pertaining to Ministers 
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He shall also accept credentials of the 
representatives of foreign countries and 
organisations. 
Article 41 [Pardon] 
The Amir may, by decree grant a pardon or 
commute a sentence. However, amnesty shall 
not be granted except by a law and then only 
in respect of offences committed prior to the 
proposal of the amnesty. 
Chapter III Executive Power 
Section I The Cabinet 
Article 83 [Eligibility) 
(a) A Minister shall satisfy the qualifications 
laid down in Article 44 of this Constitution. 
Al l Provisions regarding Ministers shall apply 
to the Prime Minister unless otherwise stated. 
apply also to the Prime Minister. 
b. The salaries of the Prime Minister and 
Ministers shall be laid down by law. 
Article 46 (Oath of Office( 
Before exercising their powers, the Prime 
Minister and Ministers shall take the oath 
of this Constitution 78prescribed in Article 
before the King. 
Article 47 [Powers[ 
a. The Council of Ministers shall oversee State 
interests, lay down and follow through the 
implementation of general government policy, 
and supervise the course of business in the 
Government apparatus. 
b. The King shall chair those meetings of the 
Council of Ministers, which he attends. 
c. The Prime Minister shall supervise 
performance of the tasks of the Council of 
Ministers and the course of its business, 
implement its decisions and coordinate 
between the various Ministries and integrate 
their business. 
d. Relinquishment by the Prime Minister of his 
position for any reason shall entail removal of 
all Ministers from their posts. 
e. The deliberations of the Council of Ministers 
shall be confidential. Its decisions shall be 
adopted when a majority of its members attend 
and there is a majority of those attending in 
favour. In the event of a tied vote, the side on 
which the Prime Minister's vote is cast shall 
prevail. The minority shall abide by the 
opinion of the majority unless they resign. 
Council decisions shall be submitted to the 
King for approval in cases where issue of a 
relevant Decree is required. 
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(b) Remuneration of the Prime Minister and 
Ministers shall be determined by law. 
Article 84 (Oath of Office( 
Before assuming office, the Prime Minister 
and Ministers shall take before the Amir the 
oath specified in Article 53 of this 
Constitution. 
Article 85 [Powers] 
(a) The Cabinet shall have control over the 
departments of the State. It shall formulate 
the general policy of the Government, pursue 
its execution and supervise the functioning of 
the Government departments. 
(b) The Amir shall preside over the meetings 
of the Cabinet which he attends. 
(c) The Prime Minister shall supervise the 
functions and procedures of the Cabinet. He 
shall be responsible for the implementation of 
the Cabinet's decisions and the co-ordination 
among the various ministries, and to ensure 
that their functions are integrated. 
(d) The relinquishment of the position of the 
Prime Minister for any reason shall involve 
the relinquishment of all ministerial positions 
by the Ministers. 
(e) Deliberations of the Cabinet shall be 
secret. Resolutions shall be passed only when 
the majority of its members are present and 
with the approval of the majority of those 
present. In case of an equal division of votes, 
the side on which the Prime Minister has 
voted shall prevail. Unless they resign, the 
minority shall abide by the opinion of the 
majority. Resolutions of the Cabinet shall be 
submitted to the Amir for ratification in cases 
where the issue of a decree is required. 
Article 48 [Departments, Incompatibilities[ 
a. Each minister shall supervise the affairs of 
his Ministry and implement the general 
government policy in that Ministry. He shall 
also decide the orientation of the Ministry and 
supervise the putting of it into practice. 
b. While in charge of his Ministry, a Minister 
may not assume any other public office, nor 
may he even indirectly practice a profession or 
conduct industrial, commercial or financial 
business, nor may he participate in contracts 
concluded by the Government or public 
institutions, or combine his ministerial position 
with the membership of the board of directors 
of any company except as a non-remunerated 
Government representative. Also during this 
period, the Minister may not purchase or rent a 
State asset even by way of public auction, nor 
may he lease, sell, or barter any of his assets to 
the State. 
Article 49 [Succession] 
lfthe Prime Minister or the Minister 
relinquishes his position for any reason, he 
shall continue to discharge urgent business of 
his function until a successor is appointed. 
Article 50 [Supervision of Self-
Government) 
a. The law shall regulate public institutions and 
municipal departmental bodies so as to ensure 
their independence under State direction and 
supervision. The law shall ensure the 
municipal departmental bodies can 
administer and oversee the services that 
have a local character and are within their 
~ 
b. The State shall direct public welfare 
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Article 86 [Policy, Directives, 
Incompatibilities] 
(a) Every Minister shall supervise the affairs 
of his Ministry and shall execute therein the 
general policy of the Government. He shall 
also formulate directives for the Ministry and 
supervise their execution. 
(b) While in office, a Minister shall not hold 
any other public office or practice, even 
indirectly, 
any extra governmental profession or 
undertake any industrial, commercial or 
financial business. He shall not participate in 
any concession granted by the Government or 
by public bodies or emulate the ministerial 
post with membership of the board of 
directors of any company, except as a 
representative of the Government and without 
remuneration. Further, during the same 
period, a Minister shall not buy or take on 
hire any property of the State even by public 
auction, nor shall he let, sell, or barter any of 
his property to the State. 
Article 70 [Vacancy of Prime Minister's 
Office] 
Jf, for any reason, the Prime Minister vacates 
his office he shall continue to discharge the 
urgent business thereof until his successor is 
appointed. 
Article 87 (Supervision of Self-
Government] 
(a) The law shall regulate general and 
municipal self-government bodies in such a 
way as to ensure their independence under the 
direction and supervision of the State. 
(b) The State shall direct bodies of public 
institutions for the public good in a manner 
consistent with general State policy and the 
interest of its citizens. 
Section 3 The Legislative Authority National 
Assembly 
[Part 0 General Provision! 
Article 51 [Chambers[ 
The National Assembly consists of two 
Chambers: the Consultative Council and the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
Part I The Consultative Council 
Article 52 [Composition[ 
The Consultative Council is composed of forty 
members appointed by Royal Order. 
Article 53 [EiigibilityJ 
A member of the Consultative Council must be 
a Bahraini, enjoy full political and civil rights, 
be on an electoral list, must not be less than a 
full thirty five years of age by the Gregorian 
Calendar on the day of appointment, and must 
be experienced or have rendered distinguished 
services to the Nation. 
Article 54 [Term[ 
a. The term of membership of the Consultative 
Council is four years, and members may be 
reappointed when their term has expired. 
b. If for any reason the place of a member of 
the Consultative Counci l becomes vacant 
before his term is due to expire, the King sha ll 
appoint a replacement to serve until the end of 
the term of his predecessor. 
c. Any member of the Consultative Council 
may ask to be exempted from membership of 
the Council by applying to the President of the 
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interest in such a way that they conform to the 
general policy of the State and the benefit of 
the citizens. 
Chapter II Legislative Power 
Article 42 [National Assembly[ 
No law may be promulgated unless it has 
been passed by the National Assembly and 
ratified by the Amir. 
Article 43 [Compositionj 
The National Assembly shall be composed of: 
(a) Thirty members elected directly by 
universal suffrage and secret ballot. in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
electoral law. The number of these members 
shall be increased to forty with effect from 
the elections for the second legislative term. 
Electoral constituencies shall be determined 
by the law. 
(b) The Ministers by virtue of their portfolios. 
Council , and the President is to submit the 
request to the King. Membership shall not 
terminate until the date on which the King 
accedes to the request. 
d. The King shall appoint the President of the 
Consultative Council for the same period as the 
Council, and the Council shall elect two Vice-
Presidents for each convening period. 
Article 55 !Sessions! 
a. The Consultative Council shall meet when 
the Chamber of Deputies meets, and the 
convening period for both Chambers shall be 
the same. 
b. If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, 
sessions of the Consultative Council shall be 
halted. 
Part 2 The Chamber of Deputies Article 43 [Composition) 
Article 56 [Composition) The National Assembly shall be composed of: 
The Chamber of Deputies comprises forty (a) Thirty members elected directl:t b:t 
members elected by direct, secret general universal suffrage and secret ballot, in 
ballot in accordance with the provisions of the accordance with the Qrovisions of the 
law. electoral law. The number of these members 
shall be increased to fort:x: with effect from 
the elections for the second legislative term. 
Electoral constituencies shall be determined 
b:t the law. 
(b) The Ministers by virtue of their QOrtfolios. 
Article 57 [Eligibility) Article 44 !Eligibility] 
A member of the Chamber of Deputies must A member oftbe National Assembly must: 
meet the following requirements: 
a. He must be a Bahraini enjoying his full civil (a) Have been registered in one of the 
and political rights, and his name must be on electoral rolls, not be suspended from 
an electoral list. exercising his right to vote, and be a 
b. On the day of his election he must be not Bahraini citizen by origin. 
less than th irty years of age by the Gregorian (b) Be not less than thirty-full calendar years 
Calendar. of age on the day of election. 
c. He must read and write Arabic fluently. (c) Be able to read and write Arabic well. 
d. His membership of the Consultative Council 
or the Chamber of Deputies must not have 
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been abrogated by decision of the Chamber to 
which he belonged due to loss of confidence 
and esteem or for being in breach of duties of 
membership. However, a person whose 
membership has been abrogated may put 
himself forward as a candidate if the legislative 
season during which the decision to abrogate 
his membership was taken has elapsed, or if 
the chamber of which he was a member adopts 
a decision to cancel the impediment to 
candidature entailed by abrogation of 
membership upon expiry of the convening 
period during which the decision to abrogate 
his membership was taken. 
Article 58 [Term] Article 45 !Term) 
(I) The term of the Chamber of Deputies is (I) The term of the National Assembly shall 
four years by the Gregorian Calendar from the be four calendar years commencing from the 
date of its first session. Elections for a new date of its first meeting. Elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies shall be held during the new Assembly shall take place within two 
last four months of that term, whi le observing months preceding the expiry of the said term, 
the provisions of Article 64 of the Constitution. due regard being given to the provisions of 
A person whose period of membership has Article 65 of this Constitution. 
ended may be re-elected. 
(2) The King may, when necessary, extend (2) Members whose term of office expires 
the legislative season of the Chamber of may be re-elected. The term of the National 
Deputies by Royal Order for a period not Assembly may not be extended except for 
exceeding two years. necessity in time of war and by a law 
passed by two-third majority of the 
members constituting the Assembly. 
Article 59 [Vacancies] 
(I) If for any reason the place of a member of 
the Chamber of Deputies becomes vacant 
before his term is due to expire, his 
replacement shall be elected within two months 
from the date of announcement of the vacancy 
by the Chamber, and the new member shall 
serve until the end of term of his predecessor. 
(2) If the vacancy occurs within the six months 
that precede the end of the legislative season of 
the Chamber, there shall be no election of a 
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Article 46 !Vacancies) 
If, for any reason, a seat in the National 
Assembly becomes vacant before the end of 
the term, the vacancy shall be filled by 
election within two months from the date on 
which the Assembly declares the vacancy. 
The term of the new member shall last until 
the end of that of his predecessor. If the 
vacancy occurs within six months 
immediately prior to the expiry of the 
legislative term of the Assembly no successor 
replacement member. 
Article 60 [Presidency[ 
( l) At its first session the Chamber of Deputies 
shall choose from among its members a 
President and two Vice Presidents for the 
same duration as the Chamber's term. lfthe 
place of any of them falls vacant, the Chamber 
shall choose a replacement to serve out his 
term. 
(2) In all cases, election shall be by an 
absolute majority of those present. If there is 
no such majority on the first ballot, the election 
shall be conducted again between the two who 
secured the most votes. If a third party tied 
with the second of the two, he shall participate 
with them both in the election in the second 
ballot, and in this case, the election shall be by 
proportional majority. Ifthis proportional 
majority results in a tie, the Chamber shall 
choose by lot. 
(3) The first session shall be chaired by the 
eldest member until such time as a President 
of the Chamber of Deputies is elected. 
Article 61 [Committees[ 
The Chamber shall form the committees 
necessary for its business during the first week 
of its annual assembly. These committees may 
exercise their powers while the chamber is in 
recess. 
shall be elected. 
Article 54 [Speaker] 
(1) The National Assembly shall elect at its 
first sitting and for the duration of its term !! 
speaker, Deputy Speaker and a Secretary 
from amongst its members. If any office 
becomes vacant the Assembly shall elect a 
successor for the remainder of its term. 
(2) In all cases, election shall be by an 
absolute majority vote of the members 
present. If this majority vote is not attained in 
the first ballot, another election shall be held 
between the two candidates receiving the 
highest number of votes. If more than one 
candidate receives an equal number of votes 
in the second place, all such candidates shall 
participate in the second ballot. In this case, 
the candidate who receives the greatest 
number of votes shall be elected. If there is a 
tie in this last ballot, the choice shall be by 
lot. 
(3) The Prime Minister shall preside over 
the first sitting until the Speaker has been 
elected. 
Article 55 (Committees] 
The Assembly shall form, within the first 
week of its annual session, the committees 
necessary for its functions . These committees 
may discharge their duties during the recess 
of the Assembly with a view to submitting 
their recommendations to it when it meets. 
Article 62 [Electoral Jurisdiction[ Article 57 [Election Disputes] 
The Court of Cassation shall have jurisdiction The Supreme Civil Court of Appeal shall 
to rule on challenges relating to elections to the be the competent authority to deal with 
Chamber of Deputies, in accordance with the election disputes of the National Assembly, 
relevant law. but this competence may be transferred to any 
higher court which may be set up by law. 
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Article 63 I Resignation I 
The Chamber of Deputies is the authority 
competent to accept a resignation from its 
membership. The resignation shall be deemed 
final only from when the Chamber decides to 
accept it, and the place shall become vacant 
from the date of that acceptance. 
Article 64 I Dissolution! 
a. If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, 
elections for a new Chamber of Deputies must 
be held not later than four months from the 
date of dissolution. If elections are not held 
during that period the dissolved Chamber of 
Deputies shall regain its full constitutional 
powers, and meets immediately as though the 
dissolution never occurred, and shall continue 
its business until a new Chamber is elected. 
b. Notwithstanding the preceding clause, the 
King may defer election of the Chamber of 
Deputies if there are compelling circumstances 
whereby the Council of Ministers considers 
holding elections is not possible. 
c. If the compelling circumstances mentioned 
in the preceding clause continue, the King, 
taking the opinion of the Council of Ministers, 
may restore the dissolved Chamber of Deputies 
and invite it to convene. This Chamber of 
Deputies shall be regarded as extant from the 
date of promulgation ofthe Royal Decree 
restoring it. It shall exercise its full 
constitutional powers. The provisions of this 
Constitution shall apply to it including those 
pertaining to completion of the Chamber's term 
and dissolution. The session the Chamber 
holds in such a case shall be regarded as its 
first session irrespective of the date of its 
commencement. 
Article 58 LResignations] 
The National Assembly shall be the 
competent authority to accept resignation of 
its members, and no resignation shall be 
considered final except from the time the 
Assemb ly has decided to accept it. 
Article 65 !Dissolution] 
(1) The Amir may dissolve the National 
Assembly by a decree in which the reasons 
for dissolution shall be indicated. 
(2) However, dissolutions ofthe Assembly 
may not be repeated for the same reason. 
(3) In the event of dissolution, elections for 
the new Assembly shall be held within a 
period not exceeding two months from the 
date of dissolution. 
(4) If the elections are not held within the said 
period, the dissolved Assembly shall be 
restored to its full constitutional authority and 
shall meet immed iately as if the dissolution 
had not taken place. The Assembly shall then 
continue functioning until a new Assembly is 
elected. 
Article 65 !Interpellation] Article 67 llnterpellations] 
(I) Upon an application signed by at least (1) Every member of the National 
five members of the Chamber of Deputies, any Assembly may address to the Prime Minister 
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Minister may be questioned on matters coming 
within his sphere of competence. 
(2) The question must not pertain to a 
private interest of the questioner or his 
relatives to the fourth degree, or be made by 
his proxy. 
(3) The question shall not be debated until at 
least eight days after the day on which the 
question was posed, unless the Minister agrees 
to bring the debate forward. 
(4) The question may lead to the matter of 
confidence in the Minister being put to the 
Chamber of Deputies under the provisions of 
Article 66 of this Constitution. 
Article 66 [Responsibility, Vote of No-
Confidence) 
a. Each Minister shall be responsible to the 
Chamber of Deputies for the business of his 
Ministry. 
b. A question of confidence in a Minister may 
be put forward only at his own wish or upon an 
application signed by at least ten members of 
the Chamber of Deputies following the debate 
of the question put to him, and the Chamber 
may not give its decision on the application 
until seven days after its submission. 
c. If the Chamber of Deputies decides by a 
majority of two-thirds of its members to give 
a vote of no confidence in a Minister, he shall 
be regarded as having withdrawn from the 
Ministry from the date of the no-confidence 
vote, and he shall submit his resignation 
forthwith . 
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and to Ministers interpellations with regard to 
matters falling within their competence. 
(2) The debate on such interpellations shall 
not take place until at least eight days have 
elapsed after its presentation, unless the 
Minister concerned agrees to hold the debate 
earlier. 
(3) An interpellation may lead to the vote of 
confidence being put to the Assembly in 
68accordance with the provisions of Articles 
of this Constitution.69and 
Article 68 [Ministerial Reports) 
(I) (a) Every Minister shall report to the 
National Assembly on the affairs of his 
Ministry. 
(b) The question of confidence in a Minister 
may not be raised except upon his request or 
upon demand signed by ten members 
following a debate on an interpellation 
addressed to him. The Assembly may not 
make its decision upon such a request before 
the lapse of seven days from the presentation 
thereof. 
(c) If the Assembly passes a vote of no 
confidence against a Minister he shall be 
considered to have resigned his office as from 
the date of the vote of no confidence and shall 
submit his formal resignation immediately. 
(2) Withdrawal of confidence from a Minister 
shall be by a majority vote of the members 
constituting the National Assembly excluding 
Ministers. 
(3) In all cases, Ministers shall not participate 
in the vote of confidence. 
Article 67 [Limitations[ 
a. The subject of confidence in the Prime 
Minister shall not be raised in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
b. If, two-thirds of members of the Chamber of 
Deputies consider it not possible to cooperate 
with the Prime Minister, the matter will be 
referred to the National Assembly to 
consider it. 
c. The National Assembly cannot issue its 
decision on the lack of possibility of 
cooperating with the Prime Minister prior to 
seven days from the date the matter was 
referred to it. 
d. If the National Assembly decides by a 
majority of two thirds of its members that it is 
not possible to cooperate with the Prime 
Minister, the matter is submitted to the King 
for a decision, either by relieving the Prime 
Minister of his post and appointing a new 
Government, or by dissolving the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Article 68 [Wishes[ 
The Chamber of Deputies may express its 
wishes in writing to the Government on public 
matters. If the Government finds itself unable 
to meet these wishes, it must give its reasons in 
writing to the Chamber. 
Article 69 [Commissions of Inquiry[ 
(I) The Chamber of Deputies may at any time 
form commissions of inquiry or delegate one 
or more of its members to investigate any 
matter coming within the powers of the 
Chamber stated in the Constitution, and the 
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Article 69 [Questions of Confidence[ 
(a) The question of confidence in the Prime 
Minister shall not be raised before the 
National Assembly, unless out of necessity, 
he holds a portfolio with the premierships, 
and then he may be questioned about the 
affairs of such portfolio like any other 
minister. 
(b) If two-thirds of the members of the 
National Assembly decide, in the manner 
specified in Article 68 of this Constitution, 
that they cannot co-operate with the Prime 
Minister, the matter shall be submitted to the 
Amir for settlement. The Amir may either 
relieve the Prime Minister of office and 
appoint a new Cabinet or dissolve the 
National Assembly. Ifthe Assembly is 
dissolved and the office of the said Prime 
Minister is renewed but the new Assembly 
decide by a majority vote of the members 
constituting the National Assembly that it 
cannot co-operate with the said Prime 
Minister, he shall be considered to have 
resigned his office as from the date of the 
decision of the Assembly in this respect and 
a new Cabinet shall be formed. 
Article 73 [Wishes] 
The National Assembly shall express its 
wishes to the Government regarding public 
matters. If the Government cannot comply 
with these wishes, it shall state to the 
Assembly the reasons therefore. The 
Assembly may comment once on the 
Government's statement. 
Article 74 [Committees of Enquiry] 
The National Assembly shall at all times have 
the right to set up committees of enquiry or to 
depute one or more of its members to 
investigate any matter within the assembly's 
competence as prescribed in the Constitution. 
commission or member is to present the 
findings of the inquiry not later than four 
months from the date of commencement of 
the inquiry. 
(2) Ministers and all State employees are to 
provide such testimony, documents, and 
statements as are asked of them. 
Part 3 Provisions Common to Both 
Chambers 
Ministers and all Government officials must 
produce testimonials, documents, and 
statements requested from them. 
Article 70 (Legislation] Article 42 [National Assembly( 
No law shall be promulgated unless approved No law may be promulgated unless it has 
by both the Consultative Council and the been passed by the National Assembly and 
Chamber of Deputies, or the National ratified by the Amir. 
Assembly as the situation demands, and 
ratified by the King. 
Article 71 (Sessions( 
The National Assembly shall convene on the 
second Saturday in the month of October 
unless the King decides to invite it to convene 
before this date. If that day is an official 
holiday, it shall convene on the ftrst working 
day following that holiday. 
Article 72 [Length of Sessions) 
The normal convening period for both the 
Consultative Council and the Chamber of 
Deputies shall last for at least seven months, 
and this convening period may not be closed 
before the budget is approved. 
Article 73 (Convening Period( 
(I) As an exception to the provisions of the 
two foregoing Articles, the National Assembly 
shall convene on the day following the expiry 
of one month from the date of appointment of 
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Article 48(Initial Session) 
The Assembly shall start its ordinary session 
during the month of October of every year 
upon a convocation by the Amir. If the 
decree of convocation is not issued before the 
first of the said month, the time for the 
meeting shall be deemed 9 a.m. on the third 
Saturday of that month. 1 f such a day 
happens to be an official holiday, the 
Assembly shall meet in the morning of the 
ftrst day following the holiday. 
Article 47 (Sessions] 
The National Assembly shall have an annual 
session of not less than eight months. The 
said session may not be prorogued before the 
budget has been approved. 
Article 49 [Special Sessions) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the 
preceding two Articles, the Amir shall 
summon the National Assembly to hold its 
ftrst meeting within two weeks from the end 
the Consultative Council or election of the of the general election. If the decree of 
Chamber of Deputies whichever occurs later, convocation is not issued within the said 
unless the King decides to invite it to convene period, the Assembly shall be deemed to have 
before that date. been convoked for the morning of the day 
(2) If the date of convening the National immediately following these two weeks, due 
Assembly in that period is later than the annual regard being given to the provision of the 
of the lldate prescribed in Article second paragraph of the preceding Article. If 
Constitution, the convening period prescribed the date of the meeting of the Assembly falls 
of the Constitution shall be 72in Article 48after the annual date mentioned in Article 
reduced by the amount of the difference of the Constitution, the duration of the session 
between the two aforesaid dates. herein shall be reduced 47specified in Article 
by the difference between the said two dates. 
Article 74 [King's Address and Reply] 
The King shall inaugurate the ordinary 
convening period of the National Assembly 
with a royal address. He may delegate the 
Crown Prince or whomever he decides to 
inaugurate the convening period and deliver 
the royal address on his behalf. Each of the 
two chambers shall choose a committee from 
among its members to prepare the draft reply to 
the address, and each chamber shall submit its 
reply to the King after it is approved. 
Article 75 [Extraordinary Sessions) 
(I) Both the Consultative Council and the 
Chamber of Deputies shall be called, by 
Royal Decree, to meet in extraordinary session 
if the King deems it necessary, or if so 
requested by a majority of members of either 
chamber. 
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Article 61 [Opening Speech] 
( 1) The Amir shall open the annual session of 
the National Assembly whereupon he shall 
deliver an Amiri Speech reviewing the state 
of affairs of the country and the most 
important public matters which happened 
during the preceding year, and outlining the 
projects and reforms the Government plans to 
undertake during the coming year. 
(2) The Amir may depute the Prime Minister 
to open the Assembly or to deliver the Amiri 
Speech. 
Article 62 [Responding Speechl 
The National Assembly shall choose, from 
amongst its members, a committee to draft 
the reply to the Amiri Speech which wi ll 
embody the comments and wishes of the 
Assembly. After the reply has been approved 
by the Assembly, it shall be submitted to the 
Amir. 
Article 50 [Extraordinary Sessions) 
(1) The National Assembly shall, by decree, 
be called to an extraordinary session if the 
Amir deems it necessary, or upon the request 
of the majority of the members of the 
Assembly. 
(2) In an extraordinary session, the Assembly 
(2) When in extraordinary session the two may not consider matters other than those for 
chambers may not consider matters other than which it has been convened except with the 
those for which it has been called to convene. consent of the Government. 
Article 76 (Closing of Sessions) Article 51 [Announcement) 
The King shall declare ordinary and The Amir shall announce the prorogation of 
extraordinary convening periods closed by ordinary and extraordinary sessions, by a 
Royal Order. decree. 
Article 77 (Place and Time( Article 52 (Time and Place] 
Any meeting of the Consultative Council or the Every meeting held by the National Assembly 
Chamber of Deputies which is not held at the at a time or place other than that assigned for 
prescribed time and place shall be null and its meeting shall be invalid, and resolutions 
void and decisions taken thereat shall be passed thereat shall be null and void. 
invalid. 
Article 78 (Oath of Office( 
Every member of the Consultative Council or 
the Chamber of Deputies shall take the 
following oath in public session, prior to 
pursuing their work in the Chamber or its 
committees: 
"I swear by Almighty God that I shall be loyal 
to the country and the King, shall respect the 
Constitution and the laws of the State, shall 
defend the freedoms, interests and assets of the 
people, and shall perform my work honestly 
and sincerely. " 
Article 53 (Oath of Office] 
Before assuming their duties in the Assembly 
or its committees, members of the National 
Assembly, including the Ministers, shall take 
the following oath in a public sitting: 
"I swear by Almighty God to be faithful to the 
Country and to the Amir, to respect the 
Constitution and the laws of the State, to 
defend the liberties, interests and properties 
of the people and to discharge my duties 
honestly and truthfully. " 
Article 79 (Publicity ( Article 56 [Publicity] 
Sessions of the Consultative Council and the Sittings of the National Assembly shall be 
Chamber of Deputies shall be open to the public. However, they may be held in camera 
public. They may be held in secret at the upon the request of the Government, the 
request of the Government, the President of the Speaker of the Assembly or ten of its 
Chamber, or ten members, and the request members. The debate on such request shall 
shall be debated in secret session. be held in camera. 
Article 80 (Quorum( Article 59 (Quorum] 
(I) For a meeting of both the Consultative (I) For a meeting of the National Assembly to 
Council and the Chamber of Deputies to be be valid, more than half of its members must 
valid, a quorum of more than half the members be present. Resolutions shall be passed by an 
of each chamber must be present. Decisions absolute majority of the members present, 
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shall be taken on an absolute majority of 
members present, except in cases where a 
special majority is stipulated. In the event of a 
tied vote, the matter shall be decided in favour 
ofthe side that includes the President of the 
chamber. If the voting relates to the 
Constitution, voting shall be conducted by 
calling upon members by name. 
(2) If there is a lack of quorum for either 
chamber to convene on two successive 
occasions, the meeting of the chamber shall be 
deemed valid provided that the number of 
members attending is not Jess than one quarter 
of the chamber's members. 
Article 81 (Initiative( 
The Prime Minister shall present bills to the 
Chamber of Deputies. which is entitled to pass. 
amend, or reject the bill. In all cases the bill 
shall be referred to the Consultative Council. 
which is entitled to pass. amend or reject the 
bill or to accept any amendments which the 
Chamber of Deputies had introduced to the 
bill. or had rejected or amended them. 
However. priority of debate shall always be 
given to bills and proposals put forward by the 
Government. 
Article 82 I Reconsideration I 
If the Consultative Council does not approve a 
bill passed by the Chamber of Deputies. 
whether the Consultative Council's decision 
involves rejection, amendment. deletion or 
addition. the President of the Council shall 
return it to the Chamber of Deputies for 
reconsideration. 
Article 83 (Submission( 
If the Chamber of Deputies accepts the bill as 
it receives it from the Consultative Council, the 
President of the Consultative Council shall 
refer it to the Prime Minister who will submit it 
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except in cases where a special majority is 
required. 
(2) When the votes are equally divided, the 
motion shall be deemed rejected. 
to the King. 
Article 84 )Amendments) 
The Chamber of Deputies may reject any 
amendment made to a bill by the Consultative 
Council. and may insist on its previous 
decision without introducing any new 
amendments to the bill. In such a case, the bill 
shall be returned to the Consultative Council 
for reconsideration. The Consultative Council 
may accept the decision of the Chamber of 
Deputies or insist on its previous decision. 
Article 85 )Disputes, Joint Session) 
If the two Chambers differ twice over any bill. 
the National Assembly shall convene in joint 
session under the chairmanship of the President 
of the Consultative Council to discuss those 
clauses in dispute. For the bill to be accepted, 
the decision of the National Assembly must be 
taken on a majority of members present. and 
when the bill is rejected in this manner it shall 
not be presented to the National Assembly 
again in the same convening period. 
Article 86 [Approved Bill) 
In all cases in which a bill is approved, the 
President of the Consultative Council shall 
refer the approved bill to the Prime Minister so 
that he submits it to the King. 
Article 87 [Budget) 
Every bill that regulates economic or financial 
matters. and the Government requests its 
urgent consideration. shall first be submitted to 
the Chamber of Deputies so that it takes a 
decision on it within fifteen days. When that 
period elapses, the bill is presented to the 
Consultative Council with the opinion of the 
Chamber of Deputies if there is such an 
opinion. so that the Consultative Council 
decides on it within a further period of fifteen 
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days. If the two Chambers should disagree on 
the bill in question, the matter is referred to the 
National Assembly for a vote on it within 
fifteen days. lfthe National Assembly does 
not reach a decision on it within that period. 
the King may issue the bill as a Decree that has 
the force of a law. 
Article 88 [Governmental Program) 
As soon as it is formed, each Government shall 
submit its program to the National Assembly, 
which may put forward any observations it 
deems appropriate regarding the program. 
Article 89 [Representation, Immunity) 
(I) a. A member of either the Consultative 
Council or the Chamber of Deputies 
represents the people and cares for public 
interest. He shall not come under the sway of 
any authority in his work in the either chamber 
or its committees. 
b. No member of the Consultative Council or 
the Chamber of Deputies shall be called to 
account for expressing his opinions or ideas in 
the Council or its committees unless the 
opinion expressed is prejudicial to the 
fundamentals of the religion or the unity of the 
nation, or the mandatory respect for the King, 
or is defamatory of the personal life of any 
person. 
c. Other than in a case of flagrante delicto, it 
shall be impermissible during the convening 
period for any detention, investigation, search, 
arrest or custodial procedures or any other 
penal action to be taken against a member 
except with the permission of the chamber of 
which he is a member. Outside the convening 
period, permission must be sought from the 
President of the relevant chamber. 
(2) The non-issue of a decision by the chamber 
or its President on the permission which is 
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Article 60 [Program] 
Immediately upon its formation, every 
Cabinet shall present its program to the 
National Assembly, and the Assembly may 
make comments with regard to such a 
program. 
Article 63 [Representation] 
{I) (a) A member of the National Assembly 
represents the entire people. He shall 
safeguard the public interest and shall not be 
subject to any authority in the discharge of his 
duties in the Assembly or in its committees. 
(b) A member of the National Assembly shall 
be free to express any views or opinions in 
the Assembly or in its committees, and under 
no circumstances shall he be held liable in 
respect thereof. 
(c) Except in cases ofjlagrante delicto, no 
measures of detention, investigation, search, 
arrest, imprisonment or any other penal 
measure may be taken against a member 
while the Assembly is in session without the 
authorization of the Assembly. If the 
National Assembly is not in session, 
authorisation shall be obtained from the 
Speaker of the Assembly. 
(2) If the Assembly does not give a decision 
regarding a request for authorisation within 
one month from the date of its receipt, 
permission shall be deemed to have been 
granted. 
(3) The Assembly shall be notified of any 
measure that may be taken during its session 
being sought within one month from the date 
of receipt of the request shall be regarded as 
permission. 
(3) The chamber must be informed of any 
measures which may be taken under the 
preceding paragraph while it is convened, and 
it must invariably be informed at its first 
session of any action taken against a 
member during the chamber's annual 
recess. 
Article 90 (Postponement( 
The King may by Royal Order postpone the 
convening of the National Assembly for not 
more than two months, and such 
postponement shall not be repeated more than 
once in any one convening period. The period 
of postponement shall not be counted within 
of72the convening period provided by Article 
this Constitution. 
Article 91 [Questions) 
(I) Any member of the Consultative Council or 
the Chamber of Deputies may direct written 
questions at Ministers to clarify matters 
coming within their sphere of competence, and 
only the questioner may comment once on the 
reply. If the Minister adds anything new, the 
member shall be further entitled to comment. 
(2) The question may not relate to an 
interest of the questioner or his relatives to 
the fourth degree, or be made by proxy. 
Article 92 (Initiatives( 
a. Fifteen members of the Consultative Council 
or the Chamber of Deputies are entitled to 
request proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution. Any member of the two 
chambers is entitled to propose laws. Each 
proposal shall be referred to the relevant 
committee in the chamber in which the 
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in accordance with the foregoing paragraph. 
The Assembly shall always, at its first 
meeting, be notified of any measure taken 
against any of its members during its annual 
recess. 
Article 64 (Adjournment] 
The Amir may, by a decree, adjourn the 
meeting of the National Assembly for a 
period not exceeding one month. 
Adjournment may be repeated during the 
same session with the consent of the 
Assembly, and then once only. The period of 
adjournment shall not be counted in 
computing the duration of the session 
of this Constitution .47provided for in Article 
Article 66 (Questions) 
Every member of the National Assembly may 
put to the Prime Minister and to Ministers, 
questions with a view to clarifying matters 
falling within their competence. The 
questioner alone shall have the right to 
comment once on the answer, and if the 
Minister adds something new then the right of 
the member shall be renewed. 
proposal was made for an opinion. If the 
chamber sees fit to accept the proposal. it shall 
refer it to the Government to formulate it as a 
draft amendment of the Constitution or as a 
draft law and present it to the Chamber of 
Deputies during the same or succeeding period. 
b. Any proposal for a law which has been 
presented in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph and rejected by the chamber to 
which it was presented may not be re-
represented during the same convening period. 
Article 93 [Ministerial Right to Speak, Duty 
to Attend[ 
(I) The Prime Minister and Ministers may 
attend sessions of the Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies, and both chambers shall 
listen to the Prime Minister and Ministers 
whenever they ask to speak. They may co-opt 
such senior officials or their deputies as they 
may wish. 
(2) A chamber may require the competent 
Minister to attend when a matter relating to his 
Ministry is being debated. 
Article 94 [Regulations[ 
a. The regulations for the course of business in 
both the Consultative Council and the Chamber 
of Deputies and their committees, and the 
principles governing debate, voting, 
questioning, cross-examination and all the 
powers prescribed in the Constitution shall be 
prescribed by law, and similarly the penalties 
for a member being in breach of the regulations 
or failing to attend chamber or committee 
sessions without acceptable excuse. 
b. Each chamber may add to the law that 
regulates it such supplementary provisions as it 
sees fit. 
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Article 76 [Ministerial Right to Speak] 
The Prime Minister and Ministers shall be 
given the floor whenever they ask for it. 
They may call for assistance upon any senior 
officials or depute them to speak on their 
behalf. The Assembly may ask for a Minister 
to be present whenever a matter relating to his 
Minister is under discussion. The Cabinet 
shall be represented in the sittings of the 
Assembly by the Prime Minister and by some 
Ministers. 
Article 77 [Law of Procedure] 
(a) The law shall prescribe the procedure of 
the National Assembly and its committees 
and the rules pertaining to discussion, voting, 
questions, interpellation and all other 
functions prescribed in the Constitution. The 
law shall also prescribe the sanctions to be 
imposed on any member who violates order 
or absents himself from the meetings of the 
Assembly or the committees without good 
cause or legitimate reason. 
(b) The National Assembly may make 
necessary regulations complementary to the 
law referred to in the preceding clause. 
Article 95 [Order] Article 78 [Order] 
( l) Maintenance of order within the The maintenance of order in the National 
Consultative Council and Chamber of Deputies Assembly shall be the responsibility of its 
is a matter for its President. Guards shall be Speaker. The Assembly shall have a special 
allocated to each chamber and they will receive guard under the authority of the Speaker of 
their orders from the chamber's President. the Assembly. No other armed force may 
(2) No armed force may enter either chamber enter the Assembly or be stationed close to its 
of the National Assembly or remain in the gate unless so required by the Speaker. 
vicinity of its doors unless so requested by its 
President. 
Article 96 [Remuneration[ 
The remuneration of members of the 
Consultative Council and Chamber of Deputies 
shall be laid down by law. If this remuneration 
is amended, such amendment shall not take 
effect until the start of the next legislative 
season. 
Article 97 [Incompatibilities[ 
Membership of the Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies may not be combined, 
nor may membership of either chamber be 
combined with the assumption of public office. 
Other cases of non-combination shall be 
prescribed by law. 
Article 98 [Economic Incompatibilities) 
(I) During his period of membership a member 
of the Consultative Council or the Chamber of 
Deputies may not be appointed to the board of 
directors of a company or participate in 
contracts concluded by the Government or 
public institutions except in those cases 
prescribed by law. 
(2) Nor during that period may he purchase or 
rent a State asset, or lease, sell or barter any of 
his assets to the State, unless by way of public 
auction or invitation to tender or application of 
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Article 79 [Remuneration] 
Remuneration of the members of the National 
Assembly shall be fixed by a law. In the 
event of a revision of the said remuneration, 
such revision shall not take effect until the 
next legislative term. 
Article 80 [Incompatibilities] 
(I) Membership of the National Assembly 
shall be incompatible with public office 
except in the case of Ministers. In such cases, 
the right to the remuneration for membership 
and the right to the salary of the portfolio 
shall not be combined. 
(2) The law shall specify other cases of 
incompatibility. 
Article 81 [Economic Incompatibilities) 
(I) During his term, a member of the National 
Assembly shall not be appointed to the board 
of directors of a company, nor shall he 
participate in concessions granted by the 
Government for by public bodies, except in 
those cases prescribed by the law. 
(2) Further, during the said term, he shall not 
buy or rent any property of the State nor shall 
he let, sell, or barter any of his property to the 
State, except by public auction or tender, or in 
compliance with the system of compulsory 
the regulations governing expropriation in the 
public interest. 
Article 99 [Incompetence[ 
If a state of incompetence arises with respect to 
a member of Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies during his membership. 
his membership shall be abrogated, and his 
place become vacant on a decision taken by 
two-thirds of the members of the chamber of 
which he is a member. The membership of a 
member of the Consultative Council or 
Chamber of Deputies may also be abrogated 
for loss of confidence or esteem or for being in 
breach ofthe duties of membership. A 
decision to abrogate membership must secure a 
two-thirds majority ofthe members of the 
chamber of which he is a member. If taken by 
the Consultative Council. the decision shall be 
submitted to the King for approval. 
Article 100 (Decorations! 
Members ofthe Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies shall not be awarded 
medals or decorations during their term of 
membership. 
Part 4 Provisions on the Convening of the 
National Assembly 
Article 101 [Sessions] 
In addition to the occasions when both 
chambers of Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies. that is the National 
Assembly, convene as a congress under the 
Constitution, the King may call such a meeting 
of his own initiative or at the reguest of the 
Prime Minister. 
Article 102 [Chairmanship! 
The joint National Assembly meeting shall be 
chaired respectively by the President of the 
Consultative Council. or in his absence by the 
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acquisition. 
Article 82 [Decorations) 
During their term, members of the National 
Assembly with the exception of Ministers 
may not be awarded decorations. 
President ofthe Chamber of Deputies. 
followed by the First Vice-President of the 
Consultative Council. followed by the First 
Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 103 !Quorum) 
In the cases other than those in which the 
Constitution requires a special majority, joint 
sessions of the two chambers of the National 
Assembly shall not be deemed legally valid 
unless they are attended by the majority of the 
members of each individual chamber. 
Decisions shall be taken by a majority of the 
votes of members present with the exception of 
the President who is to cast the decisive vote 
in the event of a tie. 
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Article 71 !Initiative] 
A member ofthe National Assembly shall 
have the right to initiate bills. A bill initiated 
by a member and rejected by the Assembly 
may not be re-introduced during the same 
session except with the approval of the 
Government. 
Article 72 !Discussion) 
(I) Upon a request signed by at least five 
members. any subject of general interest may 
be put to the National Assembly for 
discussion with a view to securing 
clarification of the Government's policy and 
to exchange views thereon. 
(2) All other members shall also have the 
right to participate in the discussion. 
Article 75 I Committee for Petitions) 
(I) The Assembly shall set up, among its 
annual standing committees. a special 
committee to deal with petitions and 
complaints submitted to the Assembly by 
citizens. The committee shall seek 
explanation thereon from the competent 
authorities and shall inform the person 
Section 4 The Judicial Authority 
Article I 04 [Independence, Public 
Prosecutor! 
a. The honour of the judiciary, and the probity 
and impartiality of judges, is the basis of 
government and the guarantee of rights and 
freedoms. 
b. No authority shall prevail over the judgment 
of a judge, and under no circumstances may 
the course of justice be interfered with. The 
law guarantees the independence of the 
judiciary, and the law shall lay down the 
guarantees of judges and the provisions 
pertaining to them. 
c. The law shall lay down the provisions 
pertaining to the Public Prosecution Office, the 
tasks of the office for delivery of formal legal 
opinions, the preparation of legislation, State 
representation before the law, and personnel 
employed on such matters. 
d. The provisions governing advocacy shall be 
regulated by law. 
Article 105 [Courts] 
a. The various types and degrees of the courts 
shall be regulated by law, and the law shall 
state their functions and jurisdiction. 
b. The jurisdiction of military courts shall be 
confined to military offences committed by 
members of the Defence Force, the National 
Guard, and the Security Forces. It does not 
extend to other persons except when martial 
law is declared and within the bounds 
prescribed by law. 
c. Court hearings shall be held in public except 
in exceptional cases prescribed by law. 
d. A Higher Judicial Council shall be 
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concerned of the result. 
(2) A member of the National Assembly shall 
not interfere with the work of either the 
Judicial or the Executive Power. 
Chapter IV Judicial Power 
Article 101 [Independence] 
(a) The honour of the judiciary and the 
integrity and impartiality of judges are the 
bases of rule and a guarantee of rights and 
liberties. 
(b) In the administration of justice judges 
shall not be subject to any authority. No 
interference whatsoever shall be allowed in 
the conduct of justice. The law shall 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary 
and shall state the guarantees and provisions 
relating to the judges. 
(c) The law shall specify the rules for public 
prosecution, rendering of legal opinions, 
drafting of legislation and representation of 
the State before the courts and before those 
who are engaged in these matters. 
(d) The law shall regulate the legal 
profession . 
Article 102 [Courts] 
(a) The law shall regulate the various kinds 
and degrees of courts and specify their 
functions and jurisdictions. 
(b) The jurisdiction of courts martial shall be 
restricted to military crimes committed by 
members of the armed and security forces 
and shall not extend to others except during 
the time of martial law and within the limits 
determined by law. 
(c) Sittings of the courts shall be public save 
in exceptional cases prescribed by the law. 
(d) A Supreme Council of the judiciary shall 
established by law to supervise the smooth 
running of work in the courts and their 
supporting organs. The powers of the Higher 
Judicial Council in the functional affairs of 
judicial personnel and the Public Prosecution 
Office shall be prescribed by law. 
Article 106 (Constitutional Court) 
(I) A Constitutional Court shall be 
established. and shall comprise a President and 
six members. all of whom are appointed by a 
Royal Order for a period specified by the law. 
The court's area of competence is to watch 
over the constitutionality of laws and statutes. 
(2) The law shall state the regulations that 
ensure that the members of the Court are not 
liable to dismissal, and specifies the procedures 
that are followed before the Court. The law 
shall guarantee the right of the Government, 
Consultative Council, the Chamber of Deputies 
and notable individuals and others to challenge 
before the Court the constitutionality of laws 
and statutes. A ruling by the Court that a text 
in a law or a statute is unconstitutional shall 
have a direct effect, unless the Court specifies 
a subsequent date for the purpose. Thus if the 
Court's rule on unconstitutionality is related to 
a text in the penal code then the convictions 
made on the basis of such a text are deemed 
nul l and void. 
(3) The King may refer to the Court any draft 
laws before they are adopted to determine the 
extent of their agreement with the Constitution. 
The Court's determination is binding on all 
State authorities and on everyone. 
Chapter V Financial Affairs 
Article 107 (Taxes( 
a. Public taxes shall only be established, 
amended and abolished by law, and persons 
shall only be exempted from paying them 
wholly or in pat1 in those cases prescribed by 
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be formed by a law which shall supervise the 
functions of the Courts and the offices 
relating thereto. 
The law shall specify the jurisdiction of the 
said Council over the functional affairs of 
both the judiciary and the public prosecution. 
Article 103 [Constitutional Jurisdiction] 
(I) The law shall specify the judicial body 
competent to decide upon disputes relating to 
the constitutionality of laws and regulations 
and shall determine its jurisdiction and 
procedure. 
(2) The law shall ensure the right of both the 
Government and interested parties to 
challenge the constitutionality of laws and 
regu lations before the said body. 
(3) If the said body decides that a law or a 
regu lation is unconstitutional it shall be 
considered null and void. 
Section II Financial Affairs 
Article 88 [Taxation I 
(a) No general tax may be established, 
amended or abo lished except by law. No one 
may be exempted, wholly or partially, from 
the payment of such taxes except in the cases 
law. A person may only be instructed to pay 
other taxes, duties, and costs within the bounds 
ofthe law. 
b. The provisions governing the collection of 
taxes, duties and other public monies, and the 
procedures for their disbursement, shall be 
prescribed by law. 
c. The provisions governing the maintenance 
and management and the terms for the 
disposition of State property, and the limits 
within which any part of such property may be 
assigned, shall be prescribed by law. 
Article 108 [Public Loans[ 
a. Public loans shall be contracted by law. The 
State may lend or guarantee a loan by law 
within the credit limits prescribed for the 
purpose in the Budget Law. 
b. Local bodies such as municipalities or public 
institutions may lend, borrow, or guarantee a 
loan in accordance with the laws relevant to 
them. 
Article 109 [Budget] 
a. The financial year shall be prescribed by 
law. 
b. The Government shall prepare the draft 
overall annual budget of State revenue and 
expenditure and present it to the Chamber of 
Deputies at least two months before the end 
of the financial year, for debate and referral 
to the Consultative Council to consider it in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Any amendment can be 
introduced into the budget with the 
agreement of the Government. 
c. The budget shall be debated on the basis of 
the classification of its contents. The budget 
may be prepared for more than one 
financial year. No public revenue may be 
allocated for a particular expenditure except by 
law. 
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specified by the law. No one may be required 
to pay any other tax, fee, or imposition except 
within the limits ofthe law. 
(b) The law shall prescribe rules for the 
collection of taxes, fees and other forms of 
public funds and the procedure for their 
expenditure. 
(c) The law shall lay down rules for the 
protection of State properties, their 
administration, the conditions of their 
disposal, and the limits within which any of 
these properties may be relinquished. 
Article 89 [Public Loans[ 
(a) Public loans shall be contracted by law. 
The State may grant or guarantee a loan by a 
law, or within the limits of the funds 
appropriated for this purpose in the budget. 
(b) Local bodies such as municipalities or 
public bodies may grant, borrow, or guarantee 
loans in accordance with their own 
regulations. 
Article 90 [Budget] 
(a) The fiscal year shall be fixed by a law. 
(b) The Government shall draw up the annual 
budget, comprising the revenue and 
expenditure of the State, and submit it to the 
National Assembly for examination and 
approval, at least two months before the end 
of each current fiscal year. 
(c) The budget shall be discussed in the 
National Assembly part by part. None of the 
public revenues may be allocated for a 
specific purpose except by a law. 
(d) The budget shall be issued by a law. 
(e) If the budget law has not been 
promulgated before the beginning of the 
fiscal year, the preceding budget shall be 
applied until the new one is issued, and 
revenues shall be collected and disbursements 
made in accordance with the law in force at 
d. The State general budget shall be 
promulgated by law. 
e. If the Budget Law is not promulgated before 
the beginning of the financial year, the 
previous budget shall be adhered to until the 
law's promulgation, and revenue shall be 
collected and expenditure disbursed in 
accordance with the laws in force at the end of 
that year. 
f. Under no circumstances may the maximum 
estimates of expenditure stated in the Budget 
Law and laws in amendment thereof be 
exceeded. 
Article 110 lEx-Budgetary Disbursement] 
Any disbursement which is ex-budget or in 
excess of the budget estimates must be made 
by operation of law. 
Article ll1 IFundsl 
a. Particular sums of money may be allocated 
to more than one financial year by law if the 
nature of the disbursement so requires. The 
approbations for each, as decided by the 
aforesaid law, shall be tabled in the success ive 
annual budgets of the State. 
b. An exceptional budget running for more 
than one financial year may also be allocated 
for the disbursement referred to in the 
preceding clause. 
Article 112 !Budget Law] 
The Budget Law may not contain any wording 
establishing a new tax, increasing an existing 
tax, or amending an existing law, or avoiding 
the promulgation of a law on a matter for 
which the Constitution provides that it shall be 
regulated by law. 
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the end of the preceding year. 
However, if the National Assembly has 
approved one or more parts of the new 
budget, they shall be put into effect. 
(f) In no case shall the maximum estimates of 
expenditure, included in the budget law or the 
laws amending it, be exceeded. 
Article 91 !Expenditure] 
Any expenditure not included in the budget, 
or in excess of the budget appropriations, as 
well as the transfer of any funds from one 
part of the budget to another, shall be 
effected by a law. 
Article 92 I Funds I 
(a) Funds for more than one fiscal year may 
be appropriated by a law if the nature of the 
expenditure so requires. In this case, each 
annual successive budget shall include the 
funds allocated for that year in the way 
established by the said law. 
(b) An extraordinary budget valid for more 
than one fiscal year may be drawn up 
separately for the expenditure referred to in 
the preceding item. 
Article 93 (New Taxes] 
The budget law may not include any 
provision for establishing a new tax, 
increasing an existing law, or evading the 
issue of a law on a matter in respect of which 
this Constitution provides that its regulation 
shall be by a law. 
Article 113 [Final Account] 
The final account of the fmancial affairs of the 
State for the year elapsed shall be submitted 
firstly to the Chamber of Deputies during the 
five months following the end of the financial 
year. It shall be approved by a decision 
rendered by both the Consultative Council and 
Chamber of Deputies, accompanied by their 
observations, and shall be published in the 
Official Gazette. 
Article 114 [Accounting Procedures] 
The provisions pertaining to independent 
public budgets, their appendices, and their fmal 
accounts, shall be laid down by law, and they 
shall be subject to the provisions governing the 
State budget and its final account. The 
provisions governing the budgets and fmal 
accounts of municipalities and local public 
institutions shall also be laid down by law. 
Article 115 [Budget Bill] 
Together with the draft annual budget the 
Government shall present the Chamber of 
Deputies with a statement on the financial and 
economic condition of the State, the measures 
taken to implement the budget approbations in 
force, and the effect of the whole thereof on the 
new draft budget. 
Article 116 [Financial Control Office) 
A Financial Control Office shall be established 
by law, and the law shall guarantee its 
independence. It shall assist the Government 
and the Chamber of Deputies in controlling the 
collection of State revenues and the 
disbursement of its expenditure within the 
budget limits. The Office shall submit an 
annual report on its business, with its 
observations, to both the Government and the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
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Article 94 [Account] 
The final account of the financial affairs of 
the State for the preceding year shall be 
submitted to the National Assembly within 
the five months following the end of the fiscal 
year. The ratification of the fmal account 
shall be by a decision of the National 
Assembly, together with its comments. 
Article 95 [Law on Budget Procedures] 
The law shall prescribe the provisions of both 
the independent and the supplementary 
general budgets and the final accounts thereof 
to which the provisions regarding the budget 
of the State and the final account thereof shall 
be applied. The law shall also prescribe the 
provisions of the budget and the fmal 
accounts thereof of the municipalities and the 
public bodies. 
Article 96 [Draft of Budget) 
Together with the draft annual budget, the 
Government shall submit to the National 
Assembly a statement on the financial and 
economic position of the State and 
arrangements made to implement the 
appropriation of the budget in effect and the 
effect thereof on the new draft budget. 
Article 97 [Auditing] 
A financial control and audit commission 
shall be established by a law, which shall 
ensure its independence. The commission 
shall be attached to the National Assembly 
and shall assist the Government and the 
National Assembly in controlling the 
collection of the State revenues and the 
disbursement of its expenditures within the 
limits of the budget. The commission shall 
submit to both the Government and the 
Article 117 (Concessions, Monopolies! 
a. Any commitment to exploit a natural 
resource or a public utility shall be only by 
operation of law and for a I im ited time. The 
preliminary procedures shall ensure that the 
search and exploration work are facilitated and 
that openness and competition are realised. 
b. Any monopoly shall only be awarded by law 
and for a limited time. 
Article 118 (Currency, Banking, Standards( 
The law shall regulate cash and the banks, and 
shall regulate weight, measures, and standards. 
Article 119 (Public Salaries( 
The law shall regulate emoluments, pensions, 
compensation, relief, and remuneration being a 
charge on the State Treasury. 
Chapter VI General and Final Provisions 
Article 120 (Constitutional Amendments! 
a. Exceptionally to clauses b, c and d of Article 
35 of this Constitution, for any provision of 
this Constitution to be amended the 
amendment must be approved by a two-
thirds majority of the members of whom 
both the Consultative Council and Chamber 
of Deputies are composed, and the amendment 
must be approved by the King. 
b. If an amendment to the Constitution is 
refused, it may not be re-submitted earlier than 
one year from that refusal. 
c. It is not permissible to propose an 
amendment to Article 2 of this Constitution, 
and it is not permissible under any 
circumstances to propose the amendment of the 
constitutional monarchy and the principle of 
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National Assembly an annual report on its 
activities and its observations. 
Article 98 [Concessions, Monopolies] 
(a) No concession for exploitation of either a 
natural resource or a public service may be 
granted except by a law and for a limited 
period. In this respect, the preparatory 
measures shall facilitate the operations of 
prospecting and exploration and ensure 
publicity and competition. 
(b) No monopoly shall be granted except by a 
law for a limited period. 
Article 99 [Currency, Banking, Standards] 
The law shall regulate currency and banking 
and determine standards, weights and 
measures. 
Article 100 (Salaries] 
The law shall regulate salaries, pensions, 
compensation, subsidies and gratuities which 
are a charge on the State treasury. 
(Part Five] General and Final Provisions 
Article 104 (Amendments! 
(a) Notwithstanding the provision of Article 
of this Constitution, for an amendment to 35 
be made to any provision of this Constitution, 
it is stipulated that it shall be passed by a 
rna jority vote of two-thirds of the members 
constituting the Assembly and ratified by 
the Amir. 
(b) If a proposed amendment to the 
Constitution is rejected, it shall not be put 
forward again before the lapse of one year 
from the time of its rejection. 
(c) Under no circumstances shall the principle 
of the hereditary rule of Bahrain, the principle 
of liberty and equality set forth in this 
thereof, be 2Constitution, as well as Article 
inherited rule in Bahrain, as well as the bi-
cameral system and the principles of freedom 
and equality established in this Constitution. 
d. The powers of the King stated in this 
Constitution may not be proposed for 
amendment in an interval during which another 
person is acting for him. 
Article 121 [Former Treaties and Laws[ 
a. The application of this Constitution does not 
breach the treaties and agreements which 
Bahrain has concluded with states and 
international organisations. 
b. Exceptionally to the provision of the second 
clause of Article 38 of this Constitution. all 
laws. laws by Decree. Decrees. statutes. orders. 
edicts and circulars that have been issued and 
are in force prior to the first meeting convened 
by the National Assembly remain proper and 
valid. unless amended or rescinded in 
accordance with the regulations prescribed in 
this Constitution. 
Article t 22 (Promulgation of Laws) 
Laws are published in the Official Gazette 
within two weeks of their issue, and are 
enforced one month after the date of their 
publication, and this period may be shortened 
or prolonged if the law specifically prescribed 
it. 
Article 123 (Martial Law[ 
It is impermissible to suspend any provision of 
this Constitution except during the 
proclamation of martial law, and within the 
limits prescribed by the law. It is not 
permissible under any circumstances to 
suspend the convening of the Consultative 
Council or the Chamber of Deputies during 
that period or to infringe upon the immunity of 
their members, or during the proclamation of a 
state of national safety. 
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proposed for amendment. 
(d) The powers of the Amir, specified in this 
Constitution, may not be proposed for 
amendment when a Deputy Amir is acting for 
him . 
Article 105 (Former Treaties and Laws) 
(a) The application of this Constitution shall 
not affect treaties and conventions previously 
concluded by Bahrain with other States and 
international organizations. 
(b) All provisions of laws, decrees, 
regulations, orders and decision in effect upon 
the coming of this Constitution into force, 
shall continue to be applicable unless 
amended or repealed in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed in this Constitution, 
provided that they are not contrary to any of 
its provisions. 
Article 106 (Official Gazette) 
Laws shall be published in the Official 
Gazette within two weeks of their 
promulgation and shall come into effect one 
month after their publication. The latter 
period may be extended or reduced for any 
law by a special provision included in it. 
Article 108 (Martial Law) 
No provision of this Constitution may be 
suspended except when martial law is in force 
and within the limits specified by the law. 
Under no circumstances shall the meetings of 
the National Assembly be suspended, nor 
shall the immunities of its members be 
interfered with, during such period. 
Article 124 IComing fnto Forcel 
The provisions of the laws apply only to what 
occurs from the date the laws came into force, 
and have no retroactive effect. The law may 
state, in articles other than those pertaining to 
the penal code, that its provisions have a 
retroactive effect, with the agreement of the 
majority of the members of both the 
Consultative Council and the Chamber of 
Deputies, or if circumstances require it, the 
National Assembly. 
Article 125 [Promulgation of this 
Constitution I 
This amended Constitution shall be published 
in the Official Gazette, and shall be effective 
from the date of its publication. 
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Article 107 IComing Into Forcel 
Laws shall apply to that which takes place 
after the date of their coming into force, and 
thus shall have no effect in respect of that 
which has taken place before such date. 
However, in other penal matters, a law may, 
with the approval of a majority vote of the 
members constituting the National Assembly, 
prescribe otherwise. 
Article 109 [Promulgation ofthe 
Constitution I 
This Constitution shall be published in the 
Official Gazette and shall come into force as 
from the date of the meeting of the National 
Assembly which shall be not later than the 
Sixteenth Day of December, 1973 . 
Appendix 2 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Your are kindly requested to respond to the following questionnaire, which is 
intended for a PhD research entitled: 
First Name: 
Second Name: 
Surname: 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Date: 
THE NATIONAL REFORMATION SCHEME 
AND SOCIAL STABILITY IN BAHRAIN 
Personal Details of Participant 
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PART ONE 
No. Questions Yes No 
1 Will the National Reformation Scheme lead to improving 
individual's standard ofliving in Bahrain? 
2 Are the people of Bahrain treated in the principal of equally? 
3 If the answer ofQ. 2 is "No", does the Reformation Scheme 
provide for the desired equality? 
4 Is the National Reformation Scheme able to improve the 
Government's performance? 
5 Can the National Reformation Scheme achieve political 
reformation without taking administrative reforms into 
consideration? 
6 Will the participation of the boycotting political societies enrich 
the next parliamentary (2006) experience? 
7 Is the current agenda of the boycotting/opposition societies 
positive? 
8 Are there indications that experienced and moderate national 
currents will take part in the parliament in the next session? 
9 Will the participation of women in the representative councils 
improve the overall performance of such councils? 
10 Is the atmosphere of the current political openness different 
from that ofthe 1973-1975? 
11 Are there indications of possible failure of the present 
parliamentary experiment along the lines of that of 197 5? 
12 Is the National Reformation Scheme capable of inspiring the 
spirit of citizenship in society? 
13 Are there serious efforts for strategic national education at 
Kingdom's level? 
14 Are the national education media (families, kindergartens, 
schools, universities, mosques, religions societies, clubs, youth 
centres, political and social societies, information media) 
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playing their roles properly in developing good citizens? 
15 How do you assess citizens' exercise of democracy? 
D Poor 
D Average 
D Good 
D Excellent 
13 How would you assess the elected council's performance during 
the current session (2002-2006)? 
D Poor 
D Average 
D Good 
D Excellent 
16 Is citizenship an acquired or inherent matter? 
D Acquired 
D Inherent 
4 What comes first? 
D Economic reform then political reform? OR 
D Political reform and then the economic one? 
5 Tick, as appropriate, the challenges that hold back the progress 
ofthe National Reformation Scheme: 
D Sectarianism 
D Standard of living 
D Foreign interference 
D Bureaucracy 
D Elected council 
D Appointed council 
D Opposition 
D Education system 
D Political naturalisation 
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PART TWO 
1. There are certain categories of people in the Kingdom who have 
divided loyalties, which can adversely influence good 
citizenship. How has this dual loyalty developed? How can we 
eliminate it? 
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How can we make national loyalty prevalent over sectarian, tribal 
and doctrinal loyalties in Bahrain society? 
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Since the introduction of the National Reformation Scheme, do you 
think there has been sufficient interaction and cooperation in terms of 
the scheme's requirements on the part of Bahrain society at all levels, 
especially if the abundant cultural background of the Bahraini 
citizens is taken into account? What are the reasons? 
' ' - - - - . 
································································································ 
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2. What are the bases for administrative reforms? 
3. How do evaluate the performance of the Shura Council? 
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4. Is the atmosphere of the present political openness different from 
that of 1972? 
* Do you have reservations about referring to you name in this 
dissertation? 
DYes 
D No 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Prepared by: Waheed Abdulla Al-Qassim 
For enquiries cal this No.: 39610611 
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